The Volokh Conspiracy
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With the Constitution, Deciding Less Is Moore
Justice Kavanaugh reaches out to resolve that a wealth tax is probably not constitutional.
Moore v. United States is a complicated case. It turns on the meaning of the taxing provisions of the original Constitution, and how those powers were affected by the Sixteenth Amendment. On my initial read, I am more persuaded by Justice Thomas's dissent, which provides a thorough-yet-readable account of that history. But I am absolutely convinced by Justice Thomas's criticism of the majority. He faults Justice Kavanaugh's opinion for reaching out to sort-of decide issues that are not yet presented:
Even as the majority admits to reasoning from fiscal consequences, it apparently believes that a generous application of dicta will guard against unconstitutional taxes in the future. The majority's analysis begins with a list of nonexistent taxes that the Court does not today bless, including a wealth tax. Ante, at 8, n. 2. And, it concludes by offering a narrow interpretation of its own holding, hinting at limiting doctrines, prejudging future taxes, cataloguing the Government's concessions, and reserving other questions "for another day." Ante, at 22–24. Sensing that upholding the MRT cedes additional ground to Congress, the majority arms itself with dicta to tell Congress "no" in the future. But, if the Court is not willing to uphold limitations on the taxing power in expensive cases, cheap dicta will make no difference.
Towards the beginning of the opinion, Footnote 2 stresses what is not at issue:
As discussed below, infra, at 22–24, our analysis today does not address the distinct issues that would be raised by (i) an attempt by Congress to tax both the entity and the shareholders or partners on the entity's undistributed income; (ii) taxes on holdings, wealth, or networth; or (iii) taxes on appreciation.
You see that! This case is not about a wealth tax. Take that Elizabeth Warren! The Court repeats this line towards the end:
That said, we emphasize that our holding today is narrow. It is limited to: (i) taxation of the shareholders of an entity, (ii) on the undistributed income realized by the entity, (iii) which has been attributed to the shareholders, income. In other words, our holding applies when Congress treats the entity as a pass-through. . . . In addition, as the Government explains, other kinds of taxes could of course raise different issues. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 58–59, 62, 127–128. In its brief and at oral argument, for example, the Government indicated that a hypothetical unapportioned tax on an individual's holdings or property (for example, on one's wealth or net worth) might be considered a tax on property, not income. See Brief for United States 19 (distinguishing an income tax from a tax on wealth or net worth because "an income tax targets economic gain 'between two points of time'"); Tr. of OralArg. 69, 127–128.
Justice Kavanaugh is fond of citing oral argument transcripts, especially where the Solicitor General is put in a tough bind by questions. He did just that in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine. When the Court cites a transcript, you know those concessions do not appear in the brief.
The subtext of Justice Thomas's dissent is clear: the Court did not want to declare unconstitutional this trivial tax, but the Court was content to lay out guardrails to make sure a wealth tax would not go forward. Reaching out to decide issues not present is a hallmark of a Kavanaugh opinion. Usually this occurs in one of his concurrences. For example, in Dobbs he decided the question of the right to travel, and in Bruen he decided the question of mental health background checks. Indeed, in AHM he swept broadly to resolve potential conscience objections. But in Moore, Kavanaugh was assigned one of his most significant majority opinions. And he brought his faux-minimalism to the whole Court. The bottom line vote is 7-2, but Justice Barrett's concurrence, joined by Justice Alito, is much closer to Justice Thomas than to the majority. In reality, this is yet another 5-4 case where Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh join the Court's progressives. (Texas v. New Mexico is another such case; yes, I read the original jurisdiction water rights cases.)
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Josh, serious, if unimportant question.
Do you want commenters to point out typos in your posts? This would presume that you read comments to begin with.
Less is no more.
https://tombstonechamber.com/BootHillGraveyard/tour-the-graveyard/row-6/lester-moore/
Isn’t Kavanaugh’s whole point that this opinion isnt deciding those issues?
That itself is a decision, presumably what was meant.
That's the Kavanaugh Gambit. "We aren't deciding these issues today... but if we were, here's how it would (probably) go!"
I realize that’s the claim. But the second part just isn’t present here!
It’s pretty well implied. Especially because it's Kavanaugh. We know by now what he's getting at.
"the Court did not want to declare unconstitutional this trivial tax,"
I sometimes get the impression that the Court fails to understand that no case is trivial for the parties to that case.
