The Volokh Conspiracy
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Confession and the Constitution
Washington State's new law on clergy reporting in child abuse cases.
This month, Washington State enacted a law requiring clergy to report suspected child abuse or neglect, even when the information is obtained through a confidential spiritual communication, like Confession in the Catholic Church. The new law seems clearly unconstitutional under current doctrine; that's the easy part. But the deeper issues are more interesting and more difficult, and they have been with us for a very long time.
The new law departs significantly from the approach in most other states, even those that mandate clergy reporting. Most of those states preserve the traditional clergy-penitent privilege while mandating that clergy report abuse they learn about in other contexts. What's more, Washington's law expressly preserves other professional privileges, like the attorney-client privilege, but explicitly eliminates the clergy-penitent privilege. That unequal treatment presents a serious problem under current free exercise law.
Under cases like Fulton v. City of Philadelphia and Tandon v. Newsom, which adopt what scholars have called the "most favored nation" approach, laws that provide exemptions for secular conduct but not analogous religious conduct must survive strict scrutiny. That means the government must show that the law advances a compelling state interest and that it uses the least restrictive means of doing so. Punishing child abuse is undoubtedly a compelling state interest, but if the law allows attorneys to withhold relevant information while requiring clergy to disclose it, the state will have difficulty justifying its choice.
The issues surrounding the clergy-penitent privilege have been with us a long time. In one of the earliest American cases on religious liberty, People v. Philips (1813), a Catholic priest refused to testify in a criminal trial about a penitent who had confessed to returning stolen goods. The state argued that public safety required all citizens to cooperate with the criminal process and that religion was no excuse. The court, however, sided with the priest, reasoning that public safety did not justify requiring him to violate a core "ordinance" of his faith. Confession might in fact encourage culprits to come clean, as had happened in Philips; the stolen goods had been returned. What's more, the court noted that the state already recognized an attorney-client privilege, and implied that religious privileges deserved equal respect.
Philips was decided under the New York State Constitution, not the Free Exercise Clause, but the debate—public safety versus religious liberty, civic obligation versus spiritual commitment—remains much the same. And that is because balancing personal religious commitments and civic duties, whatever the specific legal doctrine, is an enduring problem in a pluralistic society. Too much deference to religious commitments interferes with public policy and threatens chaos. Too little renders our commitment to religious freedom hollow.
The clergy-penitent privilege, in particular, has become more problematic over time. Confidentiality imposes costs, which can be very high in the child abuse context. Historically, though, the privilege was narrow, covering only sacramental confessions in traditions, like Catholicism, where such practices were theologically mandated. The costs were contained to a few situations.
Starting in the mid-20th century, though, courts expanded the privilege to cover a wide range of spiritual communications, sometimes in informal or undefined contexts. That expansion may have been necessary in the interests of state religious neutrality. But it has made the privilege costlier and harder to defend in the face of pressing state interests like child protection.
My colleague Marc DeGirolami and I discuss the new Washington State law, and the pros and cons of the clergy-penitent privilege generally, in a new Legal Spirits podcast. Listen in!
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Washington's law expressly preserves other professional privileges, like the attorney-client privilege, but explicitly eliminates the clergy-penitent privilege. That unequal treatment (...)
Abolishing unequal treatment isn't unequal treatment, particularly in a situation where, as the OP suggests, communication with clergy in general was never exempt.
You don't understand what "unequal" means, do you?
He thinks making treatment that is arguably unequal more unequal is abolishing unequal treatment. smh
People who hate Catholicism or religion generally can’t be expected to think clearly.
One doesn't have to hate Catholicism, or religion in general, to observe that the sanctity of the confessional helped facilitate the sexual abuse of hundreds of children so perhaps re-examining it may not be a bad idea. That said, I agree that this law goes about it wrong and may even be unconstitutional. And it's even possible some of the legislators who voted for it may have done so out of anti-Catholic animus.
But the knee jerk reaction, that the only reason this passed is because Washington hates Catholics, is absurd. Washington has a legitimate interest in protecting children from abuse, and is removing protection from an institution -- the confessional -- that helped foster it. Criticize the bill on the merits if you like, but spare us the whiny rhetoric about the law being hostile to religion.
And in some states (not sure without looking if Washington is one of them) psychologists and psychotherapists are mandated reporters. If I tell my therapist that I abuse children, he or she is required to report it. That confessional gets no privilege whatsoever. So why are secular confessionals not protected whereas religious ones are? Isn't that preferring religion over non-religion?
First, the free exercise clause can require some preferential treatment of religion. Phil Kurland’s neutrality principle has never been adopted by the Court, chiefly because it would do violence to the plain meaning of the clause.
Second, it takes a rather special kind of naivety to believe that a child molester who does not wish to turn himself into the authorities will instead freely confess to a priest who then must and will. The law will not effectuate its putative purpose but will instead hinder it by discouraging molesters to confess and therefore seek penance by turning into the authorities at the encouragement of the priest. The absurd fecklessness of the law exposes its true purpose, which is to punish priests who in virtually all cases will choose to ignore the law in fidelity to their sacred oath.
My understanding of making no law establishing religion, nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof, requires exact that: Religion neither gets discriminated in favor of, nor discriminated against. I doubt the current Supreme Court would hold that simply because a majority of its members like discrimination in favor of religion. But if you take off your advocate hat and put on your "what's good policy" hat, treating religion neither favorably nor unfavorably strikes the balance. And you can tell it strikes the right balance because advocates on both sides hate the idea. The genuine religion haters can't use the state to dump on religions they hate, and religious proponents don't get access to the state's resources to proselytize.
