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Michael Ramsey's "The Originalist Case Against the Insular Cases"
An important new article explains why the Supreme Court's precedents denying many constitutional rights to residents of America's overseas territories are wrong.
In the Insular Cases of the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court ruled that much of the Constitution does not apply to America's "unincorporated" overseas territories, such as Puerto Rico. Thus, the federal government could rule the people there without being constrained by a variety of constitutional rights. In 2022, Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch urged the Court to overrule these decisions.
Prominent originalist legal scholar Michael Ramsey has an important new article explaining why Gorsuch was right. Here is the abstract:
Concurring in United States v. Vaello Madero, Justice Neil Gorsuch argued that the Insular Cases are contrary to the Constitution's original meaning and should be overruled. The Supreme Court's decisions in the Insular Cases, which created a second-class constitutional status for U.S. overseas territories, have also been criticized by leading originalist scholars such as Professors Gary Lawson and Michael Paulsen. However, there is no fully developed scholarly assessment of the Insular Cases from an originalist perspective; their inconsistency with an originalist approach is more assumed than proven. This Article fills that gap. Using the methodology of original public meaning, it considers the constitutional status of U.S. territories from the founding era through the early nineteenth century to the constitutionalization of U.S. citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the matter is somewhat more complicated than Justice Gorsuch's concurrence may suggest, this Article finds no foundation in traditional originalist sources for the Insular Cases' differential treatment of overseas territories. To the contrary, it concludes that U.S. territories were widely understood to be broadly encompassed by the Constitution without differentiation until an academic and judicial reassessment at the beginning of the twentieth century, impelled by U.S. acquisition of territories with substantial non-white populations, set the stage for the Court's newly invented doctrine. This Article thus concludes that Justice Gorsuch's assessment is correct and should carry weight with the Court's originalist-oriented majority. Finally, this Article examines from an originalist perspective the implications for territorial government of overruling the Insular Cases, which it concludes would be significant but not substantially destabilizing.
At the Legal Theory Blog, Prof. Larry Solum gives this article his much-coveted "highly recommended" rating. I agree! The article is both compelling and important.
I would add that the Insular Cases are not the only important nonoriginalist, atextual abrogations of constitutional rights blessed by the Supreme Court as a result of late-19th century racial bigotry. The same is true of the "plenary power" doctrine, which exempts immigration restrictions from many of the constitutional constraints that apply to all other exercises of federal power. While later decisions have called elements of this doctrine into question, enough remains that it is not completely clear whether, for example, the government can deport immigrants for speech protected by the First Amendment (though I argue the answer should be an emphatic "no").
The Supreme Court would do well to definitively repudiate both these pernicious legacies of the same era that gave us Plessy v. Ferguson.
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Of course Somin can't post about something immigration related, without injecting again touting his bogus novelty that the Constitution does not allow for legislative restrictions on immigration he doesn't like.
It's such a distorted view of constitutional rights and standing, granting "discrimination" protections to aliens which can be asserted by them or citizens on their behalf. Sorry, no one was a "right" to immigrate.
"He doesn't like" = what he thinks the Constitution, using arguments that might be wrong in various respects but are more than "I don't prefer that," means.
The Constitution protects aliens in multiple ways, including Art. III giving them standing, and the 14A particularly phrased to cover not just citizens, but "persons."
The OP does not directly touch upon a "right to immigrate."
I agree with the argument that there isn't some sort of invisible ink exception to general constitutional principles when aliens are involved. It repeatedly explicitly limits certain things to citizens.
Really? Somin's rejection of "plenary power" isn't an implicit assertion of a right to immigrate? He can't stop writing about that and his rejection of any border controls.
Alien due process exists primarily (though not exclusively) as a protection of the rights of citizens, from being misidentified as an alien. Somin's plenary power notions reject that Congress can grant to the executive branch the power to make such determinations beyond the reach of civil courts and the rights that can be asserted there.
