The Volokh Conspiracy
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The Vice-President and the Speech or Debate Clause
Prof. Glenn Reynolds (Tennessee, Instapundit) has an item on his Substack about the Vice President Mike Pence / Speech or Debate Clause controversy, based on a Northwestern University Law Review article that he wrote on the Vice President's role in 2008. An excerpt:
Pence, now, is arguing that by presiding on January 6, 2021, he was serving as a legislative official, and thus that his actions and words are covered by the Speech and Debate Clause, making it improper for the special prosecutor to question him. This argument may or may not be correct, but it is not at all crazy, and even in the context of an oped that is more about politics than the law, [former Fourth Circuit Judge Mike ] Luttig should have taken it more seriously.
There are arguments both ways. Textually, the Clause applies only to "Senators and Representatives"—its actual language is "The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place."
However, presiding over the Senate is surely a legislative function par excellence. In other cases involving governmental immunity, the Court has taken a functional approach: If you're acting as a judge or a prosecutor in an administrative proceeding, for example, you're entitled to the absolute immunity accorded to judges and prosecutors, regardless of your job title. Under this approach, Speech and Debate protection for the Vice President seems like a no-brainer. And the Supreme Court, in Gravel v. United States, held that an aide who functions as an alter ego to a legislator can qualify for legislative immunity, which illustrates that the text's limitation to Senators and Representatives is not absolute.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has, somewhat bizarrely, taken a narrower view of legislative immunity, which is mentioned in the text of the Constitution, than it has taken with regard to the qualified immunity of government officials generally, and the absolute immunity of prosecutors and, ahem, judges, though the latter is entirely a judicial creation, without any constitutional or statutory roots. It is thus entirely possible that it will be a stickler for textual analysis in this case—though to be fair, where the judicially-invented immunities are concerned, there is no text at all to worry about….
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Strict texualism, eh?
Well, then, what does "all" mean in "all criminal prosecutions" in the Sixth Amendment?
Are you and Glenn Reynolds gay lovers?? Let me guess, it’s just over the clothes handjibbers and no assplay??
Are you BCD's dumber, more bigoted alter-ego, or are you just jealous that someone else might be getting dick and you aren't?
Yes, I formerly commented under the username, ButtCuntDick, and my Substack and podcast are still under that name.
Hey SBF, love your work, but the hair? fix that shit.
I hope you aren't accessing this site using a VPN.
Quickest mute, evah...
What about the "privileged from Arrest during [his] Attendance"?
What is the official position of the CHPD and USSS -- and believe me, they definitely have a policy on something like this unless they are *completely* incompetent.
I thought of this a few years back in 2006 when Joe Kennedy, reportedly intoxicated, crashed his car near the Capitol at 3 AM and said he was "going for a vote" and he wasn't arrested.
Conversely, is the VP treated as if he was a member of the Senate? Is he accorded the rights and privileges of one? Dining room, gym, etc? Is he allowed to bypass security like members are? (Does he have one of the pins?)
IANAA but it seems to me that if they are treating him like one half of the sentence applies to him, then it stands to reason that the other half does as well.
However, presiding over the Senate is surely a legislative function par excellence. In other cases involving governmental immunity, the Court has taken a functional approach: If you're acting as a judge or a prosecutor in an administrative proceeding, for example, you're entitled to the absolute immunity accorded to judges and prosecutors, regardless of your job title. Under this approach, Speech and Debate protection for the Vice President seems like a no-brainer.
Wait.
If we are going to take a functional approach then maybe we should take into account that what the VP was doing on Jan. 6 had nothing to do with legislating. It was, as they say, purely ministerial.
His job that day did not differ from that of the clerk who tallies the votes on legislation. Is the clerk covered by the clause?
How about a judge who receives the verdict?
Bernard:
Good point.
Pence has always said that he had no discretion -- his actions on Jan. 6 were just ministerial. What "speech and debate" was he involved in? It seems that he has precluded himself from that defense.
And where in the speech and debate clause is there an exception for a ministerial speech and debate?
If it was purely ministerial and Pence had no discretion, then what could he testify to?
Conversely, if what he said that day was worthy of being subpoenaed, then maybe it wasn't just ministerial and did involve discretion.
what could he testify to?
All kinds of things that had zero to do with legislating or tallying electoral college votes.
For example, maybe he got a call from Trump. Maybe someone threatened him - which they did, of course. Who knows what else.
Like I said. Perhaps you should have read what you replied to.