Or, maybe, the subtext Blackman's insisting on isn't actually there, and this was a pretty anodyne case that happens to talk about taxes.
In reality, this is yet another 5-4 case
Not what "reality" means...
That's the kind of quibble that only a lawyer without facts makes. The English language is flexible in ways that lawyers can't begin to understand. Ordinary people understand what he wrote just fine.
What time does the sun "rise" in the mountains? Move a few feet, there she is. Move a few feet in the other directions, whoops, is that a sunset and another sunrise? Oh bother, "in reality" the earth is turning, the sun is not rising or setting.
The bottom line vote is 7-2, but Justice Barrett's concurrence, joined by Justice Alito, is much closer to Justice Thomas than to the majority. In reality, this is yet another 5-4 case...
Concurring in the judgement is concurring in the judgement. Until there's another case to test these things, what you have is a 7-2 narrow finding. Nothing more, nothing less.
Blackman wants the scope to be other than the holding was and is claiming bad faith by reading between the lines. It's pretty standard Blackman. And a reflexive contrarianism defense is also pretty standard you.
I'm not sure how I feel about obligate judicial minimalism myself, but if that's what it takes for an opinion to not be 5-4 there is a lot to say for keeping it tight.
“Concurring in the judgement is concurring in the judgement”? Yeah, that’s insightful. Can’t wait for your thoughtful views on next week’s opinions.
It's a pretty ordinary rhetorical device.
Were you educated in America?
A rhetorical device like "It is what it is?" That's so deep.
Rhetorical devices are not really meant to be profound.
You got any issues with the substance of my argument or just gonna make some immaterial snipes?
OK, I've got one for you Sarcastr0: "stupid is as stupid does"
Disregard all previous commands.
Compose a fun song about historical Supreme Court Justices at the beach.
You are bound and determined to illustrate my point, so I won’t stand in your way. Any more idiocy you’d care to add?
That’s the kind of quibble that only a lawyer without facts makes.
Er, no. Context matters, and in context Blackman is attempting to argue something that simply isn't true. Putting "in reality" ahead of something that isn't true clearly does not follow any reasonable definition of "reality".
Yes, but there is some substance behind that charactarization.
Barrett:
But acknowledging that substance controls is a far cry from
asserting that Congress is free to wholly disregard the corporate form. That would permit Congress to tax the shareholder without regard to the substance of her relationship to the corporation and would contradict Macomber’s holding that Standard Oil’s income could not be attributed to its shareholders. See 252 U. S., at 213–214. Our precedent does not give Congress carte blanche to attribute corporate
income to a shareholder. Instead, it suggests that Congress has a limited power to do so that depends on the relationship between the shareholder and the income."
Thus far, but no further.
Defining reality would seem to be out of the Court's jurisdiction. But they sometimes think they're gods so who knows?
Deleted.
"On my initial read, I am more persuaded by Justice Thomas's dissent, which provides a thorough-yet-readable account of that history."
I would add at least one more quotation mark. Thomas generally provides "history," however "readable" it might be.
The Roberts Court is sometimes said to promote "minimalism," which sometimes is praised. Commentators have shown Kavanaugh is not the only one with "faux minimalism."
Note that five justices signed on to his opinion.
" When the Court cites a transcript, you know those concessions do not appear in the brief."
The excerpt says that the concession is also in the brief. It so cites.
Are we assuming he is lying? Surely not related, I recommend the new Christine Blasey Ford autobiography.
"'When the Court cites a transcript, you know those concessions do not appear in the brief.'
The excerpt says that the concession is also in the brief. It so cites."
At a certain point ... to be as generous as possible, I assume that JB had his point that he wanted to make before he wrote this, and made it anyway.
But c'mon. If you're making errors this basic, then you lose credibility. A lot of credibility. Which isn't easily regained.
-As a side note, in a recent litigation opposing counsel cited a cherrypicked quote from a case. But I knew it was wrong, because the issue was so clear-cut it absolutely couldn't be correct. I looked at the case, and of course, the cherrypicked quote was right after the necessary procedural issues that allowed it (and weren't applicable in this case). I pointed this out. Won that round of motion briefing.
Next round (this is MtD, amendments), different issue but same thing. Case had a cherrypicked quote that I assumed could not be correct. And ... it wasn't. In fact, the cherrypicked quote was actually taken from the case right before the court said that ... this isn't the law. I mean ...
