The Volokh Conspiracy
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How Can the State Prevent Viewpoint Foreclosure?
By guaranteeing five basic internet rights.
(This is the final post in a five-part series on regulating online content moderation.)
In Part III, I showed how it is possible for private actors to remove an unpopular viewpoint from the internet by preventing websites that express that viewpoint from operating, a phenomenon I call "viewpoint foreclosure." In Part IV, I explained why every lawful website should have the right to exist—that is, to stay online. In Part II, I argued that regulating core intermediaries—the entities that administer the internet's core resources and, thus, the entities capable of effecting viewpoint foreclosure—would not run afoul of any First Amendment right to editorial discretion.
In this Part, I explain how the state can prevent viewpoint foreclosure by guaranteeing certain basic internet rights. To identify these rights—the bare minimum case for the state to intervene in private content moderation—we simply need to determine what a person requires of others to stand up a public website.
Connectivity. In the first place, for a person to operate a public website, she needs to connect to the internet. For residential subscribers—those who use their internet connection merely to consume websites and other applications—a standard internet access service will suffice. But for those who wish to host their own websites, a residential subscription will not do. They require commercial internet service with the requisite stability and bandwidth to make a self-hosted website available to the world. Although it might seem that net neutrality rules guarantee a right of connectivity, that is not so. The FCC's 2015 Open Internet Order (before it was repealed) pertained only to mass market broadband internet access, not to the kinds of commercial internet service public websites need to stay online. Moreover, the Open Internet Rules were concerned with website blocking when a subscriber is already able to enjoy internet access but his ISP prevents him from accessing certain websites or services that compete with the ISP. They did not concern themselves with ISPs who might refuse internet access altogether. To ensure enjoyment of that resource, we need a right of connectivity.
Addressability. Internet access is important, certainly, but unless you have use of a static IP address, your website will not be long for this world. IP addresses uniquely identify resources, including websites, on the public internet. Without a static IP address, any site reachable today may not be reachable tomorrow.
Just five regional internet registries (RIRs)—each a private organization—administer the IP address space, and each RIR can revoke any in-use block of addresses if the holder violates its terms. Thus far, RIRs have largely steered clear of the culture wars that rage within the application layer of the internet. But the decision by LACNIC, one of those RIRs, to revoke IP addresses that Parler relied on to escape deep deplatforming is concerning. LACNIC claimed to be enforcing a neutral (non-content-based) policy that Parler's new hosting provider had allegedly violated. But as I explain in my article, The Five Internet Rights, there are reasons to question whether LACNIC was enforcing its policies equally (or accurately). That fact, coupled with the broader ideological drive to deplatform Parler, raises the possibility that we may have seen the first instance of IP-based deplatforming.
Even if that suspicion is misplaced, it doesn't change the fact that five entities alone control the world's IP addresses, each of which is as free under current law to revoke IP addresses under its policies as Facebook is free to delete user posts that violate its standards. Given the centrality of IP addresses to online speech, a complete view of expressive access to the internet must include a right to maintain one or more static IP addresses for public websites. It must include a right of addressability.
Nameability. Nameability refers to the right of a website operator to maintain a domain name and, when users query that domain name, to have those queries answered (resolved) by returning the IP address at which the website is hosted.
As with the IP address system, the domain name system (DNS) has historically operated in a content-neutral manner. But that neutrality is waning. Domain registrars have increasingly waded into the content moderation game by inserting "morality clauses" into their registration agreements. For example, various registrars have prohibited registrants from associating domain names with websites that host "profane," "vulgar[]," "embarrass[ing], "derogatory, "racist, "homophobic," "blasphemous," or other "morally objectionable" content. Thus, dailystormer.com, gab.com, ar15.com, and other websites have seen their domain names suspended because their registrars disliked their viewpoints. Guaranteeing expressive access to the internet should therefore include a right of nameability that prevents DNS intermediaries from taking adverse action against domain names associated with lawful websites merely because they disagree with the viewpoints expressed on those websites.
