The Volokh Conspiracy
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30 Months After Only Three Justices Would Have Granted Cert in Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, the New York Court of Appeals Holds Fulton Changed Nothing
Decisions from Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett continue to linger.
Since 2016, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany has been challenging a New York law that mandates that insurance policies must cover abortions. The state courts upheld this mandate as a neutral law under Employment Division v. Smith. In June 2021, the Supreme Court decided Fulton. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch would have overruled Smith. But Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh had some questions. After Fulton was decided Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany wound its way to the Court.
In November 2021, after several relists, the Court GVR'd the case in light of Fulton. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch would have granted the petition. There was no reason for a GVR, since Fulton did not actually change Smith. The options were grant or deny. At the time, I wrote "It is very obvious to me that Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett have no interest in deciding another Free Exercise Clause case now–especially after the denial of review in the Maine case."
Since that GVR, the case moved its way through the state courts. In June 2022, the New York Appellate Division ruled that Fulton did not change the relevant standard, so the Diocese lost again. I observed:
And why did Fulton not change the relevant standard? Because in Fulton, Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh declined to overrule Employment Division v. Smith, a decision that required courts to deferentially review laws that burden religion. Even when Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh joined a conservative majority opinion, they tempered its reach.
Today, nearly two years later, the case was decided by the New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in New York). And, no surprise, the court ruled against the Diocese. The court held that since Fulton did not overrule Smith, the prior New York precedent decided under Smith still stands.
When the Court GVRs a case, it may wipe the issue off a Justice's plate, and conscience. But the matter continues in the lower courts. Lawyers on both sides dutifully litigate the issue. Judges and clerks have to write opinions. The Diocese continues to operate under a sword of Damocles. Yet, throughout this entire process, the ending is preordained. In 2021, there was no reason to GVR the Albany case because it was decided under Smith, a precedent that Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett did not overrule. The GVR wasted everyone's time.
And here we are. Three years after Fulton and thirty months after the GVR, the case is ready for review. No doubt the Diocese will file a cert petition. It will probably come up for conference later this year. The Court could grant the case, and add it to its ever-shrinking docket for argument in February. If so, there would be a nearly four year gap between the GVR and the decision in June 2025. Or the Justices could stew on the petition for a while and grant in February, kicking the case to the OT 2025 term, with a decision by June 2026, five full years after Fulton. Or, the Court could deny cert altogether.
If after all of these deliberations, we are still left with three Justices dissenting from certiorari, what will we have to show for it? The Court should have put the case out of its misery in 2021 rather than wasting everyone's time.
I realize the symbol of the Court is a turtle--slow, deliberate, and careful. But these sorts of GVRs are not like the turtle. They are like the ostrich--sticking your head in the sand and hoping a problem goes away. But it never does.
For what it's worth, there is another case in the pipeline that would allow the Court to revisit whether to overrule Smith. New York compels Amish schoolchildren, living in remote communities, to receive vaccinations that conflict with their sincerely held religious beliefs and Amish way of life. The District Court ruled against the Amish plaintiffs in Miller v. McDonald, relying on Smith. The case was recently briefed before the Second Circuit. The plaintiffs squarely preserved the question of whether Smith should be overruled. There is a similar case pending up for conference next month from Connecticut involving K-12 education, though I tend to think the Amish case may be a better vehicle.
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So, someone might have to follow a generally-applicable law?
Damn this court!
So, someone might not be able to mandate a religion sin?
Damn this court!
You mean like … slavery? Mandated segregation?
Shock! Horror!
How do you think bad laws ever get overturned, if no one can challenge them?
You can challenge them. The OP is an example of that happening. But you don’t get to invoke your religion to get out of a law that everyone else must follow.
Actually, in the US, constitutionally, you do get to do that under a lot of circumstances. Because our Constitution actually says so: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;"
So, if the government enacts a law saying that everybody must be clean shaven? Yeah, Sikhs still don't have to shave.
The idea that religion doesn't get you out of generally applicable laws makes a lot of sense in a system where all the laws are prohibiting malum in se offenses. It makes a lot less sense where a lot of the crimes are malum prohibitum: "Just because we say so." Unfortunately, that's where we are today.
