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"Spam Private Eye" Can't Constitutionally Be Required to Get Real Private Eye License,
at least when the license requires 6000 hours of training on matters far removed from his expertise.
From Fink v. Kirchmeyer, decided last week by Judge Rita Lin (N.D. Cal.):
Joel Fink operates a business called "Spam Private Eye" where he reviews his clients' "junk" emails and identifies ones that might violate California's anti-spam law [and can thus support lawsuits seeking statutory damages -EV]. In July 2023, the California Bureau of Security and Investigative Securities (the "Bureau") cited Fink for acting as an unlicensed private investigator.
The court concluded that the regulation was "a content- and viewpoint-neutral regulation of professional conduct" and thus "subject to rational basis review, requiring only a showing that the licensing requirements are rationally related to Fink's fitness to conduct his business." But, though "[t]hat is a low bar," "the private investigator licensure law fails to clear that low bar as applied to [Fink]":
Specifically, he has shown a gross mismatch between the highly burdensome requirements of the licensing regime, which require him to undertake 6,000 hours of largely unrelated training, and the State's marginal interest in regulating his review of his clients' "junk" emails, which are highly unlikely to be sensitive.
As a result, the court issued a preliminary injunction against the Bureau's applying the law to Fink, reasoning:
The district court in Cornwell v. Hamilton (S.D. Cal. 1999) addressed a similar as-applied constitutional challenge to a licensing scheme under California law, and the Court finds the reasoning in that case persuasive. The plaintiff in Cornwell was an African hair braider who asserted that she should be permitted to lock hair for compensation without fulfilling California's cosmetology licensing requirement. Becoming a licensed cosmetologist required undergoing a 1600-hour cosmetology curriculum and passing a licensing exam. In granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on her Due Process and Equal Protection claims, the district court found that the plaintiff could not "reasonably be classified as a cosmetologist as it is defined and regulated presently," and "[e]ven if [she] were defined to be a cosmetologist, the licensing regimen would be irrational as applied to her because of her limited range of activities," which overlapped only minimally with the types of activities covered in the state's principal training curriculum and examination.
Here, Fink is likely to show that, as in Cornwell, the private investigator licensure law as applied to him would be irrational given the limited scope of his "investigative" activities. To become a licensed private investigator, Fink is required to have at least three years of experience in "investigation work," which is narrowly defined to include work as: (1) a sworn law enforcement officer; (2) military police; (3) an insurance adjuster; (4) a person employed by either a licensed private investigator; (5) a person employed by repossessors in limited capacities; (6) an arson investigator; (7) an investigator for a public defender; and (8) an investigative journalist. Fink would also have to pass an examination, which covers topics including: conducting interviews, asset searches, and surveillances; performing background checks and due diligence analyses; tracking individuals to locate missing or hard-to-find persons; evaluating incident scenes to gather factual evidence related to damage, loss, or injury; preparing for and providing litigation support; and participating in court proceedings.
The legislative history for the 2017 amendments to the licensure law indicates that the California Legislature imposed licensing requirements on private investigators because they "play a unique role in that their job is to delve into an individual's personal information, history, and behavior" and they "have a unique ability [to] interact with consumers' sensitive information." But on the record before the Court, there is no evidence that Fink handles sensitive client information or that he is providing services beyond reviewing his clients' junk emails. The entirety of Fink's "investigation" is reading his clients' self-identified spam emails, which by definition are unlikely to contain any sensitive information, and compiling and creating PDFs of the emails that might violate California's anti-spam law. Fink avers that he does not conduct surveillance, investigate crimes done or threatened against the United States, attempt to locate lost or stolen property, investigate the causes of fires or other property damage, carry a weapon, or operate under a pseudonym. Moreover, Fink is not involved in any of the subsequent litigation that his clients may choose to pursue with their own attorneys (who have a duty of candor toward the courts), other than receiving a percentage of any recovery on a contingency basis
Licensing regimes will often require knowledge of areas not part of a licensee's specific practice. However, Fink's situation presents an extraordinary case. He is in a particularly unusual position because of the minimal overlap between his limited "investigative" activities and the full scope of private investigative conduct contemplated by the Legislature. Fink's business of reviewing inherently non-sensitive spam emails does not appear to implicate the Legislature's concerns about privacy and deceptive practices motivating the oversight of more traditional private investigators, despite that Fink's conduct technically falls within the scope of the licensure law.
Requiring Fink to undertake 6,000 hours of training as, say, an arson investigator or investigative journalist is not rationally related to his capacity or fitness to read his clients' junk emails and identify the ones that may violate the anti-spam law. Accordingly, Fink is likely to succeed in showing that the private investigator licensure law as applied to him fails rational basis review….
Andrew Heller Ward and Dylan Moore of Institute for Justice, as well as Bretton Laudeman and Brendan P. Cullen of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, represent plaintiff. Lawyers from the Institute for Justice also won Cornwell v. Hamilton (S.D. Cal. 1999), the case cited as a precedent here.
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Why does anyone need a licence to be a private detective?