Routability. Routability refers to the right of a website operator to have traffic to and from her website faithfully routed between intervening networks.
The term internet—short for "inter-network"—concisely captures the fact that the internet operates as a network of networks (in technical parlance, "autonomous systems"). Internet communication, therefore, is fundamentally a matter of "hopping" across networks, where each intervening network represents an additional hop between source and destination. Each network learns where to route internet traffic by receiving information from border routers in neighboring networks that "announce" which IP addresses they own and which other networks they can reach.
This ability to dynamically route traffic via different combinations of independently operated networks was one of the great innovations of the internet. But it also provides opportunities for viewpoint foreclosure. Network operators or others can attempt to take down unpopular websites by falsely announcing their IP addresses, a technique known as "BGP hijacking." Or, less dramatically, network operators could simply refuse to route traffic to or from an unpopular website by declining to announce the website's addresses or network number to neighboring networks. For example, after Cloud Innovation, an English colo provider, made itself a pariah in the African community by suing AfriNIC, certain African ISPs publicly discussed ceasing to route packets to IP addresses belonging to the company as a form of ideological retribution. Any regulatory scheme premised on preventing viewpoint foreclosure should therefore take account of a right to routability.
Accessibility. Finally, accessibility refers to the right of a website operator not to have users blocked from accessing her website.
Some ISPs already block access to illegal or infringing websites. Although the federal Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and PROTECT IP Act (PIPA) bills, which would have required ISPs to block certain infringing sites, met an ignominious end after a well-publicized online revolt, copyright holders are nonetheless securing similar injunctions from courts.
But ISPs have just as much power to block lawful websites as they do unlawful websites. Such actions would no doubt violate net neutrality rules were they still in effect. Each of the FCC's three attempts at net neutrality included some form of a no-blocking rule that prevented ISPs from blocking subscribers' access to lawful applications and websites. And California's Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act, which the state enacted in 2018 after the demise of federal net neutrality rules, currently prohibits such behavior. But net neutrality has historically targeted economic discrimination, not moral or ideological discrimination. It aimed to prevent ISPs from leveraging their power over their own networks to block subscribers from accessing websites either because the ISP offered a competing product or because the ISP wished to extract a toll from website operators to reach its subscribers.
Of course, taken literally, net neutrality rules would prevent ISPs from blocking any lawful website, regardless of the reason (economic or moral). But it remains to be seen whether net neutrality advocates, who tend to populate the political left, will continue to support such broad rules if those on the political right begin attempting to use them to protect far-right websites from left-led deplatforming campaigns.
[* * *]
In sum, if it is indeed possible to boot unpopular users, groups, or viewpoints from the internet altogether; if lawful (even offensive) websites should have a basic right to stay online; and if the First Amendment permits the state to intervene in attempts at "content moderation" by the entities that administer the internet's core resources—all of which I believe to be the case—then, fortunately, there is a workable solution. The architecture of the internet reveals five distinct choke points that could be used by private parties to excise disfavored speech from the internet. The state could protect lawful speech from that excision by enshrining five basic internet rights—the rights of connectivity, addressability, nameability, routability, and accessibility—a non-discrimination regime that would be clear and administrable. It could also be bipartisan, as it marries the economic discrimination concerns of the left that animate net neutrality with the ideological discrimination concerns of the right that animate social media non-discrimination laws like those in Texas and Florida. And because it focuses only on the core infrastructure of the internet—and the core issue of whether users should enjoy a basic right to speak on their own websites—its modesty is perhaps its most attractive feature.
Does that mean the state should never intervene in content moderation in higher layers of the internet stack, such as cloud computing or social media? I don't know. I remain unconvinced that either side of that debate has a slam dunk take on the issue. But if we start with the simple premise that all users should be able to speak not on individual websites but on the internet, then I think that that premise of basic viewpoint access could provide a platform from which to tackle those and many other thorny questions of content moderation.