" . . . if the government enacts a law saying that everybody must be clean shaven . . . ,"
(checks the military - yup no beards, and yes the military can grant exemptions - BUT THERE'S NO LAW OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT THAT'S SAYS THEY HAVE TO)
https://www.army.mil/article/36339/sikh_soldiers_allowed_to_serve_retain_their_articles_of_faith
Brett is articulating the opposite of what the Constitution says under Smith.
He should read the opinion, it goes into some of his practical concerns.
He won’t.
Right, you think they're just doing that out of the goodness of their hearts, rather than on account of not wanting to violate the 1st amendment even if a court would let them.
Sarcastr0, I know this annoys you, and I don't really care that it does, but I will persist in distinguishing between the Constitution's commands and judicial rulings, since they're not always in agreement.
Smith, though they don't say so, was decided on the basis of the Constitution's invisible "drugs are different" clause. I hope they'll eventually repeal it.
I will persist in distinguishing between the Constitution’s commands and judicial rulings, since they’re not always in agreement.
Yes, that is BrettLaw. We all know it.
But you are basically lying on the Internet when you say, "you do get to do that under a lot of circumstances. Because our Constitution actually says so." Because this is not true. You do not get to do that.
Something you think should be true is not the same as something that is true.
You need to tell people you're not describing Constitutional law as it currently applies, because that is what it looks like you're talking about.
[Also it is a boring conversation to have everyone bring what they personally think the Constitution says and then no one is on the same page. How our institutions actually operate is a vastly more useful and grounded conversation.]
Correct. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
Right, no precedence of you leftists bearing animus towards religion through the law or leftist rulings. Just divine writ there, pure as the driven snow.
As always, Area Man Passionate Defender Of What He Imagines Constitution To Be.
Hmmm...
Your beard law wouldn't survive rational basis review under substantive due process (or at least it shouldn't). But under current law there is no question of giving only some people an exemption. And rightly so.
The animal cruelty example should be dear to your heart, because that gives you a proverbial stick to beat Muslims with. This was recently upheld by the ECtHR in Executief van de Moslims van België et al. v. Belgium, which continues to get legal bloggers excited in Europe: https://www.ejiltalk.org/animal-welfare-beats-freedom-of-religion/
Yes, Belgium's "Jews and Muslims can go f themselves" law.
Can't wear a gas mask with a beard.
What kind of gas mask would actually be more difficult to put on with a short beard? That they'd be less effective, I don't doubt. But not being able to wear one? I'd have to see what type of mask you're thinking of.
You could probably use the same silicone goo that suba divers with mustaches use. Messy, but it apparently works.
We have "Personal protective gear" here for dealing with toxic spills; The employees with beards get to use the positive pressure units, but they are a lot more expensive than the regular masks.
That is the holding of Smith. But there are two aspects which are often overlooked.
First, the scope and reach of "generally applicable laws" has gone far beyond what was the case at the Founding. There are laws that now reach into minutiae of life that the generation of the founders would have considered a gross intrusion into liberty, with or without religion.
Second, there is a long history in this country of accommodating religious beliefs, that in many cases has gone by the wayside. (Though not in this case, see my comment below.)
While none of this makes Smith wrong, the reality is that the State intrudes on individual religion and conscience far more than it did when the First Amendment was passed.
There are laws that now reach into minutiae of life that the generation of the founders would have considered a gross intrusion into liberty, with or without religion.
That is way too broad of a statement to make as if you are able to read the minds of men dead for more than 200 years. We can only speculate, at best, what they would have thought about today's laws and regulations. The world and society today are far, far more complex than the ones they lived in. Even if we could get The Founders (By the way, which ones? They did not all think alike.) into the present, get them caught up on modern technology and how modern civilization functions, that would only turn them into a tiny collection of men compared to the size of the U.S. population today. We would not be bound by what they would think, anyway.
While none of this makes Smith wrong, the reality is that the State intrudes on individual religion and conscience far more than it did when the First Amendment was passed.
