The Volokh Conspiracy
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No Pseudonym for Ex-Pro-Basketball-Player Sexual Assault Defendant
"While this case involves a statutory conferral of anonymity, the legislature is not exempt from the Constitution."
From Judge John Kralik's decision in Dylan v. Doe (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County Aug. 2, 2024); the private school has identified itself as Campbell Hall, a prominent L.A. school, though the ex-player's name has not yet been noted in a court filing:
Plaintiff Haylsey Dylan f/k/a Hayley Mendell ("Plaintiff") alleges that in the summer of 1987, she was 15 years old and was attending summer school at Defendant Private School Doe when she was sexually assaulted by an adult male, Defendant John Doe (alluded to as a "Former Professional Athlete"), in a locked janitor's closet in the high school gymnasium. Plaintiff alleges that the Los Angeles Lakers were filming an instructional basketball video in Private School Doe's gym and that students and faculty were allowed to meet and interact with the players during breaks in the filming.
Plaintiff alleges that during one of the breaks, the production staff began ushering out the students, faculty, and parents to resume filming, but John Doe pointed toward her and said to the production staff, "She can stay." Plaintiff alleges that Private School Doe faculty members and staff were present in the gym that day, saw John Doe single Plaintiff out to remain with him, left her unattended, and did not provide any safeguards.
Plaintiff alleges that she took photographs with John Doe, he invited her to eat lunch with him, and he asked her for a school tour. Plaintiff alleges that during the tour, he took her to a janitor's closet and sexually assaulted her….
There has never been a basis, consistent with the constitutional right of the public to open proceedings, to conceal the names of the parties in this case. There is a general constitutional right of access by the public to all court proceedings….
In general, "[t]he names of all parties to a civil action must be included in the complaint. That requirement extends to real parties in interest—anyone with a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action."
To be consistent with the constitution, anonymity for parties must be demonstrated to be necessary to protect an important privacy interest. The Court of Appeal stated in the DFEH case:
[An] important constitutional right is implicated when a party is allowed to proceed anonymously: the right of public access to court proceedings. Among the guarantees of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is that court proceedings are open and public. Public access to court proceedings is essential to a functioning democracy. It promotes trust in the integrity of the court system, and it exposes abuses of judicial power to public scrutiny. The right of public access applies not only to criminal cases, but also to civil proceedings like this one. And the right to access court proceedings necessarily includes the right to know the identity of the parties.
The Court further stated:
Much like closing the courtroom or sealing a court record, allowing a party to litigate anonymously impacts the First Amendment public access right. Before a party to a civil action can be permitted to use a pseudonym, the trial court must conduct a hearing and apply the overriding interest test: A party's request for anonymity should be granted only if the court finds that an overriding interest will likely be prejudiced without use of a pseudonym, and that it is not feasible to protect the interest with less impact on the constitutional right of access.[] In deciding the issue the court must bear in mind the critical importance of the public's right to access judicial proceedings. Outside of cases where anonymity is expressly permitted by statute, litigating by pseudonym should occur "only in the rarest of circumstances.
While this case involves a statutory conferral of anonymity, the legislature is not exempt from the Constitution. [The relevant statute is Cal. Code Civ. Proc § 340.1, which allows lawsuits based on long-past alleged sexual assaults, but calls for defendants to be pseudonymous "until there has been a showing of corroborative fact as to the charging allegations against that defendant."] At a minimum, there must be a demonstrated need to restrict such access. This is plainly stated in the Constitution of the State of California:
A statute, court rule, or other authority, including those in effect on the effective date of this subdivision, shall be broadly construed if it furthers the people's right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right of access. A statute, court rule, or other authority adopted after the effective date of this subdivision that limits the right of access shall be adopted with findings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for protecting that interest.
Here, there is no need to restrict the public's knowledge of accusations of child sexual abuse. There is no rational basis by which the legislature could possibly be justified in providing anonymity to persons accused of childhood sexual abuse, or persons making such accusations. There is no need to limit the public's access. Such anonymity can only perpetuate the secret nature of childhood sexual abuse, with the result that more abuse will occur. Even if there were a need for anonymity in specific cases, allowing anonymity of all plaintiffs and persons accused of childhood sexual abuse in civil courts is not a narrowly drawn limitation on the public's right to know.
