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Ninth Circuit Panel Concludes That Some Felons May Have Second Amendment Rights
Today's U.S. v. Duarte, written by Judge Carlos Bea and joined by Judge Lawrence VanDyke, concludes that the Second Amendment protects some felons (at least after the end of their criminal sentences). The majority begins with the principle that:
[The Supreme Court's decision in] Bruen instructs us to assess all Second Amendment challenges through the dual lenses of text and history. If the Second Amendment's plain text protects the person, his arm, and his proposed course of conduct, it then becomes the Government's burden to prove that the challenged law is consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.
It reasons, much historical analysis later, that:
A more faithful application of Bruen requires the Government to proffer Founding-era felony analogues that are "distinctly similar" to Duarte's underlying offenses and would have been punishable either with execution, with life in prison, or permanent forfeiture of the offender's estate.
And, the majority concludes, this defendant's particular past convictions—for vandalism, drug possession, evading a peace officer, and being a felon in possession of a firearm—did not qualify.
Judge Milan Smith dissents, concluding that pre-Bruen Ninth Circuit precedent categorically holds that all felons lack Second Amendment rights; the majority and the dissent disagree on whether Bruen overruled that precedent. The dissent, in particular, argues that (1) Bruen "repeatedly limited its definition of the scope of the right to 'law-abiding' citizens, using that phrase no fewer than fourteen times throughout the opinion," (2) "Nothing … in Bruen reflects a retreat from the Court's earlier statement in Heller that 'longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill' are 'presumptively lawful,'" and (3) concurrences in Bruen reaffirmed the Heller view with regard to felons.
The panel majority responds, among other things, that "we do not think that the Supreme Court, without any textual or historical analysis of the Second Amendment, intended to decide the constitutional fate of so large a population in so few words and with such little guidance…. [W]e agree with the Third Circuit that Bruen's scattered references to 'law-abiding' and 'responsible' citizens did not implicitly decide the issue in this case." It also takes the view that, "'Simply repeat[ing] Heller's language' about the 'presumptive[] lawful[ness]' of felon firearm bans will no longer do after Bruen," given Bruen's call for a historical analysis, and given that "the historical pedigree of felon firearm bans was never an issue the Heller Court purported to resolve."
The government will very likely petition for rehearing and for en banc review in this case. That review will probably be influenced by the Supreme Court's Rahimi case, which deals with whether people subject to domestic violence restraining orders lose their Second Amendment rights, and which is due to come down from the Court by June 30. The question in Rahimi and the question in this case aren't identical, but they share considerable similarities.
Note also that the government has already asked the Supreme Court to consider the Third Circuit's Range case, which reached a similar result. That the petition is being held, pending Rahimi. It seems likely that the Court will instruct the Third Circuit to reconsider the question in light of the Rahimi holding, just as the Ninth Circuit panel (and perhaps the en banc court) will be doing the same.
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I don't agree with either side. I think people convicted of violent crimes or crimes involving a threat of violence can lose their second amendment rights, while nonviolent felons should not.
"And, the majority concludes, this defendant's particular past convictions—for vandalism, drug possession, evading a peace officer, and being a felon in possession of a firearm—did not qualify."
I haven't read the full opinion yet. But given this passage, I'd be shocked if the majority treated violent felons and nonviolent felons the same.
The majority is trying to do some Bruen hocus pocus with history rather than just asking "do these convictions show that it is dangerous for this guy to own guns?".
In other words, the majority is applying the test laid down by SCOTUS. We also might want to be careful about how we apply propensity-based standards. That gets into some slippery slopes very very quickly.
The test is very vague. It allows for "felons are a historically significant category, here are the felons to disarm" which would be better than what the majority did.
I think that Judge Smith raises some good (if technical) points about the effect of circuit precedent. But isn't this the one mode of analysis that Bruen unequivocally takes off the table?
I'd be surprised if there's no historical record of disarming dangerous people.
People get surprised, get used to it.