I don't agree with that statement at all. For one thing, several states still had established churches in 1790. There were people paying taxes to fund churches that they didn't attend, or perhaps they could pay to support a local church of their choice, but couldn't choose "no church" as an option. The state imposing a particular religion upon you and/or your children in public schools extended into the 20th century. Science classrooms were still pushing Young Earth Creationism in some public schools in my lifetime. Well, it probably still happens, but by teachers that manage not to put anything online about it. I did find a blatant creationist book on the shelf in my office at a school I taught at less than 20 years ago. It was left there by the previous science teacher, and I was told about the arguments that would erupt between that teacher and the other science teachers during lunch about her pushing her beliefs on her students.
Even if we could get The Founders (By the way, which ones? They did not all think alike.
I think the 1950's Jr. High School American History Founders is the group those who make these sorts of arguments are usually thinking about.
The state imposing a particular religion upon you and/or your children in public schools extended into the 20th century.
Indeed.
Daily recitation of the Lord's Prayer, generally accompanied by Bible readings (KJV, IIRC) over the loudspeaker system was a feature of my public school days.
Even after Engel v. Vitale
I think that many younger Americans simply do not grasp how thoroughly religion - white Protestant religion usually - permeated US society, including schools - as recently as the mid-20th Century and later.
And why did Fulton not change the relevant standard? Because in Fulton, Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh declined to overrule Employment Division v. Smith, a decision that required courts to deferentially review laws that burden religion.
That's not the way I understand Smith. What I understand it to mean is that courts should not apply strict scrutiny when someone is arguing that their religion should allow them to not follow a generally applicable law. Martinned2 quoted what I assume is from the majority opinion in Smith, penned by Scalia, no less. This is the one Scalia opinion that I have read in full that I actually agree with, by the way. (That's a small sample, though, as I am not a lawyer and have only read all of the opinions in less than 10 cases, I think.)
The assertion that it violates their religion to have abortion included in the health care insurance coverage they provide to employees is based on a really thin connection, in my mind.
Imagine a woman was waiting to get her weekly paycheck at a business owned by a Catholic organization (but it's function is primarily secular, so it doesn't get the usual church exemptions).
She says to a coworker in the boss's hearing, "I'm glad that it's payday! I have an abortion appointment tomorrow!" Would the boss be able to claim a religious exemption to giving her the paycheck she's due? I don't think so. Employer-provided health insurance is compensation for labor, just like wages or salary are. It is not at all the employer's business how the employees use it, other than to know the general data of how all employees are using it as a matter of being able to maximize the value that they get out of it. (Lowest cost to them for a plan that makes employees content.)
For a Catholic employer to feel that they are implicated in the sin of abortion just knowing that some employees might use the insurance the employee earned from their labor for the employer is hard to take seriously. It is not something I think is likely, when them generally being opposed to abortion and wanting to make it more difficult for women to obtain one also fits well. That is my personal opinion of what I think is really going on though, not a legal argument. For that, we are supposed to assume their sincerity when analysing the constitutional implications, barring specific evidence that they are not sincere, I think.
Even assuming their sincerity, the connection is so thin and tenuous, and the consequences of granting them the exception falls on specific third parties (their female employees of reproductive age), I don't see any validity to the position that they should get an exemption from this general law. The reasoning Martinned2 quoted above sums it all up rather well.
"a decision that required courts to deferentially review laws that burden religion.
That’s not the way I understand Smith. What I understand it to mean is that courts should not apply strict scrutiny"
Not applying strict scrutiny IS deferentially reviewing. That's all strict scrutiny means, not being deferential in your review.
That’s all strict scrutiny means, not being deferential in your review.
Strict scrutiny means that there must be a "compelling government interest" in the law and the law must achieve that goal through the "least restrictive means possible."
Even that could be argued to defer somewhat to the government, as a person's religious liberty could end up restricted, even with that strong of a test. What is the standard that has to be applied under Smith? I don't remember how it was worded, but I'm pretty sure it was some kind of intermediate scrutiny rather than a simple rational basis test that the government almost always passes.