Sorry I misunderstood. Could you clarify your point?
"Ministerial speech and debate" is a contradiction in terms.
Yes, the bit about legislative acts seems to be a judicial invention, formed as part of a larger judicial invention - that as it would be awfully hard for those poor overworked Senators to do their legislating without aides entitled to the same Speech and Debate privilege as the actual Senators, then the aides must be deemed to be an integral body part of the Senator, and thus entitled to that privilege.
Seems to me that the text makes Pence’s claim laughable, but SCOTUS precedent makes it laughable to suppose that the text has been of the slightest interest to SCOTUS thus far.
A good result would be for SCOTUS to rule that Senator means Senator, cos that’s what it says, and btw sorry about that total crap our judicial ancestors plucked from their rear ends in the 70s, which we humbly and shamefacedly reverse.
That would be nice.
It would also be nice for me to learn that I was entitled to claim Blackbeard’s treasure, tax-free.
Which of those things is more likely, I wonder?
You'd have to find it first. Supposedly it's buried somewhere on Ocracoke Island. So the National Park Service gets first dibs.
Like the FBI in the Pennsylvania case?
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/07/pennsylvania-civil-war-treasure-gold-hunt-fbi/638445/
The thing is, the Constitution was written in a different era, and the idea that with our limited knowledge and biased perspectives we can be sure what it means, is simply ignorant.
Who knows what "Senators and Representatives" means? The phrase should evolve in response to contemporary understandings and needs.
I'm sure Stephen Lathrop would agree.
/sarc
Margrave—worse than /sarc—utter incomprehension. Plus substitution of a red herring of your own. The notion that any historical, "phrase should evolve in response to contemporary understandings and needs," is the exact opposite of what I tried to explain to you.
But I have owned up. After multiple attempts to explain adequately, I failed to reach most of my intended audience. I am not equal to that task. On reflection, I realized I was trying in a few hundred words to clarify points that someone much smarter than me had taught me in an essay of more than 100 pages, so I referred my still-baffled readers to him.
Thus, I take comfort only insofar as some folks, almost unaccountably, did understand me, repeated pretty accurately what my points were, and even added appropriate related inferences. I am grateful to them for that little bit of positive feedback.
As for you, you still need to read Oakeshott, or else forget trying to talk about historical context—which is the concept that either I could not explain, or that you could not understand.
To be fair, you specifically professed inability to understand what habeas corpus and ex post facto meant in the Constitution. And you couldn’t explain why you couldn’t explain it.
I found about 17 books by your guy, and I know he’s a philosophical big shot. Still, not even 17 books can obscure the meaning of habeas corpus, and certainly can’t exempt the interpreter from the duty of trying. A judge can’t simply throw up his hands at the indeterminacy of it all and send the poor prisoner back to his cell without explanation. Nor can he simply release everyone who applies for release, or act arbitrarily in whom to release.
To be fair, you specifically professed inability to understand what habeas corpus and ex post facto meant in the Constitution.
Margrave, to achieve fairness, you will have to try harder. Specific inability to understand what habeas corpus and ex post facto meant in the Constitution is what I ascribed to present-minded modern legal commenters, such as yourself.
I did confess that I do not know what those terms meant at the time of the founding, but not because I have any inability to understand; only because to understand that historically would require historical study which I have not done—or seen from anyone else—to elucidate the context of their creation at that time, and also prior to that time.
After such study were done, it might prove possible to infer from it a now-forgotten passage of history with power to illuminate an in-context-of-creation answer of the sort you demand. Or it might not. But if it did not, I would have gained insight to say why not.
What you do understand is a modern meaning for those terms, one which may or may not have much to do with a founding-era meaning. My guess is that you have a high degree of unwarranted confidence that what you think those terms mean now is exactly what they did mean then. That is not something you know how to demonstrate, and maybe not something you think anyone should be required to demonstrate.
If so, that is just more evidence where none is needed that so-called originalism is an impractical legal method. Impractical, because folks who practice law cannot be persuaded to take seriously the intellectual challenges necessary to avoid fallacious historical reasoning.
By the way, I do not know why that would bother you, or almost anyone else who practices law. Your modern meanings are (inevitably and unavoidably) the ones everyone relies on to interpret habeas corpus and ex post facto in cases decided today. You can all get along perfectly well with the modern meanings, even while you are pleased to fantasize that they come down unchanged to you from history.