Note I'm not commenting on the merits of overturning the Insular Cases. I don't think overturning them vindicates Somin's other immigration legal beliefs.
Note I'm not commenting on the merits of overturning the Insular Cases.
Then quit yapping.
You are usually not a shitposter, but you are one of the some people who become insufferable ad hominem bores in Somin threads.
Alien due process exists primarily (though not exclusively) as a protection of the rights of citizens, from being misidentified as an alien.
That's a round peg in a square hole argument. It says "persons" unlike the Privileges And/Or Immunities Clauses, but somehow it really primarily about citizens? That is curious drafting.
Somin's plenary power notions reject that Congress can grant to the executive branch the power to make such determinations beyond the reach of civil courts and the rights that can be asserted there.
The OP speaks of "constitutional constraints" and not where they are enforced. Certain restraints protecting "persons" do require civilian courts. If a noncitizen is prosecuted, for instance, there are rights enumerated, including a right to a jury.
"That's a round peg in a square hole argument. It says "persons" unlike the Privileges And/Or Immunities Clauses, but somehow it really primarily about citizens? That is curious drafting."
I think the argument is that due process applies to everyone but it is a truism that the process that is due a person has to do with what is being taken from him and his status under the law. An alien has certain protections but not the full complement of rights that a citizen has, importantly the right to remain in the United States.
Correct; it is not.
None the less, he does assert a right to immigrate, and that all levels of government in the US lack any constitutional authority to regulate immigration. He doesn't even admit that an actual lack of a federal power to regulate immigration would render it a 10th amendment power of the states.
Um, he literally doesn't say anything of the kind in this post.
No, the original meaning of the Constitution was not to give rights to people living on an island on the other side of the world, or speaking a foreign language.
If that island is governed by the US, I fail to see why.
At least in the context of imperialist expansion, I don't see how it is possible to acquire territory, then immediately give the people you just acquired/subjugated the full panoply of constitution rights. I think the Insular Cases were indisputably correct.
Otherwise, you would immediately have a hostile territorial government, juries voting to free insurrectionists, electing judges who don't follow the Constitution etc. etc.. You would have to refight the war to bring order, but then immediately have to give rights, rinse and repeat.
That's ... a thought-provoking defense. It seems like there must be some limits to that argument (specifically including duration) but I want to think more about it.
It would have been easier to defend if the person said "full panoply of constitutional rights" as compared to "give rights." Ditto other qualifiers. Under his original phrasing, the U.S. could have taken over Australia, and it would be absurd to give them our rights.
We managed to acquire/subjugate the Louisiana and Mexican territories, both with people from different legal systems and who spoke different languages, without taking the Insular Cases route.
The Philippines was a somewhat tricky matter since it took years to defeat rebels, but Puerto Rico, for instance, did not seem to be at risk of having juries voting for insurrectionists.
On that front, I think that was more of a problem in the American South. At best, there was a limited period. The Insular Cases continued into the 1920s
I think the Insular Cases minority had a point.
I thought he was saying it in the context of the Insular Cases. Those cases hold that people have certain basic rights, it is just that the constitution does not apply in full.
For the reasons I said, I don't believe it could or should, even if we are talking about Australia. There would be some things, at least for a time being, that such a similar country would not suit them as they would American citizens---gun rights being the first that comes to mind. I don't think it is racist or otherwise bad to realize that newly acquired territory might not be ready for the full U.S. system, nor would many inhabitants be ready to take part in the social structure. It wouldn't make for very effective imperialism.
The whole comment:
No, the original meaning of the Constitution was not to give rights to people living on an island on the other side of the world, or speaking a foreign language.
I'm not going to put limiting words into his mouth.
For the reasons I said, including involving foreigners brought into our country from different legal systems (France/Spain/Mexico), I disagree. The application, especially as long as it was (into the 1920s for the "Insular Cases" collection), was more obviously a racist and imperialistic policy.
