The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
A Group Autopsy of the Supreme Court's Oral Argument on Section 230
Episode 445 of the Cyberlaw Podcast
As promised, the Cyberlaw Podcast devoted half of this episode to an autopsy of Gonzalez v Google LLC , the Supreme Court's first opportunity in a quarter century to construe section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. And an autopsy is what our panel – Adam Candeub, Gus Hurwitz, Michael Ellis and Mark MacCarthy – came to perform. I had already laid out my analysis and predictions in a separate article for the Volokh Conspiracy, contending that both Gonzalez and Google would lose.
All our panelists agreed that Gonzalez was unlikely to prevail, but no one followed me in predicting that Google's broad immunity claim would fall, at least not in this case. The general view was that Gonzalez's lawyer had hurt his case with shifting and opaque theories of liability, that Google's arguments raised concerns among the Justices but not enough to induce them to write an opinion in such a muddled case.
Evaluating the Justices' performance, Justice Neil Gorsuch's search for a textual answer drew little praise and some derision while Justice Ketanji Jackson won admiration even from the more conservative panelists.
More broadly, there was a consensus that, whatever the fate of this particular case, the Court will find a way to push the lower courts away from a sweeping immunity for platforms and toward more nuanced protection. But because returning to the original intent of section 230 is not likely after 25 years of investment based on a lack of liability, this more nuanced protection will not have much grounding in the actual statutory language. Call it a return to the Rule of Reason.
In other news, Michael summed up recent developments in cyber war between Russia and Ukraine, including imaginative attacks on Russia's communications system. I ask whether these attacks – which are sexy but limited in impact – make cyber the modern equivalent of using motorcycles as a weapon in 1939.
Gus brings us up to date on recent developments in competition law, including a likely Department of Justice challenge to Adobe's $20 Billion Figma deal, new airline merger challenge, the beginnings of opposition to the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) proposed ban on noncompete clauses, and the third and final nail in the coffin of the FTC's challenge to the Meta-Within merger.
In European cyber news, the European Union is launching a consultation designed to make U.S. platforms pay more of European telecom networks' costs. Adam and Gus note the rent-seeking involved but point out that rent-seeking in U.S. network construction is just as bad, but seems to be focused on extracting rents from taxpayers instead of Silicon Valley.
The EU is also getting ready to fix the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) -- fix in the sense that gamblers fix a prize fight, as it will make sure Ireland never again wins a fight with the rest of Europe over how aggressively to extract privacy rents from U.S. technology companies.
I am excited about Apple's progress in devising a blood glucose monitor that could go into a watch. Adam and Gus tell me not to get too excited until we know how many roadblocks The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) will erect to the use and analysis of the monitors' data.
In quick hits,
- Gus confirms our suspicion that generative AI Is coming for lawyers' jobs
- And Illinois' biometric privacy law has gone from a really bad idea to a social, economic, and litigation catastrophe. The Illinois Supreme Court could have staved this off but didn't.
You can subscribe to The Cyberlaw Podcast using iTunes, Google Play, Spotify, Pocket Casts, or our RSS feed. As always, The Cyberlaw Podcast is open to feedback. Be sure to engage with @stewartbaker on Twitter. Send your questions, comments, and suggestions for topics or interviewees to CyberlawPodcast@steptoe.com. Remember: If your suggested guest appears on the show, we will send you a highly coveted Cyberlaw Podcast mug! The views expressed in this podcast are those of the speakers and do not reflect the opinions of their institutions, clients, friends, families, or pets.
Editor's Note: We invite comments and request that they be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of Reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason at any time. Comments may only be edited within 5 minutes of posting. Report abuses.
Please
to post comments
AI is perfect for legal work where you're just throwing shit at the wall to see what sticks.
You're not trying to divine falsifiable truth.
Predicting the SCOTUS decisions based on oral arguments is like predicting the weather based on groundhogs. You might be right, but there is little to it.
I'm collecting the interesting predictions for comparison later. It's even more fun than wondering how groundhogs, or at least their interpreters, got it 59% or 42% or whatever right.
It certainly worked in Bruin.
I also think that the case can be resolved very simply. The recommendation is Google's speech, not the poster's. Section 230, whatever it does, does not immunize Google's speech.
So no immunity, and remand so you can litigate for 2 years and then the plaintiff loses anyway.
That seems correct.
