Kicking Out Paid Conference Attendee May Be Breach of Contract—but His Returning Is Still Criminal Trespass

A case stemming from a "Holocaust revisionist's" expulsion from a conference on "Mennonites and the Holocaust."

From Leichty v. Bethel College, decided April 20 by the Tenth Circuit (Judge Robert Bacharach, joined by Judges Bobby Baldock & Joel Carson):

This appeal involves the scope of rights that come with attendance at a conference. Upon paying the required fee, individuals obtain rights to attend the conference. But under what circumstances can the conference organizers expel attendees? And does expulsion subject individuals to arrest if they reappear at the conference? Here we conclude that purchase of a ticket created an irrevocable right to attend the conference. But once the attendee was expelled, his reappearance could support an arrest for trespass….

These issues arise from a two-day conference sponsored by Bethel College, which is a Mennonite college in the City of North Newton, Kansas. The subject of the conference was the Mennonites' role in the Holocaust.

Mr. Bruce Leichty paid the $100 attendance fee to attend the conference and planned to conduct his own program in the evening. At the evening program, Mr. Leichty and two associates would present "unusual perspectives on the Holocaust."

Before the conference had begun, Mr. Leichty distributed flyers about his own program. The organizers asked Mr. Leichty to stop distributing the flyers on the conference grounds. But Mr. Leichty refused to stop until the organizers called the police.

The conflicts resumed at the conference when Mr. Leichty stood to make a comment. One of the conference organizers reminded Mr. Leichty to stay on topic. Mr. Leichty then commented that Jewish people had different perspectives on the Holocaust. One of the conference organizers instructed someone to cut Mr. Leichty's microphone. Though his microphone had been cut, Mr. Leichty continued to speak about his upcoming program.

Later that day, another organizer of the conference told Mr. Leichty that he was "out of the conference." In front of Mr. Leichty, the organizer told a colleague to call the police if Mr. Leichty attended the next day.

Undeterred, Mr. Leichty returned the next day. The college president told him to leave, but Mr. Leichty refused. College officials called the police, who arrived and arrested Mr. Leichty for trespass. He then sued Bethel College and the City of North Newton.

The court concluded that, under Kansas law, Leichty's paying the $100 registration fee gave him a contractual right to attend the conference, and that ejecting him could breach that contract:

The district court concluded that the college could revoke Mr. Leichty's license if he failed to act in good faith. And in the court's view, Mr. Leichty's conduct reflected a failure to act in good faith. We reject this reasoning because state law treated Mr. Leichty's license as irrevocable once he enrolled and paid the registration fee. See Wichita State Univ. Intercollegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Marrs (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) ("Although a license is generally revocable at the will of the licensor, an executed license—a license supported by valuable consideration—may not be revoked."); see also McKim v. Carre (Kan. 1905) (stating that "even an oral license may be irrevocable, where it is given for a valuable consideration and is acted upon by the licensee")….

Rather than question the irrevocable nature of the license, the college argues that further performance was excused when Mr. Leichty breached his implied obligation to act in good faith…. The breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing ordinarily entails a question of fact. Bethel College argues that the ordinary rule doesn't apply because Mr. Leichty indisputably breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by

• disregarding instructions to stop handing out flyers and
• standing up to promote his event during Bethel College's conference.

In our view, Bethel College's arguments entail questions of fact. Mr. Leichty acknowledges that he distributed flyers. But Bethel College implicitly assumes that its contract with Mr. Leichty prohibited him from passing out flyers on the campus.

When Mr. Leichty began handing out flyers, he was told to stop. He responded that he believed that he was entitled to hand them out. A factfinder could regard that belief as reasonable, for Bethel College hadn't said anything earlier about an inability to promote other events. A reasonable jury could thus find that

• Mr. Leichty had a good faith belief that he was entitled to distribute the flyers, and
• his refusal to stop had not amounted to a material breach of his duty of good faith and fair dealing.

The same is true for Mr. Leichty's comment at the conference. When Mr. Leichty stood, he was told to stay "on topic." But Mr. Leichty could reasonably view his comments as "on topic." After all, his comment concerned the Holocaust.

Mr. Leichty's comments did spark an outburst, and organizers cut Mr. Leichty's microphone as other attendees shouted at him. Bethel College contends that Mr. Leichty improperly continued to speak after his microphone had been cut. Mr. Leichty concedes that he added "a few more sentences without benefit of the microphone." Even so, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that his continuing to speak did not constitute a material breach of his duty of good faith and fair dealing.