To accept that, all you would have to give up is a complex and flimsy pretense you can readily do without. You would have to stop pretending: that folks who do not understand how to reason historically; can properly be empowered to govern modern law; on the basis of spurious reasoning; about purported historical evidence; which they make up from scratch without knowing they are doing it. For the life of me I cannot understand why anyone would regard giving that up as a sacrifice instead of as an improvement.
Lanthrop comment – “If so, that is just more evidence where none is needed that so-called originalism is an impractical legal method. Impractical, because folks who practice law cannot be persuaded to take seriously the intellectual challenges necessary to avoid fallacious historical reasoning.”
Lanthrop – what is the alternative to originalism. Ignore the original meaning and interpret the text to mean would you would like it to mean or pretend that parts of the historical record didnt exist like Stevens did in Heller.
Originalism may get it wrong sometimes due to misinterpretation. But the alternative gets it wrong everytime.
The purpose of the alternative is to get it wrong. You only abandon originalism, (Or "reading", as it was called prior to needing a formal name.) because you want an excuse to reject the correct meaning.
Brett Bellmore 5 hours ago
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"The purpose of the alternative is to get it wrong. You only abandon originalism, (Or “reading”, as it was called prior to needing a formal name.) because you want an excuse to reject the correct meaning."
that was my point - along with the hope that the anti - originalists would grasp the reason for being anit-originalists.
Actually, Joe, it seems to me that "originalism" is an excuse to get it wrong. There are so many flavors, so many ways to read, and cherry-pick, the historical record, so many BS "history and tradition" arguments, that it's just a cover for whatever the "orginalist" wants, on the grounds that someone in 1795 said or did something.
As I stated - Originalism may get in wrong sometimes , though not often wrong. Interpreting a statute based on anything other that what was meant at the time of passage will always get it wrong. Anti-originalism is designed to get an interpretation of a statute to mean what you want it to mean.
Those who disagree with me are arguing in bad faith, says Brett for the ten thousandth time.
Actually, “originalism” used to be called not “reading” but “strict constructionism.”
Like its buddy, “states rights” the term came into bad odor because it was rightly associated with segregationists, so the marketing guys changed the names to “originalism” and “federalism.”
I recall telling you that I didn’t think I was an originalist, but that when the Constitution invokes a term of art or refers to past practice, then you consult appropriate legal sources available at the time (not generic “history”). And perhaps supplement it with intelligent, serious efforts by later interpreters to understand the historical meaning of that term of art.
You’re giving plugged-in generic responses to a specific question, without feeling obliged to answer the specific question. And you flail around at the originalists in your head.
You could have contented yourself with saying that not everything in the Constitution can be satisfactorily interpreted with the tools of historical investigation, but you go to extremes and try to wish away specific clauses which are embedded in legal history and whose interpretation requires some familiarity with the relevant sources.
Courts seem to be reading the speech and debate clause very textually lately, which I approve of.
I would have thought that Lindsey Graham would have a good case to avoid testifying under the speech and debate clause about his phone call to the Georgia Secretary of State about suspect absentee ballots, and the possibility of invalidating them.
Clearly as a Senator who could object to electoral votes and vote to accept or reject them, and also as chairman of the Judiciary committee he had a “legislative purpose“ to make the call.
But his conduct was a private phone call not a “speech or debate” so the courts didn’t buy his immunity claim (although the lower court did say that Graham could not be questioned about his “informal investigative fact-finding,”).
Why in the heck are we making this more complicated than it is? The answers to three simple questions should resolve this:
(1) Was Mike Pence a United States Senator on January 6, 2021? No, he was not.
(2) Was Mike Pence a member of the United States House of Representatives on January 6, 2021? No, he was not.
(3) Did Mike Pence engage in speech or debate in either the Senate or the House on January 6, 2021? No, he did not.
I'd have to say that you're right on points 1 and 2, and that's sufficient to dictate the outcome, but Pence DID utter a few words that day in the legislative chambers.
I really doubt that the courts are going to dice things as finely as you would in point 3.
On first impression, I would have to agree that Pence is not a senator as defined in the constitution (or what ever the equivalent of a definitional section in the constitution maybe). As such, Pence doesnt qualify under the speech and debate clause. I concede that there are valid arguments both ways, thus I have not developed a conclusive opinion either way.
That being said, Pence wasnt exactly pro - rejecting the electoral vote, so I dont see what the subpoena is intended to accomplish except for the political theater.
I would guess that it's mostly a desperate hope that Trump said something incriminating to Pence. With a smidgen of needing to hound Pence because he was associated with Trump, and EVERYONE who was associated with Trump must be hounded for the rest of eternity.
