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Prof. Jack Goldsmith (Harvard) on "Was the Iran Strike Constitutional?"
A characteristically excellent analysis, from a leading scholar of the subject, at his Executive Functions substack. An excerpt:
A lot of people over the next few days are going to argue with confidence that President Trump violated, or didn't violate, the Constitution when he bombed Iran over the weekend without congressional authorization.
You might think that the Constitution would provide a clear answer to such a momentous question. But it doesn't.
Or you might think I would know the answer, since I (with Curt Bradley and Ashley Deeks) have a casebook that covers the issue; I have written about it for decades; and I served in the Office of Legal Counsel that is the storehouse of executive branch legal opinions on the topic, one of which has my name on it. But I don't know the answer.
I don't know the answer because I do not think there is anything approaching a settled or clear normative framework for analysis.
Very often Supreme Court decisions guide constitutional analysis. But here we have only the Prize Cases, which in the Civil War context held that "[i]f a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force." This is basically all the Court has ever said in a holding about the president's unilateral war powers; and because of justiciability constraints it is all the Court is ever likely to say.
So when looking for normative sources against which to assess the constitutionality of the Iran strikes, that basically leaves the constitutional text (subject to one's favorite but contestable interpretive theory) and historical practice.
The Constitution gives Congress many war-related authorities, most notably the power "[t]o declare War," "raise and support Armies," and "provide and maintain a Navy." And Article II says the president "shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States." There has been a massive debate since the founding about what these provisions mean and how they are supposed to operate….
The framers worried about the president using force unilaterally (and self-servingly) to bring the nation into war in ways that did not serve the national interest. But it is not at all clear how they grounded that concern in constitutional text. One plausible interpretation of the constitutional provisions is that the primary constraint came in Congress's control over appropriations and the standing military, not the declare war clause. On that theory the Iran strike would be lawful since the president deployed the tools that Congress gave him without constraint.
The counterfactual about what the framers would have thought about the president's contemporary use of military force without congressional authorization nonetheless underscores something important: We have had almost 240 years of constitutional practice with war powers, and much has changed. The basic story of change is as follows.
Congress over the centuries authorized standing military forces on a larger and larger scale, equipped those forces with more and more powerful weapons, and rarely put affirmative constraints on the president's use of military force. As Congress did these things, presidents used these military forces abroad without congressional authorization more and more aggressively, both offensively and defensively, scores and scores of times….
If you're at all interested in the subject, read the whole thing.
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My takeaway is what I thought going in: Only very stupid people on both sides will say confidently, "I am 100% certain that Trump did/did not have authority to . . . ."
There are certainly lots of open-and-shut cases that I can envision. This is not one of them. I can see plausible arguments for both sides. So I'm wary of anyone who is loudly proclaiming just how obvious it is that her position is the correct one, and how equally obvious it is that your position is the incorrect one.
This is true for any controversial issue; there is no obvious answer. There may be a "right" answer, but don't let anyone claim it is "obvious."
This is true for any controversial issue; there is no obvious answer.
I can think of some exceptions where there was an obvious answer and the SC decided against it - most recently the Trump immunity case, which will forever be a stain upon the Roberts court, far worse than Kelo for the liberal wing.
Your inability to understand that there was another side to the immunity case is part of the problem that santamonica811 referred to.
I agree with Prof. Smith. Ultimately, war is politics. and no Court is ever going to decide one way or the another.
If you give a kid a toy, you expect them to play with it.
"Congress over the centuries authorized standing military forces on a larger and larger scale, equipped those forces with more and more powerful weapons, and rarely put affirmative constraints on the president’s use of military force. As Congress did these things, presidents used these military forces abroad without congressional authorization more and more aggressively, both offensively and defensively, scores and scores of times.
... For the most part Congress as an institution has gone along with presidential war aggrandizement."
Jefferson got new ships for the Navy, and used it without prior Congressional authorization.
Congress has lots of levers they can pull. But they would rather do nothing while at the same time complaining about it, so they get the best of both worlds: They can be both for it (wink wink) and against it (should that position ultimately prove popular, which it wont).
That last is the key to why Presidents get more and more power while Congress twiddles its thumbs. Politicians are essentially bureaucrats, and the last thing any bureaucrat wants is to solve the problems that put them in power and keep collecting votes. Much better to whine without accountability than have to risk fumbling a solution, or worse yet, actually solving a problem.
You might think he’d have some understanding that the president is the commander in chief under Art. II and that the discreet military force ordered by the commander in chief against Iran was perfectly consistent with past actions by presidents of both parties, but you’d be wrong.