As another comment notes, that also suggests a "very effective imperialism" policy might clash with constitutional principles. See also how Jim Crow showed effective second-class citizenship for blacks violated constitutional principles. People also defended that on "they weren't ready yet" grounds.
I don't know why Mexicans, one day/Americans the next, could enjoy equal privileges of citizenship while Puerto Ricans could not.
It is definitely imperialist but I disagree with those who assert that it is racist. Just as we as a society would not/could not wholesale adapt to a completely foreign idea of government, those countries would not either.
Sure, if make a conscious choice to emigrate to France/Spain/Mexico then I as an individual can accept their system of government. You are stating the opposite--whether those countries, nearly overnight, could be forced to accept our system. It's not that they are racially or otherwise incapable of doing so, it simply does not suit their traditions and experiences.
The opinions were judgments on whether a country like the United States should be engaging in imperialism in the first place. The dissents did not think so while the majority thought that it was the right and power of any country to do so. My only point is that one cannot be both and imperialist AND disagree with the rationale of the Insular Cases. It is absolutely necessary for the acquisition of new territory.
That the Constitution would require this seems like a pretty good argument against pursuing imperialist expansion.
It was literally one of the purposes of adopting a militia system instead of a standing army, that militias would not be usable for foreign adventures. And the decision to engage in them anyway was why the militia system was largely abandoned.
"If that island is governed by the US, I fail to see why."
Indeed. If you're governed by the US, you're protected by the US constitution. Maybe to a lesser extent if you're not a citizen, but people living in US territories ARE US citizens.
Hmmm...how would all this apply to what used to be the U. S. zone in West Berlin?
A real-life Cold War trial - dramatized in a book and movie - involved an East German couple who hijacked a plane and flew it to West Berlin. The Carter administration brought in a federal judge to preside at the trial, and the judge decided that the defendants had a right to trial by jury under the U. S. Constitution. So he summoned a jury of Berliners (grammar?) who convicted the couple, but the judge gave them time served.
https://variety.com/1987/film/reviews/judgment-in-berlin-1200427547/
Would the old U. S. zone in Berlin be subject to the Constitution? What about the old U. N. territorial trusteeships the U. S. formerly administered in the Pacific?
West Berlin was never a territory of the United States of any kind so, it wouldn’t.
So it wasn't part of the United States, but a foreign jurisdiction under the U. S. government.
What about the old Canal Zone? I think it was recognized as Panamanian territory over which the U. S. just happened to have governing authority.
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty:
"The United States of America and the Republic of Panama being desirous to insure the construction of a ship canal across the Isthmus of Panama to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oecans, and the Congress of the United States of America having passed an act approved June 28, 1902, in furtherance of that object, by which the President of the United States is authorized to acquire within a reasonable time the control of the necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia, and the sovereignty of such territory being actually vested in the Republic of Panama...
"ARTICLE III
"The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and authority within the zone mentioned and described in Article II of this agreement and within the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters mentioned and described in said Article II which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority."
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/pan001.asp
So, what makes somewhere "a territory of the United States" for purposes of applying the Constitution in full?
That is the problem -- which this paper doesn't address.
It is entirely true that the Framers did not make any provision for cases when the United States exercises government functions outside the US. This lack of foresight does not itself imply the conclusion that all such cases must therefore be governed as if they are part of the United States.
In the case of Verdugo-Urquidez, the DEA searched a Mexican's house, in Mexico, with the permission of the Mexican government. Does the lack of a proper warrant (as US domestic law would see it) mean it was an illegal search?
One can, of course, bite that bullet and say the full array of Constitutional restrictions govern all actions by the US government everywhere, including when dealing with foreigners in foreign countries. But if one rejects the conclusion that the Constitution applies in full to the exercise of power by the United States government over noncitizens outside the United States, even in such a limited case as Verdugo-Urquidez, one is inevitably stuck with the question, what counts as outside the United States for purposes of the Constitution?