To use the word "deferential" in describing how judges should look at the law, the issue would always then be how deferential must judges be towards the government's position. It is not should or shouldn't they be deferential.
Courts have applied rational-basis review in the wake of Smith. Even before Smith, there was a watered-down version of strict scrutiny used in Free Exercise cases that amounted to a intermediate-scrutiny-like balancing test (the state often won, which they almost never do in Freedom of Speech cases). Scalia rejected such balancing tests in Smith.
" watered-down version of strict scrutiny"
Strict scrutiny is itself a watered down form of judicial review, since it will frequently take things the Constitution simply outright forbids, and permit them anyway if the government asserts a good reason for doing so.
No, the Smith standard — where it applies, which is neutral laws, not based on animus, of general applicability — is in fact rational basis review. According to Smith the 1A has nothing to say about such a situation.
Thank you for correcting me. I'll have to go back and read it again sometime.
You're treating insurance as cash. But insurance is not cash. Insurance is a contract between the employer and the insurer to provide certain benefits to the employees. While there are regulations (especially since Obamacare) mandating some of the contents of such benefits, the employer still has discretion in that area. The employer here is fighting over what benefits it has to provide, not what the employee can do with those benefits after they're provided.
Consider an employer who says, "I care about climate change, so I will give each of my employees a $250 monthly voucher for mass transit." Could an employee say, "I don't want to take mass transit; I want to drive to work. Give me a $250 voucher for gas instead"? Of course not. And it would be nonsensical to argue, "The $250 is compensation. It is not at all the employer’s business how the employees use the $250."
The flip side is, if the employer worships polar bears they can't claim that therefore they don't have to provide whatever parking is required locally because they think that encouraging global warming is sinful.
The insurance thing was more like requiring part of the pay to be in the form of vouchers good for an abortion. If you pay your employee money, and they chose to spend some of it on something immoral, that's on them. But if as part of their pay you have to give them a voucher redeemable for 1 free abortion at Bob's Abortion and Lipo clinic, that's a bit more complicit.
Those still don't capture the situation.
First, what is and isn't covered by health insurance was regulated by state laws long before the ACA, as far as I can tell. Those regulations are intended to ensure that there aren't gaps in the coverage for medically necessary treatments that employees wouldn't really get say in as individuals. Not to mention that people just don't have the time or knowledge to pour through the detailed list of what is and isn't covered and recognize when something important is missing from the list. I mean, have you ever done that? I haven't.
Next, employers are not providing health insurance out of the goodness of their hearts, or out of a belief in its value to society, as in your mass transit voucher analogy. If the employer is large enough to fall under this law, no doubt they also fall under the ACA or state laws that require them to offer insurance. A plan that went beyond the minimums of the law could be in order to attract highly talented employees, but that's not the issue here, of course.
Also, the employer still doesn't get to be involved in the personal, private, medical decisions that the employees are going to make. Just like with an employee's pay, he won't have any idea how they actually use it, and he shouldn't. So that is not like the mass transit voucher at all.
Lastly, as Bored Lawyer points out, the coverage is not for elective abortion, but medically necessary abortions. A woman was happy to be pregnant, wanting a third child. But then she gets a cancer diagnosis 3 months in. Waiting several months to start treatment would worsen her prognosis considerably, so she sadly opts for an abortion to give herself the best chance of remaining alive to care for her two existing children. Is that medically necessary? I'd certainly say so. Does it seem at all reasonable for her employer to view it differently, so he made sure that it wasn't covered by insurance? Oh wait, it is covered by insurance, it is just on a separate rider that neither he nor the employee have to pay for.
So, like Bored Lawyer said, what exactly is the problem here?
The Hobby Lobby case precludes the argument that employers have no cognizable religious objection because they are not involved in what employees do with health coverage.
Okay, what was the majority's reasoning that their religious exercise was being burdened by employees having abortion covered in their health care plans but not if they used their wages to get an abortion?