People say things in confession all the time for a variety of reasons that a genuinely rational actor probably wouldn't. Sometimes people are consumed with guilt and they blurt stuff out, even though they didn't intend to. Sometimes they really do want help. Sometimes they aren't guarded and stuff slips. It happens. The question is what happens when it happens during a confession. And why are my conversations with a therapist not entitled to similar protection? On the other hand, unremorseful serial abusers go to confession with no intention of changing, and probably don't talk about it for the reasons you give. As with everything else, the genuine sociopaths will find a way to do an end run around whatever the rule is, but they're not the people the rule is for.
And hovering over all of this is the point you didn't respond to -- the sanctity of the confessional contributed to the abuse of hundreds of children. Is the legislature really not allowed to take note of that?
In the context of free exercise clause jurisprudence, does the word “accommodation” ring some bells?
Your factual speculations boil down “assume the molester is entirely irrational.” Right.
In any case, when it comes to the Sacrament of Confession priests are not going to comply. No matter what. Anyone with an ounce of intelligence knows this. The law’s chief effects will be to discourage the confessions of criminals and punish the fidelity of priests. I suspect the latter is its real purpose.
Except the word "accommodation" appears nowhere in the text. It is, in fact, a fairly breathtaking bit of judicial activism.
And I do not assume all child molesters are either rational or irrational. But sooner or later some confessor somewhere will hear a confession of child abuse, and the question is what happens then. And the answer is the same thing that happens every other time there's a conflict between the law and someone's religion.
The text says that no law can be made that prohibits the free exercise of religion. That text does not lose its literal force just because the law prohibits other things as well. For instance, a law outlawing the ownership or consumption of alcohol would have to allow for its Sacramental use, at least if such use was essential to its religion as has been the case in the Catholic Church for 2 millennia. You are relying on a reading of the text that is grounded in your idiosyncratic sense of fairness rather than the literal words.
So, just to be clear, since the 9/11 hijackers were engaged in the free exercise of their religion, any laws against hijacking airplanes and flying them into buildings must make an accommodation for them? Is that your position?
And if that is not your position, then how is that result any less entitled to protection by the clear words on the page -- Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion?
A Woman —
You are being embarrassingly unserious. The point is that even laws of general application must provide accommodation unless they hurdle the compelling interest/strict scrutiny test, which would be easily satisfied in your example.
Not all laws restricting the free exercise of religion are constitutionally infirm, just as not all laws of general application are constitutional. A law of general application that restricts the free exercise of religion is unconstitutional if it fails the strict scrutiny test and is constitutional if it passes it.
Try again.
No. Employment Division v. Smith held that neutral and generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious exercise are subject only to rational-basis review.
Josh —
You are correct
I admire Scalia, I do, but this decision is textually incoherent and will be overruled.
Do you seriously think that a law outlawing the use of alcohol in public, which would prevent the use of Sacramental wine at Mass, would be upheld today or should be?
I don't get the textual argument. "Free Exercise" is ambiguous as to whether it means exemptions from generally applicable laws or merely non-discrimination.
Assuming that a church is considered a public place, the Free Exercise would not overrule your hypothetical law under Smith. I agree with Eugene, that's the right call.
I'm not being unserious; I'm trying to get you to articulate a coherent standard, which thus far you have not done (though I will acknowledge your most recent post if your best attempt so far).
You originally said that the standard was the words on the page, and "make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof" does not, on its face, appear to contain any exceptions. So by the textualist standard you were claiming earlier, the 9/11 hijackers should be free to fly airplanes into buildings.
You then articulated reasonable accommodation -- even though it's not in the text. Even granting reasonable accommodation, as I said earlier, I'm not sure the Catholic church wins on that one because protecting children from pedophiles strikes me as a pretty compelling state interest. So a judge might well say that there is a compelling state interest in breaking the seal of the confessional. Of course we won't know until there's an actual case on it.
With respect to your own hypo about whether during Prohibition Catholic churches and Jewish synagogues should have been permitted to use sacramental wine, I think if that issue came up today, the courts would most likely require an accommodation, and that is probably how I myself would rule if I were the judge. But I think it's a closer call than you do, because if one buys into the premise behind Prohibition -- demon alcohol devastates society and must be stopped -- then giving demon alcohol any toehold at all makes it that much harder to protect society from its more evil manifestations. People who want to drink wine may use religion as an excuse to obtain alcohol they could not otherwise legally get. So there are arguments for not allowing religious exceptions.
But keep in mind that you and I are both influenced by our biases. You are pro religion and therefore you are inclined to give religion what it wants, at least within limits (like not flying airplanes into buildings). I suspect that you therefore probably tend to ignore or discount society's legitimate interests in, say, not providing safe haven to child molesters. If there were cold, hard evidence that breaking the seal of the confessional would prevent 10 actual children from being sexually abused, would that change your analysis?
And I see religion as, at best, a wash. It does some good things; it does some really awful things, but since I don't see it as clearly a force for good I'm not as inclined to foster it as you are. (And, the sacramental wine issue should never have come up because Prohibition was a really stupid idea that never should have passed, so I don't personally care if some people are finding end runs around it.)
Not to be rude, but the opinion of the current Supreme Court is the law, and your opinion is entitled to just as much weight as that of anyone posting comments on the internet. I never understand why people (including the Conspirators, to be sure) insist on giving their own idiosyncratic opinions and calling it the law, while admitting that the courts don't apply the law as they state it.
Where did I say that my views were the law?
You did say that was your understanding of the law. Moreover your understanding would do violence to the text of the free exercise clause.
