Claim That Someone Is "Racist" or "White Supremacist" Is Opinion and Thus Not Libel, Though …

claims that someone has engaged in specific conduct may be factual assertions and therefore potentially libelous.

From Richards v. Union Leader Corp., decided Wednesday by the N.H. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice James Bassett, joined by Chief Justice Gordon MacDonald and Justice Patrick Donovan (for more on the general legal principle here, which emerges from mid-1900s concluding similarly as to allegation of Communist sympathies, see this post):

The plaintiff is the father of two children enrolled in the Hanover School District …. In 2021, the district "began sending parents an increasing number of communications about [its] increasing focus on 'equity' and 'anti-racism.'" The communications indicated that the district was planning "significant curricular changes around these issues." The plaintiff was "concerned by materials that he learned were in use in the school district." While he believed the curricular changes were "well-intentioned," the plaintiff believed that the changed curriculum was "deeply divisive and ultimately harmful to the goal of a quality education and a society where everyone is treated equally."

As a result of his concerns about the district's proposed curriculum changes, the plaintiff supported "legislation that prohibits New Hampshire schools from teaching children that they are 'inherently racist, sexist, or oppressive, whether consciously or unconsciously.'" The parties agree that this legislation was House Bill 544 (HB 544). The plaintiff submitted public testimony in favor of the bill.

The Union Leader published an op-ed written by defendant Azzi, titled "White supremacists reveal content of their character," and saying, among other things (I'm excerpting the allegedly defamatory statements here),

Desperate to stay bonded to America's original sins of slavery and genocide of indigenous peoples, Gingrich, Frank Edelblut, Dan Richards, Mike Moffett, Joseph Mendola, and others have disseminated, across multiple media platforms, white supremacist ideology ….

Those who favor whitewashing history—favor suppressing the grievances and rights of Americans unlike themselves—favor suppressing the franchise of citizens who don't look like them—have shown they'll lie … to protect their privilege and power ….

Plaintiff sued for defamation, but the court said that, in context, these statements would be understood by reasonable readers as statement of opinion, not of provable fact:

An important criterion for distinguishing statements of opinion from statements of fact is verifiability—i.e., whether the statement is capable of being proven true or false. "Where an expressive phrase, though pejorative and unflattering, cannot be objectively verified, it belongs squarely in the category of protected opinion." The vaguer a term, or the more meanings it reasonably can convey, the less likely it is to be verifiable and hence actionable.

Although we have not had cause to consider whether characterizations like the terms "racist" or "white supremacist" can be considered actionable under a theory of defamation, numerous other jurisdictions have considered the question. See, e.g., Law Offices of David Freydin, P.C. v. Chamara, 24 F.4th 1122, 1131 (7th Cir. 2022); La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 93 (2d Cir. 2020); Overhill Farms, Inc. v. Lopez, 190 Cal. App. 4th 1248, 1261-62 (2010); Olthaus v. Niesen, 232 N.E.3d 932, 940 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023). The Ohio Court of Appeals recently concluded that the term "white supremacist" lacks precise meaning, and is an "inherently value-laden" label that conjures "a vast array of highly emotional responses that will vary from reader to reader." The court explained that "because labels like 'white supremacist' lack a plausible method of verification, a reasonable reader will not believe that the statement has specific factual content."

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, applying California tort law, has held that "accusations of concrete, wrongful conduct are actionable while general statements charging a person with being racist, unfair, or unjust are not." Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois defamation law, has held that the statement "racist" is actionable "when based on identifiable conduct but [is] non-actionable when stated in general terms." So too has the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "derogatory characterizations without more are not defamatory," concluding that "a simple accusation of racism is not enough."

We find the reasoning of these cases persuasive. See, e.g., Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir. 1988) (the derogatory characterization of the plaintiff as a "racist" was non-actionable because it did not "impl[y] the existence of undisclosed, defamatory facts"); Automated Transactions, 172 N.H. at 534 ("an opinion … is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion" (quotation omitted)). Reading the op-ed as a whole, we agree with the trial court that the op-ed merely expressed the author's political opinions and beliefs that he individually held about the plaintiff and others not based on any undisclosed defamatory facts.