In fairness, once you hanged the rapist or horse thief, the issue of whether he could be trusted with weapons became somewhat moot.
Hear hear. Well said.
Who knew that John Wayne, when collecting guns from rowdies and strangers as they walked into the saloon, for safekeeping at the sheriff's office until the revelers sobered up and/or left town, was a godless, gun-grabbing, un-American commie?
"safekeeping at the sheriff’s office until the revelers sobered up and/or left town" is a key point in your hypothetical
At least based on the federal Crimes Act of 1790, this does lead to some surprising results: you can be disarmed for counterfeiting or forgery convictions, but not for maiming, assault, or manslaughter. But I haven't looked at any state statutes for a while: my suspicion is that all or nearly all violent crime is going to satisfy the majority's test, as well as an awful lot of nonviolent crime.
But you can't base that on the federal crimes act of 1790, because in 1790 almost all crimes would have been state crimes, because the federal government lacked the general police power, and they actually cared about that. So they only made things crimes if they had some reasonable basis for federal jurisdiction. Either relevant to a federal power, or in a place where the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction, such as a military base or DC.
Maiming, assault, or manslaughter would have been state felonies. Unless, of course, they occurred in a location subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, in which case they actually were included in that act.
I'm not sure you what point you're trying to make. The Crimes Act of 1790 criminalized (with appropriate jurisdictional limitations) a number of common crimes, including forms of murder, robbery, treason, counterfeiting, manslaughter, assault, larceny, and maiming. The first four were punishable by death (and thus, under the test set forth in this case, could justify applying § 922(g) to defendants with similar convictions), while the latter four were not punishable by death, and thus would not be adequate. I agree (as I said in another comment) that you would need to look at state criminal laws as well, and that there could be (and, I would guess, likely is) a consensus that would wrap in, e.g., burglary, rape, and certain serious assaults.
I think this would really only be relevant in terms of prohibition on the basis of federal convictions, and the problem with that is that the federal courts automatically give the federal government an insane degree of deference.
So maybe they're going to make considered judgments when it comes to state crimes, but for the federal ones? Unlikely.
What if the nonviolent felony is along the lines of possessing a stolen firearm or even selling them? What if the crimes is a threat to shoot a federal judge in a circuit where such threats are not violent crimes under controlling precedent? I would want the state to disarm someone convicted of such behavior, just as I don't think dumping a water bottle on a cop should cost you 2A rights even if it is defined as violent.
While "all felonies mean no guns" is a poor way to apply 2A, I don't think we should be replacing it with the easiest alternative rule we can think of, but instead with nuanced rules that make sense. A controversial take, I know.
Is there a jurisdiction where a true threat to commit murder isn't a felony?
Bruen happened, by the way, because the Supreme court got tired of "nuanced rules" that in practice amounted to ignoring Heller.
1. Yes.
2. What does that have to do with anything?
1) Interesting, I wouldn't have thought that. Where?
2) I don't know, what would the Supreme court having done Bruen specifically out of disgust with 'nuanced rules' have to do with your proposal to instead use 'nuanced rules'? The connection escapes me. [/sarc]
Well, let's look alphabetically:
In Alabama, "credibly threaten[ing] to commit a crime of violence against a person" is terroristic threatening in the second degree, a class B misdemeanor. Ala. Code § 13A-10-242.
In Alaska, "mak[ing] repeated threats to cause death or serious physical injury to another person" is a felony, see Alaska Stat. § 11.41.220(a)(2), but it doesn't appear to me that making a single death threat, on its own, is illegal at all.
Since we're 0-2, I'll stop there.
Perhaps I was unclear. By "this", I wasn't talking about "nuanced rules". I was talking about why, even if you'd been right that a death threat is invariably a felony, that would matter.
Well, color me surprised.
Bruen happened, by the way, because the Supreme court got tired of “nuanced rules” that in practice amounted to ignoring Heller.