A lot of them do turn out to be criminals, foreign agents and pedophiles.
Like the Biden family
All done in bad faith, no doubt. Right, Brett?
But his speech was pro forma. Does anyone want to question him about his counting?
I don't even understand why that is at all relevant.
In fact, the whole thing looks completely phony to me. Nobody is trying to arrest Pence, so the first part of the clause doesn't apply.
The second part refers to speech or debate in Congress. But I don't see how that applies to anything else that happened that day.
If Pence had witnessed a car accident on his way in to work could he not be questioned about that?
To this non-lawyer the whole argument is just some legal shit thrown against the wall in the hope that some might stick. It does let professors profess, though, thereby keeping them off the streets and out of trouble, so I guess that's one benefit.
"To this non-lawyer the whole argument is just some legal shit thrown against the wall in the hope that some might stick."
...which has been pretty much the case lately.
"To this non-lawyer the whole argument is just some legal shit thrown against the wall in the hope that some might stick."
As opposed to, say, every investigation etc Trump has been subjected to non-stop since July 2016? What if I told you that the entire practice of law is throwing shit against the wall?
As opposed to, say, every investigation etc Trump has been subjected to non-stop since July 2016? What if I told you that the entire practice of law is throwing shit against the wall?
Yes, as opposed to those investigations, which are by and large legitimate. Do you think The Mighty Trump shouldn't have to pay taxes, for example?
You're the one slinging bullshit here. When's the next cult meeting?
However, presiding over the Senate is surely a legislative function par excellence.
So the Constitution got it wrong, when it decreed that it was a Vice Presidential function?
Well no, they didn’t, or at least not just him.
Presiding over the senate is either a function of the VP or the Senate President pro temp ore. It seems kind of funny that presiding over the Senate would be a legislative task if done by the Senate pro temporary, but not if it’s being presided over by the VP.
Well, 3 U.S.C. § 15 assigns duties to the President of the Senate, and certification of the electoral count is a legislative function. Subsequent to enactment of the Electoral Count Act in 1887 and prior to ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, that certification sometimes occurred when the office of the Vice-President was vacant -- in 1905, 1949 and 1965. So Pence's claim that the Speech or Debate Clause applies here, while a question of first impression, it at least plausible.
That having been said, the Speech or Debate Clause -- assuming arguendo it applies -- is not an impediment to Pence appearing before the grand jury and testifying. In Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), SCOTUS considered whether a Senate aide who had been subpoenaed before a grand jury shared the Senator's constitutional privilege. "Because the claim is that a Member's aide shares the Member's constitutional privilege, we consider first whether and to what extent Senator Gravel himself is exempt from process or inquiry by a grand jury investigating the commission of a crime." Id., at 613.
The Court there opined "The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch. It thus protects Members against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process." Id., at 616. Here Pence attempts to wield the privilege, not as a shield against intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch, but as a sword to block inquiry into exactly such threats as were made against him.
"The courts have extended the [Speech or Debate] privilege to matters beyond pure speech or debate in either House, but 'only when necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations.'" Id., at 625, quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 760 (1st Cir. 1972). The instant subpoena to Pence seeks to inquire into the effort of third party criminal actors to effectuate impairment of a legislative function.
The Gravel Court opined, "The grand jury, therefore, if relevant to its investigation into the possible violations of the criminal law, and absent Fifth Amendment objections, may require from [Sen. Gravel's aide] Rodberg answers to questions . . . with respect to third-party conduct under valid investigation by the grand jury, as long as the questions do not implicate legislative action of the Senator." 408 U.S. at 628.
The Court there delineated areas of grand jury questioning which are forbidden under Speech or Debate protections:
408 U.S. at 628-29 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). The exception to category (4) would apply here -- prosecutors are inquiring into criminal conduct of third party actors, not the conduct of Pence or his aides.
By your reasoning, a Senator could be compelled to testify, over his claim of privilege, as to why he voted a certain way on a bill, on the mere belief or assertion of a prosecutor (who is, obviously, a member of the executive branch) that the Senator was threatened (or bribed, for that matter) in connection with his vote. It would render the privilege a nullity if a prosecutor could defeat it merely by claiming he was looking into possible crimes by third parties connected to an act that would otherwise be privileged.
So what?