The first allegedly defamatory statement identified by the plaintiff (statement 2) cannot be read in isolation, but rather must be read within the context of the paragraph in which it appears. The paragraph reads in its entirety:

Desperate to stay bonded to America's original sins of slavery and genocide of indigenous peoples, Gingrich, Frank Edelblut, Dan Richards, Mike Moffett, Joseph Mendola, and others have disseminated, across multiple media platforms, white supremacist ideology to keep Americans from learning an unexpurgated American history from its 1619 origins alongside the dominant White 1776 narrative.

When read in context, the language used is unquestionably "imaginative expression." As the trial court pointed out, no rational finder of fact could read this paragraph and conclude that the author was claiming that the plaintiff "has engaged in the act of enslaving people" or that the plaintiff was desirous of committing genocide. Rather, as the trial court aptly observed, the author "made an 'imaginative expression,' which, although unflattering, reflects what Azzi believes the plaintiff desires." In addition, it is clear from the context in which it is contained that the phrase "disseminated … white supremacist ideology" falls into the realm of non-actionable derogatory characterization.

Nothing within this paragraph or the greater context of the op-ed states or implies that the plaintiff has engaged in "concrete, wrongful conduct." Rather, the paragraph speaks generally about ideology the author considers to be "white supremacist"—ideology which the author believes the plaintiff supports. As the trial court points out, such a characterization "cannot be objectively verified … because whether a statement espouses white supremacist ideology is a matter of socio-political opinion that differs between individuals." …

Likewise, the other two statements the plaintiff challenges … cannot be read in isolation. The paragraph in which the challenged statements appear states:

Those who favor whitewashing history—favor suppressing the grievances and rights of Americans unlike themselves—favor suppressing the franchise of citizens who don't look like them—have shown they'll lie, go to any lengths, propose any laws, to protect their privilege and power over others. Most repugnant are those who distort, decontextualize, and misrepresent truth-tellers like MLK and Kendi when they talk about race and oppression.

We will assume, as the trial court ruled, that the implication of the challenged statements, which are emphasized above, is directed at the plaintiff as a member of the group identified at the beginning of the op-ed. However, when read as a whole, the general tenor of the rhetoric in the paragraph, and the challenged language especially, is hyperbolic and, therefore, does not create the implication that the author is stating actual facts.

This language does not accuse the plaintiff of actual conduct—for example, as the trial court noted, it does not claim that the plaintiff prevented anyone from voting or personally lied to "protect his supposed privilege and power." Rather, the author merely expresses his opinion of the behavior of all people who hold this purported ideology and projects it onto those who, like the plaintiff, supported HB 544. As the trial court concluded, "the statements are what Azzi claims to be attributes of a group that 'favor[s] whitewashing history.'"

At its core, as the trial court noted, this rhetoric expresses the author's "socio-political opinion and cannot be verified." Accordingly, we conclude that the language falls within the realm of non-actionable opinion and, therefore, the trial court did not err.

The plaintiff next asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that "none of the challenged statements imply undisclosed defamatory facts." Although the plaintiff argues that a statement of "opinion" is actionable if it may reasonably be understood to imply the existence of defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion, as explained above, we agree with the trial court that the challenged rhetorical language does not imply the existence of any non-disclosed defamatory facts. Moreover, the author explains that his opinion derives from the plaintiff's support of HB 544, a fact which the plaintiff does not dispute. Thus, while the op-ed does not imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts, it also states the factual basis on which it relies. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err….

[Furthermore,] "Although the appearance of the column on the op-ed page, without more, is not at all dispositive, it is nevertheless some indication that the statements made in the column are opinions." "[R]eaders of the op-ed page no doubt expect to read columnists' views and opinions as opposed to factual news stories." …

Justice Melissa Countway disagreed on this point:

The majority asserts that the phrase "'disseminated … white supremacist ideology' falls into the realm of non-actionable derogatory characterization," and that "nothing within this paragraph or the greater context of the op-ed states or implies that the plaintiff has engaged in 'concrete, wrongful conduct.'" I disagree, because I would distinguish a statement accusing someone of being a white supremacist, see Olthaus v. Niesen, 232 N.E.3d 932, 940 (Ohio 2023) (noting that the plaintiff made no argument "for how someone would plausibly go about proving or disproving one's white supremacist bona fides"), from the statement at issue here. In the present case, it would be possible to examine the information that, according to Azzi, the plaintiff has disseminated over multiple media platforms to determine whether it contains white supremacist ideology.