A recent law article … discusses these concerns further:
Public naming of litigants is one aspect of the broader "presumption, long supported by courts, that the public has a common-law right of access to judicial records." []"Public access to civil trials … provides information leading to a better understanding of the operation of government as well as confidence in and respect for our judicial system." []In particular, the right to public access "protects the public's ability to oversee and monitor the workings of the Judicial Branch," []and "promotes the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch." []"Public confidence [in the judiciary] cannot long be maintained where important judicial decisions are made behind closed doors and then announced in conclusive terms to the public, with the record supporting the court's decision sealed from public view.'"[]
In citing various Circuit Court cases, the article continues:
"The public[]" has a "legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts involved, including the identities of the parties." []"The people have a right to know who is using their courts." []"Anonymous litigation runs contrary to the rights of the public to have open judicial proceedings and to know who is using court facilities and procedures funded by public taxes." [] "The Court is a public institution and the public has a right to look over our shoulders and see who is seeking relief in public court." [] …
[P]seudonymization can lead to possibly pseudonymizing the name of others (such as a minor's parent and other parties) or even other cases; redactions and sealings of documents filed in the court and sealing of related cases; interference with reporting on cases; making it difficult to determine whether a party is a vexatious litigant or a judge is biased in favor of or against a litigant; and affecting a defendant's ability to test credibility and rebut a plaintiff's claims of damages. In addition,
Pseudonymity can also create a "risk of unfairness to the opposing party," []even when … the defendant knows the plaintiff's identity. … Fundamental fairness suggests that defendants are prejudiced when required to defend themselves publicly before a jury while plaintiffs make accusations from behind a cloak of anonymity.
For example, plaintiffs' pseudonymity may make it hard for defendants to defend themselves in public and may create an imbalance in settlement negotiation positions as a named defendant would be more eager to settle than a pseudonymous plaintiff.
As stated by the Court of Appeal in DFEH:
Much like closing the courtroom or sealing a court record, allowing a party to litigate anonymously impacts the First Amendment public access right. Before a party to a civil action can be permitted to use a pseudonym, the trial court must conduct a hearing and apply the overriding interest test: A party's request for anonymity should be granted only if the court finds that an overriding interest will likely be prejudiced without use of a pseudonym, and that it is not feasible to protect the interest with less impact on the constitutional right of access.[] In deciding the issue the court must bear in mind the critical importance of the public's right to access judicial proceedings. Outside of cases where anonymity is expressly permitted by statute, litigating by pseudonym should occur "only in the rarest of circumstances."
In the NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) case, the California Supreme Court discussed that before closing substantive courtroom proceedings and sealing documents, the trial court must hold a hearing and expressly find that: (i) there exists an overriding[] interest supporting closure and/or sealing; (ii) there is a substantial probability[] that the interest will be prejudiced absent closure and/or sealing; (iii) the proposed closure and/or sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and (iv) there is no less restrictive means of achieving the overriding interest.[]"
Based on these factors, the Court cannot justify allowing defendants to proceed anonymously in this action. As summarized above, John Doe opposes the request to reveal his name on the basis that Plaintiff's request is premature because, he says, there are no known facts to corroborate her allegations against John Doe at this time. He also argues that he is a public figure such that irreparable harm to his character and reputation may ensure such that it would be reasonable to maintain his confidentiality until after discovery.
However, John Doe has not provided any admissible evidence or other factual support for his claims. He has not explained or shown that the case is without merit, as he contends. John Doe has not explained how his status as a public figure affords him additional rights to maintain the confidentiality of his name or shield his identity. Celebrities must suffer the same embarrassment of accusation as regular people. Here, there is no overriding interest requiring that any party remain anonymous. Ms. Dylan has never sought such anonymity for herself—she is ready to subject herself to the embarrassment and stress of a public trial.
Moreover, there is an important public interest in knowing the names of anyone accused of childhood sexual assault as well as the names of the accuser so that those claims can be fairly evaluated and handled. The records of the Catholic Church and the Boy Scouts of America and other organizations that have cared for children show the tragic folly of attempting to suppress evidence of such accusations. Why should the Courts, which have imposed crippling judgments against these organizations, follow the same procedures they have condemned? When such accusations occur, both the accuser and accused should be identified by their true names so that the accusations can be proven or disproven in an open and fair court proceeding.
Thus, the Court does not find that there is an overriding interest supporting anonymity in Defendants' true names or that there is a substantial probability that Defendants' interests will be prejudiced if their true names are revealed. Rather, the Court upholds the constitutional right of access by the public of all court proceedings, which includes knowing the name of all parties in an action….
Defendant John Doe and Private School Doe shall proceed with this case with their true names upon entry of this order. The Plaintiff may amend the Complaint to disclose their true names….
