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The Court Should Cast Doubt On Havens Realty "Diversion" Standing and Establishment Clause "Offended Observer" Standing
If Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine lacks standing, so should progressive groups.
On Tuesday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in FDA v. Alliance Hippocratic Medicine, the mifepristone case. Much of the argument focused on whether AHM had standing to challenge the FDA's actions. From my vantage point, it looks like the plaintiffs will lose. Indeed, the writing has been on the wall since the Court granted a stay of the Fifth Circuit's decision back in April 2023. The question isn't whether AHM will lose; the question is how. I would humbly submit that the Court could take this opportunity to clean up several aberrations in standing law.
First, the Court should claw back so called "diversion of resource" standing based on Haven's Realty. As this theory has been interpreted by some lower courts, an organization can claim Article III standing simply by claiming that a government policy forces the organization to divert resources. In other words, the organization would usually spend their resources on X, but because of some state action, the organization now spends their resources to respond to the state action. That injury seems entirely self-inflicted, and is at odds with decades of standing law. Yet some lower courts accepted this theory in legal challenges to Trump policies. I had hoped that the Supreme Court could address Havens Realty in Acheson, but that case fizzled out on mootness grounds.
During oral argument in AHM, several Justices addressed Havens Realty standing. Earlier in the argument, Justice Barrett said that AHM's injury "sound[s] in the Havens Realty associational standing." Barrett added that these are the sorts of "allegations we see by immigration advocacy groups." They claim a "diversion of resources" in the form of "increased expenses that result from the complications of having to address" the state action. Barrett asked Solicitor General Prleogar to distinguish "diversion of resources" from Havens Realty.
Prelogar explained that in Havens, the civil rights group had a "direct and concrete demonstrable injury" apart from the diversion of resources. Specifically, the organization "organization had a contract to provide low-income housing" and "the racial steering practices directly interfered" the "contractual obligations." Prelogar said Havens Realty did not "bless[] a theory of standing that would allow an organization to assert a setback to its abstract social interests." The Solicitor General acknowledged that "in the immigration context," some "lower courts in particular have seemed to read Havens to endorse far broader theories of standing." Prelogar said "we would welcome an eventual clarification from this Court on organizational standing."
Erin Hawley, representing AHM, said that Havens Realty was "on all fours with this case." Hawley said there "was an impairment of the organization's mission" and "an expenditure of resources." That impairment, Hawley said, is sufficient for an injury-in-fact. Justice Thomas said that reading of Havens makes standing "easy to manufacture." The organization would just have to "us[e] resources to advocate their position in court" and say those expenditures "now causes an injury." Hawley acknowledged that "the lower courts have cabined Havens to say where you have sort of prelude to litigation types of activities." It is not enough to have a diversion of resources. Hawley said AHM's actions were "neither a prelude to litigation, nor would they have occurred but for FDA's unlawful conduct in this case." Justice Thomas did not return to the issue.
Justice Barrett turned to Havens with Hawley. She asked "what additional costs [AHM] might have incurred or how [AHM's] resources were diverted in a way that would satisfy Havens"? Barrett pointed to AHM's conducting and analyzing studies. Barrett replied, "Is that it?" Barrett, and Thomas, did not seem persuaded.
During the Solicitor General's rebuttal, Prelogar said that "clarify" that Havens Realty does not permit "every organization in this country . . . to challenge any federal policy they dislike." I suspect progressive lawyers who are keen to challenge future Trump immigration policies were gritting their teeth when Prelogar made this comment.
Second, the Court can cast some doubt on so-called "offended observer standing" under the Establishment Clause. I have long questioned how someone can claim standing to challenge a policy on Establishment Clause grounds based simply on being offended. Justice Gorsuch raised this issue in his American Legion concurrence. And Gorsuch pushed SG Prelogar on this issue. Prelogar attempted to deflect, and "would put the Establishment Clause precedent and First Amendment precedent generally in its own bucket." Gorsuch pushed back. "Standing is standing." There is no First Amendment exception to Article III.
