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Severability on the Shadow Docket: SCOTUS Splits 5-4 On Whether Entirety of Title IX Regulations Must Be Enjoined
Justice Gorsuch joins the three dissenters on severability. What about Justices Thomas and Barrett?
Recently, federal district courts in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits enjoined the new Title IX regulations in their entirety. These courts declined to sever three provisions that injure the plaintiff from the remainder of the scheme. Both courts of appeals declined to stay those rulings. The Solicitor General asked the Supreme Court to narrow those injunctions to three provisions that the plaintiffs allege injure them. By a 5-4 vote, the Court denied the SG's stay application in Department of Education v. Louisiana. The Court issued a per curiam opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson.
It would be wrong to assume that Justice Gorsuch is Bostocking again on transgender rights. The four dissenters upheld the injunction against that three critical provisions that redefine sex discrimination to include gender identity, regulate sex-separated facilities like bathrooms, and redefine hostile environment harassment. Sotomayor's dissent explains that the plaintiffs' "alleged injuries flow from those three provisions." And this measured dissent, which lacks any of the vitriol we've seen of late, was probably tailored to keep Justice Gorsuch's join. Sotomayor explains:
For now, on the briefing and record currently before us, I would stay the preliminary injunctions except as to the three provisions above, in keeping with the traditional principle of equitable remedies that"relief afforded [to] the plaintiffs" must not "be more burdensome than necessary to redress the complaining parties." . . .
At this juncture, however, enjoining the application of any other part of the Rule needlessly impairs the Government from enforcing Title IX and deprives potential claimants of protectionsagainst forms of sex discrimination not at issue in respondents' suit.
What, then, was the disagreement? The Justices fractured on severability. Indeed, severability, along with vacatur and nationwide injunctions, are among the most unresolved areas of the Court. In recent years, Justices Thomas, and later, Justice Gorsuch, have called for a re-examination of severability doctrine. That Justice Gorsuch dissented here likely reflects his nuanced views on severability. He rejects the notion that courts can "vacate" rules, in large part because of standing doctrine. To Justice Gorsuch, if a provision does not injure a person, it cannot be enjoined.
But where is Justice Thomas on this issue? And Justice Barrett has been very skeptical about granting preliminary relief. She seems to be trending to the position advanced by Sam Bray that there should not be a fixation solely on the likelihood of the merits--or a preview of the merits question. But that is precisely what the per curiam opinion did here.
The majority per curiam opinion only had this to say about severability:
In this emergency posture in this Court, the burden is on the Government as applicant to show, among other things, a likelihood of success on its severability argument and that the equities favor a stay. On this limited record and in its emergency applications, the Government has not provided this Court a sufficient basis to disturb the lower courts' interim conclusions that the three provisions found likely to be unlawful are intertwined with and affect other provisions of the rule. Nor has the Government adequately identified which particular provisions, if any, are sufficiently independent of the enjoined definitional provision and thus might be able to remain in effect.
Here, Justice Kavanaugh's Labrador concurrence provided the rule: the Court focuses almost exclusively on likelihood of success on the merits. There is no discussion at all about irreparable harm. By contrast, Justice Sotomayor's dissent expressly discusses the balance of harms:
By blocking the Government from enforcing scores of regulations that respondents never challenged and that bear no apparent relationship to respondents' alleged injuries, the lower courts went beyond their authority to remedy the discrete harms alleged here. The injunctions this Court leaves in place will burden the Government more than necessary. The injunctions will also affect the public. Individuals in the respondent states will be deprived of guidance related to their rights under Title IX, of updates to the processes schools must follow in investigating their complaints of sex discrimination, of protections from retaliation should they file a complaint, and of much more.
These interests are absent in the majority's opinion.
The majority's only discussion of the "equities" concerns how quickly the lower courts will hear oral argument. That is not really a weighing of the equities. This analysis throws any sort of four-factor test out the window. Again, I think Justice Kavanaugh was correct in Labrador. But it provides further rejection of Justice Barrett's Does v. Mills analysis.
And what about Justice Thomas? Unless you believe that the Court has a writ of erasure, and can "vacate" rules, the notion of enjoining provisions of Title IX that inflict no injury needs to be explained. Now in Corner Post, Justice Kavanaugh zealously defended the vacatur, especially with regard to entities that are not regulated. But other members of the majority, including Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Barrett, were mum.
There is a lot here going on in the vacatur/severability debate. I think the Court did not want to get into that thicket with a shadow docket case. They likely thought it sufficient now to deny relief, without weighing in on whether other provisions should be put on ice. If I had to guess, Justice Kavanaugh and/or Chief Justice Roberts wrote this per curiam opinion.
This issue will likely come back to the Court probably later this term, with a cert grant before January. If Trump prevails, and the SG witches positions, the Court will probably DIG the case, and issue a Munsingwear vacatur. Skrmetti would likely suffer a similar fate. The Court can decide even fewer cases!
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This foreshadows Gorsuch writing a 5-4 majority opinion on the merits that upholds the Biden rule in the same logic as Bostock.
