The Volokh Conspiracy
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Second Amendment Roundup: Second Circuit Opines on New York's Gun Restrictions
Some provisions remain enjoined, but the decision on “sensitive places” is problematic.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit released its long-awaited decision in Antonyuk v. Chiumento – all 261 pages of it – on December 8. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Northern District of New York preliminarily enjoining major parts of New York's Concealed Carry Improvement Act, which was enacted to counter the Supreme Court's decision in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen.
The circuit court stripped down the district court's finding that plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits regarding the law's provisions on licenses to carry firearms and on sensitive places where firearms may not be possessed. It upheld the lower court's finding that plaintiffs are likely to prevail regarding restricted places where firearms may be possessed on private property open to the public only if the owner positively consents.
First, the court agreed that requiring license applicants to disclose even pseudonymous names under which they post online infringes on the Second Amendment and raises serious First Amendment concerns. Remember those three guys in 1787-88 who signed their names as "Publius"? The court let stand the requirement of "good moral character," which "is a spongy concept susceptible to abuse," but abuses "can still be vindicated in court as they arise."
Second, the court let stand the injunction against enforcement of a gun ban applicable to church members as a violation of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. The ban is not neutral, as owners of retail businesses open to the public may decide whether to allow firearms on their premises, and the ban is not narrowly tailored to meet the state's interest.
Third, the court agreed that plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their claim that the ban on firearms on private property open to the public, unless the property owner posts a conspicuous sign that firearms are permitted, violates the Second Amendment. While historically, enclosed private lands were closed to the public, no historical analogue supports the law's default presumption against carriage on private property open to the public.
That part of the decision is of decisive importance. The law makes it a felony for a license holder to enter any private property open to the public unless it has a "welcome gun owner" sign up. That would include everything from gas stations and fast-food places to hardware stores and used-car lots.
Fourth, and finally, the circuit court overturned the injunction against enforcement of the gun ban at various "sensitive places." The court made a critical error that undercuts much of its analysis. The error arose in the court's search for historical analogues for the law's ban on firearms in public parks, although it extends to its treatment of other "sensitive places." The court's error concerned, just when we thought it was deep-sixed, the Statute of Northampton of 1328.
To be sure, the court's conclusion on parks only extended "at least insofar as the regulation prohibits firearms in urban parks, though not necessarily as to rural parks." The latter includes wilderness parks, forests, and reserves.
I'll have a full report in early January, during which a number of methodological and historical errors will be identified and discussed in detail. Meanwhile, have a Happy Holiday season.
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My copy still says " . . . shall not be infringed".
Does anyone have one of the copies that says " . . . shall not be infringed except in places some politicians think are sensitive."?
I wish you'd stop repeating that. The 1st Amendment also says "shall make no law" concerning freedom of speech, yet no one says that allows libel and slander, or reporting secret military matters.
I personally think all those should be absolute, and the fault in disclosing secrets lies with whoever disclosed the secrets to unreliable people. But 99.999% of the population probably disagrees, and the same goes for "shall not be infringed" when it comes to arming jail prisoners or mental asylum patients.
Yeah, except that the left reads "Shall not be infringed" to mean "Shall not be infringed unless the law's stated purpose is to make people safer, and then it's fine."
No, mostly they read 2A as a collective or state right. By that reading, limits on civilian gun ownership aren't an infringement at all.
They keep pushing it even thougb it was debunked by the Supreme Court.
It was never bunked in the first place to be in need of debunking.
Just as most of the public accepts laws about sufficiently irresponsible uses of speech, they accept laws about sufficiently irresponsible uses of weapons. We don't accept laws about where people are allowed to speak.
In fairness, yeah we do. I can't, for example, unilaterally express my right to free speech through a bullhorn into your bedroom window at 1 am.
As usual, the leftist judges acted in bad faith. They upheld some of the injunctions to avoid a smackdown by SCOTUS, but meanwhile, it percolates in the courts for years while the unconstitutional aspects of the law live on. Meanwhile, when the Rev. Kirkland was told he couldn't shoot off into his LawTalkingGuy or whomever else he met at the bath house, courts granted permanent injunctions within hours.
These are your fans, defenders, and ideological allies, Volokh Conspirators . . . and the reason one of you is in the market for a moving van, with others to follow . . .
Do you admit that you go off in LawTalkingGuy's bunghole?
"Likely to prevail" -- is anyone recording ultimate statistics on this? As if any court that misjudges this by, say, 30% or more is clearly into partisan hackery and loses its power.