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Professor Volokh, I'd love your take on something that happened a quarter century ago at UMass -- there had been a series of rape hoax reports throughout the fall and early spring with one every Tuesday.
In the midst of a *massive* anti-rape rally, with *hundreds* of police officers on the ground, a female student slices her face in her car, gets out and runs 500 yards across campus, blood streaming, and screaming that she'd just been attacked.
EMT's first ask her what happened to evaluate for possible concussion, then cops do the same to catch the perp -- and get two completely different stories. She tells one she was attacked in her car, the other that she was attacked after exiting it. Etc...
It gets better -- she was a disabled vet (something about a HumVee rolling over in Bosnia) and had twice attempted suicide on campus in the prior year -- that I knew about. Cops tell her she's clearly lying and her father threatens to sue UM for libel if they don't say she was attacked. So spineless UM does -- but doesn't name her.
Some of us know who she is -- and the local DA threatens to criminally prosecute us if we mention her name -- Massachusetts has some law that criminalizes revealing a rape victim's name. Even though she wasn't raped.
How does that play with this?
Sweet jeebus on a popesicle stick Grampa, would it pain you to include even one cite? Maybe to the alleged UMass press release you're whinging about?
Heck, what year was this? Put up or STFU.
Bet you won't.
You bet wrong.
It took some digging, but here is an AP story on it:
https://www.capecodtimes.com/story/news/1999/11/17/another-sexual-assault-reported-at/51028485007/
"Yesterday's victim reported she was assaulted by a knife-wielding man in a parking lot off North Pleasant Street. It was not immediately clear whether the victim was a student or member of the UMass faculty or staff. The extent of her injuries was unclear."
This story of course is entirely fictional. After reading it, I'm beginning to doubt that the state of Massachusetts even exists.
The STATE of Massachusetts does *not* exist.
Nor do the STATES of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Kentucky.
There was a story about a erson reporting being assaulted by a knife-wielding man.
https://www.capecodtimes.com/story/news/1999/11/17/another-sexual-assault-reported-at/51028485007/
Except there was no such man, she cut herself, and no one was allowed to say that.
The Harvard Crimson says the attack was fabricated.
The University concealed her identity.
And no charges were filed. "The district attorney's office has decided there's no law enforcement objective in prosecuting the woman" What?!?
Ed, I have to admit that, when you're right; you're right. You predicted doom and gloom at the DNC, with rioting and chaos. As usually, you were spot-on: the burning of neighborhoods was even worse than you predicted, and that was nothing compared to the utter lawless insanity inside the convention hall itself.
I have enough integrity to admit when I was wrong. Ed, you totally called it, and, in the future, we all should remember how accurate and perspicacious you were.
This judge is stunningly wrong to claim that "There is no rational basis by which the legislature could possibly be justified in providing anonymity to persons accused of childhood sexual abuse". There is a plausible argument that the rational basis is insufficient but to simply say that it doesn't even exist is ludicrous.
False accusations are definitely a thing. And in a world where the accusation (perp walk, etc) gets published on page one but the exhonoration/retraction/correction is buried on page 23 (if it gets published at all), it's a serious thing.
The legislature may have strunctured the law poorly or maybe overstepped but to simply assert that the legislature may have no say in this process at all is an absurd overreach by the court.
It isn't even that -- the perp walk will live on the internet for eternity.
This is a civil suit; there is no "perp walk."
Don't be obtuse
What I'm curious about and what we'll never know is how many high profile individuals are aware of those dynamics and simply pay off nonsense claims rather than deal with this-- even a complete vindication is worthless, after all, the lawyers won't defend it for free and the internet never forgets. An accuser who extorted $100K of after-fees nuisance change from ten extremely rich people would be a millionaire.
Or might be found floating face-down somewhere...
That's the way leftists operate. They'll say that a ban on collapsible stocks satisfies strict scrutiny, but a law prohibiting homosexual sodomy or naming civil defendants in a rape suit to be without rational basis.
Wow, angry much. With your long list of imagined grievances; you have GOT to be a full-throated Trump voter, yes?
He's too liberal for me. I usually vote the Constitution party.
That struck me, too. It's one thing to weigh the factors differently, but to say that there's no rational basis for anonymity is ludicrous.
Huh.
I have to admit, I'm a little confused on this one. I know that we have a presumption to open access to the courts (which I complete agree with!).
But I also know that people can proceed under pseudonyms. It's disfavored, highly so, but I don't see why it's an FA violation to legislate that for X issues, there is a burden shifting framework on that.
