The Volokh Conspiracy
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Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions
Controversial memes, mandatory recusal, and punitive damages caps.
Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.
This year the Fourth of July isn't just America's independence day—it's also, ironically, general election day in the old mother country. Over at Discourse Magazine, IJ's own Anthony Sanders uses this coincidence as an opportunity to reflect on the differences between the two countries. Such as: when Americans declared their independence, it ended up not just being from Britain but from the British constitutional system. Parliamentary supremacy was out, written "higher law" constitutions were in. Which meant judicial review was too. Yet, some judges keep wanting to be British, even today.
New on the Short Circuit podcast: British connections with the US of A, old and new. The Supreme Court's affirmation of the ancient common law right of trial by jury in SEC v. Jarkesy and a Fifth Circuit crime caper at the British Consul General's home.
- Newly hired Massachusetts high school teacher is discovered to have posted six "controversial" memes to her TikTok account months before she was hired. She is promptly un-hired and sues for violation of her First Amendment rights. But the First Circuit, in a ruling with inexplicably strange section headings (including "Table-Setting," "The Main Course," and "Parting Words") says there's no claim here.
- Certain federal statutes allow litigants that prevail against the gov't to recover their attorneys' fees, but, as the Second Circuit reminds us, litigants haven't "prevailed" just because they've gotten literally everything they wanted.
- Under New York law, political groups that nominate candidates aren't considered "parties" until they reach a certain size. Until that point, they're "independent bodies." The difference matters, because parties can receive contributions of $138,600 from individuals (and unlimited contributions to pay for headquarters, staff, etc.), and may make unlimited contributions to their candidates, while "independent bodies" are limited to receiving and making contributions of $9,000. An independent body challenges these distinctions. Second Circuit: Allowing 15x greater contributions to the groups most likely to control government is closely drawn to preventing corruption.
- Oops! District judge presiding over a case involving Bank of America discovers his wife owned stock in the company. She divested before the judge ruled. Was recusal mandatory? Must the court of appeals vacate the ruling? Second Circuit: Yes, and yes.
- In 2017, the "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville, Va. sought to protest the city's decision to remove a statue of Robert E. Lee. And, as a subsequent civil trial found, to incite violence for which a jury awarded more than $26 mil in damages, of which $24 mil were punitive damages. But the district court slashed the punitive damages to $350k by applying a Virginia cap on punitive damages to the award. Fourth Circuit: Which was improper. The $350k cap applies per plaintiff. Remanded for recalculation.
- Allegation: Louisiana prison officials kept IJ client Percy Taylor in prison an extra 525 days after his sentence had finished; indeed, the state overdetains a quarter of its prisoners, a fact that's been known to the head of the state's prison system for over 10 years. So, no qualified immunity for him, right? Fifth Circuit (2023): The right to timely release is clearly established, but Taylor didn't satisfy this fun, special third prong to the QI test: whether the prison chief's conduct was "objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law." Fifth Circuit (2024, unpublished): Okay, just kidding, there is no third prong. But Taylor still loses because he wasn't actually overdetained! The state court judge who said that he was (and ordered him released) did his figuring wrong.
- Adrian, Mich. city commissioner gets beered up and goes on Facebook, where he is chagrined to see that a local gadfly has posted a picture of him during his time as a Chippendales dancer, along with a variety of criticisms. The commissioner calls the gadfly's mom, a fellow real-estate agent, and they exchange some disputed words. The gadfly sues for First Amendment retaliation. Sixth Circuit: The commissioner was acting as a private citizen, notwithstanding being represented under the city's insurance coverage.
- Lexington, Ky. officers get a tip that man is selling drugs from apartment. After each of two controlled buys, the man drives from the buy location to the apartment. So the officers had probable cause to get a warrant to search the apartment? Sixth Circuit (en banc): Sure did. Motion to suppress denied. And even if they didn't, the good-faith exception applies. Dissent: An uncorroborated tip and a tenuous connection to a location do not probable cause create.