While historically, enclosed private lands were closed to the public, no historical analogue supports the law's default presumption against carriage on private property open to the public.
Can someone enlighten me about what Holbrook is attempting to say there? It sounds like an argument that mere historical practice, no matter how pervasive, cannot be cited to build a historical analogy, unless some statute on the books mandated that practice. Which would be historical idiocy of a high order, but by no means inconsistent with Bruen.
Of course I await with bated breath non-historian Halbrook's promised January contribution to the corpus of American history.
You have to ask yourself, if these gun writers are so keen to opine on history, why not go to a good graduate school somewhere and get trained in historical practice? Why doesn't there seem to be anyone in the history-spouting pro-gun camp with any claim to historical distinction, or even minimal competence?
I will tell you the answer. It would get in the way. Pretend history, paid for and disseminated by the gun industry and its media supporters has become a huge part of pro-gun advocacy. Where a trained historian would suffer professional embarrassment if he published that customary historical practice becomes trivial in the absence of a statute to mandate it, a pro-gun writer, including a pro-gun writer parading as a Supreme Court Justice, labors under no such constraint.
+1
+1 for a guy that repeatedly misconstrues proper historical analysis.
+1 for a guy's version of historical analysis mirrors Stevens dissent whereby he treats the historical written records of the right to self defense as if it doesnt exist.
great job with that historical analysis
Joe_dallas, no doubt you take keen interest in finer points which guide historical analysis. You can distinguish proper means of historical inference from the others, and explain the problem to untangle contextual meaning after the context of creation for a text has been forgotten. Why not share what you know with those less-informed on these subjects?
Lathrop - I fully grasp both the basics and the finer points of "historical analysis"
The error that you make repeatedly in your call for proper historical analysis and the error that Stevens made in his Heller dissent - is that both you and Stevens ignore (or intentionally pretend ) contemporaneous written records do not exist. Substantial written record documents the right to keep and bear arms for self defense. Both you and Stevens ignored the existence of the historical record.
Your frequent critizism of Halbrook completely neglects to address any of the citations he makes of the historical record. Its one thing to misinterpret the historical context but quite another to pretend the historical record doesnt exist. That is the error that both you and Steven make repetitively.
" It sounds like an argument that mere historical practice, no matter how pervasive, cannot be cited to build a historical analogy, unless some statute on the books mandated that practice."
It sounds nothing like that. He's pointing out that you can't treat enclosed land that's closed to the public as identical to closed land that's open to the public.
My living room and my store front are not legally the same!
He’s pointing out that you can’t treat enclosed land that’s closed to the public as identical to closed land that’s open to the public.
Anyone here who can translate from gobbledegook?
By the way Bellmore, you have an aspirational take that it would convenience gun fans if SCOTUS stripped from commercial property owners property rights they have enjoyed from colonial times onward. I get that.
But I don't think you are even reading Halbrook in context of Bruen. Bruen is explicitly about where you can go if you interpret history and tradition exclusively according to statutory text—and Bruen is explicitly against paying attention to history as an account of what happened in the past.
Any notion is not to be entertained that customary historical practice—no matter how deeply entrenched or widely supported—could inflect contextual meaning of statutory text. The demand SCOTUS now delivers is that all statutory texts be read not according to the historical context prevailing at the time of their creation, but instead according to the context prevailing now—a great convenience to justices who know nothing of that past context anyway, but who remain keenly alert to present-minded policy goals.
Dobbs is like that too, by the way. That may not be an entirely new trend in legal interpretation. But it is new to put it explicitly, and to add a demand that every argument related to history be made under that constraint. And of course, newly and especially stupid.
Sorry, but the ship has sailed on commercial property owners having rights, starting in the 1960s with the Civil Rights Act.
"While historically, enclosed private lands were closed to the public, no historical analogue supports the law’s default presumption against carriage on private property open to the public."
The quote is expressly about the legal distinction between private land closed to the public, vs private land open to the public. They are not legally interchangeable, and the relevant precedent existed only for the former. Understandably so: Your uninvited presence in the former is trespassing, and armed trespassers can (rebuttably) be presumed to be up to no good. Your uninvited presence in a place open to the public, OTOH, is not trespassing until you're told to leave and refuse, so no such presumption attaches.
I don't think English is your second language, and you're clearly not in any conventional sense stupid. But you exhibit a very strong case of motivated incomprehension; You treat anything that contradicts your own position as though it were 'gobbledygook', you don't even lift a finger to understand it.
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What evidence do you have that in colonial times, it was illegal to enter a store with a gun unless the owner affirmatively consented?