What I said was "my understanding of making no law establishing religion, nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof, requires exact that: . . ." In other words, my understanding of what the text means, which is not necessarily how the Supreme Court has interpreted it. It remains, however, that reasonable accommodation appears nowhere in the text and is a fairly breathtaking bit of judicial activism.
What if your religion requires pedophilia? Given the history of religion I would be surprised if someone somewhere hasn't made that claim. You can even find some biblical passages that with a little bit of squinting would support that position; IIRC, Jacob was 71 when he married 14 year old Rachel (poor girl). How much of a leap is it really from that passage to the general claim that God is fine with 71 year olds marrying 14 year olds? What about the provision in the Mosaic law that allows fathers to sell their children to pay off debt? Or the other provision in the Mosaic law that says that on a bride's wedding night, if she doesn't produce bloody bedsheets it's to be assumed that she's not a virgin and shall then be stoned to death? What if someone wants to put that passage into practice?
And that's the real issue here. We can't accommodate everyone's religion; we just can't. So then the question become why should Catholicism be privileged?
A Woman —
We have no choice but to grapple with such efforts if we are to respect the plain meaning of the 1A. The fact that it will be difficult and require some line drawing is irrelevant.
The Framers and their generation had an understanding of what religion is. We start there.
The framers had an understanding that only property owning white males should take part in civil governance, so I'm not really sure why their views on religion should carry any more weight. If the framers all came back from the dead, you would be hard pressed to find a group of people whose views are further removed from contemporary views.
But what you're arguing sounds suspiciously close to "but that's not real religion." You didn't actually say that, but that's where I think your argument ultimately takes us. And the caselaw is clear: If a belief is sincerely held, it's protected. If deep down in my heart of hearts I sincerely believe that God wants me to screw your ten year old daughter, then as far as the First Amendment is concerned, that's a protected belief, even if the conduct itself is unprotected.
And since comparative religion is a special interest of mine that I've been studying for going on 60 years, I can assure you I've run across some fairly bizarre religious beliefs. If the standard is the rationality of any given belief, is it really any less rational to believe that God wants me screwing ten year olds than it is to believe he wants infant male foreskins cut off? Candidly, the only reason one of those beliefs is mainstream and the other is not, is just because it's been around longer and has more followers.
Plus there's the not-insignificant detail that in this country, anybody can start and church and call themselves a minister. I once had a client who started a church the sole function of which was to avoid paying income tax. There's zero reason someone couldn't similarly start a church to facilitate human trafficking, wire fraud, or other unsavory activities. So long as the "pastor" isn't actually involved in the criminal activity himself, anything said in the "confessional" is beyond the reach of government. You sure that's a good idea? (NOTE: I'm not saying that pastor and others who actually are involved in criminal activity can't be prosecuted. Just that they have the tactical advantage of not being forced to disclose what was said in the "confessional," and if you're trying to avoid telling the grand jury what you know, that is an awesome advantage.)
The Catholic church at least has a vetting process for who gets to be a priest, even if it doesn't always work perfectly. But given the lax controls on religion we have here (and which the First Amendment probably requires), I'm not really sure it's a good thing to give churches that kind of power.
Sure, the boundaries of religion present some vexing challenges, but such challenges cannot be conveniently avoided by doing violence to the text of the First Amendment.
You're the one doing violence to the text by inserting an accommodation provision that isn't there.
I did not insert it; SCOTUS did. And it is logically necessary that statutes must be designed to allow for some accommodation of the free exercise that the 1A protects.
The more that I think about it, the less sure I am your position should prevail even under a reasonable accommodation standard. It's not "any and all" accommodation, it's "reasonable" accommodation, which means you have to balance the interests of the religious against the interests of the state. It's really a question of which interest is greater.
It strikes me that protecting children from pedophiles is a pretty damned important interest. Maybe Catholicism's interest in the sanctity of the confessional is important enough to overcome it, but I would not bet on that result.
"The absurd fecklessness of the law exposes its true purpose, which is to punish priests who in virtually all cases will choose to ignore the law in fidelity to their sacred oath."
Civil disobedience is always an option -- for this Washington law or for any other. I would actually have some degree of admiration for a priest who is willing to go to jail rather than reveal a penitent's confession.
The likelihood of detection there is low -- the abuser has a strong motive to remain silent. But an essential component of civil disobedience is acceptance of the consequences.
All perhaps true but just corroborates the law’s fecklessness with respect to its putative purpose.
I do deny that confessionals have facilitated sexual abuse. It appears that you have some crazy views about Catholics.
You think that confessionals have facilitated sexual abuse. If Father Kid E. Diddler knew that he could not gain absolution from Father P. Ed Erasty, and vice versa, would either one be as eager to bugger their parishioners' children?
As Jesus reportedly said to his disciples, "Temptations to sin are sure to come; but woe to him by whom they come! It would be better for him if a millstone were hung round his neck and he were cast into the sea, than that he should cause one of these little ones to sin." Luke 17:1-2 (RSV).
Catholic teachings are very much against buggering children. You have been influenced by false rumors.
Follow the money, Roger S. As Jesus said in the Sermon on the Mount, "For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also." Matthew 6:21 (RSV).
The Roman Catholic Church has paid out billions (that's with a B) of dollars in damage awards and settlements because it was unwilling to keep its priests out of its parishioners' children's pants.
Yes, the Church has had to pay a lot of money. There are also companies that have been bankrupted by bogus lawsuits. There are very few examples of priests getting convicted in a criminal court. The stories are mostly invented to extort payments.
The relative dearth of criminal convictions is because Catholic higher ups concealed the abuse and shuffled the abusers like pieces on a chessboard until the time to commence prosecutions expired.