Nonetheless, the court held that, after the college kicked Leichty out and demanded that he not return, he could be properly arrested for returning:

Mr. Leichty argues that college officials lacked a contractual right to expel him from the conference. But Mr. Leichty's contractual right to attend the conference didn't vitiate Bethel College's right under property law to exclude him from the grounds. See Marrone v. Wash. Jockey Club of D.C. (1913) (concluding that a patron who purchases a ticket to an event has a contractual right to enter the premises, but the landowner maintains a property right to exclude the patron). When the college told Mr. Leichty to leave the premises, he incurred an obligation to leave and "[h]is only right was to sue upon the contract for the breach." …

We remand for further proceedings on the contract claim against Bethel College.

The case has since settled, for a payment to Leichty of $50,000. For more backstory, here's an excerpt from the district court's description of the facts:

Plaintiff planned to moderate an event he organized at a nearby community room in North Newton on the evening of March 16, 2018. The main speakers were to be two individuals, both Jewish, whom Plaintiff knew to be extremely pro-Palestine regarding the Palestine/Israeli conflict. Plaintiff's concern, which he believed these two individuals shared, was that "the Holocaust was being exploited in modern day America … as a carte blanche, if you will, for all sorts of conduct by — whether it be Israel or Zionists or other elite Judaics [—] that they would trot out the anti-Semitism/Holocaust card whenever it was convenient."

Prior to the Bethel conference, Plaintiff contacted Paul Schrag, the editor and publisher of Mennonite World Review, an independent journalistic ministry in Kansas, and requested that he publish Plaintiff's classified advertisement about his event at the community room in the March 12, 2018 edition of Mennonite World Review. Schrag rejected the ad. Plaintiff then sent Schrag a pamphlet explaining "Holocaust revisionism" in an effort to change his mind, but Schrag still refused to publish the ad. Schrag then emailed the organizers of the Bethel conference — John Sharp (Hesston College employee), John Thiesen (Bethel College employee), and Mark Jantzen (Bethel College employee) — informing them of Plaintiff's plan to hold an event and attaching the pamphlet….

On March 16, the first day of the Bethel conference, Plaintiff brought with him the two speakers who were scheduled to speak at his own event. Neither of them had pre-registered for the Bethel conference and Jantzen denied Plaintiff's request that they be granted access to the conference. According to Plaintiff, Jantzen indicated his decision might be revisited the following day. After Plaintiff checked in, he began passing out flyers about his event ("Two Revisionist Jews Consider the Holocaust") scheduled for that evening….

UPDATE: I originally erroneously wrote that the Tenth Circuit concluded that the ejection breached the contract; I've corrected that to reflect that the court concluded the ejection could breach the contract, but remanded to the District Court to consider that. My apologies for the error.

Comments

[tkamenick]

This makes sense. It's not a serious enough problem to justify self-help solutions. Deal with it in the aftermath.

[Brett Bellmore]

Seems to me he had a contractual right to be there, and how can you be trespassing where you have a right to be? The ejection can't change this when it was wrongful.

But I see there is contrary precedent.

Still, glad he prevailed on the breach of contract!

[Archibald Tuttle]

If the contract was for an apartment rental, yes you have a right to be there and can't be ejected without certain procedures by the landlord.

But people are ejected from events all the time, so landlord-tenant law must not apply.

I suspect that the way to deflect a lawsuit is to refund the ticket price when ejecting someone, and to print a warning on the ticket about behavior.

[Brett Bellmore]

Yeah, I was thinking they'd have been in a much better position legally if they'd just thought to refund the registration fee.

I find myself wondering which was actually more disruptive; This guy's behavior, or their response to it?

[David Nieporent]

They did offer to refund the registration fee. The guy is a Nazi ideologue; he didn't want a refund. He wanted to have his Holocaust-denying views publicized.

[Bruce Leichty]

Again, the unsourced Mr. Nieporent deigns to favor us with his speculation. No, they did not offer me a refund even of the $100 that I paid for registration -- until well after they had tried to expel me and called the cops to have me (falsely) arrested. Then I received an unsolicited Bethel check in the mail, which I never cashed. [You want to buy my silence about your suppression that cheap?] But of course they also knew before I ever set foot on the property that I did not always toe the Mennonite party line, particularly on Israel-Palestine issues and on controlling speech about the Holocaust, and I was still given a badge. Discovery revealed that the organizers themselves were not concerned about me --based on my reputation for peacefulness and non-disruptive dissent. I just wanted attendees to hear from Henry Herskovitz and Daniel McGowan, my Jewish colleagues whose dangerous powers to open a few minds then caused panic among the Mennonite Stasi. Maybe some of you also missed the part about Bethel president Gering not having concern about my being on his campus, ONLY AT HIS THOUGHT-CONTROLLED CONFERENCE.