- Two teens threw lit matches into the woods on Chimney Tops Mountain in the Great Smoky Mountains on Thanksgiving Eve 2016, sparking a fire. The park's fire management officer decided to let it burn, believing that natural barriers would catch and hold the fire. He rejected the local fire department's offer of help and didn't call in the park's fire staff (who were out for the holiday). The fire worsened. By the time the officer requested more help and officials ordered the area evacuated, it was too late—the fire engulfed Gatlinburg, Tenn., killing 14 people, injuring nearly 200, and destroying property worth hundreds of millions. Much litigation ensued. As for the families of the dead and those who lost property, the feds tried to toss their claims for filing the wrong forms. Sixth Circuit (2023, with three opinions): No. As for the insurers, the feds tried to toss their claims for challenging discretionary decisions. Sixth Circuit (2024, with three opinions): The fire management officer ignored the mandatory incident-command structure, so that claim goes forward, as does the claim that the park failed to warn about the imminent danger of the fire.
- In 1987, a 17-year-old is sentenced to 42–60 years in prison for his role in a home invasion and sexual assault, which the sentencing court described as "one of the most heinous crimes that it ha[d] presided over." He will not be eligible for parole until 2027, when he'll be 57 years old. Does the sentence effectively keep him in prison for life without parole in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights? Sixth Circuit (over a dissent): We can't answer that. His claim attacks a combination of his sentence and the statute that won't let him out on parole before 2027. He should've brought a habeas claim, not a § 1983 claim.
- Eighth Circuit (2023): It was dark out and the video is inconclusive, so plaintiff, a mom begging a Springdale, Ark. officer to stop holding her minor (mistakenly identified) children at gunpoint, might have seemed like a threat to the officer. No constitutional violation for pointing a taser at her. Eighth Circuit (2024, per curiam): It was dark out and the video is inconclusive, so we accept the plaintiff's version of events, under which a Washington County, Minn. officer shot an armed, suicidal—but not threatening—man dead. We don't even have jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity.
- Allegation: Meta Platforms, Inc., which operates Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, prefers to hire H-1B visa holders over U.S. citizens because it can pay the former less money. Naturalized U.S. citizen sues, claiming this violates federal law. Ninth Circuit: We agree and split with the Fifth Circuit. Dissent: Federal law prohibits discriminating against non-citizens. It doesn't prohibit discriminating against citizens. Even though "I personally like the majority's conclusion better than mine."
- Allegation: The Office of Foreign Asset Control has threatened to impose sanctions on transactions involving humanitarian aid to Iran. As a result, third-party banks won't facilitate our transactions and pharmaceutical companies won't provide the wound dressings we need. Ninth Circuit (unpublished): No standing. Maybe banks and pharmaceutical companies would refuse to do business with Iran even if they didn't fear sanctions. Who's to say?
- Ninth Circuit (unpublished): Officers have been on notice since 2014 that it's unconstitutional excessive force to handcuff a calm, compliant 10-year-old who is surrounded by adults. So no qualified immunity for these Honolulu officers who arrested a girl at school for drawing a threatening cartoon picture. Contrary to the district court, however, the false-arrest claim is a no-go.
- Allegation: Two Mesa, Ariz. officers approach suspected drunk driver's vehicle on foot. The driver declines to hand over his keys, instead reversing slowly and knocking down an officer who'd been reaching into the vehicle with a taser. The car stops when it collides with a patrol car, at which point the officer who'd fallen shoots at the driver nine times, killing him. Officer (who has an Army Ranger tattoo despite never being one): I thought the other officer was pinned under the car! District court: Then why did you fire in that direction? Ninth Circuit (unpublished): Yeah, a reasonable jury might not believe you. Denial of QI affirmed. Dissent: There's no case on point saying an officer who just had his taser knocked out of his hands can't shoot into a car.
- Driver of a Mercedes parks poorly; it rolls into another car at a Los Angeles strip mall. Man from the other car punches the Mercedes driver. Everyone leaves, but the driver of the Mercedes reappears and fires into the other car (which contains not only the man but also his girlfriend and their baby). The man is fatally struck. Did it violate the Mercedes driver's Fifth Amendment rights to put him in a cell with a jailhouse informant after he invoked his Miranda rights? Ninth Circuit: The Supreme Court has never said so, so it's not clearly established for AEDPA purposes. No need to upset his conviction for second-degree murder.