Bruen happened because:
1. The Court got a 5th vote for it (if you remember they were comically denying cert and ignoring circuit conflicts before that)
and
2. The majority didn't want to come to grips with the fact that in the end, all gun control is about suppositions of dangerousness (something Scalia in Heller at least basically admitted).
And starting in Rahimi, the Court is going to tether this back towards dangerousness as the criterion, because it is the only thing that works.
Well, it's the only thing that works if you want to go back to treating the 2nd amendment as not really a genuine civil liberty.
But does the Court want to do that? I don't think so. They've chosen their criterion: Adjudicated dangerousness, as proven by a felony trial. Not "Somebody's got a hunch" dangerousness, not even when that somebody wears a robe to work.
You would want a non-violent felon like Martha Stewart (convicted of perjury for denying she had an inside tip that a stock she owned was gonna tank before she sold it) to keep and bear arms after a felony conviction? The Horror! The Peril to Public Safety!
I remember the lead up to the 1968 Federal Gun Control Act.
The talk was about nobody wanted violent felons to keep their gun rights. But the GCA has expanded prohibited persons far beyond violent felons.
Not only do felons (non-violent or violent) lose their 2A rights, but if a non-violent misdeamor crime is punishable by possible imprisonment of wenty fout months or more, they lose their 2A rights too.
And the ATF office that is supposed to review federal 2A rights restoration has gone unfunded since its creation by letter of law. It does no exist in reality.
I think Martha Stewart should get to keep her pistol, which I am sure is quite fashionable and tasteful and is part of a fancy arrangement in her gun case.
And I also think non-violent misdemeanants should keep their guns.
But I think if a crime involves violence or a threat of violence, the state can disarm you.
I think that if the crime involves violence or a threat of violence, and you were convicted of it in a full criminal trial, the state can disarm you.
For a misdemeanor? No, screw that. You want serious penalties, use serious process.
What part about the misdemeanor process is insufficiently serious?
For starters, the lack of a right to trial by jury.
Every state requires a jury trial for some misdemeanors, with some requiring them for all.
"Some".
"Presumptive" lawfulness just meant, lawful pending an analysis. Now they've done the analysis.
.
Apologies, I see you did quote this part. So take my comment as pertaining to the title of the post, instead.
that's the holding
This is really a problem that flows from the Heller decision that the Second Amendment protects an individual right rather than the right of the states to maintain a militia. If it is truly an individual right under natural law, can we really strip it from anyone? Even a convicted felon has the right to security in their home and the right to avoid self-incrimination. But if the maintenance of a militia were a right secured to the states and they had the authority to establish a criteria for membership (and therefore the RTKBA), it would be much easier to justify taking RTKBA away from convicted felons.
"If it is truly an individual right under natural law, can we really strip it from anyone?"
Sure, but only in consequence to a serious felony conviction. Serious felony convictions routinely resulted in loss of civil liberties.
Let's differentiate natural (substantive) rights from granted (procedural) rights.
Not that I disagree with you, but that this differentiation will prove valuable in time.
“Sure, but only in consequence to a serious felony conviction. Serious felony convictions routinely resulted in loss of civil liberties.”
1. What is a “serious” felony?
2. After serving time in prison, which is the punishment, why shd anyone by punished for life by the loss of any civil liberty like gun rights or voting?
3. The 2nd Amendment doesn’t say, “Except for felons.”
Second Amendment disarmament shd be an individualized finding of dangerousness. That is, how likely is the now free felon likely to commit a new crime with a gun.
two rights , not one
The right of the people to keep and bear arms (for self defence) and the right of the people to form militias for the common defence.
It would seem to revolve around what exactly is a "felon."
It is obvious that a felony in 2024 with "punishable by ..." is not what a felony was in 1791.
As a physicist, I like to take things to extremes: Redefine "felony" as "currently breathing." I am certain that the Supreme Court would hold that simply changing the definition of a word does not enable the government to prevent all firearm ownership. However, it is clear that the "redefinition" of a "felony" has done essentially the same thing.
