The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
What Happens When The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Violate Federal Law?
The Federal Judiciary's Rules Committee will find out if it adopts the "Random Case Assignment" Policy
Life-tenured judges play the long game. Last spring, the Judicial Conference adopted, without any debate, a "binding" policy that would force reassignment of cases seeking nationwide relief. After some controversy, the mandatory policy suddenly became "optional guidance." And over the past few months, a handful of districts have adopted this policy. The overwhelming majority have done nothing. And other districts, including the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, rejected the policy. This process played out exactly as Congress intended: 28 U.S.C. 137 expressly delegated rules concerning case assignment to "the rules and orders of the court." Each District Court can decide these matters for itself.
But if at first you don't succeed, try, try again. Or in the world of the federal judicial bureaucracy, send it to a committee! Tomorrow, the Rules Committee will consider the issue of case assignment. And they will consider whether to adopt the Judicial Conference's reassignment policy by virtue of modifying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If you read Page 415 of the agenda (and who hasn't!), you will find that the committee expressly recognizes that this might be contrary to federal law!
There is also a strong argument that assignment of cases among the judges in a district is within the Congress's jurisdiction. Since the Judiciary Act of, Congress has statutorily provided for case assignment to be left to the districts in the first instance, and this remains the case today. 28 U.S.C. § 137(a) provides that, "[t]he business of a court having more than one judge shall be divided among the judges as provided by the rules and orders of the court.
In the wake of the Judicial Conference guidance, Senators McConnell, Cornyn, and Tills stated their views in a letter to the Chief Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky: It is Congress that decides how cases should be assigned in the inferior courts and Congress has already spoken on this issue in an enacted statute: Congress gave that power to the individual district courts. Whatever the Judicial Conference thinks you ought to do, what you actually choose to do is left to your court's discretion under the law.7
A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure could potentially supersede this statute if it complies with the strictures of the Rules Enabling Act and is approved by Congress. It would require consideration of whether a rule regarding case assignment is within the Enabling Act's delegation of authority to "prescribe general rules of practice and procedure," 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). One could assert that a rule governing the assignment of cases is one of practice and procedure, as it does not implicate the merits of any claim. Such a judgment must be considered in the context of the history of the Congressional delegation of power to divide judicial business to the districts themselves. This issue will remain on the Advisory Committee's agenda as the districts continue to react to the Judicial Conference guidance. The Reporters will continue to monitor the situation as it develops.
Let's be very clear here what is going on. Senator Schumer and some law professors complained about a handful of federal judges. The judges and private members of this committee seem poised to accede to that criticism, even if it means adopting a potentially unlawful rule of Civil Procedure. And who would adjudge whether that reassignment policy is lawful? The same judges who authorized the rule.
Senator McConnell harpoons this proposal in National Review:
Simple statutory interpretation shows why the judicial bureaucrats have it wrong. The case-assignment statute has its roots in the Judicial Code of 1911. Two decades later, in 1934, Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act, which governs the civil rules. Against that backdrop, Congress then enacted the case-assignment statute in 1948, directing that cases "shall be divided" among the judges in a district as the court sees fit.
Knowing full well that the Rules Enabling Act was out there, Congress gave a directive — not a suggestion — to the district courts, over which it has constitutive authority, as to how they must administer their dockets.
The Justice Department is skeptical. It says if this were the case, surely Congress "would have left some evidence in the statute's text or legislative history." Legislative history — the last refuge of a textual scoundrel.
The statute's text is the evidence: Congress mandated how the courts must manage their dockets. We should all take that at face value and not look for some broad, amorphous grant of legislative power to the judicial bureaucracy.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has warned against assuming that Congress has delegated broad legislative authority to other branches of government. Usually that's in the context of the executive branch, but it ought to apply to the judiciary, too. We can't assume that Congress gave the judicial bureaucracy a roving commission to rewrite the case-assignment statute through the Rules Enabling Act.
Why? Why do this? Remember, under the Rules Enabling Act, unless Congress passes a statute, through bicameralism and presentment, to disapprove of a rule, it goes into effect. And that process is subject to a filibuster. It cannot be that a handful of federal judges can override a federal statute unless Congress enacts a new statute.
And while we're at it, I've long thought that the Rules Enabling Act violates the Non-Delegation Doctrine. Relatedly, Ethan Leib recently wrote that the Federal Rules of Evidence are unconstitutional. If the Rules Enabling Act actually gives the federal judiciary the power to override a federal statute, unless Congress disapproves, then the Non-Delegation Doctrine may have another very good year. Tread carefully. Or better yet, let five members of the Supreme Court give some clear guidance on nationwide injunctions and universal vacatur, so we can settle this madness in a way that is fair to all sides--not unilateral disarmament.
