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SEC v. Jarkesy: A Win for the Separation of Powers and the Right to Civil Jury Trial
The Supreme Court held today that the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial in fraud cases was violated when an administrative law judge of the S.E.C. decided the case.
Chief Justice Robert wrote an excellent, thorough, and overwhelmingly persuasive majority opinion in S.E.C. v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. __ (2024), holding that the Securities and Exchange Commission could not try civil fraud suits before its own Administrative Law Judges. It must instead try them in federal District Court where the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial must be available in all cases which were "[suits] at common law," as opposed to suits in equity and in admiralty.
The Supreme Court did today for the Seventh Amendment roughly what it did for the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). It held, in a narrow opinion, that Congress and the President cannot completely ignore the Seventh Amendment, just as they used to completely ignore the Second Amendment before Heller was decided. This is the case at least in civil fraud cases brought by the S.E.C.
The Chief Justice's opinion was joined by five other justices: Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Chief Justice Roberts' opinion examined originalist, textualist, and doctrinal sources of law. In much of the opinion, Chief Justice Roberts makes an overwhelmingly powerful argument that S.E.C. fraud cases are in the words of the Seventh Amendment "[s]uits at common law" which can only be tried by a jury and not suits in equity or admiralty where the right to jury trial has not historically been available.
The Chief's opinion is amply supported by prior Supreme Court precedent. The case does not overrule any precedent, although it distinguishes Atlas Roofing, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), a much critiqued precedent; Atlas Roofing's author (Justice White) claimed that it was overruled by a Supreme Court case in the 1980's, an issue which the Chief Justice's opinion pointedly did not address.
Justice Gorsuch wrote a very powerful and persuasive concurrence, which was joined by Justice Thomas, and which emphasized that the Jarkesy case implicated Article III's promise of a life tenured judge to hear suits in common law, as well as implicating the Seventh Amendment. Justice Gorsuch also observed that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause was implicated as well, because the S.E.C. was arguing that it could violate the separation of powers by combining legislative, executive, and judicial power—all in one administrative agency.
Justice Sotomayor wrote a heated dissent, which was joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. She complained that precedent was actually on her side, contrary to the Chief Justice's opinion. She relied very heavily on Atlas Roofing. Justice Sotomayor's view was that the Jarkesy case "involves the Government acting in its sovereign capacity to enforce a statutory violation. That makes the right at issue a 'public right' that Congress can take outside the purview of Article III, even when the new cause of action is analogous to a common-law claim." She also argued that "There are good reasons for Congress to set up a scheme like the SEC's. It may yield important benefits over jury trials in federal court, such as greater efficiency and expertise, transparency and reasoned decision-making, as well as uniformity, predictability, and greater political accountability."
Overall, S.E.C. v. Jarkesy is a correct and persuasive six justice majority opinion, which holds that in civil fraud suits, at least, the S.E.C. must bring its cases before an Article III judge and afford the defendant, who it is prosecuting, the right to a civil jury trial. It cannot prosecute such a suit before one of its own internal administrative law judges. Jarkesy is thus an important victory for both the rule of law and for common sense.
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Then bring the cases as criminal charges against whatever offenders it pleases a grand jury to indict. And by all means, give them a jury trial before an Article III judge.
Yes, that's what puzzles me about this whole case too. How is a case where the government accuses a citizen of doing something wrong and then fines them "civil"?
By all means craft a constitutional rule that says that Congress can't avoid the 6th amendment by calling something "civil". But how is this a 7th amendment issue?
7th amendment also applies to common law causes of action (suing your neighbor) and fraud is one of those. The Court said that basically the SEC is bringing what is identical to a common law fraud action on behalf of the public markets or unknown counterparties, so the Constitutional protection applies.
So the broader applicability of this case seems to depend on what agency actions mirror common law causes of action and which have no such parallels and are novel public rights/protections created via statute/regulation.
This applies to the IRS, FCC, FAA, etc too, right?
No one has been able to explain why the right to a civil jury is important. Which is why the 7A never got incorporated via the 14A.