And civil defendants do not settle cases because the plaintiffs' claims are insubstantial. Non-meritorious cases are weeded out prior to trial in summary judgment proceedings. If the church had not facilitated or ratified the misdeeds of underlings who had taken vows of poverty, it would surely have contested respondeat superior liability.
No, that evil institution settled lawsuits and potential lawsuits because the last thing its hierarchy wanted to see was the pederasts on the witness stand before juries.
ng —
“Evil institution.”
Your bigotry is exposed.
Now have the courage to reveal your name.
And it appears you have not been paying attention for the past 20 years or so.
The horrible scandals to which you refer had nothing to do with confessions outside Hollywood movies.
Oh, that's simply not true. How many pedophile priests knew that their sins would be instantly forgiven when they went to confession and no one could ever hear about it?
And if the offending priests didn't have that "Get Out of Hell Free" card to play, how many of them would instead have kept their pants zipped?
I could be mis-reading you and AWoNI, but it sounds like you think that absolution give after confession requires mere words and not actual repentance for one's sins.
Theoretically possibly a pedo priest confesses after each diddling and actually does repent each time, only to have their base desire overwhelm. Likely?
And any priest who doesn't repent has no "get out of hell free" card in his pocket for later use...
Zero. You tell me. Is there even one documented example of what you say?
Roger, I'm so happy to have met you. I've got acres and acres of blue sky and Florida swampland I've been trying to sell for ages and I know you'd be happy there. There's even a bridge that crosses from one to the other; I'll sell you the bridge too. Cheap. Just send me your bank information, credit card numbers, SSN, mother's maiden name, and you can be the proud owner of it in no time. Just think; blue sky, Florida swampland AND a bridge.
Exactly.
A Woman — Your blather is a response, not an answer.
Jmaie is right. That is not how Catholic Penance works. You are a classic ultracrepidarian.
For those like BL and MP, who can't seem to make it all the way through a post, Martinned's "unequal" referred to unequal treatment of different religions, per this toward the end:
" ...the privilege was narrow, covering only sacramental confessions in traditions, like Catholicism, where such practices were theologically mandated."
In other words, Unitarians, Baptists, and Quakers must report child sexual abuse by law, but not Catholics.
Unless you wish to further defend making all flavors of Judaism, but only limited flavors of Christianity be subject to such laws, you may wish to apologize to Martinned.
Treating all religions with a theological mandate similarly is equal treatment. Pretending such mandates are irrelevant is risible.
It is only sensible for there to be constitutional protections against legally requiring persons to do something their religion strictly prohibits.
No; the part of the OP that you elided with ellipses explains that this was the historical application of the doctrine. It hasn't been the modern one.
And while Martinned can speak for himself, I don't think that's what he was talking about at all.
My comment, by showing the context of usage, addressed the challenge that the root comment displayed an ignorance of the meaning of the word, unequal. My examples were chosen as religions historically contemporaneous with relevant Catholic historical practices
I think Martinned did speak for himself, when he referenced the converse historical position: "...particularly in a situation where, as the OP suggests, communication with clergy in general was never exempt." I took the "in general" as referencing other examples like Catholicism's theologically mandated sacramental confessions.
I apologize that I worded my reply in a way that allowed you to believe I was attempting to inappropriately take something out of context. The purpose of the ellipsis was simply brevity—something I'm rarely accused of.
But the full context is that the historical practice has a bearing on current issues, and that would require more than just quoting the entire sentence. So, the OP's entire section relevant to the point is:
I don’t see why the mandate distinction should be ignored for religious neutrality. A privilege whose intention is to respect a religion’s solemn requirement would seem to be perfectly neutral if applied to any religion.
What if the "religion’s solemn requirement" is to protect its leadership and clergy from accusation of or prosecution for child abuse?
There is a difference between the accidental but necessary effect of a requirement versus the direct purpose of a requirement.
Also, the high costs you referenced earlier are doubtful since they are based on two very unlikely assumptions: first, that molesters who do not intend to turn themselves in will choose to make sacramental confessions to priests who they know must turn themselves in, and second, that priests will in fact obey the law and turn in the penitent. The first is highly implausible and the second is risibly so. The law’s results will simply be fewer penitents and punished priests, with the latter being its rather likely objective.
Are you claiming the law is a bad faith attempt at reducing Catholic participation rather than a good (if ham-fisted) attempt at addressing the very real issue of child abuse and coverup in the Catholic church?
Also, a note regarding your assumptions. I might agree that a lay person might lie (by omission) during confessions--it probably happens all the time. I certainly omitted things when I confessed as a teen. But, do you imagine a priest will lie to his fellow priest in confession? It's possible but less likely in my opinion.
1. I’m not sure, but I’m inclined to believe that the obviously predictable results are the ones intended.
2. The putative purpose is not to target offending priests but offenders generally. But, offending priests will simply avoid Confession. Easy to do.
Communications with the clergy were already privileged under Washington state law. But this new law explicitly removes that privilege only from the clergy in cases of child abuse.
That's a facial prohibition of free exercise which triggers strict scrutiny without appealing to the most favored nation doctrine.
Starting in the mid-20th century, though, courts expanded the privilege to cover a wide range of spiritual communications, sometimes in informal or undefined contexts.
Secular privileges have also been greatly expanded. Here is Washington's privilege law: https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=5.60.060
The new child abuse law cross-references it, exempting every privileged relationship EXCEPT for clergy. That list is far more expansive than what was accepted in the early 20th Century. It includes such relationships as "peer supporters" and "union representatives."
So privileged relationships have been expanding outside the context of religion. You can debate whether or not that's a good thing. But don't single out religion.