The phrase "medically necessary" as used here does not mean "to save the life of the mother" or anything of that narrow nature. Rather, as NY applies it, it means anything other than "Gee, I think I'm bored; I'd like to get an abortion today." That would be elective. But anything "necessary to prevent, diagnose, correct, or cure conditions in the person that cause acute suffering, endanger life, result in illness or infirmity, interfere with a person’s capacity for normal activity, or threaten some significant handicap” counts. And as an illustration of how broad the definition is, any abortion of a pregnancy resulting from rape counts as "medically necessary," even though of course that has nothing to do with health.
Also, looking back into what I had generally remembered, the issue in this case is indeed that NY defines "religious employer" so narrowly that only the church itself is likely to qualify. No other entity affiliated with the church will meet each of the four criteria, which are: "(a) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the entity. (b) The entity primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the entity. (c) The entity serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the entity. (d) The entity is a nonprofit organization as described in Section 6033 (a) (2) (A) i or iii, of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended." A Catholic hospital, for instance, will fail because its primary purpose isn't the inculcation of religious values, and it does not primarily serve Catholic patients. (It probably fails B also, but definitely A & C.)
Rather, as NY applies it, it means anything other than “Gee, I think I’m bored; I’d like to get an abortion today.” That would be elective.
How narrowly are some of the conservative states with near-total bans interpreting "protecting the life" of the pregnant woman? The major concerns are that she needs to be in imminent danger of death, not "there's a 50% that she will develop a condition sometime in the next few weeks that would have a 50% of being fatal some number of days after that." If NY's definition of medically necessary is so problematic for you, then it is because pregnancy has inherent risk to a woman. With proper modern medical care, that risk is low, but still significant. (At least, I would consider ~1 in 5000 chance of dying significant risk.)
How much risk above that baseline is enough for you to consider it "medically necessary"? Also, does it have to be a potentially fatal condition? What if the risk is to her future ability to have children or for developing some other health problem?
Also, looking back into what I had generally remembered, the issue in this case is indeed that NY defines “religious employer” so narrowly that only the church itself is likely to qualify.
So? If an employer serves people that aren't the same religion, that is, it is open to the general public, and its primary purpose is not to spread its religious values to those it serves, then why does it even matter that the employer is religious for purposes of any laws concerning employer-employee relations or other regulations that would apply to completely secular businesses or organizations? That is not relevant to this case, though, since it was the church suing, right?
Consider an employer who says, “I care about climate change, so I will give each of my employees a $250 monthly voucher for mass transit.” Could an employee say, “I don’t want to take mass transit; I want to drive to work. Give me a $250 voucher for gas instead”? Of course not. And it would be nonsensical to argue, “The $250 is compensation. It is not at all the employer’s business how the employees use the $250.”
Another problem I noticed about this analogy is that there is nothing making the employer offer that $250 mass transit voucher. So, if an employee says they want it for gas instead, the employer is perfectly free to say no. This case is about employers being required by law to provide something to their employees.
The OP mischaracterizes the NY regulation (not law) at issue. In relevant part it provides:
You can read the whole reg here: https://govt.westlaw.com/nycrr/Document/I5001cca5cd1711dda432a117e6e0f345?transitionType=Default&contextData=%28sc.Default%29
Acc. to the NY Court of Appeals decision:
Although I generally sympathize with religious objections, hard for me to see what the issue is. The Roman Catholic Archdiocese could clearly claim an exemption as a “religious employer.” So what’s the issue?
(BTW, I am an advocate of taking health insurance coverage away from employers. People should buy their own policies, as they do for other forms of insurance. Then they can purchase whatever they want.)
I haven't looked into this specific law or this specific case, but I do know that in other contexts some states — CA in particular, but I believe NY — have been rather parsimonious about granting exemptions to religious employers, holding that unless we're talking about an actual church itself, it doesn't qualify for an exemption. Not Catholic Charities, not schools, hospitals, etc.
But here they did not even try.
The diocese is the lead plaintiff, but not the only one. Others include "a single individual and a construction company", which don't seem like they'd fit within the exception.