Editor's Note: We invite comments and request that they be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of Reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason at any time. Comments may only be edited within 5 minutes of posting. Report abuses.
Please
to post comments
What is the argument on the merits that a plaintiff should be able to choose the specific judge who will preside over his or her case?
The reason the divisions were created because in large states, a district can cover hundreds of miles, and it's unfair to require litigants to travel so far. So there are divisions to handle the caseload, and those often consist of only one judge. As McConnell states in his article, if the Judicial Conference's suggestion were adopted, "This would mean a litigant who files in a single-judge division in Amarillo could be required to travel to Dallas (more than 300 miles away) for their case."
I think the proper way to fix this, is that in order to "choose" a division as opposed to a district, there must be a concrete connection to that division specifically. That could be the injury or parties. This way the people that are meant to be accomodated by the divisions are but the true shopping is restricted. Obviously it can still be gamed by attaching a selected plaintiff with ties to the division, but so be it. At least it makes the choice of division make sense
IMO, there should be a national court to deal with national injunctions. IIRC, there used to be something like that -- a 3-judge court that reviewed claims that a statute was unconstitutional.
This is not responsive to Chernobog's post.
At best you raise a different, specifically local, issue.
These single judge districts are not the only way to solve that issue.
Does BL think it's good policy to have these two MAGA judges available on demand to any litigant with the money and an off-the-wall legal theory?
1. There are plenty of places where getting to your nearest federal court is a lot tougher than going from Amarillo to Dallas.
2. Under Prof. Blackman’s theory, the district could implement a rule requiring people in Amarillo to go to Dallas.
3. Randomizing judicial selection doesn’t say anything about which division the court hearings have to be held in.
Other than that, great point!
"and those often consist of only one judge"
There is currently exactly one single-judge division in the United States, according to Blackman. Steve Vladek found two but one has had another judge assigned since. Why do you lie so often?
There is no merits argument for that. No one is arguing for that. It’s an artifact of single judge divisions/districts, and the ability to file suit in one.
This appears to be an intent over text argument.
Followed by some hail marys.
And the linked paper's abstract is explicitly not about the FRCP:
"Unlike other regimes of federal rulemaking – for Civil Procedure, for Criminal Procedure, and for Appellate Procedure – the FRE rulemaking process contemplated by the Rules Enabling Act is both formally and functionally defective..."
That's explicitly the opposite of relatedly!
If a rule is approved by Congress, is that not an implicit repeal of any conflicting statute?
Well, yes. Except here the rule is not approved by Congress. It becomes law unless disapproved by Congress. That's how the Rules Enabling Act works.
If Congress reformed case assignments directly, there is no question that would be lawful. Congress can always repeal or revise what it previously passed.
No, only another statute or a treaty can impliedly repeal an earlier statute. Any rule, even one approved by resolution, is inferior in rank to a statute.
I would be constrained to partly agree.
The part where I would disagree is I think courts have inherent powers, as an independent branch of government, to set their own rules, subject to Congressional regulation. So I see no delegation doctrine problem at all. Federal courts don’t need specific authorization to set rules. To the contrary, they can set whatever rules they want unless Congress passes a contrary statute.
The part where I would be constrained to agree, reluctantly, is that here Congress has passed acontrary statute. And as a very standard matter of statutory construction, a specifically on-point statute trumps a more general one. So here the Judicial Conference is perfectly free to offer guidance and best practices for judicial assignments, but can’t override Congress’ decision to let each district make its own rules on this particular subject.
I think random assignment is better policy and Congress should pass a law adapting it. I think district courts should do so on their own if Congress doesn’t act. But both Congress and district courts are as free to ignore my advice as they are free to ignore the Judicial Conference’s.
courts have inherent powers
I don't think so. The Constitution clearly states:
Inferior courts are purely creatures of Congress, and Congress determines their jurisdiction. Congress decided which districts and divisions exist or not, and how cases are allocated among them.
So unless Congress specifically says otherwise, litigants are free either to scribble their briefs in Swahili on the backs of envelopes, to write them on orange peels, or for that matter drive trucks with the briefs written on the side into the clerk’s office and courts just have to find a way to keep track of it all, because they have no power to set rules about what form filings can have unless Congress tells them they can? Courts can’t assign cases, can’t do anything, until Congress creates rules for them or gives them explicit authority to create their own rules?
That’s reading an awful lot into the word “establish.”
Congress did grant court powers to adopt rules of procedure. Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
So, yes, Congress has authorized district courts to regulate the kinds of things you raise. But not to contradict federal statutes.