[hobie]

Take your $50,000 and piss off somewhere else, Leichty. Go find a college of Seventh Day Adventists to harass and see how long you last there.

[Noscitur a sociis]

until well after they had tried to expel me and called the cops to have me (falsely) arrested.

What was false about the basis for your arrest?

[Bruce Leichty]

I was told I was "out of the conference" first evening. Civil dispute. Not stated by property owner. No mention of trespass. I knew I had the right to return based on my paid registration. I consulted with police the following morning before returning since the professor organizer had stated he'd call police on me if I returned. I was told by police that if police were called, I'd be told that I had to leave (property) and that if I THEN returned there would be a trespass. That was obviously correct. College president (who had not talked with me the prior day) (lawful representative of property owner) then called police and told them he had warned me to not return the prior day (this was the police officer's testimony). In addition to lying, he also neglected to mention that the prof had merely told me I was "out of the Conference." I had long been a campus user on my periodic trips back to this my former place of residence, and the president even admitted during discovery that he didn't care if I came on campus, only that I not be allowed into the conference. On top of that, Kansas trespass law states that the trespasser has to know that his presence on the property is not authorized. So, instigation of arrest in order to expel me from a conference to which I was entitled to attend, was false, and was based on falsehood, and police arrested me (they told me) because of their belief that I had lied to them that morning and that a lawful representative of property owner had in fact ordered me off campus the prior day, which was proven ... you got it, false ... during discovery. Inconvenient facts for the judiciary.

[Noscitur a sociis]

I am confused. They told you that you weren't allowed to come back to the conference. You then went back to the conference. How was this not trespassing?

[Bruce Leichty]

Are you a lawyer?

"They" told me?

Conference v. campus?

Hello?

[John F. Carr]

Landlord-tenant law is special because the disruption of eviction is so severe.

[Brett Bellmore]

Whereas the disruption of not being paid by your tenants is legally negligible...

[John F. Carr]

As is being unable to live in your house because the tenants are making it uninhabitable.

[David Nieporent]

Still, glad he prevailed on the breach of contract!

He did not prevail on the breach of contract. The grant of summary judgment to the conference organizers was overturned. That means that his claim for breach of contract can go to trial, not that he wins. (Obviously, they then settled the case. Cheaper than continuing to litigate.)

[Brett Bellmore]

I think the conference organizers settling for $50K can fairly be characterized as "prevailing".

[Krychek_2]

The conference organizers' insurance company made a business decision that 50k was cheaper than litigating. That was 50k more than I would have given him. There is no right to disrupt someone else’s conference.

[TwelveInchPianist]

Well, if you've contractually given someone the right to disrupt your conference, then they do have a right to disrupt your conference.

[David Nieporent]

To be more specific, they were litigating against a pro se lawyer, who therefore had the ability to keep pouring time into the case with little out of pocket expenditure of his own. He was planning (according to his own words) to move for reconsideration, then to ask for en banc rehearing, and then of course to try the breach of contract case. $50k is a bit on the high end, but it’s probably worth it (from a purely business decision).

[Bruce Leichty]

It goes beyond business, but you're on the right track....particularly when you have something to hide -- like the fact that there may be Jews themselves who don't hew to the standard narrative of the Holocaust or how it is being used in the modern world, and when you're shown to be part of the movement to suppress dialogue rather than foster it, like an academic institution supposedly does.

[Vryedni]

Go to Hell, Nazi.

[Bruce Leichty]

Love you too, bro.

[hobie]

He ain't your bro, bigot. But most everyone else here is.

[Rev. Arthur L. Kirkland]

This guy will be right at home here. It is difficult to believe he hasn’t been here all along, maybe using another handle.

[Absaroka]

"Seems to me he had a contractual right to be there, and how can you be trespassing where you have a right to be? The ejection can’t change this when it was wrongful."

I disagree. If I buy a ticket and go see a movie, the theater doesn't have to let me stand up and give a speech during the screening. The other people paid for their tickets, too, and they paid to see the movie, not listen to me.