- Is the mayor of Wichita's political campaign's Facebook page a "public entity" that must comply with the ADA? Tenth Circuit: The Supreme Court has definitively answered the question of whether a personal social-media page is also an official gov't social-media page, and the definitive answer is "maybe, sometimes, it depends." So this claim goes to discovery.
- When the Constitution says that takings require the gov't to pay "just compensation," does it mean the gov't actually has to pay the compensation, or is it enough if the gov't just gives you an unenforceable judgment suggesting it really ought to pay you compensation (but only if it wants to)? Louisiana Supreme Court: Is that really your question? It's the first thing. (IJ had urged this eminently sensible result in our amicus brief.)
- And in en banc news, the Fifth Circuit will reconsider its decision that it may have violated the First Amendment for Llano, Tex. public libraries to have removed children's books abouts "butts and farts," as well as books about gender, sexuality, and racism, in response to citizen complaints.
Victory! Last week, the Alaska Supreme Court overturned a lower court ruling that had barred families who choose to send their kids to private schools from receiving tuition reimbursements from the state's correspondence study program. The new ruling means that the reimbursements for over 20,000 students (who can receive up to $4.5k per year) are safe for at least the next school year. Moreover, on remand, the supreme court ordered the lower court to consider our arguments under the U.S. Constitution, something it had declined to do in its first ruling. Click here to learn more.
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In the Unite the Right case, I feel like the Court of Appeals panel thinks the law must authorize more punitive damages because the defendants are bad people who deserve to be punished more. It shouldn't matter whether the event was a historic event or a routine car crash.
"who deserve to be punished more." That is literally the point of punitive damages.
The judges were asked to decide whether the statutory limit on punitive damages was $350,000 or $2+ million. This is a question of law that should not depend on whether the plaintiffs were mildly evil or Trump incarnate.
You think it’s unreasonable that they don’t want to punish plaintiffs for joining? You would prefer each plaintiff file separately if they don't want to share punitives?
If the limit is per tort and not per plaintiff the defendants should be liable for no more than $350,000 no matter how the cases are split.
I don't have an opinion on what the legislature meant, subjectively or objectively. I am unimpressed by the court's apparent desire to dispense justice rather than interpret the law.
Ah, so for you it's not about what the law says, or what the law means, just about minimizing punishment to January 6 insurrectionists. Got it. Forgot for a moment you were one of the more ridiculous commenters here.
The lawsuit against Wichita claims the former mayor's campaign page had videos without captions. By the time of summary judgment the city had captions on what it considered to be its official YouTube and Facebook pages.
I have worked for an entity that was subject to a consent decree requiring captions on videos.
Captions on images on web pages were mandatory 30 years ago.....
Well, no, not least of all because hypertext didn't support it yet in 1994.
I can't speak to the exact year. Around the late 1990s there was a dispute between the religious leaders who demanded that every image have an alt tag and the more techy people who questioned the value of replacing a 1x1 pixel GIF image with text saying "this image is blank". At the time empty images were used to control layout. CSS put an end to that controversy by making spacer.gif obsolete. But it was important because of claims that compliance with W3C accessibility "guidelines" was required by law.
The exact year matters when the question is whether something happened in a particular year. I would suggest that taking legal advice from religious leaders is not smart, and citing that advice decades later is. . . well, it's something.
The city of Watertown, Massachusetts recently decided I wanted their email updates. The PR folks decreed that emails should be in HTML form with a graphic at the top. The WWW priests or ADA lawyers decreed that every graphic must be described in plain text. My phone shows a few lines of words in the message list. In that list a message from a normal person shows "Hi, it's raining today so we've cancelled the poultry party." A message from an ADA-regulated city begins "The City of Watertown [image description: graphic of a flag, words 'Watertown City Ha…". I have to open the message to get any of the text.