On that last, agreed. Insurance wound up linked to employers due to providing benefits being a way of circumventing WWII wage controls. It's long since overdue that we cut that connection.
I just wanted to step in briefly to say this.
Employment Division v. Smith is one of Scalia's finest (majority) opinions.
"But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs."
Yep. If every generally-applicable law is subject to carve-outs for each and every person's unverifiable conscience, then there are no generally-applicable laws. And courts should not be in the business of weighing generally-applicable, non-discriminatory laws against religious tenets.
That's a reason to have fewer laws.
*shrug*
Sure. How about a party runs on the platform that they won't pass any new laws for two years, other than emergency required measure, and will, instead, spend that time going through the laws that we already have and paring them down, eliminating them, and re-writing them as necessary for efficiency?
Honestly, that's more of a ten year project, but two years is at least a good start. I would vote for a party that did that.
The problem is, people love to say these things in the comments. But no one actually wants to do it. You can't just keep mouthing the words, and help that at some point, the judiciary will become a council of guardians and just start redlining all of the laws like Iran.
If that's what you want, then you need to start advocating for it at the local, state, and national level.
Trump ran on repealing more regulations than he created, and made good on that, if I remember correctly.
But then we got RFRA in which the political branches authorized the courts to "weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs."
Oh, I am aware of that. But then again, City of Boerne, so at least there's that. It's just the federal government (of course, some states have their own RFRA). But this isn't a federal law, this is a state issue, so the federal RFRA does not apply.
I also think that Scalia's prescient opinion is just starting to come into focus, because the RFRA has, in the past fifteen years, been increasingly weaponized ... or "properly litigated" by groups that have shown its power. As we will continue to see this increase and evolve, I think that a lot of us will look back at what Scalia wrote and realize that despite his own religious beliefs, he had a keen understanding of how a pluralistic society had to function.
Let me just say that I'm less confident he would have exhibited such a keen understanding if it had been a Catholic litigant rather than a member of the Native American church.
Fair point, but we can never know the counterfactual.
I think that it is more likely that, to the extent that you think Scalia was being at all disingenuous, he understood that since America has a background of Judeo-Christianity, the democratic process is more likely to protect by default those beliefs and understandings.
Meanwhile, forcing carve-outs on an individual basis to generally-applicable laws would allow people on a case-by-case basis to be exempt from the law due to whatever idiosyncratic beliefs they might have, regardless of their professed faith (as it does not depend on an official doctrine, but on their interpretation of it).
Whenever I hear a Christian speak of the "Judeo-Christian tradition," I cringe. The "judeo" part is all too often a cynical sop to avoid obvious offense to relatively numerous and influential Jews who might take umbrage at hearing, bark off, what the speaker really means to say.
Justice Scalia may have been ahead of his time by inventing, in the McCreary County case, a rule permitting government privileging of "Abrahamic monotheism" -- a tradition meaningful only to academics -- over other religions and non-religions, bringing the less numerous and somewhat put-upon Muslims into the fold.
Can't disagree with any of what you wrote. Judeo-Christian usually means, um, Christian.
Of course, my favorite legal euphemism is "Ceremonial Deism," which means, "Yeah, it's Christian, but, uh, um, shut up. It doesn't count."
Let me just say that I’m less confident he would have exhibited such a keen understanding if it had been a Catholic litigant rather than a member of the Native American church.
Members of the Native American Church that wanted unemployment benefits after being fired (from jobs as counselors at a drug rehab clinic) for using peyote in their religious rituals.
Drugs, government benefits, and pagan religion. A trifecta of things you might think Scalia might have a hard time separating from his legal analysis.
Again, maybe.
But early Scalia (and this was a 1990 case) was much more aware of the general applicability of the decisions that he was making. That was the whole motivation behind the debate about "bright-line rules" as opposed to "balancing tests."
I don't think that the facts hurt, but I do credit Scalia with having the understanding that his decision would affect religions equally, whether it be the Native American Church or Catholics.