Ordinary private detectives pry into people’s private affairs, delve into their financial information, are in situations involving firearms, and much more. Licensure ensures they aren’t working for criminal gangs, have some awareness of the legal and ethical boundaries it will often be tempting for them to cross to get information, are reasonably even-tempered and not prone to shoot people at first blush, etc.
The rationale is similar to that for licensing doctors, lawyers, and other professions.
The plaintiff’s argument was basically that he doesn’t do anything the licensure scheme was designed to address. But the court didn’t question the rationality of the scheme as applied to traditional private investigator activities.
Licensure ensures none of the things in your list. I will concede that those are the excuses given by the protectionist lobbyists trying to establish barriers to entry to their profession but there is no evidence showing that licensure can actually accomplish those alleged goals.
You are correct that the court didn't address the rationality of the scheme as applied to traditional PIs because that question was not before the court. But in a sane world, that question ought to get in front of some court and the entire structure torn down.
Licensure regimes also fail to ensure lawyers don't steal and doctors don't kill or drivers can competently drive. Just like how criminal laws fail to ensure people in general don't lie, cheat or steal.
Unless you are arguing against all licensing regimes, and possibly all criminal laws, I fail to see your point.
The licensure regimes you list aren't intended to ensure that lawyers don't steal and doctors don't kill. The drivers license one is intended to ensure that drivers can competently drive - and that particular licensure regime has some data supporting its effectiveness.
I am not arguing against all licensing regimes but I am arguing against most of them. They should be evidence-based and shown to be effective at their alleged goals, not mere pretexts for protectionism.
And never ever to restrict entry of competition, would be a massive improvement.
This, of course, defeats the purpose of going into government.
Out of curiousity, how did you collect evidence on the relative effectiveness of licensed vs. unlicensed doctors, lawyers, etc.?
Where did I say that I did collect evidence on those two? I only said that the intent of their licensure was not what Snorkle claimed.
The alleged goal of lawyer licensing was less waste of judicial resources. A comparison of lawyer-driven cases compared to pro se cases could give you some anecdotal evidence that licensure works. But having seen the quality of some licensed attorneys' work and the massive judicial resources they waste, it's weakish evidence at best. Regardless, my point is merely that without studying the specific regime, you can't reject the null hypothesis that licensure is a pretext for protectionism.
Protectionism is never a legitimate justification for licensure. Public safety can be a legitimate justification if and only if the license can be shown to be actually effective at achieving that safety goal.
Where does a goal of saving judicial resources come from? I imagine it would often conflict with the goal of zealously representing the client.
Also, how in the world would you measure judicial resource savings? Suppose a pro se client’s complaint gets tossed at motion to dismiss, but a lawyer would win the case after a trial and an appeal. The pro se route takes less judicial resources to reach a result, right? So it’s more efficient, right?
The lawyer would arguanly provide more “justice” at the cost of judicial resources. But how much “justice” is produced is rather harder to measure than how many resources are used, so less easy to establish based on evidence.
Does the law prevent unlicensed people from charging money for delving into private affairs, etc., or does it prevent unlicensed people from delving into private affairs, etc.?
One reason is that a licensed private investigator has access to the motor vehicle database, which is closed to the general public.
The data used to be public until some stalker used it to kill some starlet in Hollywood and a Federal law required it be closed. Before that some creative uses were found -- for example a legislative candidate who sent me a pro-motorcycle mailing because she found my name and address on the list of people licensed to operate a motorcycle. (And I voted for her...)
Someone who wants privileged access to the levers of state power (e. g., a lawyer) should probably get some sort of license for that.
Yes, and I wouldn't think that a private detective should be able to do anything that any other private citizen can't do.
Scary that spam-based lawsuits are enough of a thing for this guy to make a go, looking at other people's spam for possible winners.
Sometimes the best solution to a bad law is to simply enforce it.
OTOH, the legislature felt that spam was enough of a problem to warrant such an approach, and we do need to give deference to the legislature.
Honestly, he's not even a "private investigator" other than for marketing purposes. That being said, I think "rational basis with teeth" is a good compromise from the pre-Lee Optical standard and the Lee Optical standard.
How is he not calling himself Spam Spade? Or even Spam Spayed, as in I will spay your spam?
That's almost funny.
Spam Exam I Am ?
Yes, but does he come with green eggs?
6,000 hours ?!
This should be front page news - "California Court Makes Ruling That Is Not Totally Retarded"
But wait, does the guy have an uncle in the Nigerian air force looking to transfer $ 10 Million to my bank account?
The question I ask is about the legality of Massachusetts’ requirement that — in order to be a private investigator — one must have been one of the following:
A: Regularly employed as a detective doing investigative work for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, any political subdivision thereof or an official police department of another state for at least 3 years
B: A former member of an investigative service of the United States
C: A former police officer, of rank or grade higher than that of a patrolman
D: A police officer in good standing formally employed for at least 10 years.
See: https://www.mass.gov/info-details/requirements-for-a-private-investigator-license
I would speculate that using the term “Private Eye” in his business is what triggered the regulators. If he’d called himself something like “Synergistic Email Solutions,” they might have let it go.