Court Rejects Defendant's Request to Seal 9-Year-Old Libel Case

"By maintaining access to these records, the Court promotes the public's interest 'in ascertaining what evidence and records the District Court ... relied upon in reaching [its] decision,' and the Court provides 'the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system, including a better perception of its fairness.'"

From last week's decision by Judge Edmund Sargus (S.D. Ohio) in Pillar Title Agency v. Pei:

On June 4, 2014, Plaintiffs … filed this action alleging, among other things, defamation and libel after Pei made comments on two websites about his former attorney. After litigating this action for a little over a year, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their Amended Complaint.

On April 11, 2023, Pei, proceeding pro se, filed the pending Motion to Expunge this Case, which asks the Court to "expunge the record of Case 2014-CV-525 from the Court's docket and the public record, pursuant to the applicable rules and procedures." The Court construes this request as a motion to seal the entire case file….

The Sixth Circuit recognizes that "[t]he public has a strong interest in obtaining the information contained in the court record." This interest rests on several grounds, including the public's interest "in ascertaining what evidence and records the District Court and this Court have relied upon in reaching our decisions." By protecting the public's access to judicial records, courts "serve[s] to promote trustworthiness of the judicial process, to curb judicial abuses, and to provide the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system, including a better perception of its fairness." Accordingly, courts apply a "'strong presumption in favor of openness' as to court records." The burden of overcoming the "strong presumption in favor of openness" of court records is a heavy one: "'Only the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records.'" …

Pei provides the following reasons to justify his request: (1) this is a civil case that "was resolved without any finding of liability or wrongdoing of [Pei]"; (2) given the limited number of case records publicly available on the internet, "[r]eaders usually do not get a complete picture about this case .. .and may easily have biased opinions about either party of this case"; (3) sealing this case is "necessary to protect our privacy and prevent any harm or prejudice to our reputation"; (4) "[t]he case involves personal and sensitive information that could be used against me or my family, including my young children, and I would like to prevent this information from being publicly available"; and (5) public access to this case may negatively impact Pei and Pei's family's reputation.

Pei has failed to carry his burden. His vague and conclusory allegations fall far short of overcoming the "strong presumption in favor of openness" of court records.

The Court begins its analysis with Pei's first justification, which misses the mark—that is, Pei offers no compelling reason justifying why the public's interest in accessing judicial records should yield to his interest in privacy simply because no liability arose from this action. Despite this case resolving without a finding of liability, the Court still issued multiple orders, including a ruling on Pei's motions to dismiss and motion for sanctions. By maintaining access to these records, the Court promotes the public's interest "in ascertaining what evidence and records the District Court … relied upon in reaching [its] decision," and the Court provides "the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system, including a better perception of its fairness."

Pei's second, third, and fifth grounds fail not only because they are vague and conclusory, but also because they largely concern potential reputational damage stemming from this litigation. The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that harm to one's reputation does not outweigh the public's interest in access to court records…. "The private litigants' interest in protecting their vanity or their commercial self-interest simply does not qualify as grounds for imposing a prior restraint. It is not even grounds for keeping the information under seal…." …

Finally, Pei's fourth reason similarly fails due to its conclusory nature. Simply alleging that personal information could be used against Pei or his family, without anything more, is "[a] naked conclusory statement that … falls woefully short" of the compelling justification necessary to warrant sealing this case….

For some of the substantive decisions in the case, see the denial of a TRO (partly on prior restraint grounds), and the denial of a motion to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds and a motion for sanctions. You can also see Pei's motion to expunge.