In concluding that the statement is "rhetorical" and "does not imply the existence of any non-disclosed defamatory facts," the majority states that "the author explains that his opinion derives from the plaintiff's support of HB 544, a fact which the plaintiff does not dispute." The majority evidently concludes that defendant Azzi's statement that the plaintiff disseminated white supremacist ideology was a statement of Azzi's opinion that by supporting HB 544 and opposing the teaching of critical race theory, the plaintiff disseminated white supremacist ideology.

Were it clear on the face of the article that this was the factual basis of defendant Azzi's assertion, I would agree that the statement would not be actionable. In such a case the reader would have had the opportunity to assess the basis on which the statement was founded, allowing the reader to draw his or her own conclusions concerning the opinion's validity.

But the article does not make that clear. While defendant Azzi asserts that the article, in electronic form, links to columns and articles written by others named in the opinion piece, specifically, Gingrich, Edelblut, and Mendoza, the defendants do not contend that the article contains links to the plaintiff's statements, writings or actions. Accordingly, it is not clear what facts defendant Azzi relies upon to support his assertion that the plaintiff disseminated white supremacist ideology.

In light of the foregoing, I would reverse and remand the case for further proceedings, including a determination of whether the plaintiff is a public figure, in which case he would be required to prove, not only that the stated or implied assertions of fact are false, but also that the statement was made with actual malice….

For another illustration of the general pejorative vs. specific allegation line that the court is drawing, see Duc Tan v. Le (Wash. 2013):

While an allegation that someone is a communist may be merely imprecise or loose language [and therefore nonactionable opinion], it is "quite another case" [and one in which a defamation claim can be made out] to accuse someone of being an agent of the Viet Cong communist government.

See also, e.g., Ollman v. Evans (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Kenneth Starr, J.) (concluding that saying someone "is an outspoken proponent of political Marxism" is opinion; Judges Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia, among others, also agreed on this point).

On a separate matter, the Justices unanimously declined to recognize the "false light" tort, which allows liability for false statements about people even when they're not defamatory but are just highly offensive. Most states recognize this tort, but some don't. (All states recognize the defamation tort.)

Kathleen C. Sullivan (Malloy & Sullivan) and Michael S. Lewis (Rath, Young and Pignatelli) (no, not the other Kathleen Sullivan and Michael Lewis) represented defendants.

Comments

[The Margrave of Azilia]

So could I (hypothetically) call the defendant a racist, America-hating communist and it wouldn't be defamatory?

[Kords]

Yes. Obviously.

[ReaderY]

You might be able to call the plaintiff a Nazi, as long as you took care not to assert anything New Hampshire would consider a fact, like membership in the Nazi party or cebrating Hitler’s birthday.

[Noscitur a sociis]

But if you’re in New Hampshire, might want to avoid “fascist”, “agent of fascists”, or “God damned racketeer”.

[ReaderY]

While I have no problem distinguishing “defamation” from “false light” as distinct torts, I think there should be a tort for this, and I think that such torts are not only constitutional but needed for public policy.

A core resson for the “fighting words” doctrine is that really outrageous accusations, like “Nazi,” tend to lead to breeches of the peace, as well as potentially destroying people’s reputation in the community. If citizens have no legal remedy to protect them, they tend to resort to illegal ones. So there SHOULD be a civil tort of some kind covering it.

I am skeptical that these kinds of accusations aren’t matters of fact. Sure there are boundary cases subject to an opinion. But it seems to me that “white supremacist,” like “Nazi,” has a core discernable meeting and while there is certainly a gray area, there are cases clearly within and cases clearly without it. There is a tendency in these areas for the judiciary to require so much unrealistic overprecision as to prevent the law from performing any useful role in society. I think one has to look to whether people in ordinary society, the ordinary reasonabke person, percieves an accusation as having a factual basis. An idea central to an absurdly stringent application of overbreadth, that government cannot regulate speech whenever some ivory tower expert can come up with an argument that the term might have a different meaning from the one ordinary people give it, strikes me as detrimental to the ability of law to preserve a civil so iety.