In 1987, a 17-year-old is sentenced to 42–60 years in prison for his role in a home invasion and sexual assault, which the sentencing court described as "one of the most heinous crimes that it ha[d] presided over." He will not be eligible for parole until 2027, when he'll be 57 years old. Does the sentence effectively keep him in prison for life without parole in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights? Sixth Circuit (over a dissent): We can't answer that. His claim attacks a combination of his sentence and the statute that won't let him out on parole before 2027. He should've brought a habeas claim, not a § 1983 claim.
I see this guy was pro se-- which explains the procedural error and also the audacity of receiving such a lenient sentence, after going to trial, and complaining about it. When he is eligible for parole, I hope the parole board laughs in his face. Looks like they have to let him out when he's 77, but he shouldn't get out a moment sooner and hopefully he dies before that.
You think that 60 years for rape is "lenient"?
It wasn't "just" sexual assault, he was a one predator crime spree-- two counts of armed robbery, three counts felony fire arm, breaking and entering, and unlawful driving away a motor vehicle. The underlying state court opinion has more details. I might be willing to let him out earlier if he had pled but he didn't; instead of accepting responsibility, he went to trial and lost on some charges. I would have therefore maxed out everything to run consecutively and given him what amounts to a life sentence even if it was formally just a lot of years. That he can someday get out at all is incredibly lenient. That he might be eligible for early release before he's even a senior citizen is even more lenient. And yet still he complains. And presumably couldn't find a lawyer to go along with this nonsense, hence proceeding pro se.
Even to the extent you disagree and want to go soft on crime, the 8th Amendment is silent on this topic. This is something for the voters, not courts, to decide and to the extent the people decide that treatment of criminal predators is overly harsh, then commutation and pardon policies exist for a reason. The court didn't get to the merits, but assuming he files a habeas petition then it should be summarily rejected.
It was not a "crime spree." It was a single course of conduct. He broke into a house, robbed it, and raped the homeowner. The rape was by far the most serious offense; the rest was just whatever the inverse of gilding the lily is.
A life sentence for rape is not just insanely harsh, but isn't even good policy. Many criminals are not rational, but to the extent one is, well, it doesn't take a lot of book learning to figure out that not leaving witnesses behind is the logical thing to do. That doesn't mean I think the constitutional claim has merit; I don't. (I do think that punishing someone for excerising their constitutional right to a trial, as you propose, is unconstitutional, though.)
You're not the same poster posting under a new handle who used to argue that prisons were too cushy, are you?
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"Allowing 15x greater contributions to the groups most likely to control government is closely drawn to preventing corruption."
Anyone care to speculate as to what this sentence is trying to say?
(Also, if it is saying that making it easier to donate to people who actually wield power reduces corruption... just, what?)
They're suggesting that only large parties are in a position to be corrupt since they have power in government, because they think we're dumb enough to think the word "corruption" necessarily implies "government corruption." I guess when your readers are libertarians you can just blow smoke up their asses like that and assume they won't question it. What the law actually is preventing is individuals launching fake one-man campaigns to play silly buggers with campaign funds.
Why is that a government interest? (At most, it sounds like a tax issue.)
It is largely a tax issue, and the government is allowed to prevent tax fraud and money laundering. Compelled, even.
A tax issue is addressed by requiring such a person to pay taxes on funds received, not by forbidding the person from receiving funds in the first place.
So you prefer a different tax policy than the New York legislature. Good for you. Your preference is one that, historically, didn't work very well at all.
The Supreme Court has said that restrictions on campaign contributions can be justified by the government’s interest in fighting corruption and the appearance of corruption. The Second Circuit concluded that this was sufficient to uphold the law being challenged. John Ross is puckishly suggesting that allowing eatablsihed politicians better access to donations looks more corrupt, not less.
“It’s about tax fraud, and not about politicians keeping competition down!” — the politicians
" Second Circuit: Allowing 15x greater contributions to the groups most likely to control government is closely drawn to preventing corruption"
The real reason is preventing competition.
"litigants haven't "prevailed" just because they've gotten literally everything they wanted." Catalyst theory not apply in this instance?
"Allowing 15x greater contributions to the groups most likely to control government is closely drawn to preventing corruption." In what world? Bribing people who have no power is not likely to accomplish much.