This special exclusion could face legal challenges under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment or similar state constitutional rules, as it seems to unfairly weigh down religious practices without a strong reason that applies equally to similar non-religious privileges. While the state has a strong need to shield children from harm, carving out clergy from confidentiality protections, while keeping them for non-religious roles, shows an uneven approach that might not hold up under close review.
The growth of non-religious privileges over time, set against the limits placed on religious ones, backs the claim that the law wrongly singles out religious communications instead of setting a fair standard for all protected relationships.
The recently enacted statute requires clergy, but not others, who receive confidential communications disclosing child abuse to report such information authorities. Assuming here for sake of discussion that strict scrutiny applies, how would this Washington statute fail strict scrutiny analysis? There the state would have the burden of showing it has employed the most narrowly tailored means available to satisfy a compelling state interest. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. ___, 141 S.Ct. 63, 70 (2020) (per curiam).
Does anyone dispute that the State of Washington's interest in detecting and punishing child abusers is compelling? What particular, more narrowly tailored measures would achieve that governmental interest?
Then why single out clergy confessionals?
We know why.
Once again, SGT. Do you dispute that the State of Washington's interest in detecting and punishing child abusers is compelling? What particular, more narrowly tailored measures would achieve that governmental interest?
Once again, ng, why single out clergy only if it is so compelling? Is child abuse insignificant when reported to lawyers or shrinks?
SGT: "Then why single out clergy confessionals?"
It doesn't single out theologically mandated sacramental confessions like the historical and current practices of Catholicism. The OP made that point:
"Starting in the mid-20th century, though, courts expanded the [confessional] privilege to cover a wide range of spiritual communications, sometimes in informal or undefined contexts."
It might also be more instructive to think of this as adding clergy to the mandated reporter list rather than "singling them out."
The Washington effort is not only unconstitutional and grounded in anti-Catholic bigotry, it is feckless. Confessions of child sex crimes are not that common, but absent a privilege they will be virtually nonexistent.
How is it unconstitutional? How does the statute fail strict scrutiny?
For singling out clergy, as if child abuse doesn't matter when reported to others.
In addition, in order to pass strict scrutiny the law must not only plausibly articulate a compelling state interest, it must also plausibly advance such interest. Assuming advancing that interest is the law’s putative purpose, the necessary two predicates for its efficacy are: molesters who do not intend to turn themselves into the authorities will nonetheless seek sacramental penance from priests who they know must then turn them into the authorities; and priests will actually violate their solemn oath in order to comply with law. The first is highly implausible, and the second is risibly so. The obvious implausibility of the law actually advancing its articulated compelling interest exposes its more likely real purpose, which is simply to punish faithful clergy.
The law is not limited to the confessional.
It covers “members of the clergy" overall.
I don't know how much this will matter. People confess child abuse to the police. Members of the clergy would warn people they have to report. People who confess would likely feel guilty and want to repent. Some still will feel compelled to do so, just as some now confess things to the police and other mandatory reporters.
Members of the clergy are mandatory reporters. The Church does not have an objection to that, except to the extent that it requires the disclosure of confidential communications, which were formerly exempt.
That no-longer-in-effect exemption was not limited to the literal "confessional," but it was limited to confidential clergy-penitent communications.
Thanks for the clarification.
My overall point is that the protection isn't just for Catholics.
Indeed. Under both former and current law, if a clergy learns of child abuse outside a communication (e.g., he sees child abuse) then he must report it. AFAIK, no one thinks that's controversial.
Yes: the State of Washington, which exempts numerous categories of confidential communications from being mandatory reporters.
Giving clergy the same exemption that other confidential communications have. Underinclusiveness is a prototypical situation in which a law flunks strict scrutiny.
I don't know why you stubbornly refuse to read the Tandon case. If your analysis were valid, then California should've prevailed — stopping the transmission of COVID was obviously a compelling government interest — but it did not.
I have no idea about Tandon but this is one of those rare times where we agree -- singling out just clergy shows a real lack of concern for child abuse.
I have read Tandon, thank you very much.
Giving clergy the same exemption that other confidential communications have would result in lesser net detection of child abuse. That simply would not advance the state's interest at all -- advance being the operative word.
Would it not advance the state's interest even more to include attorneys and shrinks and everyone else?
Attorneys and their clients stand on different footing. The State is obliged to afford a criminal defendant a fair trial with the effective assistance of counsel before convicting and punishing him. To require attorneys to report confidential communications from clients would prevent that.
If, however, an attorney learns that a person other than his client has committed child abuse, he may legitimately be required to report that to authorities (unless doing so would also incriminate his client).
And what of psychiatrists?
Union representatives?
Peer supporters?
Those are discretionary calls for the legislature to make. Unless and until they do, the question is academic. The legislature would not be prohibited from making them mandatory reporters, and apart from psychiatrists, the other categories do not typically receive privileged communications.
Well, it's not academic because the Washington legislature did make those calls. And the Court's position in Tandon is that the legislature does not have the discretion to distinguish between secular and religious activities that pose similar risks of harm.
So, yes, the Washington legislature can decide which relationships' communications can remain confidential, but it can't treat religious ones worse than comparable secular ones.
The likely implication of Tandon, is a get out of jail free card for religious objectors to any law with a secular exemption such as anti-discrimination law which exempts small employers. As Eugene has argued, judges are not equipped to decide what secular exemptions are comparable. Leave that decision to the elected branches. That's the danger of deciding big issues in the emergency docket. I hope the Court trims back Tandon later on, although this Court seems predisposed at overruling Smith.
All that being said, the Washington state law triggers strict scrutiny even without Tandon because it facially targets religious practice.