[TwelveInchPianist]

Seems easy enough to limit the contract to exclude preventing others' enjoyment of the movie. Or claim some sort of implied limitation. You shouldn't get to just breach the contract if you decide you don't like how the other person is exercising their contractual rights.

[ducksalad]

One assumes the judge looked at the terms of the ticket sale and decided the guy had a case. I’ve seen event fine print that says the organizers have the right to eject anyone and the sole remedy is a refund.

If it’s implied terms, I’d say quite a few limitations are implied in a ticket to an academic conference. They go well beyond 1st amendment stuff.

Among many other things: You’ll sit not just quietly, but politely, through any speakers you choose to attend without trying to call attention to yourself or otherwise upstage them. That would preclude banners and signs. In Q&A period you’ll limit yourself to a reasonable number of questions and quietly accept when the speaker says they want to move on to other questioners. Questions will be germane to the specific topic of the speaker, not just the conference as a whole. At the reception you won’t badger people when they’ve asked you to leave them alone. At the banquet lunch you will primarily eat and engage in conversation with people at your own table, rather than trying to give an impromptu speech to the whole dining room. If there is a designated spot for distributing pamphlets, you’ll leave yours there rather than all over the place. And more generally, if you’ve bought a ticket as a spectator, as opposed to being invited as a speaker, you will primarily spectate rather than try to make the event about yourself and your ideas.

I don’t know exactly what this guy did and he might be in the right. But I’ve seen people evicted from conferences and it was usually for breaking some rule that ordinary people understand without seeing it in writing.

[BMS]

This is actually something I remember from bar review many years ago!

There’s a difference between a contractual right and a property right. Buying a ticket creates a contractual right, which can be vindicated by money damages. It is rare that a court will order specific performance on a contract claim.

But buying a ticket does not create a leasehold property interest in the way that an apartment lease agreement does. The only property interest created by a performance ticket is a revocable license to be at the site. Some tickets even say so in the fine print, but it’s the law whether or not the ticket says it.

The example from bar review was that someone famous (Barbra Streisand?) showed up to a sold-out Broadway show and asked to be given a ticket. Conceding to her celebrity, the producers kicked out a paying customer and seated her instead. That was a breach of contract for which the producers could be sued (and it was also bad PR once the media got ahold of it) but it was within their rights as a matter of property law.

(But note that the linked decision gives a somewhat different view revocability of the license. This may reflect substantive differences between NY and MN law or May reflect my bad memory.)

[ducksalad]

Consider an airline ticket.

Yeah, it creates a right to something (not much if you read the fine print). In some sense you have a right to get on the plane or be compensated.

What it absolutely does not give you is a right to defy the orders of the airline staff to get off the plane. Not even if their orders are wrong. Not even if the orders are openly criminal, corrupt, racist, communist, fascist, and woke all at the same time, and violate seven different constitutional amendments. You get off the plane first and then litigate later.

[Bruce Leichty]

All the analogies given to date are dubious. You may not learn it from the federal courts, but this was an academic conference with a built-in opportunity for attendee comments at the conclusion of each session. I was handed a microphone. My mic was then cut simply based on what I was saying, which was nothing more provocative than announcing an off-campus presentation with two revisionist Jews an hour later. (Shades of Peter Flaherty at the Berkshire Hathaway shareholders meeting earlier this month; hopefully he will forgive the comparison since admittedly the Holocaust is even more of a third rail than Jeffrey Epstein’s blackmail operation.) One conference organizer then charged up the aisle — causing the disruption. Another invited me to dialogue at lunch the next day.

[ducksalad]

Wow! Mr. Leichty here in person. Thanks for responding.

I typed my other comment before I saw this, it wasn’t intended to apply to you personally.

Your description sounds like you were treated unfairly and deserve compensation, perhaps above and beyond the ticket price since you invested time and money to get there.

I stand by my opinion that when a property owner asks me to leave, I should leave right or wrong and argue later.

[Religion and Politics, my life]

!3th chapter ANALECTS of Confucius

Chapter 3.
The supreme importance of names being correct.
1. Tsze-lû said, "The ruler of Wei has been waiting for you, in order with you to administer the government. What will you consider the first thing to be done?"

2. The Master replied, "What is necessary is to rectify names."

3. "So! indeed!" said Tsze-lû. "You are wide of the mark! Why must there be such rectification?"

4. The Master said, "How uncultivated you are, Yû! A superior man, in regard to what he does not know, shows a cautious reserve.

5. "If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success.