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Existing laws at the federal and state level already provide a satisfactory regime for regulating a social medium platform.
A social medium platform provides a service of message carriage. This service is identical to Email service, which the FCC has already ruled to be common carriage. The service of a social medium service differs from Email service by virtue of a nifier user interface. The common carrier status of Email service must be brought to the attention of SCOTUS so that SCOTUS can make a ruling on the status of the message carriage service of a social medium platform.
If SCOTUS rules that a social medium platform is a common carrier of messages, the FCC must enforce 47 U.S. Code § 202 - Discriminations and preferences.
Does a 2023 ISP meet the definition of a 1996 ICS?
In 1996 AOL was an Interactive Computer Service and provided its Access Software on computer diskettes or on a CD-ROM. A user logged into AOL and interacted with it to obtain access to the Internet.
Today’s ISP certainly does include a service or system that provides access to the Internet. An ISP certainly seems to be an ICS. An ISP definitely provides common carriage, and an ISP has at times been defined to be a telecommunications service § 223 notwithstanding.
An information service can be or can provide a common carriage service. It may not be a telecommunications service from one president to the next, but despite § 223 the FCC could certainly apply § 202 to an ISP, which is an ICS, even if it does not consider an ISP, which is an ICS, to provide a telecommunications service.
A common carrier of messages can offer a plurality of service tiers and can define an item to be unfit for carriage by means of a content neutral standard.
Blah blah blah. Even if any of your analysis were true, § 230 supersedes § 202. Also, SCOTUS is not going to rule that a social medium platform is a common carrier of messages, because (a) that requires complete illiteracy as to what a social media platform is, (b) it requires complete illiteracy as to what a common carrier is; and (c) because of the aforementioned § 230. Also, that issue isn't coming before the Supreme Court.
The common carriage issue is raised in Prelogar's brief of amicus curiae for the United States. See page 11, but Prelogar did not recommend that it should be addressed. The Conference will be held on Sep 26. SCOTUS may punt the common carriage issue because the Netchoice cases do not necessarily provide the best context for addressing this issue, and the common carriage issue was not posed in a question in any of the three petitions for writ of certiorari.
1) Issues can't be raised in amicus briefs.
2) The issue wasn't raised in the amicus brief. It merely quoting in passing some non-controlling language from Oldham's ramblings,
Prelogar mentioned the subject of comment carriage, which is an issue of 5th and 12th circuit appellate opinions that SCOTUS is reviewing. SCOTUS may or may not opine on common carriage as it addresses the questions, which have been presented.
I am responding to obvious nitpicking.
Social media sites being common carriers or not (hint: not) is not at issue in either the 5th circuit case nor the imaginary 12th circuit case. (It's actually the 11th circuit.) Read the cert petitions. None of them ask the Court to decide whether social media companies are common carriers.
Incidentally, now that you know that the Netchoice case is out of the 11th circuit rather than the 12th, you should read it, because it demolishes every one of your arguments.
Nitpicking a typo is a substitute for sound legal reasoning. I fat-finger typewriter keys all the time.
What is legal logic of claiming that § 230 supersedes § 202? If Congress had intended such supersession, it would have written the supersession into the statute, or it would have repealed § 202 when it enacted § 230.
Section "(e) Effect on other laws" makes no mention of § 202.
Later laws always supersede earlier laws in the event of a conflict. 230 says that ICSs can block whatever they want. Common carriers cannot block whatever they want. Therefore, either there's a conflict and § 230 supersedes § 202, or there's no conflict because they're not common carriers and therefore § 202 doesn't apply. (Note: there is no conflict, because by definition social media companies are not common carriers.)
Whoosh! So close to it, and yet it still went entirely over your head. Congress expressly specified the laws that were not superseded by § 230, and did not include § 202.
The Congressional Research Service states the following.
During the Obama administration an ISP was simultaneously an ICS and a telecommunications (common carrier) service. The standard of good faith for a common carrier differs from the standard of good faith for a non-common carrier, but § 230 makes perfect sense both for an ICS, which is a common carrier, and also for an ICS, which is a non-common carrier.
