Professor Kagan Writes Perfect Synopsis of Arising Under Jurisdiction, Supplemental Jurisdiction, and Federal Removal

All CivPro students should read these pages.

Justice Kagan's opinion in Royal Canin U. S. A. v. Wullschleger was such a joy to read, and a reminder of how good of a CivPro professor she must have been. 

Here are the facts. A case was filed in state court with both federal and state claims on the face of the complaint. The defendant removed the case to federal court, invoking supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. The plaintiff amended the complaint in federal court, dropping all federal claims, leaving only state claims. Does the case stay in federal court by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction? The Court, per Justice Kagan, says no. "When an amendment excises the federal-law claims that enabled removal, the federal court loses its supplemental jurisdiction over the related state-law claims."

All CivPro students should read Part I-A of Kagan's opinion, from the bottom of page 1 through the top of page 4. It is a tight and crisp summary of the relationship between §1331 (arising under jurisdiction), §1367(a) (supplemental jurisdiction), and §1441(a) (removal jurisdiction). Here is the full section (and stick around for some other observations about the case at the end):

"Federal courts," we have often explained, "are courts of limited jurisdiction." E.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U. S. 375, 377 (1994). Limited first by the Constitution, to only the kinds of "Cases" and "Contro-versies" listed in Article III. And for all lower federal courts, limited as well by statute. Congress determines, through its grants of jurisdiction, which suits those courts can resolve. So, for example, Congress has always given federal courts power to decide "diversity" cases, between "citizens of different States" whose dispute involves more than a stated sum (the so-called amount-in-controversy). §1332(a). And of special importance here, Congress has long conferred jurisdiction on federal courts to resolve cases "arising under" federal law. §1331.

"Arising under" jurisdiction—more often known as fed-eral-question jurisdiction—enables federal courts to decide cases founded on federal law. A suit most typically falls within that statutory grant "when federal law creates the cause of action asserted." Gunn v. Minton, 568 U. S. 251, 257 (2013). On rare occasions, the grant also covers a suit containing state-law claims alone, because one or more of them "necessarily raise[s]" a "substantial" and "actually disputed" federal question. Id., at 258. Either way, the determination of jurisdiction is based only on the allegations in the plaintiff 's "well-pleaded complaint"—not on any is-sue the defendant may raise. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U. S. 1, 9–10 (1983). That longstanding rule makes the complaint—the plaintiff 's own claims and allegations—the key to "arising under" jurisdiction. If the complaint presents no federal question, a federal court may not hear the suit.

But if a complaint includes the requisite federal question, a federal court often has power to decide state-law ques-tions too. Suppose a complaint with two claims—one based on federal, the other on state, law. This Court held in Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725 (1966), that a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim so long as it "derive[s] from" the same "nucleus of op-erative fact" as the federal one. The Gibbs Court reasoned that when the two claims are so closely related, they make up "but one constitutional 'case' "; and the Court presumed that Congress wanted in that situation to confer jurisdic-tion up to the Constitution's limit. Ibid. (quoting U. S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. 1); see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapat-tah Services, Inc., 545 U. S. 546, 553 (2005). Congress later confirmed that view, generally codifying Gibbs's supple-mental-jurisdiction rule in 28 U. S. C. §1367 (whose text we will soon consider, see infra, at 7–8). Under that statute, as under Gibbs, jurisdiction over a federal-law claim brings with it supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim arising from the same facts. That derivative jurisdiction, though, is to some extent discretionary; §1367 spells out cir-cumstances, again derived from Gibbs, in which a federal court may decline to hear a state claim falling within the statute's bounds. See §1367(c); Gibbs, 383 U. S., at 726–727.