Here the motivation is obvious: to make it harder to enforce securities laws. But the argument is empty.
It’s important because it’s in the constitution.
So is Congress’s power to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal. Is that important?
Letters of marque and reprisal have diminished in direct importance for the same reason the 3rd amendment has: Because our government has become wealthy enough that it has different concerns. The Letters were meant to accommodate a government which scarcely had any military resources of its own to deploy. Just as the 3rd amendment was intended to forbid an abuse a relatively poor government would be tempted to commit.
But all constitutional limitations on government are important. Some are directly important, some more because they serve as indicators of the extent to which the government still feels bound by the rule of law.
So, yes, it IS important because it's in the Constitution, because if the government doesn't think that's a good enough reason to do it, that tells us something about the government that it's really important that we know: That it doesn't anymore feel obligated to be law abiding.
If the president tried to issue letters of marque without congressional approval or something—yes, it would be pretty important!
Yeah. Until Wednesday, "everything was securities fraud" (in the immortal words of Matt Levine). Now, effectively nothing is, because the SEC won't even try to explain something like this to a jury: https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2024-77
That said, Matt Levine himself thinks that this judgment is actually a win for the SEC, because at least its rulemaking powers survived. The jury point, he said, the SEC was always going to lose, and is "not a big change to the SEC’s procedures".
I realize that in grand constitutional decisions the actual consequences are of little importance, but now requiring jury trials for all civil penalties formerly handled by administrative judges simply means grinding administrative regulation to a halt. Nobody's going to want to pay for that number of juries.
Which I assume was part of the goal by our conservative judges. Gorsuch must be very happy. How convenient that the 7th Amendment , previously little regarded, was lying around for the purpose.
The Constitution does not exist to make life easy for government.
It doesn't exist to make the administration of government needlessly hard either.
The government could save money by not compensating takings, too.
The government principle here is that, if the government wishes to punish somebody, it must persuade people who AREN'T on its own payroll that they're guilty. Sure, that's inconvenient. But it's still an important principle.
The word "needlessly" is doing a lot of work there.
It's doing exactly as much work as I intended it to do.
The Constitution expanded the power of the federal government. It made it more easy for the federal government to use power.
It also includes various limitations on the government.
I think the difference reflects a fundamental divide that isnmt captured by the legal differences.
What do we expect of the Executive branch? Do we expect that they will administer the law fairly and in the public interest? Or do we expect that they will seek the President’s personal and political difference.
The liberals expect the first as a matter of course. But one difficulty I have with the majority is that basically implies that administrative tribunals not only cannot but should not be expected to be fair.
The caselaw ensuring administrative tribunals comply with 5th Amendment Due Process including principles of fundamental fairness has long been at odds with the concept of a unitary exectutive. If the constitution requires that administrative proceedings be fair, then administrative judges have to be insulated in some fashion from heing ordered how to decide cases by their boss. But the unitary executive line of cases casts increasing doubt on the constitutionality of administrative structures allow that independence.
It is one thing to say that the appellees are entitled to a jury trial. But it is quite another to announce that administrative tribunals cannot be and should never have been expected to be fair, because after all they are under the thumb of the Big Guy who of course seeks his own interests.
It’s one thing to say framers feared a corrupt government. It’s quite another to say that they expected it, indeed, created a system of government that practically invites it.
I fear a two-tier system of justice, in which the rich have more rights to resolve their disputes in court, while the unitary executive theory smashes into and destroys principles of fairness in past cases, so the poor go to tribunals whose corruption is tolerated by the courts. If they don’t like it, they can after all sue.
Do we want a society where the law, in its sublime majesty, requires the rich and the poor alike to hire expensive lawyers if they want to be able to exercise basic rights or have actual access to nominal entitlements?
I don't think there's actually any possibility of creating a system where the wealthy don't have some advantages over the poor. But it would be a big help if we acknowledged some obligation to make people whole after failed prosecutions; The wealthy can go through a prosecution, and have enough margin that after acquittal their lives go on as normal.
People of normal resources? A prosecution, even if it fails to convict, ruins them financially. As a result, people of normal resources almost always plea bargain to avoid a trial, even if they know they're innocent, because even an acquittal will ruin them.