But I would have no problem giving these sorts of accusations their own tort and calling them something other than defamation if a state so prefers.

[ReaderY]

I also think that the majority needed to explain why the allegations made in this specific case would not have constituted a false light tort if the New Hampshire court had decided to recognize it. It seems hard to argue that the tort adds nothing and makes no difference if it would add something and make a difference here. (If it would have made no difference to this case, the court could also have spared itself the necessity of having to recognize it by saying we’ll wait for a case where it makes a difference to decide, perhaps expressing an opinion that the wait might be long.) This kind of accusation does not strike me as particularly unusual in our society. So if the difference matters to this case, I suspect it could matter to quite a few.

[David Nieporent]

I also think that the majority needed to explain why the allegations made in this specific case would not have constituted a false light tort if the New Hampshire court had decided to recognize it.

What? You the majority needed to explain why something that didn't exist would or would not apply if it did exist?

It seems hard to argue that the tort adds nothing and makes no difference if it would add something and make a difference here.

They are not recognizing a tort for one case.

[NOVA Lawyer]

Utterly confused and not the worst part of ReaderY's comment.

No, this shouldn't be tortious. Among other things, ReaderY, your edge case is not someone else's edge case which just goes to show how subjective this is. You might think "white supremacist" is less subjective than "racist", but I know people who think (or at least expressed the opinion) that Obama is a racist (against white people) though, to me, that is an objectively moronic viewpoint, so a false thing to say about him. My point is not about whether that person could be sued for defamation by Obama (Obama being a public figure and all), but that, despite the fact we can all agree, theoretically, that there are some things that are "white supremacist" (or racist) and others that are not, there is no general agreement on what those things are. Not only do courts not want to wade into that morass, it is a very bad idea from free speech and public policy perspective for them to do so.

Shorter: We'll put ReaderY down for supporting a Ministry of Truth to tell us what is and isn't racist, what is and isn't white supremacist, etc. Can't have people having different opinions on that and expressing them!

[David Nieporent]

A core resson for the “fighting words” doctrine is that really outrageous accusations, like “Nazi,” tend to lead to breeches of the peace, as well as potentially destroying people’s reputation in the community. If citizens have no legal remedy to protect them, they tend to resort to illegal ones. So there SHOULD be a civil tort of some kind covering it.

The fighting words doctrine — assuming it still exists (if it does, it's on life support) is based on the idea that some words carry with them the risk of immediate breach of the peace. That is, you say something particularly offensive to someone and he will reflexively punch you in the face before he even has a chance to think about it. It's not about protecting people from offense or licensing them to go around assaulting people when they are offended.

By the very nature of the concept, therefore, something has to essentially be face-to-face for the fighting words doctrine to come into play.

[ReaderY]

I am talking about civil liability, not arrest or criminal prosecution. Civil liability covers less immediate things, such as things that reflexively cause people to go punching even when there doesn’t happen to be an immediately ready target around.

I’ll just say briefly that the Constitution generally regards human beings as creatures possessing personhood and moral dignity, not as inanimate machines whose reflexes are to be merely mechanically controlled. The reason fighting words are prohibited is not purely and solely that they will induce inanimate reactions analogous to throwing an electric switch. It is also that they offend people’s personhood and dignity in a particularly strong way, so that people using violence to ward off affronts to their dignity, if not strictly legal, is treated more sympathetically and with more compassion than in an ordinary case.

And when an affront to people’s dignity is considered so substantial that people could understandably (if not strictly legally) use physical violence, they really ought to be able to have some remedy at law to use instead. That’s really at the core of what courts are for. It’s part of the core purposes of having a rule of law, protecting people’s dignity and preserving the peace.

[Noscitur a sociis]

I am talking about civil liability, not arrest or criminal prosecution. Civil liability covers less immediate things, such as things that reflexively cause people to go punching even when there doesn’t happen to be an immediately ready target around.

But again, the justification for the fighting words exception is that it’s necessary to prevent immediate violence. If you have time to file a civil lawsuit, it’s inherently inapplicable.