6. "When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties and music will not flourish. When proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not properly awarded, the people do not know how to move hand or foot.

7. "Therefore a superior man considers it necessary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks may be carried out appropriately. What the superior man requires is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect."

[Brett Bellmore]

While I generally agree with the conclusion, I observe that step 6 seems a bit dubious; The connection between music and punishment being properly awarded seems a bit tenuous. Is that a cultural thing?

[apedad]

I think it has to do with an enlightened society where music in this case stands for higher thinking.

So according to Confuscius, only enlightened personnel can make nuanced punishments decisions - and not the "off with his head" noise we see even from some of the VC commenters.

[SRG]

“The defendant is sentenced to 6 months of listening to the 2nd Viennese School”.

[Religion and Politics, my life]

Apedad missed the cultural context as he also does with Plato on music, which is related to the Muses and is much wider than songs on the radio.
As to the Chinese situation of Confucius in this selection from the Analects, proprieties is like holding the door for a lady and music is the whole realm of (shared) diversionary and enlightening art , art that always has a message. This is not far from 'The Republic"

[SRG]

deleted

[Religion and Politics, my life]

Readers of Chantal Delsol know that most horrors of injustice have been CAUSED by interlational law.

Think of the Clintons with their never-ending perfect solutions that unfortunately will cause a lot of suffering. But what did Bill actually do with his supra-national powers.

He destroyed the livelihood of Haitan farmers. Here he is admitting it.,
https://vimeo.com/154595060

He allowed 300 000 to die in Rwanda. Here he is admitting it.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RpKV8psvnaQ

So that perfectionist international urge is deadly

In this anthropology man is viewed as a being who becomes, who is never fully completed but is always coming to be. In other words, he is a being with a beginning and a finality. …His true dream is not directed toward that which is here below. In this earthly realm, therefore, a “perfect” unity could only be a false unity.”
― Chantal Delsol, Unjust Justice: Against The Tyranny Of International Law

[MonitorsMost]

I’m unconvinced that a contract cannot create an irrevocable license for the given time period. The United States Supreme Court case is straight-up wrong that only conveyances can create a right to use property. As other commenters have noted, many leases are not conveyances.

To the extent that the terms of use are silent as to the revocability of the license, I agree that irrevocability probably isn’t the default. But the analysis here is too simplistic to be the correct reasoning.

[ReaderY]

It’s a question of state law. The US Supreme Court doesn’t have the final say on the question.

[David Nieporent]

Or any say at all.

[ReaderY]

This seems to be a full-employment-for-lawyers type decision. Unless you have detailed lists of rules covering every conceivable contingency and then some, if somebody does something you think disruptive he can sue you and take the case to trial. So you either pay us now to come up with the list of rules, or you pay us later to defend you at the trial.

It’s not clear to me the college could have avoided a lawsuit by promptly refunding the registration fee, although in hindsight it now seems obvious they should have done this. A plaintiff could still argue that that wouldnmt make them whole. The detailed rules would doubtlessly have to include a detailed waiver of liability. Full employment for lawyers.

[David Nieporent]

I think the lesson is "Don't invite Nazi lawyers to Holocaust conferences in the first place."

(Leichty claims that calling him a Holocaust denier is a slur because that implies the Holocaust happened.)

[Brett Bellmore]

I'm not sure the cost of vetting everybody who buys a ticket to an event is actually more economical than just accepting that, occasionally, people you disagree with are going to buy tickets. Unless maybe you're envisioning some sort of social credit score that the reservation system can automatically consult?

[David Nieporent]

This guy is a multiple-time offender. The same way a grocery store or convenience store tells its clerks that certain people aren't allowed to cash checks there, the Mennonites probably ought to have a "Do not sell tickets to" list that has this guy on it.

[Bruce Leichty]

In response to David Nieporent, I am not a Nazi, and even the two courts which got so much of the law wrong in this case didn't stoop that low. I will write further about the bad law, when I have a few minutes later today. Moreover, I have never claimed -- nor would I -- that I shouldn't be called a "Holcoaust denier" because that "implied the Holocaust happened." Or anything of the sort. I do object to being called a Holocaust denier, although it's a free country (maybe, partly). I indicated during my prosecution of this case, and still would, that I'm a skeptic about standard Holocaust historiography, and there is plenty of reason -- for those willing to step outside of their echo chambers and do a little reading from the Amazon Banned Books list. That doesn't make me a denier, particularly in the most important aspects of the Holocaust: Ordinary Jews suffered and died disproportionately during WWII just as they have often suffered as scapegoats for the more powerful. No group should be subjected to genocide for their ethnicity or religion (or anything else) and that would include the Palestinians who just recently celebrated the 75th anniversary of the totally-overlooked Nakba, the massacre and explusion of Palestinians from their homeland in 1948. I'm also devoted to reason, logic and sourced history. Your source, Mr. Nieporent?