Gorsuch "was looking for some guidance" of how to "stitch it all together." Prelogar acknowledged that an "offense or distress type of injury" would "likely go far too much in the direction of allowing Article III courts to weigh in based on generalized grievances." But she said the Court has found an "cognizable" injury where "there is a kind of direct governmental action producing that type of injury." I'm not sure that distinction works. Article III is not satisfies because some "direct governmental action" offends a person. There has to be an actual, concrete injury in fact. Cases like Van Orden and American Legion are inconsistent with decades of standing doctrine.
Ultimately, there are probably more than enough votes to reverse the Fifth Circuit. It is tempting to write a 9-0 decision that finds a way to rule against AHM, without speaking to these broader issues. But it would be helpful if the Court, or at least a plurality of Justices, clamps down on the other standing theories at play in this case. There is some degree of unilateral disarmament when conservative litigants are thrown out of court but progressive groups can skate in under the radar. The Court can reject the broad reading of Havens Realty, and hold that mere emotional distress is insufficient to establish a concrete injury.
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I don't know if Josh reads comments, but it would be great if someone could go back through this post to clean up a number of typos.
I’ve got some bad news for you, Cheshire!
tl;dr Josh is pissed that his favorite Judge was exposed as a partisan hack so wants dicta obfuscating that his favorite Judge is a partisan hack.
If this lawsuit were not a made up "controversy" manufactured from whole cloth, why did the plaintiffs elect to file suit in federal court in Amarillo?
This calls to mind the maxim about being careful what one asks for.
A case where one side clearly loses under the broadest possible test seems like a poor vehicle to use to overturn precedent and narrow the test.
But the issue isn't overturning precedent or narrowing anything; it's clarifying that some lower courts have been misreading it.
Well, one.
Standing doctrine ultimately serves the constitution it doesn’t trump the constitution and the constitution makes it very clear that we are to take the harm created by being exposed to the government’s proclamation of an official religion very seriously — not to mention the funding of that religion (and those are fundamentally about offended observer status).
Yes, you can suggest that not every constitutional right has a remedy etc etc so it’s not a completely airtight argument but ultimately modern standing doctrine is just a nice theoretical construct judges came up with (loosely based on case or controversy language) while the constitution is the law of the land so if giving up on a uniform theory of standing results in fewer unenforceable constitutional provisions — well too bad for a uniform theory of standing.
"and the constitution makes it very clear that we are to take the harm created by being exposed to the government’s proclamation of an official religion very seriously"
Where does it do that? The 1st amendment, I assume, but all that says is that Congress shall make no law "regarding" an establishment of religion; The whole topic is off limits for legislation.
A proclamation, though, without any force of law? That's not a law. That's just empty words without a law, and the law, or at least executive action supposedly, (As all executive actions are supposed to be...) based on a law, is where the prohibition kicks in.
By that same logic the government talking to social media companies is fine too.
Honestly, as long as they did nothing but talk, with no veiled (Or not so veiled!) threats, that would be fine. We’re just not obligated to pretend that a guy standing there with a can of gasoline and a lighter is just admiring your business when he says, “Nice place you have here, be a shame if it caught fire.”
But we’re not obligated to treat actual admiration as an extortionate threat, either.
The problem with the government “talking to” social media companies was that it is happening in the context of serious threats to take adverse legal actions, such as repeal of Section 230. Not in a vacuum.
So, is this proclamation in the context of the government threatening to take away churches' tax status, or something like that? It matters.
I do not see how you are distinguishing between one set of government speech being coercive and another not being so.
And no, calling one admiration and the other a veiled threat is not a factual distinction; it's just begging the question via labeling.
And the rest is paranoia, though this time your paranoia is shared by many on here.
There were no serious threats to Section 230, just the usual political bluster. And certainly that bluster was not tied to granting government requests. *because the companies chose not to grant plenty of government requests*. Extortion is not known for resulting in the extorted party casually taking half measures.
Shorter Josh: wahhh, my hack-pretending-to-be-a-judge is going to be reversed 9-0 for an utterly lawless decision, but liberals are bad too.
And if Josh thinks progressives don't frequently lose on standing grounds, he's badly misinformed.
There is some degree of unilateral disarmament when conservative litigants are thrown out of court but progressive groups can skate in under the radar.
I remember a Mormon judge in Idaho who would have held in contempt any lawyer who said that in court.