Our system is actually set up that way on purpose now. Only 2-3% of criminal cases ever result in trials, almost all end in plea bargains. The whole system would collapse if people actually asserted the rights they theoretically have, and so they've rigged things so that almost nobody dares do it.
I seriously wonder how many of the cases currently being brought could be successfully prosecuted if plea bargains were not available to avoid having a trial. I have a dark suspicion that it's not a lot of them.
Those are some great points. The battle is really never over. The Plea era of criminal justice and overcharging to force it, need to be stamped out with the force of criminal law.
Government will always invite corruption. It's power & money in one. The framers created a system to mitigate it. That's why we have a three way split. Judge/Jury/Executioner in one is guaranteed too easy to corrupt.
Administrative agencies, and the people who work for them, will largely work to increase the agencies (and hence their own) power. This invites corruption. Tribunals mean there's no check on the agencies. Jury trials and independent judges will provide a check. Not perfect. Better than nothing.
I think the difference reflects a fundamental divide that isnmt captured by the legal differences.
What do we expect of the Executive branch? Do we expect that they will administer the law fairly and in the public interest? Or do we expect that they will seek the President’s personal and political difference.
The liberals expect the first as a matter of course. But one difficulty I have with the majority is that basically implies that administrative tribunals not only cannot but should not be expected to be fair.
The caselaw ensuring administrative tribunals comply with 5th Amendment Due Process including principles of fundamental fairness has long been at odds with the concept of a unitary exectutive. If the constitution requires that administrative proceedings be fair, then administrative judges have to be insulated in some fashion from heing ordered how to decide cases by their boss. But the unitary executive line of cases casts increasing doubt on the constitutionality of administrative structures allow that independence.
It is one thing to say that the appellees are entitled to a jury trial. But it is quite another to announce that administrative tribunals cannot be and should never have been expected to be fair, because after all they are under the thumb of the Big Guy who of course seeks his own interests.
It’s one thing to say framers added some safeguards because they feared a corrupt government. It’s quite another to say that they expected it, indeed, created a system of government that practically invites it.
I fear a two-tier system of justice, in which the rich have more rights to resolve their disputes in court, while the unitary executive theory smashes into and destroys principles of fairness in past cases, so the poor go to tribunals whose corruption is tolerated by the courts. If they don’t like it, they can after all sue.
Do we want a society where the law, in its sublime majesty, requires the rich and the poor alike to hire expensive lawyers if they want to be able to exercise basic rights or have actual access to nominal entitlements?
I was more impressed by Gorsuch's concurrence. To me, the bigger issue was that one wing of the SEC gets to prosecute, while another wing gets to judge. If the holding had been that the SEC has to bring it before an Article III court, but it can be tried to the bench (which is the case for SEC disgorgement actions), I would be a lot less bothered.
“The Supreme Court did today for the Seventh Amendment roughly what it did for the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). It held, in a narrow opinion, that Congress and the President cannot completely ignore the Seventh Amendment, just as they used to completely ignore the Second Amendment before Heller was decided.”
Heller is a narrow opinion? I guess in comparison to Bruen.
The “completely ignore” part is conclusionary.
At least concerning the 2A, you have many people with a certain understanding that think it was being largely ignored. It wasn’t but I can at least get the general idea of why that is said.
How has the 7A been “completely ignored”? The dissent explains how civil juries under the terms of the 7A are not necessary for a subset of cases. The majority disagrees.
Where is the evidence that as a whole the amendment was completely ignored everywhere else?
This is really the second fist of a one two punch against bureaucratic and government overreach. A restoration of rights and a refutation of arguments claiming that ease or effectiveness should overrule rule of law.
Anyone else notice how the opponents of these rulings, all the way up to the dissenting judges, seem to be able to offer no more than claims of effectiveness and history. (because if everyone jumped off a roof in the past, everyone should now)
^ The above is not to say that i don't think that the people in a lot of these cases don't deserve to be legally pounded, just that it needs to be legal, not at the whim of some faceless bureaucrat/agency.