[Rev. Arthur L. Kirkland]

Is this the Bruce Leichty a federal appeals court found to be antisemitic (while imposing sanctions against Leichty and a client) . . . or a different Bruce Leichty?

Is this the Bruce Leichty regarding whom a different federal appeals court affirmed a bankruptcy court's finding that he had, as a trustee, engaged in litigation that was not reasonable or necessary . . . or a different Bruce Leichty?

Would any reasonable person (or most unreasonable persons) believe that payment for admission to a conference precipitates entitlement to invite two other people to attend the conference . . . or to advertise (during a question-and-answer period) another conference?

[Bruce Leichty]

This is the same Bruce Leichty who has practiced more than 35 years with an unblemished disciplinary record in the State of California, a Hoosier native who is a graduate of University of Chicago Divinity School, MA (1977), and UC Berkeley School of Law (1987 — we called it Boalt), and who has been a lifelong Christian active in his Mennonite church and certainly one with feet of clay. Good to meet you, Arthur. Be careful out there, you can’t always believe what you read and especially when it comes from people with too much legal training. For some balance, see my article about the 2nd Circuit “antisemitic” slur at http://www.goodinformation.org. BTW I was never a bankruptcy trustee, but I did try to ferret out fraud and battle the Big Boys on behalf of trustee clients in the CA bankruptcy courts for many years … with too much success for the good of my own career advancement, I’m saying. Yes, you’re ripe for judicial pickings by the Selected Few when you understand advocacy and justice as I do.

[Rev. Arthur L. Kirkland]

Were your Christian beliefs responsible for your conduct at that Mennonite event? Did Jesus authorize you to multiply admissions and bring those other two (apparently unregistered and unwelcome) kooks to the conference. Did the Lord grant you special license to spread the gospel (advertising another event) at the question-and-answer portion of the conference?

(Being on a Mission From God does not authorize boorish conduct, even when you and the Lord have an understanding.)

[Bruce Leichty]

By now I know you're just a troll and not a real man of the cloth, but sure, I'll rush in where trolls fear to tread. What made you believe I engaged in boorish conduct? My two guests, from the state of New York and Michigan respectively, had traveled a long way to get to Kansas, and there were plenty of loaves and fishes (seats) available in the auditorium. I had thought they were registering; they had thought I was handling their registrations. Alas, there was no room at the Inn for these undocumented Jews. And yes, whenever I seek to hold others accountable to the truth, or even to dissident narrative, that is fundamentally a Christian act, an act in the spirit of Jesus. No special Mission or license was needed for a short announcement during public mic time -- to a crowd of folks already assembled because of their interest in the Holocaust -- of an opportunity to hear firsthand about the significance of the Holocaust from a Mennonite (me) and a couple dissident Jews. You think? Yet it proved very threatening, certainly worth arresting the pacifist who dared think of such a thing. Certainly worth two federal courts concocting all sorts of legal fictions and ignoring all manner of relevant fact until some furtive figure falling far short of the form of Diogenes caused the 10th Circuit to grudgingly concede that there was at least a question of fact as to the propriety of my expulsion.

[Rev. Arthur L. Kirkland]

Do you contend superstition is required to constitute a man of the cloth?

In what way do you claim your paltry, illusory god is superior to the Congregation of Exalted Reason?

You are going to fit in at this blog quite nicely.

[David Nieporent]

After I typed that you were a Nazi lawyer, I was going to clarify that I meant you were Nazi and a lawyer, rather than that you were a lawyer for Nazis. But fortunately something jogged my memory, and I doublechecked: you're both! You represented Ernst Zundel.

[Bruce Leichty]

Ha ha, now you’re starting to look at sources. I know you can’t help yourself, because you’re not allowed to have any other worldview in the mental prison you call New York City. Zundel, despite holding some opinions which I think deserve to be repudiated, was the person who -- through the "Battling Barrister" Doug Christie may he rest in peace -- caused the dean of Holocaust historiography (Raul Hilberg) to admit on the stand (in Canada) that there was no real evidence of the extermination of 6 million Jews, or indeed of many other “historical facts” which are often presumed necessary to honor the memories of those killed in the Holocaust. Books have been written about this, but they are hidden from inmates like you. And by the way, Ernst also was not a “Nazi.” He was born years after WWII ended, and was as adamant as he could possibly be on that point, even though of course no one accorded him the dignity of the use of his own self-description: German human rights activist. And so it goes.