The Tandon court left open the possibility that the state could justify why precautionary anticovid measures for permitted secular activities would not work for the religious activities in question, but the state didn't even try to do that.
Kagan's dissent forcefully counters your claim that there wasn't a justification for the different treatment. The Court nonetheless concluded otherwise which gives even more credence why the courts aren't equipped to make these decisions.
Reminds me of Sherbert and its progeny.
The idea is that an attorney has a necessary reason (how about shrinks?) to prevent "incrimination."
The 1A recognizes another "necessity" -- an obligation to one's faith. Free exercise is protected.
A person's faith might require them to refuse to work & that is accepted as "necessary," akin to someone being physically unable to do the task.
The State is obliged to afford a criminal defendant a fair trial with the effective assistance of counsel before convicting and punishing him.
You are surely aware that not all privileged communications between client and attorney are in the context of criminal prosecution. The vast majority are not.
And as others have stated here, now do union reps.
"You are surely aware that not all privileged communications between client and attorney are in the context of criminal prosecution. The vast majority are not."
Of course I understand that. But the legislature cannot delineate between communications related to criminal defense and unrelated thereto without effectively breaching the privilege itself.
As for union reps, is there a privilege there to begin with? (That's not a rhetorical question. I am unaware of any jurisdiction that recognizes such a privilege.)
Well… sort of. Washington recognizes such a privilege, but it's riddled with exceptions that make it much narrower than traditional privileges like a/c or doctor patient.
I linked the to list of Washington privileges. It's quite extensive. Maybe review it before you comment.
David, "It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is 'compelling.'" New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-757 (1982), quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). "Accordingly, we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights." Id., at 757. If you disagree, I fervently hope that you have no children.
The State has a "particular and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of children" than it does in prosecution of obscenity offenses. Ferber, at 761. Accord: Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002).
Of course protecting children in a "sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights" is a compelling interest. But, that's not the issue. Instead, it's whether a substantially underinclusive law punctures the state's claim of a compelling interest. It seems Lukumi (see citation below) says it does.
Let's take a closer look. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 529 (1993), the district court had found that protecting against emotional injury to children who witness the sacrifice of animals to be a compelling interest. The district court weighed conflicting expert testimony and specifically found:
723 F.Supp. 1467, 1475 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (footnote omitted). The District Court further opined, "The evidence at trial established that exposure to the ritual sacrifice of animals imperils the psychological well-being of children and increases the likelihood that a child will become more aggressive and violent. Based on the expert testimony, the City has shown that the risk to children justifies the absolute ban on animal sacrifice." Id., at 1486.
SCOTUS opined there:
508 U.S. at 546-547, quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-542 (1989) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Protecting actual children from physical and/or sexual abuse and prosecuting the abusers is a governmental interest of a much higher order than that discussed by District Judge Eugene Spellman in Church of Lukumi Babalu. As I wrote upthread, "It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is 'compelling.'" New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-757 (1982), quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). "Accordingly, we have sustained legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights." Id., at 757. "The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance." Ibid. Accordingly, the Ferber Court upheld a New York Statute which criminalized simple possession of child pornography, whether obscene or not, in that child porn is unprotected by the First Amendment.
"The sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). SCOTUS there opined, however, that pornographic images of what appear to be children, but which do not depict actual children, are First Amendment protected. (Kudos to my friend and mentor, Louie Sirkin of Cincinnati, who represented the plaintiffs there.) The Court there distinguished Ferber:
535 U.S. at 249-250.
As the Sesame Street jingle goes, one of these things is not like the other. The harm to children discussed by the District Court in Church of Lukumi Babalu is trivial compared to the actual physical and/or sexual abuse of children which the Washington statute at issue is designed to help prevent.
As I read Lukumi, the degree of harm to children plays no role in the conclusion "[i]t is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that "a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest 'of the highest order' ... when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited."
Doesn't the state have a compelling interest in the prevention, detection, and punishment of all crime? That seems to be a frighteningly easy way to get the camel's nose under the tent of strict scrutiny.
As we discussed the last time this law came up in this forum, the Court in Lukumi held that a substantially underinclusive is not narrowly tailored and thus fails strict scrutiny:
On top of that, the Lukumi Court questioned whether the interest is compelling when the law is substantially underinclusive:
Yes, we have had this discussion before. Are you now prepared to offer a less restrictive means that in fact will achieve the State's interest in detecting and punishing child abuse?
Speculating and simply reciting buzzwords doesn't feed the bulldog.
The absence of a less restrictive means to advance a compelling interest does not suffice for overcoming strict scrutiny. The law must satisfy all three prongs: 1) advance a compelling interest, 2) be the least restrictive means for doing so, and 3) be narrowly tailored.
Per Lukumi, this law almost certainly fails the first and third prongs.
"As we discussed the last time this law came up in this forum, the Court in Lukumi held that a substantially underinclusive is not narrowly tailored and thus fails strict scrutiny:"
Another head scratcher. So the lesson is that the government might get nicked if it only takes a way a little bit of freedom. Best to go full bore and take away all freedom so as to better survive strict scrutiny.
If the law simply permits vehicle searches to look for X, a compelling interest of the government, it may suffer because it does not allow searches of the home. Better have the law allow searches of the home and body cavity searches to make it MORE likely that the law survives. That's an odd jurisprudence when the idea is protection from government intrusion.
You have made this comment numerous times, and every time the answer is the same. It's the discrimination that's the problem. Constitutional rights in general also mean that you can't discriminate on that basis, either. Strict scrutiny applies to that discrimination.