And there you go, thinking you have the one clear answer. Did you even read the article?
He might have read it and your comment. Understood them? Doubtful.
Being CinC means he's highest in the chain of command of the military. It doesn't mean that he has sole decision making power about where and when to use the military. Assuming that's true assumes that the military is an autonomous force unconstrained by any other part of the Constitution.
There is zero Constitutional or federal law basis for Trump's attack to be legal. Yes many other presidents have done similar, but those were illegal also. The American people need to stop ignoring illegal actions by the administration.
Professor Goldsmith curiously omits any discussion of Article I, § 8, ¶14, which provides that the Congress shall have Power "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces". Neither does he discuss the Necessary and Proper clause, which authorizes the Congress:
Any discussion of whether President Trump's action was or was not unconstitutional should take into account the express authority of Congress to enact the War Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq.
50 U.S.C. § 1541 (a) and (b) seem to be on solid ground, but is (c) ?.
The notion of the President being the Commander in Chief has a problem, however. Art 2, Sec 2, has the "when called into the actual Service" provision which should mean by some method and not simply because the President is the executive which would make the phrase, "when called into the actual Service" redundant or meaningless. Listing the "when called into the actual Service" phrase is a condition upon being the Commander in Chief. It's there for a purpose: to condition the executive's authority by some further means. Thus, where is the authority which conditions the President to be the Commander in Chief upon being sworn in ?
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States
The proviso "when called into the actual service of the United States" refers only to the militia, making clear that the usual commander in chief of a state militia is the governor of the state, except when the militia is called into federal service, at which point their commander in chief is the president. Regular members of the U.S. military are always in the "actual service of the United States".
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
"Originalists" (among others) often ask, "What would the drafters of the Constitution have thought of this particular scenario?" when the answer is they did not give it any thought, because they were not omniscient and could not have anticipated every possible future hypothetical. Goldsmith notes the "theory the Iran strike would be lawful since the president deployed the tools that Congress gave him without constraint."
One natural place to start with that theory and Frankfurter's notion of using historical gloss to explicate the limits of executive power is with President Jefferson and the Barbary pirates. In June 1801, three months after his inauguration, as Jefferson sent three frigates and a schooner to the Mediterranean to dispatch the Barbary pirates and blockade their ports, as a response to their depredations on American shipping. Jefferson did not consult with Congress beforehand, but did ask for more formal authorization in his year-end Message to Congress on December 8. To paraphrase Abraham D. Sofaer, George P. Shultz Distinguished Scholar and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and top lawyer at the State Department under Reagan, Congress had provided those ships to protect American commerce, which is exactly what Jefferson used them to do, so he had all the "Congressional authorization" he needed (1). I am unaware of any contemporary objection from Congress over Jefferson's actions being unconstitutional. In the more than 200 years since Jefferson's actions, American presidents have dispatched military forces to foreign lands to vindicate American interests hundreds of times without Congressional approval, exercising their constitutional roles as Commander-in-Chief (2).
1. Abraham Sofaer, Constitutional War Powers: Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates (short video) https://fedsoc.org/commentary/videos/constitutional-war-powers-thomas-jefferson-and-the-barbary-pirates
2. Congressional Research Service, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2023 https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf
As I see it, the Constitution gave Congress power over informal as well as formal forms of war. Letters of marque and reprisal represent the 18th Century’s form of informal or covert war. I would no more limit it to its literal meaning than I would interpret “the press” as limited to its literal meaning, involving ink mechanically positioned on paper by means of pressure. Rather, I think the Framers intended to assign responsibility for initiating all hostilities, informal as well as formal, covert as well as overt, to Congress. As I see it, new ways of doing this automatically get covered. just like new methods of communication automatically get covered by the First Amendment.
If the strike on Iran was unconstitutional, then was Operation Eagle Claw, the (1980 military mission under Jimmy Carter to rescue the hostages in Iran), unconstitutional as well?
It’s a grayer area because Iran arguably initiated hostilities by taking Americans hostage, so the United States was arguably responding to hostilities already initiated.
But I think Carter should have gotten Congress’ approval all the same.
The Constitution permits Congress to hold secret sessions, pass secret laws, and record its proceedings on a secret journal.
The mitary had begun planning for a possible rescue two days after the hostages were taken. Congress could easily have secretly pre-authorized the mission in the early stages of planning to be executed at the President’s discretion, if and at a time that the President and the military found favorable.