That seems more of a policy issue. I can imagine that it could become an FA issue, but not seeing it here.
Yes, there have even been Supreme Court cases which used pseudonyms.
I have long argued that there is simply no constitutional right involved. The matter should be one of statutory and common law. In a criminal trial, the accused has a 6th Anendment right to a public trial. One problem with inferring a broader first amendment right of the public is that it would render the textual 6th Amendment right completely superfluous. I think this violates a basic canon of construction. Courts should interpret provisions enacted at the same time, as the Bill of Rights was, to harmonize them wherever possible, interpreting them so no provision is superfluous. The Framers could not have possibly thought that there was already a provision covering openness of trials when they enacted the 6th Amendment. And there is an obvious difference between criminal and civil trials.
There is in particular no obvious reason that the constitution should entitle businesses to the kind of confidentiality they have long enjoyed in court, while mandating that ordinary people get screwed.
I think the legislature was entitled to make this judgment call and it is a usurpation of the judicial role to constitutionalize it.
And there is OBVIOUSLY a rational basis for it.
Correct.
The state does have a legitimate interest in protecting the reputations of those accused but not yet adjudged of wrongdoing. If a policy is rationally related to this interest and does not implicate fundamental rights, it should survive a court challenge.
But don't forget this rule of constitutional construction:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
At some point you can just read too much into what isn't there. "Look, here it says the defendant has a right to an impartial jury. But it doesn't say he has the right to an impartial judge! Surely if there was such a right, they would have said so!" "Hey, this says you can't deprive someone of life, liberty, or property without due process. But it says absolutely nothing about depriving them of their sense of smell without due process! It must be legal!"
None of your examples result in rendering an actual constitutional provision superfluous.
Further, it’s by no means obvious that a right to speech comprises a right to intrude on others, against their will and wishes, to gather information. The Supreme Court had for half a century had a doctrine in which marriage was a matter of “privacy.” Why does it follow that the same constitution requires divorces to be public, just because judges are involved?
I am unconvinced that there is a First Amendment right to access to courts. Perhaps it allows people to be more informed and that's good for speech, but if you follow that logic, there's also a First Amendment right to free college, free Internet, anything which allows more access to information. If there's a right to court access in civil cases, it's unenumerated. (Not that I think courts should restrict access; just the opposite.)
But on the other hand... when a party uses pseudonyms, it's not just that the government is declining to reveal the information; almost always the other side is actively prohibited from revealing the party's name to the public. *That* restriction is fairly categorized as a First Amendment issue.
It would not render anything superfluous; the rights belong to different people. A defendant can't assert a newspaper's first amendment rights to cover a trial.
The Findlaw link appears to currently show an old version of 340.1; it does not match the version of the law quoted by the judge. California has changed that law a few times.
Heh. Interesting choice of using ellipses there. Do we know anyone who possibly could have written that law article on pseudonymous litigation?
As far as my thoughts on the subject go... The requirement to have pseudonymity *only* applies in the special case where the plaintiff is suing for childhood abuse but is over 40. This case involved alleged conduct from 1987, and was commenced in 2022. Ordinarily any lawsuit involving conduct from 35 years ago would have been long since time-barred. This is the legislature saying "OK, you can sue, but there are some special concerns with totally eliminating the statute of limitations like we did here, so here are some extra hoops to jump through." I am likewise not convinced that the defendant's due process rights are being violated because the plaintiff has to make an *extra* showing that most plaintiffs wouldn't have to make, and the defendant doesn't get to be there for that showing. That would be like a defendant complaining that they don't get to be there when a court decides whether a vexatious litigant is allowed to proceed. Not having to show up for that is a protection from frivolousness.
I agree with Rossami's comment that there is certainly a rational basis. Even if that's not the standard and it is indeed unconstitutional, it leaves me wondering whether the judge is truly incapable of comprehending why such a law would be passed. This judge has already been overruled by the appeals court on this case; I'm guessing he will be again.
The judge cites a case which says: "Outside of cases where anonymity is expressly permitted by statute, litigating by pseudonym should occur 'only in the rarest of circumstances.'" That is an odd case to cite, considering that here, the anonymity IS expressly permitted by statute!
David C: Whoops, sorry for the link to the old version -- just replaced it with a link to the leginfo.legislature.ca.gov site.
I must wonder if there is a due process right to have certain lawsuits or prosecutions time-barred even in the absence of statutes of limitation, or in the presence of statures expressly authorizing such prosecutions and lawsuits.