Hypothetical. The State of Washington exempts white people as mandated child-abuse reporters, but not brown people. Applying your analysis, that passes muster because there is a compelling government interest (stopping child abuse) and there is nothing narrower that would do. But that's clearly wrong. Not because brown people have a right not to report, but because such a law would be racial discrimination. (The exemption also indicates that the interest is not so compelling, as DN states below, and as I have stated before.)
Mutatis mutandis, all of that applies here.
A government can indeed discriminate against religious folk in order to achieve a compelling governmental interest that cannot be achieved by less restrictive means. George Reynolds found that out when he took a second wife in Utah Territory and was convicted of bigamy. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). But that government needs to be prepared to make an evidentiary showing that that is in fact the case.
Please tell me what less restrictive means you would propose, Bored Lawyer.
Strict in theory, fatal in fact is not always the case.
As for your hypothetical, how would the State offer evidence that white people's mandated child-abuse is materially different from white people's mandated child-abuse?
A government can indeed discriminate against religious folk in order to achieve a compelling governmental interest that cannot be achieved by less restrictive means. George Reynolds found that out when he took a second wife in Utah Territory and was convicted of bigamy.
How was he discriminated against by having to follow a general law? The complaint here is that multiple groups are exempted, except for religious ones. Now, maybe there is a valid reason for that -- that lawyers or therapists are different -- but that is where I would focus my attention.
It also still excludes union reps and peer supporters.
It doesn't actually exclude union reps. The union member-rep privilege, on its own terms, does not apply to, inter alia,
1) disclosures to prevent future crimes that risk serious physical injury or death;
2) Any action in which the represented employee is accused of a crime;
3) The admission of, or intent to engage in, criminal conduct by the union member;
Moreover, Washington law expressly says that the union member-rep privilege "may not interfere with an employee's or union representative's applicable statutory mandatory reporting requirements."
George Reynolds was discriminated against as a member of a religious sect that taught:
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878). He was in essence claiming that the territorial statute was unconstitutional as applied to him.
Under Smith or even Tandon, wouldn't the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act be subject to only rational-basis review because it was not substantially underinclusive?
George Reynolds was treated the same as every other person in the United States who wanted to engage in polygamy. That's the opposite of "discriminated against."
It was discrimination among religious sects. Members of churches that taught and practiced polygamy were subject to prosecution for their exercise of what they perceived to be a religious duty; members of other churches would not have raised that as a defense. Reynolds was an as applied First Amendment challenge before such phrases as "as applied challenge" and "disparate impact" entered the legal lexicon.
It was not. All religious sects were treated equally.
David, if a state criminalized wearing a yarmulke in public, would that be a law of general application because Jews and Gentiles alike are subject thereto?
A law prohibiting any head covering would be neutral and generally applicable, but a law applying only to yarmulkes targets Judaism because yarmulkes are inextricably linked to Judaism. In contrast, polygamy is not inextricably linked to Mormonism. Plenty of religious sects, as well as secular persons, have practiced it.
And laws against it predated the founding of Mormonism.
What JFTB said. Reynolds did not involve multiple exemptions. If the law there had said Mormons can't be bigamists, but doctors and lawyers can, the result would have been different.
The claim that barring clergy from keeping talks private under Washington’s child abuse reporting law (SB 5375, changing RCW 26.44.030) passes strict scrutiny and avoids wrongful bias under the Free Exercise Clause does not stand. While shielding children is a mighty state goal, the law unfairly picks on clergy by taking away their right to hold talks secret, yet leaves untouched the same rights for worldly roles like lawyers, mind-healers, peer helpers, and union spokesmen under RCW 5.60.060. This uneven handling, targeting holy talks like confession, shows the law is not tightly shaped, as it weighs down faith without touching like worldly rights.
Also, the state has not shown that barring clergy is the least heavy way to guard children. Other paths, like teaching clergy to report abuse outside private talks or urging willing reports, could meet the goal without breaking holy customs. The law’s wide sweep, set against growing shields for worldly roles, hints it wrongly harms faith, failing strict scrutiny and backing claims of unfair bias.
Yes, and the state must not only articulate its compelling interest, it must also show that the law would at least plausibly advance it. The idea that a child molester who has no intention of turning himself into the authorities will confess his act to a priest who must then promptly report the act to those authorities is implausible if not risible. It will occur rarely if at all. The obvious fecklessness of this law exposes the anti-religious bigotry that animated it.
Um, what? That was a neutral law of general applicability; it didn't say that non-religious people could engage in polygamy but religious people couldn't.
...
The other aspect of this involves mental health -- particularly now that the APA will not permit observant Rabbis, Priests, & Ministers to become licensed mental health practitioners. (See Keeton v. Augusta State)
Both do the same thing, in service of different masters -- the religious people in service of the Lord and the voodoo scientists in service of voodoo science. The voodoo scientists would like to drive the religious folk out -- and this is what I really think is behind this.
You're a lawyer and your client comes to you and expresses concerns about his attraction to his 15-year-old stepdaughter. Do you refer him to his Priest (who is required to report him) or a voodoo scientist who isn't?
And as the greater good is to have him STOP banging her, wouldn't it be better if the Priest could stop this?
"You're a lawyer and your client comes to you and expresses concerns about his attraction to his 15-year-old stepdaughter. Do you refer him to his Priest (who is required to report him) or a voodoo scientist who isn't?"
Someone's merely having an attraction to his adolescent stepchild is not child abuse, and is not required to be reported by anyone.
That is, of course, not the holding of Keeton, which did not even involve the APA.
How does / why should the state have the power to force ANYBODY (who isn't working for the government and thus subject to employment rules/conditions) to report a crime?