“If Trump prevails, and the SG witches positions, the Court will probably DIG the case”
If he rescinds the order, that is. If they switch position but the order remains the court would probably just appoint someone to defend the order itself.
It does not. Every member of the court agreed that the portions pertaining to gender identity should be enjoined. From the dissent:
"Every Member of the Court agrees respondents are entitled to interim relief as to three provisions of that Rule: 34 CFR §106.10 (2023) (defining sex discrimination [to include discrimination on the basis of gender identity), §106.31(a)(2) (prohibiting schools from preventing individuals from accessing certain sex-separated spaces consistent with their gender identity), and §106.2’s definition of hostile environment harassment."
What this signals is that the provisions relating to gender identity are very likely to be stricken 9-0, once the 6th Cir hands it up. The only real question is how much of the rest of the rule survives.
The unanimous part of the case suggests that procedurally it was the proper approach. It is far from clear that every justice, including each liberal and Gorsuch, will strike it down on the merits.
I disagree, Bostock v Clayton County was 6-3 at the time with Roberts joining Gorsuch to cross into the majority.
The language at issue in that case was passed by Congress around the same time as the near-identical language of the law in this case so I foresee a 5-4 majority at minimum carving this case out the same way as Bostock unless they find some weird thing in the way the regulation itself was procedurally implemented.
The latter case is one I’m less willing to put money against.
You don’t seem to be disagreeing with me.
"Striking it down" references the Biden rule. I disagree with the prediction it would be struck down "9-0."
Yesterday, all nine justices agreed on a limited procedural point. That doesn't tell me much.
You’re right, I think I’m agreeing with you.
The witches? Is that a reference to Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson and their goofy ideas about sex?
"Witches position"
Is that like when the coffee lady changes from Almira Gulch into the Wicked Witch of the West inside the twister?
FIRST! Leads to typos, perhaps.
Gorsuch and Thomas have in the past questioned the breadth of injunctive relief. Court reform discussions should examine the issue.
For instance, the Final Report of the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court (btw, William Baude was a commissioner) has many references to injunctions, which has been the concern of congressional legislation over the years.
The problem here is really the difference between injunctive relief and vacatur. With injunctive relief, narrowly tailoring the remedy and weighing the equities is the standard. But if a rule is invalid, because it, for example, violated the APA, it is invalid. It’s much more black and white. It’s much harder slicing and dicing the remedies – it makes little sense for a rule be valid in the 9th Circuit, but invalid in the 5th, and somewhere in between in others, when the issue is that it was not legally promulgated. Here, it appears (without reading the decision or dissent) that part of the rule was contrary to the underlying statutes. That was apparently unanimous (even with our newest Justice, who apparently can’t tell men from women). That requires vacatur. But of the whole rule? Maybe not.
This vacatur versus injunctive relief, esp in the regulatory setting, is pretty new. My view is that if a regulation is improperly promulgated, the vacatur has always been required. And, yes, it’s a move by the right to try to get the regulatory state under control. And from the right, it’s none too soon. The Obama Administration jumped over all the hurdles implementing the ACA. We may not have liked the fact finding conclusions, but they did perform the required APA Notice and Comment. The Biden Administration has repeatedly just skipped it, relying on EOs and the like. Rule making from the WH, and not the agencies involved, bypassing required formalities.
“right to try to get the regulatory state under control”
Litigation during the Trump Administration accused them of not properly following formalities. Various courts, including the Supreme Court, found that it did not in various cases.
I am somewhat doubtful about concluding “without reading the decision or dissent” that part of the rule was contrary. Not that reading them would clarify that much, especially the opaque per curiam. The unanimous part involved a limited procedural judgment with the merits not discussed from what I can tell.
Was this written intentionally ironically or unintentionally ironically?
Labrador was about enjoining a State law.
Title IX regulations on treatment of gender identity are not legislation that was passed, but newer interpretation of existing Federal law.
I expect Sotomayor to be absurdly deferrential to government but I am disturbed to see Gorsuch signing on to that approach. Government as a party is vastly different from other parties in litigation. When government does something challengable, all benefit of doubt should go the other way.
This is especially true when the government action being challenged is executive agency "interpretation" of law.
Gorsuch is a lawbot. He cares not for consequence or broader pictures.
You knew this when you picked him.
It’s one of the reasons I, a liberal, have him as my favorite Justice right now. He focuses on the law, the text, and writing an opinion that a layman like me can read.
The Louisiana District Court order is at https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.lawd.205659/gov.uscourts.lawd.205659.54.0.pdf
It enjoins the final rule at 89 FR 33474 within the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, and Idaho. Literally that is what it says, "the FINAL RULE ... is hereby enjoined and restrained from going into effect". If the rule does go into effect despite being ordered not to go into effect, can the rule be held in contempt?
A separate paragraph gives an order to actual human beings not to enforce the law.
They could always pull an Andrew Jackson, but I wouldn’t die on this hill if I were any administration.