I think that what people most misunderstand from Scalia's jurisprudence ... at least, before the sour turn ... is that he truly believed that democratic governance was a valuable principle not to be unduly constrained by the Courts, even if the people were stupid. And, more importantly, that the Constitution is not the answer to all of our problems, and that it sets a minimum floor that we can always legislate above.
I am reminded of his concurrence in Doe v. Reed-
Plaintiffs raise concerns that the disclosure of petition signatures may lead to threats and intimidation. Of course nothing prevents the people of Washington from keeping petition signatures secret to avoid that—just as nothing prevented the States from moving to the secret ballot. But there is no constitutional basis for this Court to impose that course upon the States—or to insist (as today’s opinion does) that it can only be avoided by the demonstration of a “sufficiently important governmental interest,” ante, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). And it may even be a bad idea to keep petition signatures secret. There are laws against threats and intimidation; and harsh criticism, short of unlawful action, is a price our people have traditionally been willing to pay for self-governance. Requiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed. For my part, I do not look forward to a society which, thanks to the Supreme Court, campaigns anonymously (McIntyre) and even exercises the direct democracy of initiative and referendum hidden from public scrutiny and protected from the accountability of criticism. This does not resemble the Home of the Brave.
I disagree with a lot of Scalia's opinions, especially the later ones, but I do agree with him regarding this - the Constitution shouldn't be the first resort for every problem we see.
That is a nice 'find' from Scalia's opinion. I'm not sure I agree, but it summarized your point succinctly.
Killing innocent humans is terrible enough.
But on top of that you’re going to force others who don’t agree with the killing to pay for it?
Really betrays the lie that for progressives it’s all about letting people form their own personal conclusions and make their own choices on the matter.
Did you read the regulation as quoted by B.L.?
No? Quelle surprise!!
Let me help:
(1) No policy ... shall limit or exclude coverage for abortions that are medically necessary. ...
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Part, a group or blanket policy ... may exclude coverage for medically necessary abortions only if the insurer:
(i) obtains an annual certification ... that the policyholder or contract holder is a religious employer and that the religious employer requests a contract without coverage for medically necessary abortions;
(ii) issues a rider to each [insured individual] at no premium to be charged to the certificate holder (i.e., primary insured) or religious employer for the rider, that provides coverage for medically necessary abortions subject to the same rules .... The rider must clearly and conspicuously specify that the religious employer does not administer medically necessary abortion benefits, but that the insurer is issuing a rider for coverage of medically necessary abortions, and shall provide the insurer’s contact information for questions;..
IOW, as I read it. The employee still gets the abortion paid for. The Church gets to claim it had nothing to do with it. The exemption is not about all abortions, just those that are medically necessary.
Maybe it's you who want to participate in the death or maiming of innocent human beings.
So what is the objection? I suppose the Church could claim that the business about no cost is not true, since the costs will inevitably be folded into the premiums, even if not explicitly. But that's weak. In fact, the Church might even gain financially by avoiding certain other costs.
And isn't this whole objection more than a little rich? Do they decline to pay for treatment for problems brought on by obesity (or, as some might call it, gluttony)? Or STD's contracted outside of marriage (lust, adultery). Or for injuries brought on by participating in physical activity on the Sabbath (Is that really keeping the Sabbath?)
Can the mosque refuse to cover treatment for diseases caused by alcohol abuse?
Just how attenuated does the connection to religion have to be before we say, "too bad?"
I have no idea what your point is. I wasn’t commenting on the constitutional issue.
If you pass a law saying that health insurance policies have to pay for X (whether there’s a religious employer exemption or not) then you are passing a law that forces some people who disagree with X, or otherwise don’t want to pay for X, to pay for X. Not just employers, but also employees and any other insureds unless they fall under some exemption.
Now, as a liberal I assume you will say, that’s OK, we want to redistribute wealth and socialize things in a roundabout way by regulating insurance, dictating the coverage and regulating premiums like Obamacare does for example, so that young healthy people can’t get by with really cheap premiums that would actually reflect the actuarial value of their expected losses, but instead makes them pay through the nose and subsidize older people or morbidly obese people or smokers or what have you.