Many statutes in 47 U.S. Code Part I (Common Carrier Regulation) and elsewhere in the US Code are not overridden by § 230 and are not mentioned in § 230 to have continued validity.
I maintain we wouldn’t be here if Congress and presidential candidates hadn’t threatened to yank section 230 unless they play ball censoring harrassment (which later morphed into nebulous “dangerous” statements to try to piggyback on the idea of true threats using wild distortion.)
That in turn would crush their business model by opening them up to lawsuits, dragging them back down to the normal state of every other industry.
So the solution is solving an iatrogenic problem of government’s own creation. But how do you unwind that when it still hangs over everything like a trillion dollar sword of Damoclese?
With no intion of easing.
“Regarding my client, The Honorable Congress of the United States…”
https://youtu.be/sA0glbG6c-8
There was a similar problem in the early days of telegraphy. The problem resulted from a combination of the Wow!Factor with a lack of understanding of telegraphy by legal professionals. For this reason, I applaud Nick Nugent’s effort to demystify the technology of the Internet.
I think we'd have gotten here anyway in time, even without that threat. There's a reason the platforms were so amenable to caving at that threat. They so didn't want to be thrown into that briar patch...
Respect for intellectual freedom, freedom of speech for dissident viewpoints, (Dissident from the prevailing view in academia, I mean, which can often just mean conforming to the prevailing view in larger society!) has been on the decline in academia for 2-3 decades now, and control of other institutions is, sadly, downstream of academia.
But, regardless of whether it would have happened on its own in time, it HAS happened, and unscrambling that egg is NOT going to be easy. I think the answer lies more in the direction of making deplatforming of all sorts technically more difficult, while we work on beating back the support for it.
We need to push the internet back in the direction of being genuinely decentralized, move back to distributed systems, instead of centralized platforms. Centralization is a choice, it's not inevitable.
We need SCOTUS to rule whether Congress declared the Internet to be a public forum in 47 U.S. Code § 230 – Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material.
The declaratory sections (a & b) of 47 U.S. Code § 230 seem to declare the Internet to be a public form, and the definition (f)(1) of the Internet explicitly tells us that the Internet is a network of federal and non-federal networks.
The Internet is substantially composed of federal networks and technology that a social medium platform intrinsically uses in creating its forum within the public forum of the Internet. A social medium platform is inextricably intertwined with the government if it operates within the Internet. It is the situation of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority at both the state and also at the federal level.
A social medium platform does not have to host unprotected speech like obscenity, and it could restrict its forum to children (but not specifically to white children).
To be more precise, § 230 addresses:
• (a) (1) “our citizens”,
• (a) (3) “forum for a true diversity of political discourse”, and
• (a) (4) “benefit of all Americans”.
According to the ordinary definition of English words, (a) (1), (3), and (4) refer to Internet and seem to designate the Internet to be a forum for the American pubic, to wit, a public forum.
Sometimes the following incorrect argument is made.
Social media platforms do not “operate within the Internet.” That phrase has no meaning. Every retail store in the country relies upon public roadways, both to obtain its products and to receive its customers. A retail store also relies other government services. This reliance does not mean that all stores are “inextricably intertwined with the government.”
Here is the refutation.
In point of fact, the Internet is a big machine or device. Every device connected to the Internet is part of the bigger machine or device.
The analogy to the phone network should be obvious. The US phone network is a big machine or device. Every device (including a customer premises handset) connected to the phone network is part of the bigger machine or device.
The road, which passes by the supermarket, is not part of the supermarket. These issues were all settled decades ago — in some cases over a century ago.
In the case of placing a phone call, the originator is not intrinsically intertwined with the destination’s telephone, but in order to provide its service, a social medium platform downloads its software onto a public government computer by means of a public government computer network or other public government Internet devices. (If the user’s device is a government mobile device, App software of a social medium platform has been licensed and installed on the user’s government device, which is connected to the Internet.)