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Nope. You're embarrassing yourself.
Yeah.
In no state are there laws that prohibit those who offer public accommodations from refusing them to armed persons.
Absent a warrant, or the pursuit of a fleeing suspect, store owners have every discretion in keeping out Secret Service agents!
This fundamentally misconceives the legal issue at hand. It is NOT whether the property owner could put up a sign on the door saying, "no firearms beyond this point". They could, and anyone found to be violating that sign could be legally ejected as a trespasser.
No, the issue at hand is a law establishing a default prohibition on entry by people bearing arms, which has to be affirmatively overridden by the property owner.
.
Halbrook is summarizing the court’s opinion, specifically this paragraph:
No, it doesn’t sound like that at all. The point has nothing to do with the pervasiveness of the proposed historical analogues, but rather whether or not they’re actually analogous.
.
Not unless one believes in miracles.
No, that's not even a little bit what he's saying. For someone who boasts about how he's trained to read historical sources, you're not even good at reading current ones. Holbrook in fact talking about historical practice, not laws that were on the books.
NY passed a law making it a felony for someone with a firearm to enter private property otherwise open to them or the public (for example, a store) unless the owner has expressly told them, or posted a sign saying, that they can. In other words, it flips the ordinary law of trespass on its head; ordinarily, if you enter an otherwise-open property, you're not guilty of trespass unless the property owner tells you to leave and you refuse. (And that would be a misdemeanor.) So, for example, if you go into a supermarket with a gun and the manager says, "Sorry, no guns allowed here; you have to leave," and you refuse, then you're guilty of trespass.
But New York's new law says that if you're carrying a gun, you're automatically guilty of criminal possession of a weapon — again, a felony — unless the supermarket had a sign posted saying, "Firearms welcome." It doesn't even require that the store manager say something to you. A cop who happens to be buying a can of soup and sees you can say, "There's no sign here allowing that, so I'm arresting you."
Holbrook is saying that there is no historical practice for such a restriction. (His first clause is distinguishing that from a place that's not open to the public.)
Bellmore, you wrote a reply with the second word being, "historically," but you based your reply on present-minded context. And you don't even know you did that.
Noscitur, Nieporent, and of course Halbrook, do the same. They are equally in the dark about the past.
Nobody can help any of you guys. None of you will take the time to learn first-hand what the past you imagine you understand was actually like. It was stranger than you think, and stranger than any source you ever encountered said it was.
You have that problem because most sources which inform your views today were created by people who also knew nothing about eras now centuries past. Even in the 19th century, the 18th century and earlier was an inaccessible mystery—which 19th century authors filled in according to 19th century context, just as you guys do now, using 21st century context.
You guys are like Nathaniel Hawthorne, who with no real opportunity to study the Puritans systematically created in fictions a cultural portrait of their era which almost everyone relies upon uncritically today. Hawthorne got the past almost entirely wrong. You are doing the same.
Take some time off, take yourself to a historical archive or rare books library, and just read whatever original sources interest you. Just be sure to exclude everything modern, especially including modern interpretations of the stuff you choose to read. Do it with an eye to find historical antecedents to today's policy problems and controversies. Make it your mission to find records to show that the very arguments which make sense to you today were understood similarly by people during that bygone age, or at least that those folks were in process of trending towards your views.
It shouldn't take more than a few months trying that to cure you of any misplaced confidence that you understand the past. What you will discover is that time and again circumstances arise which cry out—as you see it—for the very kind of thinking you cherish, but time and again everyone involved seems to veer unaccountably in some other direction—as if they were ignoring your insight on purpose. It is uncanny to experience that. When you do experience it, you get your first clue that what seemed like a manageable project to understand the past using present context is not manageable at all, and destined to fail. Then you either give up, or concede that the project will be larger, subtler, and more intellectually demanding than you supposed.
It is amazing how much you bloviate without saying anything at all. Also: stop pretending history is an arcane art. It's not. Law, on the other hand, is far beyond your comprehension.
And nothing you said even remotely responded to anything I wrote.
I'm sure there are extensive, unimpeachable historic records that will prove beyond a doubt that civilian ownership of arms was an anathema to the founding fathers. It's just that no one has looked for them!
If Michael Bloomberg can ever scrape up enough money for a couple of years of stipend for a grad student, you'll see!
Can someone enlighten me
If the long history of countless attempts to do just that is any indication, then...no.
"Trained in Historical Practice" the way Michael A. Bellesiles was?
LMFAO.