[David Nieporent]

Hilberg did of course not admit any such thing, and just as an example of Leichty's fidelity to the truth, Zundel was born in 1939, not "years after WWII ended."

[David Nieporent]

That having been said, if Leichty wishes to argue that only people who were actual members of the NSDAP between 1920 and 1945 were Nazis, and the rest of their ilk are just sparkling neo-Nazis, I will let him have that point.

[Anon]

How crass a business, to stick a finger in another's wound.

[SKofNJ]

Can someone explain how a breach of a contract for something worth $100 can result in a $50,000 settlement? As to avoiding litigation costs, how could cost it anything near that amount to take the case to trial?

[Brett Bellmore]

One presumes there are details that make the conference organizers' conduct out to be a lot more outrageous than the above account suggests, and $50K was the cost of avoiding their being disclosed in a trial.

[Noscitur a sociis]

No, you presume that. Those of us with some actual knowledge of how litigation works in place of conspiratorial nuttery do no such thing.

[Bruce Leichty]

Yes, but then there are always people who both know "how litigatoin works" and who also engage in reading and investigation and find out that there is no "conspiratorial nuttery" involved. Very little of present company included, it appears. I know, I know, cluck cluck, not enough time for a lawyer to catch up on all the good reading out there. But anyway -- http://www.goodinformation.org, and you can also check the filings on PACER.

[Rev. Arthur L. Kirkland]

Your writings seem to indicate that most people who interact with you regret it.

Are you proud of that?

[Bruce Leichty]

Jesus, it seems that you have a lot of enemies, don't you think you're risking crucifixion? Don't you think that you'd win more friends if you stuck to love?

[Noscitur a sociis]

If “I’m not antisemitic! The judge really was part of an Israeli plot to cover up the truth about September 11!” is the best defense you can muster…

[Bruce Leichty]

I like your rule of interpretation, Nosci. The questionable intent of a dubious jurist can be discerned from his associations. OK, sure, I took a few liberties. But don't be silly. Judge Hellerstein was obviously totally disinterested in whether 9/11 victims got trials or truth: "Money is the universal lubricant," he urged.

[hobie]

Welcome to the blog, Bruce. You'll fit right in

[Rev. Arthur L. Kirkland]

What Brett Bellmore doesn’t understand about the practicalities of litigation would fit in a thimble, leaving enough room for what Brett Bellmore doesn’t understand about normal interpersonal interactions. He identifies with the disaffected, delusional boor, naturally.

[Bruce Leichty]

You really shouldn't talk about your friends that way, Art.

[ducksalad]

Lost of reasons to pay $50K to avoid a lawsuit, even if you did nothing wrong, if what matters is the bottom line rather than the principle of the thing.

A lawyer taking something to trial was $15K last time I got a quote. That’s just the lawyer. There’s also employee time lost in depositions, hearings, and producing documents. Employee time can easily be $200/hr if they’re professional level and you’re counting overhead. Then there’s the cost of the plaintiff calling up other people you are doing business with and telling them not to close any deals yet because they (the plaintiff) are going to break your company in court and you won’t be able to perform. Dealing indirectly with one of those right now.

To be clear, I’m not even remotely suggesting Mr. Leichty engaged in any of this. Just saying why $50K might be the cheaper option, especially if it’s a one-off situation unlikely to attract copycat lawsuits.

[EscherEnigma]

You can't be kicked out of a conference in Kansas for being a disruptive asshole?

What a strange state.

[John F. Carr]

You can be. Whether the particular asshole was sufficiently disruptive was a question of fact. The case settled without a decision on that point.

[Bruce Leichty]

Even stranger because the person kicked out here was neither disruptive or an asshole. http://www.goodinformation.org

[EscherEnigma]

You're posting in the comment section of Reason.com. It's fair to assume that you are both disruptive and an asshole.

Self-awareness is important, dude.

[ducksalad]

Some of us come here to get the disruptive asshole out of our system so we can keep it in check at work and home.

[EscherEnigma]

See? Self-awareness: Helping people manage their emotions and improve work-life balance.