So the dissent's view that 'felony" categorically prohibits firearm ownership is in principle no different from the view that a definition "if you are alive you are a felon" would be a path to constitutionally prohibit all private firearm ownership.
Antisocial gun nuts are among my favorite culture war casualties.
What measures should mainstream America impose on those right-wing losers as the culture war progresses and the liberal-libertarian mainstream shapes our national policies and practices?
Prohibition of hunting on public lands (or on private land without express written permission of the landowner)?
Tobacco-like taxation?
Mandatory liability insurance for gun owners?
Elimination of all private sale (and similar) loopholes?
Universal registration (with purchases of ammunition conditioned on presentation of a relevant registration)?
Alcohol-like prohibitions with respect to minors?
Judge Carlos Bea is 90 years old. He immigrated from Spain when he was 5 years old, around the end of the civil war. He was 69 when George W. Bush appointed him to his seat. He took senior status in 2019.
I had always assumed he was a Coolidge appointment.
Presumably W appointed him as part of a deal to make nice with filibustering Dems. Let me have this one, he can’t last more than five years.
He fooled em
I’ve argued this issue in an actual case for the government, and the SCOTUS caselaw—be it Heller, McDonald, Bruen, or even Alito’s dissent (joined by Thomas and Gorsuch) in the original NY gun case (which was thrown out as moot)—is very clear that the default is felons can be dispossessed of their right to bear arms. There may be some room for as-applied challenges a la Range, but that’s the exception, not the rule.
In other words, we don’t even have to get into Bruen’s test. The controlling precedent itself decides this issue—precedent SCOTUS simply isn’t going to overturn or abrogate outside the above-mentioned as-applied challenges, and even that’s a maybe.
This was an as-applied challenge.
Yeah, but this guy isn’t like Range, who wasn’t even a felon; rather, he was treated like one under federal law (which is problematic in and of itself). Like I said, under SCOTUS precedent, the default is that felons lose their right to bear arms. Some as-applied challenges might prevail, but they’ll be the exception.
I think you mean something by "default" that's a little too strong.
What the Supreme court actually said was "presumptive".
Cornel law school:
"presumption"
"Presumption is a legal inference that must be made in light of certain facts. For example, in the case of In Interest of Keiss, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District defined presumption as a legal inference; a party challenging it can overcome the presumption by providing the appropriate burden of proof.
Most presumptions are rebuttable, meaning that they are rejected if proven to be false or at least thrown into sufficient doubt with evidence. Other presumptions are conclusive, meaning that they must be accepted to be true without any opportunity for rebuttal. In Sandstrom v. Montana, the United States Supreme Court described a conclusive presumption as “an irrebuttable direction” in light of certain convincing facts. However, the Court noted that a conclusive presumption or a presumption that shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant could pose constitutional issues."
So, you get that? If it's presumptive, it's only established until you provide evidence to the contrary. That's what the court did here.
That would be all fine and good if every current member of the Court save Jackson hadn’t signed onto an opinion at some point that says those who break the law, most notably felons, lose their right to bear arms. Again, except for the rare cases, felons (and probably other types of criminals) are going to be deemed to have forfeited their arms rights. Any lower-court judge refusing to see the writing on the wall is just trying to make a point while pretending to respect what SCOTUS has actually written.
If your point is that the Court isn't going to follow their own reasoning, so a lower court following that reasoning to it's end point is liable to be slapped down, I agree.
They're still following that reasoning, though, until the Court announces different reasoning it will fail to consistently follow.
And once again the headline allows one to instantly conclude that it must have been a GOP majority panel.
If it were not for some weak kneed Bushy types, one could almost replace the Appeals Court judiciary with colored cards.
This was my favorite part of the USA v. Duarte opinion. Citing Heller, "State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850) (describing the Second Amendment as protecting every “man’s right to carry arms . . . ‘in full open view’”)."