And there are an infinite number of such gradations. You can start with the Verdugo-Urquidez situation; move through examples like short-term military occupations; then cases like long-term military occupations; then not-exactly-annexations like "UN Trust Territories"; then annexations like the Philippines (where sentiment from an early date was that we'd divest ourselves of control eventually); then American Samoa (which we seem to be keeping perpetually without making the residents citizens); then Puerto Rico (where the US apparently wanted to keep the territory forever and made the people citizens, but never seemed to want to make it a state); and finally through situations like the Northwest Territory where conversion into states was always the explicit goal. (With DC as a specific anomaly aside from the continuum, so the Federal Government could operate without conflicting with a state government.)
Obviously a line has to be drawn somewhere on the continuum, and since it's a continuum, any line will separate some similar situations from each other, which means we need an intelligible principle. One can disagree with the particular line drawn by the Insular Cases (intent to make into states), but, if so, one still has to come up with a way to draw the line.
(Incidentally -- even if one bites the bullet in the case of Verdugo-Urquidez, you still need to do the line-drawing for what is "in the United States" for citizenship under the 14th Amendment. The line-drawing cannot be escaped.)
And, well. This paper doesn't address that line-drawing in the slightest; it just assumes "unincorporated territories" (to use the Insular Cases term) are part of the US for purposes of the Constitution because Founding-era territories were.
The response to this paper from defenders of the Insular Cases is incredibly easy. "All your Founding-Era examples are from what the Insular Cases class as incorporated territories. The Insular Cases already agree the Constitution applies in full in incorporated territories. So, do you have any arguments that actually address the question of where to draw the line between what is genuinely part of the US, and what is a place that is not part of the US but is a location where the US is exercising authority?"
Pointing out that incorporated territories in the Founding Era were under the Constitution isn't responsive. Answering that the Insular Cases line was judge-made rather than originalist or textualist isn't responsive. Declaring the Insular Cases to have been motivated by racism is, again, non-responsive.
As the US no longer has any Trust Territories, nor control of the Philippines, and what we have in the way of "unincorporated territories" are small and generally unimportant, it is easy to argue for pushing the line out to "not part of the US for places under temporary military occupation, yes part of the US for anywhere we've annexed and intend to keep ruling, and we'll leave it otherwise unspecified". But it being easy to draw the line there isn't the same as making a coherent argument for that line as a matter of law, much less the same as making a coherent originalist or textualist legal argument for that answer.
Two comments.
1. It’s a significant improvement that Professor Somin is making an argument that existing precedent wrong, rather than his more typical practice of simply asserting that what he thinks the Constitution ought to say is what it says.
2. While I don’t really agree with his argument, I do think that the category of “fundamental” rights has proved unworkable. It’s so standard that it’s essentially a stand-in for political ideology. History has shown that nearly all judges are prone to saying that the political causes they happen to believe in most fervently are the “fundamental” ones. This means that decisions reflect whichever political party happens to have lucked into a majority of the judges at the moment and can be counted on to get reversed when the other party lucks into a majority. This is so unstable, so lawless, so political, it makes a mockery both of the concept of constitutional rights being something people can actually count on and the role of the court as a trustworthy and mutually respectable arbiter of disputes rather than a partisan advocate for whatever side happens to have appointed the majority of its justices.
We need to do things differently if we want to avoid a court that half the country regards as completely illegitimate at any one time and which half keeps switching.
There needs to be a basis for rights being considered applicable to the states etc. other than the Justices mere personal say-so.
I agree that the category of "fundamental" rights can be manipulated, but surely you agree with it in theory.
Some rights take on an almost natural law quality such that we would believe that any government which did not recognize them was tyrannical. Others--like for example the right of indictment by a grand jury, or a jury trial in suits at common law over more than $20---are merely rights because that is how we do things in our national government, not because God or nature commanded that they be such.