And yet one more preparatory point: If a statute confers federal jurisdiction over a suit, not only the plaintiff but also the defendant can get it into federal court. Take the "arising under" statute: It grants federal district courts "original jurisdiction" over cases presenting a federal ques-tion. §1331; see §1332 (similarly providing "original juris-diction" over diversity suits). The plaintiff may avail her-self of that jurisdiction (and of the opportunity §1367 affords to add supplemental state claims); but she also may file her suit in state court. If she takes the latter route, another statute then gives the defendant an option. Be-cause the case falls within the federal courts' "original ju-risdiction," the defendant may "remove[ ]" it from state to federal court. §1441(a). And there the case (including sup-plemental state claims) usually remains. Except that "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the dis-trict court lacks subject matter jurisdiction," the case must be "remanded" to state court. §1447(c). That is because, to return to where we started, federal courts are courts of lim-ited jurisdiction: When they do not have (or no longer have) authorization to resolve a suit, they must hand it over.

What a perfect exegesis of CivPro in a few paragraphs. 

And here is the core of the Court's holding:

When a plaintiff amends her complaint following her suit's removal, a federal court's jurisdiction depends on what the new complaint says. If (as here) the plaintiff eliminates the federal-law claims that enabled removal, leaving only state-law claims behind, the court's power to decide the dispute dissolves. With the loss of federal-question juris-diction, the court loses as well its supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. That conclusion fits the text of §1367, governing supplemental jurisdiction. And it accords with a bevy of rules hinging federal jurisdiction on the allegations made in an amended complaint, because that complaint has become the operative one.

Seems right to me.

***

A few other notes on the case.

First, Ashley Keller has scored another victory in a major Civil Procedure case. Combined with Mallory v. Norfolk Southern, Keller is putting together entire chapters of CivPro casebooks.

Second, Justice Kagan lists a Posner opinion by name.

So even if removing a case was improper because the initial complaint did not contain a federal claim, the plaintiff 's later assertion of such a claim establishes jurisdiction going forward. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U. S. 211, 215– 216, and n. 2 (2000); Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 738 F. 2d 179, 185–186 (CA7 1984) (Posner, J.).

I've always wondered how the Justices decide which inferior court judges they mention by name. I suppose Posner meets the cut, though he has been off the bench now for some time.

Third, the Court finds that a passage from a prior precedent was dictum, and offers some analysis to explain why:

But still, the footnote is dictum, and does not control the outcome here. Rockwell was an original federal case, not a removed one. So the footnote's assertion of a special rule for removed cases was outside the issue being decided—or more colloquially put, beside the point. The statement had no bearing on the Court's conclusion about jurisdiction in original cases. Nor did it relate to the rationale supporting that result. And to top it off, the footnote was itself barely reasoned.9 This Court has often stated that "drive-by jurisdictional rulings"—asserting or denying jurisdiction "without elaboration," or analysis of whether anything "turn[ed] on" the ruling—should be accorded "no precedential effect."The admonition goes double for throwaway footnotes about jurisdictional issues neither raised in nor conceivably relevant to a case. We

But the Court does not blame lower courts for relying on that passage:

We therefore need not follow the Rockwell footnote just because it exists; our adherence instead depends on whether it withstands analysis. [FN10]

[FN10] It is of course a much different thing for this Court to reach that conclusion than for a lower court to do so. We do not at all fault any court that relied on the Rockwell footnote to find jurisdiction in a case like this one. Courts that did so simply took us at our word, in a way both understandable and appropriate.

Fourth, we can already start to make predictions about the assignment of cases. There were nine cases argued during the October sitting. Presumably, each Justice will have one case from that sitting. Two cases have been decided so far from that sitting. Justice Kagan wrote Royal Canin, and Justice Jackson wrote Bouarfa, an immigration case. If I had to guess, the top two candidates to write Royal Canin would be the two procedure professors: Kagan or Barrett. Kagan got Royal Canin, which was argued on October 7. VanDerStock was argued on October 8. The only liberal left to write is Justice Sotomayor. And I do not think the Chief would give her that case.  I have a sinking feeling Barrett has VanDerStock, which is at bottom a statutory interpretation case. (I say sinking because I was counsel on that case, and attended oral argument.) Then again, we may never know how that case turns out, if the Trump ATF and DOJ take a new position. If that happens, we can check at the end of the term if Barrett doesn't write an opinion for October.