Mormon culture is interesting. It seems to produce among too many bigots a generous sprinkling of unusually principled citizens. If he were not so old, I would back without hesitation the conservative Rusty Bowers as a SCOTUS nominee. I would expect to see him on the Court set an example of superb judicial temperament which his fellow justices would be embarrassed not to emulate. Not Blackman, of course. But it takes a catastrophile to speculate a prospect of a Blackman appointment to any court.
Blackman would be close to the median in some state trial court systems. My state's judges are half otherwise unemployable patronage appointments and half qualified.
I think Blackman aspires to appellate work rather than getting his hands dirty in a trial court. Not much use for constitutional law expertise in a slip and fall case.
Only half?!?
"It's 95% of Massachusetts judges that make the other half look bad."
---- Howie Carr
A lawyer who practices here agreed generally with my assessment, without agreeing to any specific proportion. It's not really binary. There are the alcoholics who couldn't hold a real job (more commonly they are magistrates). There are ex-politicians who don't want a real job. There are other connected people who, as Howie Carr would put it, want their snouts in the trough. And there are ambitious people. There was a magistrate who was a former prosecutor. Said to be by the book, justice will be served. Never heard he was incompetent or unstable. But he was presiding over traffic court! That's not about justice. Magistrates are allowed to let some people get away with it and are expected to use their sense of fairness to decide who gets away with it.
I got a summer job in college through a connection and it was just luck for the employer that I made them happy.
"catastrophile"
Beautiful!
I want to shift the line on standing. This is not the case to do it. A change in standing doctrine is not necessary to resolve the case. If you see standing as a political game, the three liberals will not need to compromise to get to five votes. They might need to make a concession to get to nine.
"There is some degree of unilateral disarmament when conservative litigants are thrown out of court but progressive groups can skate in under the radar."
The greatest irony in the world is how white, American, males can be THE most butthurt group in history.
Watts burned for less -- FAR less....
Dey speak English in Watts?
For less than the Supreme Court failing to narrow its standing doctrine in exactly the way Prof. Blackman is asking?
There is some degree of unilateral disarmament when conservative litigants are thrown out of court but progressive groups can skate in under the radar.
Josh, if you were anything other than a petulant, hackish piece of shit, you’d recognize that the same standing doctrine that served “progressive” groups in other cases can just as easily be employed by conservative groups, for other claims. You’re just not getting the extraordinary reach requested here, where a bunch of doctors are claiming that the only way to protect them from potentially having to provide care to women who have taken mifepristone and require follow-up is to toss the FDA’s decades-old approval of mifepristone, thereby rendering it effectively unavailable to all women in the country.
You keep using this space to push for bad law in order to achieve short-term, narrow, culture war goals, Josh. You can fuck right off with that shit.
Just like California v. Texas, another Josh Blackman winner, the remedy requested for the harm alleged is completely insane:
“I feel coerced by a $0 mandate so millions of people need to be kicked off Medicaid”
“I might have to treat a person for side effects of a drug/I like looking a pregnant people so you have to cancel a 24 year old FDA approval of a drug”
It’s like a petulant teenager being mad he can’t have a phone out in class so he goes to court asking it to dissolve the entire state’s education system as unconstitutional and somehow gets lower courts to agree with him.
Prof Blackman is right that standing doctrine is in need of serious cleanup but I think his proposal is exactly backwards.
Diversion of resources is most definitely not a "self-inflicted" injury - it is work that would not be required but for the government's policy decision. Now, you could say that it's a "self-inflicted" injury to oppose an unjust policy decision but let's take that logic a little further. That same logic would say that you have no standing to oppose a warrantless search because it's your "self-inflicted" decision to fight it. That leaves no one with standing to fight an unjust law or policy. I do concede that that is the current state of the law but that is an intolerable policy result. If standing doctrine ever leaves a situation where no one has standing, then the doctrine is clearly and self-evidently broken.
It's work that isn't required, so yes, it's self-inflicted. Just don't divert the resources. You aren't harmed, other than disliking the law.
No, that's not the same logic. The warrantless search itself is an injury.
No, that’s not the same logic. The warrantless search itself is an injury.
Specifically, an intrusion into private property and effects.
that is just so fucking obvious!