Or to put it another way, why doesn't the government just compel everybody to report every crime they ever learn about? All crime is bad, right? Some are even worse than sexual abuse.
Interesting point. We just accept "mandatory reporting" as normal.
Was the concept ever challenged in court?
Mandatory reporting is complicated, and doing it for "all crimes" would cause problems.
Certain at-risk individuals are deemed worthy of special rules. The rules don't just apply to sexual abuse.
A mandatory reporter could also be required to report physical abuse, such as if someone broke a child's arm. It can also apply to other at-risk groups, such as elderly people.
Finally, the rules often apply to professionals with special responsibilities. Professionals choose to accept certain ethical and other responsibilities not applied to the general public.
The law does not just require reporting crimes. It requires reporting suspicions.
It does not. It requires reporting when one "has reasonable cause to believe" that a child has suffered abuse or neglect.
And "reasonable cause" is defined as "a person witnesses or receives a credible written or oral report alleging abuse, including sexual contact, or neglect of a child."
So, no; "suspicion" does not trigger any legal obligations.
Here is the Wash. law:
"When there is reason to suspect that sexual assault has occurred, mandated reporters shall immediately report to the appropriate law enforcement agency and to the department.
When there is reason to suspect that physical assault has occurred ..."
So yes, a mandated reporter must report what he suspects.
That is not the statute we are discussing.
Given current doctrine, I can see this law being problematic.
One article notes:
Clergy members are mandatory reporters in more than half the states, most of which exempt disclosures that occur in confessional, according to the Standard. But now, Washington is joining states like West Virginia and New Hampshire where such conversations won’t be shielded.
Read more at: https://www.theolympian.com/news/politics-government/article305755521.html#storylink=cpy
A "confessional" exception itself is problematic as a dubious opt-out. If religious belief protects certain conversations, especially with clergy, why should confessionals have a special opt-out?
Note that Jehovah Witnesses is reportedly the direct reason the bill was proposed. Not Catholics.
https://www.opb.org/article/2025/05/14/think-out-loud-washington-law-clergy-mandatory-reporters-sb-5375-senator-noel-frame
As noted there, Catholics split on the issue. This is far from surprising given their overall disagreement with Catholic doctrine.
The governor of Washington is Catholic.
People who self-identify as Catholics are also split on the Real Presence. Such polling trivia is irrelevant.
If a state is going to going to make it a crime for a person to fail to commit an act that his religion specifically prohibits under threat of automatic excommunication then AT THE VERY LEAST it had better criminalize all similarly situated failures.
Such polling trivia is irrelevant.
To what?
If someone claims something is "anti-Catholic" and many Catholics accept it, it is somewhat relevant. People toss labels around a lot. How the so-called harmed group feels is relevant.
You edited in the last paragraph. First, see my first sentence. Second, that's a separate issue, and "all similarly situated" is a complicated subject. I don't think a lawyer, for instance, talking to their client is necessarily "similarly situated." I'm open to it being but these things tend to be complicated.
I see your point, but many people self-identify as Catholics solely to enhance their credibility when criticizing the Church in which they have not been sacramentally active in years. These “Catholics,” who typically have not seen the inside of a confessional in a generation, have no problem making criminals of priests who refuse to break their solemn oath. They are among the worst anti-Catholic bigots.
many people self-identify as Catholics solely to enhance their credibility when criticizing the Church
It's rather hard to know who those people are. I don't know, for instance, how much the governor practices his faith. He referenced a close relative being a Jesuit, for instance.
Many run-of-the-mill Catholics disagree with the Church's position on this issue. The True Scotsman problem, where someone is not a "real" such and such, is also something we should be wary about.
The Scotts lack a Magisterium.
57% of American Jews eat pork. This does not remove the obvious anti-Semitism from a law requiring the consumption of pork.
It would be helpful if these sorts of posts had a link to the law.
For the record, this is the mandatory reporter statute.
And this is the cross-referenced statute that defines what confidential communications are.
"My religion requires for me to be complicit in child abuse" is not the explanation they think it is.
How trite.
"My profession as a lawyer requires me to be complicit in child abuse."
"My profession as a therapist requires me to be complicit in child abuse."
"My profession as a union rep requires me to be complicit in child abuse."
We need to abolish all these laws requiring the reporting of suspicions. They do much more harm than good. Traditional American law does not even require reporting direct witness of a murder. Now laws require reporting suspicions. Are you Libertarians happy with that? Don't you have a right to keep your suspicions to yourself? If someone has a lot of suspicions, then he is supposed to report them all. Do you really believe that is a good thing?
As noted above, you're unfamiliar with what this law requires.
People have been prosecuted for not reporting suspicions.
Name one.
This article has some examples. It says: "Failure to report allegations and arrests often go hand-in-hand with child abuse arrests."
Noting that I am not Catholic (though my children were raised in that faith), and have leveled severe criticisms at the Church (not congregants, at least not for being Catholic, but Church leadership), and that IANAL, it’s hard for me to see how this survives strict scrutiny, or how it doesn’t substantially burden free exercise. Thank to all y’all, these comments have been illuminating. My sense is that confessional confidentiality shouldn’t be breached, but maybe that’s a policy preference and not a sound legal position?
All the talk about the sacrament of confession with little understanding of the process. I would like to hear from a priest about that.
A priest that breaks the seal of confession is automatically excommunicated and condemned to hell. Priests have suffered torture and death before violating the seal. How does the state get past this?
The confessional is designed to shield the identity of the confessor from the priest, but I believe confessions can be held anywhere. The sacrament also includes the concept of penance or atonement. I believe the priest can require the confessor to turn himself in as part of the process of returning to God's good graces. It's not a get out of punishment free sacrament.