[Bruce Leichty]

Very lawyerly of you, EE

[EscherEnigma]

Please, I'll never be a lawyer. I have too much self-respect and not enough self-hatred.

[Bruce Leichty]

There are so many errors of law in the decision of the 10th Circuit that it's hard to know where to begin. But before we get there, let me say that I never claimed that my registration for the conference earned me an "irrevocable" right. I myself believe there are circumstances which would have allowed Bethel College to expel me from its "Mennonites and the Holocaust" conference and to warn me to leave the campus and not return, on penalty of being found in trespass. But in the absence of any advance warnings or detailed agreement, the circumstances would have had to be egregious, and I am a careful and respectful person, and therefore they simply didn't occur here. "Disruption" might be a ground, but where the only disruption happened in response to my otherwise allowed speech (the 10th Circuit got that part right), not so much. The 10th Circuit took its eyes off the ball at numerous points in its decision, since it was charged only with determining whether I had in fact shown one or more genuine disputes as to material facts, and instead started making sloppy statements about what the evidence showed. But where the decision gets really ugly is in its use of -- and conclusion from -- Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633 (1913). The short version of that embarrassing tale is that Marrone was never a case about trespass, and never a case about false arrest; rather the early 20th century ticket-holder there was claiming that his ticket gave him in rem rights to the venue. Thus when the Supreme Court stated, "his only right was to sue upon the contract for the breach," it was NOT ruling out the possibility that a ticketholder could suffer false arrest, but only ruling out that he had any in rem rights. Supreme Court said nothing about false arrest in Marrone: the ticketholder was "forcibly prevented from entering" the track, and he apparently argued only that he had the right to do so because his ticket created a property interest. Had the 10th Circuit not bungled the conclusion it drew from that case (appears in Prof. Volokh's extract above), they may have also recognized that there were material facts in dispute as to the falsity of the (instigation of the) arrest that I was subjected to. ....which should have led to remand for trial on the false arrest claim as well as the breach claim and which would have likely stripped the decision of all the curious bells and whistles that made it the subject of this blog.

[The Turtle Dove]

Interesting array of comments. Clearly, revocable license can be revoked (it's not a right to come back and re-voice opinions). There are layers of authority here--the conference organizers are presumably licensed users of the space, but perhaps in a different context, they might have a property interest in the space itself. For trespass, you'd look to the property interest, so think of it as two planets--contract and property. Authority to be there came from the first, but the trespass is against the folks on the other planet, and they have the right to expel. So as soon as someone from the property end of things (college administration, police) told the plaintiff to vamoose, so long as they had sufficient authority over the property, vamoosing must necessarily have ensued. The contract-based right by the purchase of revocable license doesn't give an atom of the air of property-planet.

That said, a property-based interference with the contract-based revocable license can be redressed by the powers of contract-planet, but none of them (saving the outlier above, where the organizers have a property interest in the space) touch the absolute right of the property owner to claim that the person is bending the herbage. These are not just two different species of law, but of two distinct genus, of completely different origins.

It's the difference between someone telling you to leave their castle, or two shepherds arguing over an especially verdant bit of the common. The castle belongs to someone, while the commons looks to fairness.

(Not legal advice, don't rely, quite likely off-base.)

Mr. D.

[Bruce Leichty]

Congratulations, TD, you’re the first person to actually focus on and appreciate the issue raised by the case (not even the 10th Circuit did). Note that I was only told “you’re out of the Conference” on the first day–by a professor organizer of conference, and by only one of them at that (whereas another invited me back). Contract-planet. Then the President (property-planet) called police when he saw me and when I declined to leave the next morning, and told police that I had returned in violation of his own trespass warning as a property owner. That was where I showed an issue of disputed fact (actually it was not even disputed that he had not warned me the day before), and that issue was certainly material, but neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals was honest enough to go there. Or perceptive enough? I think the former, because they had extensive briefing.

[Bruce Leichty]

Also, lest it be misunderstood, I never went to this Conference with the intent to "voice an opinion." Nor did I. I went to partake of and evaluate the scholarly contributions offered, and to announce an off-campus event featuring two Jews with revisionist views on the Holocaust. That's not how I define opinion, at least. I also did not go back to the Conference the second day with any intention to voice an opinion: my purpose remained the same, except that my event had already occurred the previous evening, so that was a fait accompli, no more event, no more need to announce anything. I also assured both organizer Jantzen and President Gering when he confronted me that I had no intention to speak or be disruptive (nor had I been) but it still resulted in sneers and cuffs and a holding cell for 18 hours.