I agree with you about the procedural rules, but this is jurisdictional. If Congress says that the US District Court for Westvalia is to have a single judge who presides over that district, it has "ordained and established" that court.
The courts have no power to say that, "No, really this other judge should possibly hear the case."
I am with ReaderY on this. The fact that Congress can establish courts probably does mean that Congress can establish procedural rules for those courts. But that doesn’t mean that courts don’t have the inherent power to establish procedural rules to the extent that Congress hasn’t done so.
Nothing about what we're discussing is jurisdictional.
deleted
What's good for the goose is good for the gander. If the President has inherent powers, so does the Judiciary.
That's a superficial Trumpian analysis.
The Supreme Court and some inferior federal courts having gone rogue is a strong reason for the electorate to keep control of the Presidency and the Senate in Democratic hands and to return control of the House of Representatives to the Democrats. When the new Congress convenes, the Senate could then abolish the 60 vote rule that hamstrings needed legislation.
If that happens, I would expect to see creation of numerous additional District Courts and seats on various Courts of Appeal. The last time that that happened on an appreciable scale was during the Carter Presidency.
"having gone rogue" = issued decisions NG does not like.
There is already bipartisan support for more district court judges.
https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-coons-young-celebrate-bipartisan-passage-of-their-judges-act-by-the-senate-judiciary-committee
I wonder if the Republicans in the Senate would remain on board if they thought the bill would pass the House and (possibly) allow a Democratic President to make the first two rounds of appointments.
I note also that the Courts of Appeals are not included in the bill.
Separate from political questions, I think the 9th Circuit could stand to be split up into 2 or 3 and new districts and judgeships need to be created. Once upon a time, the parties would have cooperated enough so that something like this could have been structured to be done over 10 or 20 years to ensure no single administration gets to appoint all the new judges.
As BL just said, “gone rogue” is just shorthand for anything you don’t like.
Even more easily than creating new district courts, Congress could just amend the statutes to clearly allow for what these updated rules are attempting to do. Or just put it in law directly.
But if Congress refuses to do that, then the current state of things has the acquiescence of Congress. If the updated rules subsequently fail to survive judicial review, then current practice is correct law.
and of course there's this little time bomb in the 20th Amendment that Congress has ignored for 91 years.
"If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President-elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President-elect nor a Vice President-elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified."
Then the law is unconstitutional as it violates separation of powers.
Each branch of government is responsible for their own procedural rules. At least at the state level, a number of laws have been struck down as violating state constitution separation of powers since they impermissibly attempted to change the state supreme court's rule of criminal/civil procedure. (For example, changes to procedures for medical malpractice cases, procedures for dealing with evidence in sexual assault cases, etc.)
And those self-aggrandizing decisions by state courts are wrong. It does not violate separation of powers for legislatures to set procedures for the judiciary. It would violate separation of powers for legislatures to tell courts how specific individual cases must come out.
Um, the federal separation of powers maybe different from a particular state's separation of powers. Some state constitutions certainly allow for more intermingling than at the federal level.
In Pennsylvania, the state supreme court has explicit authority under the state constitution (used in 2020) to modify provisions of election law to satisfy constitutional mandates (not a generic matter of equity). Something unthinkable under federal constitutional law.
No, not as the court sees fit, but "as provided by the rules and orders of the court" (28 U.S.C. §137(a)). Each district court can set its own rules (§2071(a)) but those rules may be overridden by the judicial council of the circuit (§2071(c)(1)). The judicial councils are required to override district court rules (§332(d)(4)) that conflict with general rules of procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court (§2072(a)). The Judicial Conference suggests rules for the Supreme Court to so prescribe (§2073).
Arguing that the Rules Enabling Act violates the non-delegation doctrine is wild. Federal courts have had rulemaking authority (especially in suits in equity) since the 1700s. Plus it's not delegating any legislative power--procedural rules for courts is part of the "judicial power"--which is quite unlike delegating substantive rule making authority to administrative agencies. Indeed, the English court system regularly made and enforced their own procedural rules.
Section 137(a) relates to the *division* of a district court's business (i.e. division of workloads) , not the method of *assignment* of cases.
Also the strongest indication that section 137 doesn't supersede the rules enabling act is that the rules enabling act expressly states that "All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." 28 USC 2072(b).
"If the Rules Enabling Act actually gives the federal judiciary the power to override a federal statute, unless Congress disapproves, then the Non-Delegation Doctrine may have another very good year."
It would be best to take the view that the Rules Enabling Act had the effect of taking all statutes which the rules could amend and essentially reducing them to administrative law, which courts could make and thus amend.