A social medium platform certainly operates within the Internet (and specifically on public government networks and other devices including a user’s computing device) while a telephone user in contrast merely uses the public telephone network, which is owned by a private telephone service provider. (In the days of POTS (Plain Old Telephone Service), the telephone company even owned the user’s handset.)
A substantial part of the Internet (networks and other devices) is public and owned by federal and state governments. A substantial part of the Internet is a public government facility. A social medium platform’s abridgment of speech is a subterfuge for government abridgment of speech within a public government facility and forum.
We do not, for two reasons: because this isn't a controversial point, and SCOTUS does not exist to resolve your curiosity; and because Congress doing so would have no legal effect anyway.
I'll take "one thing that didn't happen obviously caused another thing that also didn't happen" for $1,000, Alex.
Have you gotten your Egyptian citizenship yet? You seem to spend an awful lot of time in denial.
Stopping Social Medium Censorship
The plaintiff in O’Handley v. Weber argues that Twitter has crossed the line from attention to government speech to action on behalf of the government.
The argument may not be persuasive.
Here is my argument.
47 U.S. Code § 230 (f)(1) tells us that the Internet is a network of federal and non-federal networks. To be more accurate, one would assert that the Internet is a network of inextricably intertwined private and government networks or devices.
In serving a user, a social medium platform is inextricably intertwined with the federal and every state government if it operates within the Internet. Isn’t this situation just like Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority both at the state and also at the federal level?
In serving a customer, Eagle Coffee Shoppe was inextricably intertwined with the State of Delaware because Eagle Coffee Shoppe was renting space within a state building. Eagle Coffee Shoppe was substituting for a coffee shop that Delaware could have put into the building. It certainly seems like a subterfuge for the state to discriminate against a Black person by proxy.
A substantial part of the Internet (networks and other devices) is public and owned by federal and state governments. A substantial part of the Internet is a public government facility. Allowing Twitter to use state networks and other state technology certainly seems like a subterfuge for California, the federal government, and other states to abridge the speech of O’Handley within public state networks and on public state computers.
No, it doesn't. It tells you what the word "Internet" means in 47 U.S.C. § 230.
No. This has been yet another episode of Simple Answers to Stupid Questions. (For one thing: there is no such as "operating within the Internet." That's word soup. (The Internet is not a physical place to be "within."))
The worst part of your nonsense is that the Supreme Court expressly rejected in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority itself the notion that it stood for a broad, widely-applicable proposition, but instead limited the holding to the specific facts of that case. The decision did not turn on the mere fact that the coffee shop was leasing space in a government building.
The common carriage issue is raised in Prelogar's brief of amicus curiae for the United States. See document page 11, but Prelogar did not recommend that it should be addressed. The Conference will be held on Sep 26. SCOTUS may punt the common carriage issue because the Netchoice cases do not necessarily provide the best context for addressing this issue, and the common carriage issue was not posed in a question in any of the three petitions for writ of certiorari.
Why are you cut-and-pasting non-responsive stuff from comments you wrote above? Just say, "Yes, I don't really understand any of this stuff" and move on.
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972) limited the Burton precedent to a situation of substantial support.
Just think of all those public end user devices that the government has purchased and on which a social medium platform’s frontend software runs. In addition, the government also provides an end user device to the indigent so that it can run a social medium platform's frontend software and so that he can access a social medium platform.
Eyes on a page is an extremely valuable item to a social medium platform.
Such support is much more than the grant of a liquor license.
Once again, gibberish. I don't know what "public end user devices" you are thinking of, but the government buying a computer or smartphone does not have anything at all to do with the operations of a social media company, any more than the government giving out bus passes to poor people means that the government is entangled in the businesses that those poor people patronize via the buses.