Google's speech is : 'Based on our analysis of your and similar people's action (which we also analyzed to find), we think you might also like ...' is transformative, unique and not 3rd party content.
The recommendation is Google’s speech, not the poster’s. Section 230, whatever it does, does not immunize Google’s speech.
Even so, what kinds of recommendations can Google make that are not protected by the 1A? Looks like a pretty small target.
The only question in the case before SCOTUS is whether 230 immunizes the conduct. The plaintiffs’ claim is knowingly aiding and abetting international terrorism, which allegedly caused their daughter's death at the hands of ISIS. All under a federal statute. Which, as I have said here many times, the plaintiffs will not be able to prove. But I don’t see that the 1A protects against such a claim.
Yes. That particular type of claim might be part of the small target I referred to.
Google's recommendation is unquestionably speech, but I don't see that it fits either the speech-incidental-to-criminal-conduct exception or incitement exception. Remember that the statute that Brandenburg v. Ohio struck down criminalized the outright advocacy of terrorism, and if that offends the First Amendment then one that criminalizes simply recommending content that originated from a terrorist organization seems unlikely to pass scrutiny.
The oral arguments showed the problem of a litigation in which no technology expert participates.
I improved the relevant paragraph in my draft district court complaint. I tried to provide the understanding that the pre-Breakup AT&T legal team would have evinced. Back then I used to help prepare filings and prepped an attorney that had to appear before the FCC or before an Article III tribunal. On international matters, I often spoke directly with an official from the US State Department on behalf of AT&T.
Experts?
Judges and lawyers have no interest in experts that aren't confirming their pre-existing biases. So put an expert in the room if you want, it'll have zero impact because that's not the sort of thing that actually sways judges/lawyers.
EscherEnigma seems not to have had much experience with either Title 47 litigation or with Title 35 litigation.
In a Title 47 case or a Title 35 case, the FCC, the USPTO, CAFC, the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, and SCOTUS all expect and need to see an expert report.
In a Title 35 case in federal district court, the Court expects expert participation at several stages of the trial.
A Section 230 case has been an outrageous anomaly in a federal district court.
Have you heard of "security theater"?
What you're describing could fairly be called "expertise theater". Sure, there's a lot of movement and it all looks pretty, but it doesn't do anything to change the outcome.
An Expert Report provides facts. Escher Enigma essentially asserts that a jury does not reach a verdict based on the facts presents. Does EscherEnigma truly believe that the expert testimony in the Derek Chauvin trial did not change the outcome?
So did you mean to conflate "jury" with "lawyers and judges", or did you just skip past that distinction?
A jury might be persuaded by experts. But judges and lawyers? Nah.
Claim construction is a matter of law based on evidence that is usually presented by experts in a Markman hearing. You must have no experience whatsoever with Title 35 litigation and must have never studied patent law. Are you a lawyer?
... my first post in this thread explicitly denigrated both judges and lawyers in a sweeping statement, and you have to ask if I'm a lawyer myself?
I leave it as an exercise to the reader to figure out that conundrum.
I also leave it as an exercise to the reader to figure out if anything you've said does a thing to contradict my assertion that judges/lawyers are unusually prone to confirmation bias.
Why is it outrageous? Section 230 is usually pretty straightforward, and hardly needs an expert report to apply.
Familiarity does not mean understanding. From Aristotle until Galileo, everyone thought he understood gravity. Galileo was the first one to provide an expert report on gravity.
Did you listen to the discussion Google recommendations? Google was generating a multipage document with text and images. Google recommendations are an obvious text document -- not much different from the old white pages that we all used to receive from an RBOC. Google's recommendation page is an product of Google just as or the white pages were a product of an RBOC. The discussion of automated production of recommendations was completely vacuous. The production of the white pages was completely automated. From the standpoint of someone that helped construct the World Wide Web and an Internet service, it's hard to understand why one would consider a Google recommendations page any less a full fledged document and product than the white pages are.
I am not talking about the Google case. Section 230 in general is straightforward, an ISP cannot be held liable for third party content. Regardless of whether it allowed it, censored it, or censored other content or allowed it. That simply principle disposes of 98% of Section 230 cases. You don't need an expert for that, any more than you need an expert to ascertain whether judicial or prosecutorial immunity applies in a civil rights case.
You are already wrong and have shown why an expert is needed.