I would disagree with that and just allow a totally free market to work in all things health care from top to bottom. Basically any health insurance contract you can imagine, if the parties agree then they can do that. And I'm not against some form of providing for the indigent, but keep that as a separate matter rather than mucking up the entire industry. I believe this would result in drastically better and more efficient results for everyone in the long term.
But setting all of that aside, it’s a rather different issue when you are talking about something like abortion which is killing a human. Some people don’t think it is killing a human and they are plainly wrong about that. But if you then go and force people who disagree with abortion to pay for abortions, then you aren’t allowing people to make their own personal decisions on the issue very much. I would say forcing people to pay for others to chop off their breasts or penises for transgender reasons is in a similar bucket, but still that is qualitatively different because there isn’t an innocent third party being harmed.
But if you then go and force people who disagree with abortion to pay for abortions, then you aren’t allowing people to make their own personal decisions on the issue very much.
Jehovah's Witnesses disagree with blood transfusions. Can a JW employer make sure that health insurance plans they provide don't cover them? Heck, maybe they wouldn't want to just avoid having to pay for the blood transfusion, but for any surgery where the patient would need a blood transfusion.
You aren't asking for the employer to make their own decision about abortion, you are asking for them to be able to impose their decision upon their employees to whatever extent that they can. In this case, by making sure that the employee's insurance won't pay for it.
Well, health insurance shouldn’t have anything to do with employers at all. But let me ask you this, say you were a JW, should you as an individual be able to buy a policy that doesn’t pay for things you don’t want? I say sure, why not. As far as a "JW employer" if that means like, a church, then yes. If it's just a huge business and the owner happens to be JW then I agree that would be a problem, but the actual problem is tying health insurance to employers, not allowing people to purchase policies with whatever terms they want.
Just how attenuated does the connection to religion have to be before we say, “too bad?”
For me, it isn't how tenuous the connection is to religion, but how tenuous the connection is between the person making the exemption claim is from the actual decision to act against that person's religious principles. In other words, what is it, specifically, that the person making the claim for an exemption sees as a violation of their beliefs? How connected to that violation is that person, really?
The Catholic diocese opposes abortion. Fine. No one is making anyone that opposes abortion have an abortion or perform one. So, they aren't being asked to directly participate in an abortion itself. Well, are they being asked to knowingly participate with one degree of separation? Like driving someone to an abortion clinic? To pay the provider themselves? No, they aren't being asked to do that. Are they being asked to knowingly participate indirectly with more than one degree of separation? Well, it depends on what you mean by knowingly. Are they participating with knowledge when a particular employee gets an abortion and uses the health care coverage to pay for it? No, they are not. They only know that it is possible that an employee could use their insurance to pay for an abortion. They are at least two degrees separated from the abortion, and they have no knowledge when or even whether it actually happens.
And that is what bothers them. They don't just think that abortion is wrong for them. They oppose anyone having an abortion. If a law can't be passed that prevents any abortions from happening, well, at least they can make sure that an employee will have to pay for it out of their own pocket instead of with the insurance they've earned from their labor for the employer.
This is why I oppose these exemptions. It isn't allowing someone to practice their own religious beliefs. It is allowing them to impose their religious beliefs on their employees.
That is an awful lot of meandering rationalization and mind-reading inquisition to ultimately justify the same old thing as usual: taking people's money against their will. Only with the slight twist of using it to fund the killing of babies.
"impose their religious beliefs on their employees."
No, those employees can go work somewhere else if they do not agree with the religious organization they are working for. And that's how it is supposed to work, if they didn't agree with the religious group from the start then they were never supposed to start working there in the first place. A religious organization is just a group of religious people doing things as a group.
If you want to look at the individual level, as I mentioned above, this law is the state imposing its beliefs (religious or anti-religious or otherwise) on everyone, even if some can jump through some hoops for an exemption.
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Next, New York will expect religious fundamentalists to drive on the proper side of the road, to refrain from beating their children, and to pay taxes! (But not, from the clinger perspective, to exercise a religious sacrament that compels abortion.)
Carry on, clingers.