[ReaderY]

No, that’s not the only purpose of the doctrine.

Nor does it make sense even on the terms you give it. It seems rather quaint to suggest, in the 21st century no less, that people have to be in other’s immediate area to cause harm to them. It’s not like fists, or even guns, are the only means people have available to them these days to breach the peace. Technology has come quite a long way in terms of enabling people to wreak havoc at a distance. It’s a bit like saying freedom of the press only applies to ink physically pressed onto paper and anything else is clearly outside scope.

[Noscitur a sociis]

No, that’s not the only purpose of the doctrine.

Here is the Chaplinsky court's explanation for its holding:

On the authority of its earlier decisions, the state court declared that the statute’s purpose was to preserve the public peace, no words being “forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is addressed.” It was further said:

The word “offensive” is not to be defined in terms of what a particular addressee thinks…. The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight…. The English language has a number of words and expressions which, by general consent, are ‘fighting words’ when said without a disarming smile…. [S]uch words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight. So are threatening, profane or obscene revilings. Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming within the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted only when they have this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace…. The statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee, words whose speaking constitutes a breach of the peace by the speaker—including “classical fighting words,” words in current use less “classical” but equally likely to cause violence, and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and threats.

We are unable to say that the limited scope of the statute as thus construed contravenes the Constitutional right of free expression. It is a statute narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of state power, the use in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace.

Seems pretty unequivocal to me. What’s the authority you’re looking to for your claim?

Nor does it make sense even on the terms you give it. It seems rather quaint to suggest, in the 21st century no less, that people have to be in other’s immediate area to cause harm to them.

With all respect, I’d say the quaint thing is the idea that the government can put someone in jail for calling a police officer a racketeer. But be that as it may, Chaplinsky is pretty clear that the basis for the law isn’t protecting the subject of the speech from “harm”, but rather protecting the public generally (and, I presume, the speaker in particular) from being harmed by the subject in response to the speech. I don’t see how that can justify making it illegal to call someone a racist in a newspaper opinion piece.

[NOVA Lawyer]

"Seems pretty unequivocal to me. What’s the authority you’re looking to for your claim?"

It is unequivocal.

ReaderY appears to be relying solely on first principles, ala Descartes, and his own intelligence, such as it is.

[David Nieporent]

No, that’s not the only purpose of the doctrine.

It is.

Nor does it make sense even on the terms you give it. It seems rather quaint to suggest, in the 21st century no less, that people have to be in other’s immediate area to cause harm to them.

But nobody is suggesting that. You're piling aa false conclusion on a false assumption. The fighting words doctrine is not about harm to the target. Therefore, whether the words cause harm to the target near or far is irrelevant.

It’s not like fists, or even guns, are the only means people have available to them these days to breach the peace.

But it is like that. That's what breach of the peace means: that an altercation occurs. Not that someone is offended or harmed, but that there's danger to the general public.

[Riva]

I wonder where, in the range between unprotected incitement and protected expression, a comment suggesting that it's possible to conclude that a political rival being killed would benefit the country would fall? Probably protected but maybe this is the wrong scale? Maybe such words should be judged on the bat shit crazy stupid scale? Pretty much tops that measure.

[David Nieporent]

Bot still shilling for Hitler, I see.

[Riva]

There were 2 options for you. Show some intelligence, integrity and class and reject your bat shit craziness, or just embrace the bat shit crazy stupid and reply with “bot.” As to the meaning of the Hitler reference, only the bat shit crazy understand that.

[NOVA Lawyer]

ReaderY, shilling for the "triggered snowflake" exception to the First Amendment.

[David Nieporent]

reason fighting words are prohibited is not purely and solely that they will induce inanimate reactions analogous to throwing an electric switch

I mean, yes, it is.

[Riva]

But apparently the risk of an insurrection is still too high if one suggests a peaceful and patriotic protest to let such violent and traitorous language to go unpunished.

[Michael P]

How does one square the court's argument with the classic hypothetical about "my neighbor is a drunk" and undisclosed defamatory facts, unless the meaning of "racist" has become so attenuated by overuse that it is held to not really be offensive to a reasonable person. (But then why would it be used as an epithet?)