A 1996 ICS is not an ISP while a 2023 social medium platform in no way meets the definition of an ICS in Section 230.
Someone has to provide the facts that can be evaluated by judge and by a jury.
Please read my draft complaint. I tried to keep the text at a level that someone could understand that had no technical knowledge whatsoever. The pre-Breakup AT&T legal team told me that I was good at such explication.
I mean, repeating it just makes you wrong many times instead of once.
Here’s a hint: you’re not an expert. You’re not a lawyer. You’re not sane.
No, they didn't.
In 1996 AOL was an Interactive Computer Service and provided its Access Software on computer diskettes or on a CD-ROM.
I logged into AOL and interacted with it. I don’t log into my ISP (XFINITY) or don’t use my ISP in any way interactively except that I occasional call customer service when there is an outage.
Sometimes in interpreting a statute, we have to pay attention to the actual word and its meaning. XFINITY is a Turnkey Network Service. I turn the cable modem on and receive the service. The service is turnkey because it is not interactive.
An old-fashioned IAP (Internet Access Provider) was interactive in that a phone number might have to be dialed in some way. In most cases the, the Access Software did the dialing, but in the 80s one occasionally manually did the dialing to connect a computer host to the Internet, but I was interacting with the modem not with the Internet Access Provider. Sometimes the Internet Access Provider was configured to call my computer host periodically.
1996 AOL was an Interactive Computer Service that was an Access Software Provider and Internet Access Provider. While this sort of technology can be found in a computer or networking museum, no one uses this technology any more.
Neither a 1996 ICS, an ISP, nor an IAP has any similarity to a 2023 Social Medium Platform,
Applying Section 230 to current Internet technology is rather like applying bicycle and golf cart statutes to an automobile, but at least an automobile, a bicycle, and a golf cart all have two or more wheels.
That is true. Not relevant to any question we're discussing here today, but true. You seem to have trouble with basic logic. "All A are B. C is not A. Therefore, C is not B." is a fallacy.
You certainly do. You may not realize it because the process is essentially automated so that you don't need to consciously do anything the vast vast majority of the time, but you are in fact doing so. (Otherwise how do you think they keep people who don't pay from using their service?)
I mean, you literally just described interacting with it in that first sentence!
The statute defines the terms. A 2023 social media platform fits that definition. Everything about AOL and ISPs is utterly irrelevant to that.
See Richards v. United States, 369 US 1, 9 (1962), quoted in Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993) at 1269 ("[W]e must always be cognizant of the fact that 'the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.'").
Interactive computing was defined in the early 1960s.
Before the 1960s a computer operated in non-interactive batch mode. In ordinary English, the need to turn on or to plug in a computer does not make it interactive. ARPA, which is a US government agency, developed interactive computing. The phrase “interactive computer” is a well-defined term in ordinary English usage.
Interactive computing
In computer science, interactive computing refers to software which accepts input from the user as it runs.
Interactive software includes commonly used programs, such as word processors or spreadsheet applications. By comparison, non-interactive programs operate without user intervention; examples of these include compilers and batch processing applications that are pre-programmed to run independently.
Interactive computing focuses on real-time interaction ("dialog") between the computer and the operator, and the technologies that enable them.
If the response of the computer system is complex enough, it is said that the system is conducting social interaction; some systems try to achieve this through the implementation of social interfaces.
The nature of interactive computing as well as its impact on users, are studied extensively in the field of computer interaction.
History of interactive computing systems
Ivan Sutherland is considered the father of interactive computing for his work on Sketchpad, the interactive display graphics program he developed in 1963. He later worked at the ARPA Information Processing Techniques Office under the direction of J. C. R. Licklider.
There he facilitated ARPA's research grant to Douglas Engelbart for developing the NLS system at SRI, based on his visionary manifesto published in a 1962 report, in which Engelbart envisioned interactive computing as a vehicle for user interaction with computers, with each other, and with their knowledge, all in a vast virtual information space.
In a 1965 report, Engelbart published his early experiments with pointing devices, including the computer mouse, for composing and editing on interactive display workstations. Engelbart's work on interactive computing at SRI migrated directly to Xerox PARC, from there to Apple, and out into the mainstream. Thus, the tree of evolution for interactive computing generally traces back to Engelbart's lab at SRI.
In December 2008, on the 40th anniversary of his 1968 demo, SRI sponsored a public commemorative event in his honor.
You didn't.