It's hard not to notice all the public Internet end user computing devices that the government installs at schools, colleges, libraries, museums, hospitals, and various government buildings. A social medium platform provides its service and makes money from its service by downloading its software to those computing devices. The government has intrinsically intertwined government activities with an ever growing set of social medium platforms, which often proxy for government websites.
If we analogize the public internet end user devices to busses, the social medium platform drives the busses to provide its service.
Too many legal professionals believe that a social medium platform provides its service by magic.
In addition, the government often uses the service of a social medium platform to substitute for the a government Internet server. If a member of the public is excluded from the social medium platform, the member suffers discrimination in state services by state action.
I do not believe that any lawyer, or anyone else, believes that a social media platform provides its service by magic.
And, no, social media platforms do not drive the buses to provide its service. The buses would be there even if no social media platforms existed.
And, no, a government agency using Facebook does not make Facebook's decisions state action. (Once again, you don't seem to grasp the first amendment. The government's unilateral actions cannot limit the 1A rights of social media platforms.)
State action doctrine does not only apply to abridgment of speech but also applies to due process and to equal protection. Eagle Coffee Shoppe was a discriminatory proxy, subterfuge, or surrogate for the state coffee shop, which could have been located in the same space (something that could not usually be claimed for a recipient of a liquor license).
If a state or the federal government uses a social medium platform to replace a government website that provided a public forum, that disclosed government rules and regulations, or that made various state announcements, there is probably a state action violation against all the people that the social medium platform excludes.
It is amusing that Texas and Florida seem to be violating state action doctrine in their use of a social medium platform.
Please learn how a social medium platform works.
The social medium platform sends a program to the end user's computing device so that back and forth transmission of messages work. The social medium platform is in complete control of social medium platform communications between the social medium platform backend server and the frontend computing device.
The social medium platform is "driving the bus."
Just five regional internet registries (RIRs)—each a private organization—administer the IP address space, and each RIR can revoke any in-use block of addresses if the holder violates its terms.
Prof Nugent may have covered this in one of his earlier pieces but how does this work, exactly ? How do these five avoid treading on each other's toes - ie what prevents RIR assigning an address space that another RIR has dibs on ?
I presume that the five are regional monopolies, but if so there must presumably be some cross border legal, rather than merely technical, way by which the regional monopoly is enforced. What prevents a new 6th RIR pushing its way in ? What prevents a hostile goverment or private actor disrupting things ?
Which is a long way of saying - it's quite unusual for genuinely private private organisations to be able to maintain even a regional monopoly, without mucho support from government, special monopoly-protecting laws, exemption from laws like anti-trust, and so on.
How do they do it ?
IANA, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority has top authority, and they allocate blocks of IP addresses to the RIR's. So the different RIR's don't have overlapping pools of IP addresses.
I gather there's a fair amount of "illicit" use of unassigned blocks in the dark web.
The use and abuse of unassigned IP address space
But you won't have much luck trying to associate your url with such an address, unless you're using a private Domain Name Server.
That simply moves the question down another level.
Who made IANA God ? (A quick wiki suggests it was the US Department of Commerce.) And this snippet :
In January 1998, Postel was threatened by US Presidential science advisor Ira Magaziner with the statement "You'll never work on the Internet again" after Postel collaborated with root server operators to test using a root server other than Network Solutions' "A" root to act as the authority over the root zone. Demonstrating that control of the root was from the IANA rather than from Network Solutions would have clarified IANA's authority to create new top-level domains as a step to resolving the DNS Wars, but he ended his effort after Magaziner's threat, and died not long after.
if true, suggests that the hand, or foot, of the federal government is intimately involved in this allegedly "private" thing.
And the question remains, how does the US Department of Commerce, and its agents, impose its control on the rest of the world ? Including Russia and China, which last time I looked, were not in the habit of accepting the authority of the US federal government over them. Even the EU is very sniffy at the merest hint of any kowtowing to the Evil Yankees.
There's apparently some sort of treaty. ICANN has an international advisory body, for example, that assists in governance.
Having said that, China, and to a lesser extent, Russia, both have their own "Great Firewalls" and are able to adjust their national networks as they see fit.