My example was poorly chosen. Consider instead a warrant that is illegally requested and approved but, for entirely unrelated reasons, is never carried out.
Guess what!
"I had hoped that the Supreme Court could address Havens Realty in Acheson, but that case fizzled out on mootness grounds."
Two different issues. Havens Realty had holdings on individual standing and group standing. Acheson Hotel could have addressed the first issue had the Court not decided the case on mootness grounds, but there was no group or association plaintiff in that case. The Court's questions in AHM focused mostly on group standing.
Standing doctrine has been abused by liberal and conservative plaintiffs alike, so I wouldn’t see this as a partisan issue.
From the oral argument, I suspect the Court will dispose of this case by clarifying that Havens Reality has a narrower scope than some lower courts, like the ones in this case, have interpreted it as having, but will not otherwise disturb existing standing precedent.
Justice Gorsuch explored the idea of using this case to come up with a global standing standard that would apply across the board, including eliminating the special deference currently given in First Amendment cases.
I could be wrong. But I didn’t read the other Justices as inclined to go along with such an effort. So I think this case won’t end up with much impact on the law except to cabin the scope of Havens Realty without overruling it.
There was some talk of using this case to cut down on the scope of injunctions and to limit the use of national injunctions. There was general agreement that even if they had standing, an injunction that effected the entire country for the benefit of perhaps 2 of the 7 doctors was unreasonable as a matter of equity, and interim injunctions should have been limited to just the parties at hand.
But without standing, and there’s a pretty good chance the court will be unanimous in concluding that these plaintiffs have no standing, there isn’t any jurisdiction to decide anythjng further. So the Court will have to wait for another case, where there is standing, to address the proper scope of injunctions.
The government is one of the parties at hand, and the injunction was limited to the government. If you mean an injunction that only benefits the specific individual plaintiffs, the problem is that the alleged harm they purportedly suffered (or purported harm they allegedly suffered) cannot be remedied by a lesser injunction. They're afraid some woman somewhere will take mifepristone, suffer an adverse reaction, and they'll be forced to treat that woman. There's no lesser injunction that could prevent that.
They’re afraid some woman somewhere will take mifepristone, suffer an adverse reaction, and they’ll be forced to treat that woman. There’s no lesser injunction that could prevent that.
Well, there is one, it's just not against the defendants they decided to sue. They could sue whoever they think is requiring them to treat these women for an injunction relieving them of the obligation to do so.
Another precedent from the Burger Court may soon be on the chopping block: Havens Realty v. Coleman (1982). This case found that an organization can assert an Article III injury based on a "drain of the organization's resources." For example, an organization that sends a "tester" to determine if there was a violation of the law could claim the money needed to send the tester was an injury in fact. This injury seems to be self-inflicted, as that term is understood today: anyone can generate standing-on-demand by spending money to investigate the alleged illegal activity.
The Court in Havens Realty actually went too far to find standing.
There were individual plaintiffs in the case who had actually been discriminated against, per the findings of the trial court. There was no need to address organizational standing, as individual standing was enough to satisfy the Article III case or controversy requirement.
In this case, there is no indivudual plaintiff that alleged actual concrete, particularized harm by the FDA's decision to permit the use of a drug.
I do think narrowing Havens Realty's application in lower courts (specifically as used in this case) would be a logical part of the ratio decendi. There's no logical reason to use an opinion as a treatise on standing in general and it would be improper for the Court to do so.
I think the rationale of the "offended observer" in Establishment Clause cases is being subject to a government-sponsored religion, by itself, is the harm suffered. I don't think the person even has to be offended, just prefer to not be subject to an establishment of a religion. The thinking on the Establishment Clause has shifted considerably over the years so it may be worth revisiting whether that is a harm the Establishment Clause is designed to address (and, therefore, whether there is standing) in an appropriate case. But this case is not that case.
That's right. Injury, in standing law, comes from the nature of the right. In the case of the Establishment Clause, the right is the general public's right to not have the government intertwined with religion, so it makes sense that the injury could be very broad for standing analysis.
But Havens Reality makes very little sense as a standing rule.
Every Blackman column: "This is why Trump should appoint me to some important post"