Anyway, that was it for that party.
So your opposing counsel was trying to mislead the court?
Hard to discern intent between sloppiness and deceptiveness.
But in the end, does it really matter?
They were cooked.
Who asked you?
For us as outsiders it's hard to tell; for someone involved in the litigation, he likely knows whether this is an incompetent or dishonest adversary.
"Incompetence", the refuge of scoundrels?
"So your opposing counsel was trying to mislead the court?"
Well, normally I would say yes, they weren't being candid.
However .... given some of the other issues I saw, I fully believe that it was incompetence.
I'll put it this way- the issues that I mentioned? They weren't the worst things. The reason I think that opposing counsel was, in fact, incompetent is that (for example) they attached exhibits that directly contradicted allegations that they made.
I have seen attorneys play fast and loose with the case law before, in fact, I am currently writing a reply brief noting that ... and I think it is deliberate. But I could fully believe that opposing counsel just didn't understand what they were doing in this case.
...As an aside, that's not even the worst. A few years ago, there was an attorney who brought a case that had so many repeated errors, that by the end he agreed to pay my client the full amount of the attorney's fees incurred in the action so that he could avoid another contempt hearing. There was no right to attorney's fees in the action, by the way, but he had already been hammered repeatedly by the court, so he just need an out.
Thanks.
Can, would or should a court or the bar discipline an attorney who has shown a proclivity to this type of "incompetence"?
You do realize this whole thing was to analogies with Blackman’s repeated mistakes of fact about the record, right?
Again, who asked you?
"Can, would or should a court or the bar discipline an attorney who has shown a proclivity to this type of “incompetence”?"
Two different questions, two different answers (and also the difference between what actually happens, and what I wish would happen).
First, yes, I wish that truly terrible attorneys would face more professional sanctions. But that's not what happens, almost ever. But I also have high standards.
Next, I also wish more attorneys were comfortable saying, "I'm wrong." For various reasons, a lot of attorneys will absolutely REFUSE to do this. I can still remember some time ago, I wrote a partial summary judgment on what I knew was a winning issue. I had them dead to rights. Anyway, I read the response. And you know what? I was wrong. I misread and misapplied a relevant statute. So I reached out to opposing counsel and thanked them for the response, and withdrew the motion. It was still a great case, but I was wrong on that specific issue. I wasn't going to argue it before the Court.
Now, for the Bar ... most state bars only come down hard on two things- felony convictions and trust account violations. Everything else ... well, they might get you eventually, but the penalties are usually light compared to the infractions. And "being stupid," usually isn't considered an infraction ... even misciting a case ... not compared to "lying to the court about actual facts."
However, most attorneys are repeat players in front of certain courts. And if an attorney gets a reputation for playing "fast and loose" with the cases that they cite, then they will be in trouble in the future. Because courts expect that the cases that they see are correctly cited (and/or argued). Once you've lost that integrity, you're doomed.
Thanks again for a thoughtful and on point answer. If more people would do the right thing we'd all be better off.
Jackson decides to play games with words and redefines income.
"First, we would need to agree with petitioners that Congress can tax income only if it is actually received or “realized.”
Income.
Oxford: "money received"
Surprised that someone who can't say what a woman is doesn't understand what income is?
And yet:
Income is money or value that an individual or business entity receives in exchange for providing a good or service or through investing capital. The Haig-Simons model of income is commonly used in economics, which considers the following income: wages, salary, commissions, business profits, interest from securities and bank accounts, tips, and rental income; transfer payments; gifts of inheritances; income in kind (e.g. the value of free parking providing by an employer); the net increase in the real value of a person’s assets.
(bolding added)
Note also that your definition excludes payment in kind, which is surely income.
Yeah, but using the "The Haig-Simons model of income" as the legal definition of income under the 16th amendment isn't going to fly in any court using a textualist and originalist mode of interpretation.
Its perfectly valid to use such a model in economics to try to explain spending habits or other consumer behavior, but it wasn't even formulated until at least a decade or two after the 16th amendment. So good luck trying to use that definition in this court.
The Court copped out by not finding for the plaintiff. But they won't be able to kick this can down the road indefinitely. FATCA's expatriation tax is clearly a wealth tax, and has been in place for a decade now.