"The $350k cap applies per plaintiff." That might well be how the statute reads. But as a normative matter, punitive damages aren't about awarding (or rewarding) the plaintiff, but punishing and deterring the defendant.
"The commissioner was acting as a private citizen, notwithstanding being represented under the city's insurance coverage." Boy I hope the citizens of that city get to go after the commissioner to pay out of pocket for all that representation.
"He will not be eligible for parole until 2027, when he'll be 57 years old. Does the sentence effectively keep him in prison for life" <--- why people hate lawyers, especially criminal defense lawyers.
"prefers to hire H-1B visa holders over U.S. citizens because it can pay the former less money." What a can of worms. All kinds of rational reasons to look for employees who will work for less money
"No standing. Maybe banks and pharmaceutical companies would refuse to do business with Iran even if they didn't fear sanctions." What a perversion, and more reason to jettison the standing doctrine, which is not required by the Constitution.
"Did it violate the Mercedes driver's Fifth Amendment rights to put him in a cell with a jailhouse informant after he invoked his Miranda rights? Ninth Circuit: The Supreme Court has never said so, so it's not clearly established" How about just, "No"?
"Is the mayor of Wichita's political campaign's Facebook page a "public entity" that must comply with the ADA?" A CAMPAIGN page is different than just a personal page. Definitionally, a campaign page cannot be part of government activity. The distinction between the two (admittedly a convenient legal fiction) is foundational to so many laws.
On the punitive damages, the statute reads:
I see words here like "in any action" and "total amount awarded" and "in no event" which make me think the court got it wrong. The limit applies to any action (one lawsuit is one action, as I understand it), the limit is on the total amount, and there are no exceptions. I appreciate that it might be easier on the courts to do it the other way - the plaintiffs "would have 350,000 not to join their claims" - but good policy does not trump statute.
"Did it violate the Mercedes driver's Fifth Amendment rights to put him in a cell with a jailhouse informant after he invoked his Miranda rights?
How is putting a known informant in with him and saying wink wink not a violation of his rights? That is a government action with a deliberate partner working with them. It isn't some random guy he stumbled across.
8: “Dissent: An uncorroborated tip and a tenuous connection to a location do not probable cause create.”
He went directly back to the apartment after the first buy. At the second buy, they observed the defendant leave the apartment, go directly to the buy (where drugs were exchanged for money, just like they were at the first buy), and go directly back to the apartment. I suppose it’s *possible* that a drug dealer just leaves all his drugs and money in his car, but the standard here is probable cause, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The tip was not uncorroborated – that’s a ridiculous claim; does the judge even know the definition of that word? The tip said the guy was selling drugs out of an apartment. The controlled buys proved 100% that the guy was in fact selling drugs. That’s corroboration. The guy came directly from said apartment, and went directly back to said apartment after the buy. That’s also corroboration even if it’s not proof.
I agree that this doesn’t seem like a close call. Kind of remarkable that four judges thought it wasn’t, or that any thought it wouldn’t qualify for the good faith exception.
In National Gay Task Force v. Oklahoma Board of Public Edication, the 10th Circuit struck down the School Board’s policy of firing teachers who advocated tolerance of homosexuality outside of school on First Amendment grounds.
It seems to me that if the case got it right, it covers McRae. The fact that in 40 years the positions have reversed – a school board is now firing a teacher for opposition advocacy outside of school hours on grounds that the oposite position is now considered the disruptive one – shouldn’t make the slightest difference to the First Amendment analysis.
The First Circuit didn’t so much as cite the case, or indeed any of various others from late in the last century in which teachers successfully challenged being fired for advocating tolerance of homosexuality. It spoke from general principles as if the whole subject was one of first impression. It isn’t.
What’s sauce for the goose ought to be sauce for the gander. The same First Amendment priniciples that courts used to permit yesterday’s advocates of homosexuality to force their way into teaching in schools over the protests of conservstive school boards should also permit today’s opponents to teach over the protests of liberal school boards.
Situational ethics: The high valuation of a philosophical principle when it supports your already decided-upon position, and the low valuation of it when it gets in the way of another.