Also, don't forget that the internet is an invention of us Evil Yankees that the rest of the world, especially China, has profited from.
"But for those who wish to host their own websites, a residential subscription will not do. They require commercial internet service with the requisite stability and bandwidth to make a self-hosted website available to the world."
As someone who has and still does host their own servers, this statement above, along with related statements later in the OP, is not accurate.
You can host a server from home on a standard internet connection--even a poor one. In those cases, you're most likely using a dynamic IP address. There are dynamic DNS services that can route to your dynamic IP so people can find your server. This is the cheapest route.
In recent years, I've always had enough of a choice over network providers and ISPs that I could run my own server on a fairly high bandwidth with a static IP. Static IPs (IPV4) cost more because they are a scarce resource but you can still get them. The bigger issue is the nature of your connection (cable? fiber?) and whether it is capable of symmetrical transmission (same up as down). Cable internet generally isn't, so there's that. If one makes the argument that being able to run a full commercial server at home is a "right," then a very large portion of American homes will need new connections to the internet. I have fiber now so I'm good but even in large cities like SF, many people don't have access to fiber.
More often, with the relentless slide in costs of running server farms, virtual machines are cheap and easy to acquire. I have a VM I pay $20/mo for just so me and my friends can play a multi-player video game. Add $4/mo for automatic backups and hard drive space. When I compare that to the cost of a small server at home, it makes sense to rent the VM. Anyone wanting to run a commercial server can just go find the right provider and pay to have a VM provisioned and start running their server in any of several operating systems.
But the OP appears to be making the claim that people have the civil right to these things at their residence (presumably no matter where they live) and at high speeds with commercial levels of throughput in order to support whatever their demand might be. Yet everyone already has this ability insofar as they have the resources to stand up microwave towers or pay to string new wires into remote regions. Otherwise, who's paying for this?
Here's what a "free speech absolutist" thinks is fair for his own ISP.
Missing from this five-part series: how to deal with people who abuse these rights. How to handle hackers, scammers, spammers, griefers, and terrorists. This entire series seems to be in defense of why these bad actors, despite illegal activity, cannot be banned or even denied access to the very services and citizens they abuse.
Common carriers and public forums have dealt with misbehavior and bad actors forever.
Here is an example of US government support: “Internet for All” at https://www.internetforall.gov/.
It looks to me like the entire series is about how you can't use claiming somebody is a bad actor as an excuse to deny them those services that you don't want to actually bother proving they've abused.
Sure, he's talking "rights", but rights CAN be lost as a result of proven abuse. We have a process for that, criminal trials and sentencing. Not, "Take them away while being vague about what the actual abuse was."
Fair. But that's a hack. And ISPs can (and do) prohibit subscribers from using their residential internet subscriptions for website hosting.
The five internet rights pertain only to lawful websites/content. I'm open to permitting core intermediaries to revoke resources for unlawful websites, but I do have some concerns with permitting that, including (1) the fact that private technology companies may not be competent to make final determinations as to legality and (2) the ease with which providers could use suspicion of illegality as a pretext for ideological discrimination.
Perhaps because of these concerns, telephone companies (which I would analogize to core intermediaries) have at times been prohibited from terminating service based merely on their suspicion that a subscriber is engaged in illegality. See, e.g., Andrews v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 83 F. Supp. 966, 968–69 (D.D.C. 1949) (“A public utility may not deprive a member of the public of his rights to service merely because it receives a notice from a law enforcement agency that he is using the service for illegal purposes.”); Nadel v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 170 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96-98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957) (prohibiting a telephone company from removing telephone service to a customer with eleven previous arrests based on the mere assumption that the customer would likely use the service for illegal purposes).
But, admittedly, that topic is outside the scope of my article. So, my views on it aren't fully formed. I do think services should be able to block users who violate neutral terms of service. And I'm certainly in favor of permitting citizens to block abusers, harassers, etc.