[Kords]

Saying "my neighbor is a drunk" implies the existence of underlying, verifiable facts (i.e., my neighbor drinks a lot of alcohol or regularly becomes intoxicated).

To the extent simply calling someone a "racist" implies underlying facts, the nature of those facts are not verifiable. Basically, the facts implied by calling someone a "racist" is that the person so accused engaged in "racist" acts or speech. But whether those acts or speech were "racist" is also a matter of unverifiable opinion - some people may think it was racist and others may not. So the implication of underlying facts doesn't serve to remove the "racist" epithet out of the realm of protected opinion.

[Michael P]

That's a facile distinction. Being a drunk isn't black and white; some people might say it because their neighbor has one alcoholic drink most days, or because he drinks multiple servings most days, or because he gets very inebriated most weekends; others will draw the line of "being a drunk" differently. The whole point of the "my neighbor is a drunk" hypo and the "undisclosed defamatory facts" doctrine is that disclosing the specific facts allows a listener to apply their judgement and their own thresholds in a way that saying "my neighbor is a drunk" forecloses. The exact same is true of saying "so-and-so is a racist".

[Krayt]

I supported gay rights and legal marijuana since almost 40 years ago. Politics is so saturated with intellectual fraud: you pick your position, then look for philosophy to support it, that people presume an ulterior motive. Because they have one.

No, I am not gay or a toker. I also note these kinds of accusations back then might have been made by the types whining about this Nazi accusation.

[apedad]

To borrow Mr. Bumble's straightforward line of thinking, (The way to stop discrimination is to stop discriminating,); if you don't want to be labeled as a racist or white supremacist then don't be a racist or white supremacist.

[GKHoff]

His point was, he is neither. Branding him publicly as such was therefore defamatory (but non-actionable, as it turns out).

[Bored Lawyer]

You're not that naive, are you? Those terms have become so debased as to be almost meaningless -- they have been applied in contexts far removed from real racism or white supremacy.

[David Nieporent]

they have been applied in contexts far removed from real racism or white supremacy.

As in this very case.

[Rossami]

By the available evidence, he wasn't a racist or white supremacist yet was falsely labeled as such anyway.

'The way to stop discrimination is to stop discriminating' works because you are controlling your own behavior. Being labeled is other people's behavior.

[questioner7]

Dissent is right. “Distributed white supremacist ideology” is reasonably taken to imply “distributed _undisputably_ white supremacist ideology”, when no reference to what was actually distributed is given.

[Longtobefree]

At this point, being called racist or sexist or homophobic (remember that one?), or transphobic creates a rebuttable presumption that you are NOT whatever it was you got labeled.

[Krayt]

Would that such mockery were so hyperbolic it could be laughably rejected out of hand.

It is fancy name calling, severed from the menial task of actually addressing issues, of which there are many facets in this issue. What to teach kids. Who decides? “Parents have no say in it!”, remember that good one? And the side trying to jam in the current teaching can probably recite chapter and verse on the evils of corporate regulatory capture, even as they tremulously stand there and feign natural divine right in their own capture of scholastic programs.

[Brett Bellmore]

The problem is that such accusations are simultaneously taken as hyperbolic verging on meaningless by perhaps most people, and at the same time treated as a target designation for destruction by any means possible by others.

There's no consensus response.

[santamonica811]

"..."for how someone would plausibly go about proving or disproving one's white supremacist bona fides"..."

I feel like, in the context of white supremacy [et al]; you should use 'mala fides' rather than 'bona fides.' (Only mostly joking)

[ConservativeProfessor]

Does a person perjure himself if he claims under oath to not be a white supremacist but turns out to be a member of the Ku Klux Klan? Can he claim as a defense that it is only his opinion that he is not a white supremacist?

[questioner7]

If I say someone "either committed murder or ate a sandwich", is that not defamatory because I'm not _definitely_ saying he committed murder? That would be odd. Likewise, here the statement was that someone "either spread actual white supremacist propaganda or ideas wrongly characterized as such". Does the less-than-definite nature of the statement make it not actionable? This doesn't seem right.

[The Margrave of Azilia]

[inappropriate Groucho Marx joke deleted]