"Can someone enlighten me about what Holbrook(sic) is attempting to say there? It sounds like an argument that mere historical practice, no matter how pervasive, cannot be cited to build a historical analogy, unless some statute on the books mandated that practice. Which would be historical idiocy of a high order, but by no means inconsistent with Bruen."
I'm glad you are starting to understand, that is what Halbrook is saying, because that is what Bruen said, for example:
"To be clear, even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster. For example, courts can use analogies to “longstanding“ laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” to determine whether modern regulations are constitutionally permissible."
What would you have them do, cite some treatise that "wives generally forbade their husbands to carry weapons on Sunday afternoon outings to the park based on a few letters of sisters corresponding with each other? That might be an unenumerated power of spouses, even today, but not a power permitted to the legislature. Surely you can see the difference.
So, as this is a preliminary injunction, there's still going to be a hearing on the merits, back down the chain. The plaintiffs are still capable of prevailing at that hearing even on the matters where the court of appeals undid the injunction, right?
Of course, I suppose that the appeals court saying that they're unlikely to prevail on some matter might be treated by the lower court as a tacit command to rule against them...
Yes, but in the meantime, there are two years of delays, which is the whole point.
“To be sure, the court's conclusion on parks only extended "at least insofar as the regulation prohibits firearms in urban parks, though not necessarily as to rural parks." The latter includes wilderness parks, forests, and reserves.”
In Bruen: “How many muggings take place in the forest?” the Chief Justice asked.
I see a discrepancy…
I'm kind of curious about the "private property unless the owner consents" bit. A Social Club that I belong to just bought some property that we are going to turn into parking. While doing research to acquire our permits, I noticed something interesting. In our City the Property line extends to the middle of the street. The City doesn't own the property that the street is on, they have a right of way, usually 45 feet from the centerline of the street. If this is the same in New York, how long is it going to be until some one is charged with a violation of the "private property" clause for just sitting at a red light or stop sign with a weapon in their vehicle. Before you call me stupid, just remember that this is the "by any means" crowd.
This is the group that locked up a guy whose flight was diverted to New Jersey and brought his checked gun to the hotel with him.
They are evil people. They should be gassed.
These are the people who have literally arranged for airlines to notify them when planes carrying legally checked guns are diverted to their airport, so that when the passengers are forced to take possession they can be charged with a crime. Faced with a federal law protecting lawful transport of firearms from one legal place to another, they said, "Aha, but if you stop at a gas station you're no longer in transit, we can arrest you!"
They will use literally any excuse they can come up with to violate the 2nd amendment.
That's why they should be gassed, and their daughters and wives kidnapped and gang raped.
When you are faced with evil monsters, you need to become the monsters they are.
Jesus can turn the other cheek. We shouldn't.
That's ... odd. In every jurisdiction I've lived in, the property line ended at the curb of the street. However, there is an equivalent easement for the sidewalk so your legal question survives, just with the scenario slightly adjusted.
Nah, that's the way it was in rural areas in Michigan, as I recall from when I got my property surveyed: The road right of way was just an easement. Likewise for rail lines. Of course, easements held by the government have a way of gradually turning into outright ownership...
I don't think there's any universal rule, it varies by state, and maybe even locally.
Supreme Court, while moving the bar significantly in the NRA’s direction, hasn’t completely adapted the NRA’s view of the 2nd Amendment. Or Mr. Halbrook’s. One thing the oral argument in Rahimi strongly suggested is that Mr. Halbrook’s position - everything is legal unless there was a Colonial-era statute specifically prohibiting it - is very unlikely to be adapted by the Supreme Court.
Sure. Our 2nd amendment rights were a long while being eroded, and it's going to be a long, hard slog restoring them. I think it will have to be accomplished by steps; as each bit of restoration does NOT cause 'blood in the streets', the judiciary will gain confidence in the next.
Heller would not have been possible, I think, were it not for the spread of concealed carry reform proving to skeptical Justices that Americans really could be trusted with guns. Absent that demonstration, it doesn't matter if you can prove the outcome is legally dictated, they just won't follow the logic. It was critical that the anti-gun jurisdictions were demonstrated to be outliers.
I think that's part of why the particularly anti-gun jurisdictions are so desperate to not implement Bruen: Every loss they suffer without disaster following undermines their case for opposing the next restoration of the right.
But this means that the courts are not going to be leading this fight, that has to be done politically. All they'll do is secure the liberty after it's reclaimed at the ballot box, and clean up the holdouts.
They just want to protect us from the crook and the mugger and the carjacker and thew gang member. How can that be wrong?
Easily: Simply by the means chosen being impermissible.