Taking a bribe is, obviously, no part of the legislative process or function; it is not a legislative act. It is not, by any conceivable interpretation, an act performed as a part of or even incidental to the role of a legislator. It is not an “act resulting from the nature, and in the execution, of the office.” Nor is it a “thing said or done by him, as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office,” [Coffin v. Coffin,] 4 Mass. [1,] 27 [(1808)]. Nor is inquiry into a legislative act or the motivation for a legislative act necessary to a prosecution under this statute or this indictment. When a bribe is taken, it does not matter whether the promise for which the bribe was given was for the performance of a legislative act, as here, or, as in [United States v.] Johnson, for use of a Congressman’s influence with the Executive Branch. And an inquiry into the purpose of a bribe “does not draw in question the legislative acts of the defendant member of Congress or his motives for performing them.”
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972), quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 185 (1966). The applicable privilege for the member of Congress would be the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, not Speech or Debate.
The "so what" is your reasoning would create an exception to the privilege that would swallow the privilege, effectively rendering it meaningless and cutting against what you say is its main purpose, to prevent intimidation from the executive branch.
I think you're misreading Gravel a bit, where the important factor, per the Court, is whether the underlying act is a legislative one. For example, it would not permit questioning about what went on in the subcommittee hearings. “Senator Gravel may not be made to answer—either in terms of questions or in terms of defending himself from prosecution—for the events that occurred at the subcommittee meeting." The Senators could have been discussing soliciting bribes or ordering assassinations, but that would not permit compelled questioning of the Senators on the hearings. However, the Court would permit questions about the negotiations with third parties to publish the Pentagon Papers, because that was not essential to the legislative process.
So, I think the key question is whether the Vice President's role in presiding over electoral count, as provided in the Constitution, is a "legislative act." I think one could plausibly argue that is or that it is not. If it is deemed a legislative act, then, I believe, assuming he is entitled to claim the privilege at all, he cannot be compelled to answer questions about his discussions on how to carry out his role.
EDIT: I used the phrase "subcommittee hearings" where I meant "subcommittee meetings".
But if the VP is not a Senator, is that not decisive all by itself, regardless of what he said or did in the chamber? Does the Clause apply to anyone who is performing legislative activities, for instance someone called to testify before a committee? Or just to actual Senators and Reps.
The Gravel precedent is that the privilege is not restricted to actual Senators or actual Representatives.
That precedent is obvious baloney but it’s there.
And yet, many feel if Trump had decided not to run again, all this would be, and was, winding down, and got fired right back up when he started mumbling about running again, suggesting continued investigation and prosecution are politically motivated. Isn't that the kind of intimidation you fear?
"And yet, many feel if Trump had decided not to run again, all this would be, and was, winding down, and got fired right back up when he started mumbling about running again, suggesting continued investigation and prosecution are politically motivated."
I don't think so. The events culminating in the storming of the Capitol on January 6, 2021 have been investigated by the Department of Justice continuously since Donald Trump left office. Trump has made noise about running again during that entire timeframe. A Special Counsel was appointed in the wake of Trump's formal announcement, but that in fact detracts from any suggestion of political motivation -- someone from outside DOJ, insulated from political supervision, was brought in to helm the prosecution.
In January 1876, the House of Representatives created a five-member committee to investigate the bankruptcy of the firm of Jay Goode & Co., into which the Secretary of the Navy had deposited government funds. Pursuant to the investigation, the committee subpoenaed one Hallett Kilbourn to testify before the committee and to produce certain documents. Kilbourn did appear, but refused to answer any questions or produce the subpoenaed documents. The committee declared Kilbourn in contempt and requested the Speaker to issue a warrant, directed to the House Sergeant-at-Arms John G. Thompson, to seize Kilbourn wherever he may be found and to bring him before the bar of the House. The Speaker did issue the warrant, and Thompson did arrest Kilbourn and bring him before the bar of the House.
Kilbourn sued Thompson and the five members of the committee for false imprisonment. The Supreme Court, in Kilbourn v. Thompson (1881), held that the five members of the committee were immune from suit under the Speech and Debate Clause, but Sergeant-at-Arms Thompson was not. In support of its ruling, the Court cited the British case of Stockdale v. Hansard (Queen's Bench, 1839), in which the court had held that the official reporter of the House of Commons was not immune under parliamentary privilege (the English antecedent of the Speech and Debate Clause) from a libel suit, even though he had published the report containing the alleged libel upon the direct orders of the House of Commons. What the Supreme Court did not mention was that Parliament, in direct response to that ruling, had passed the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840, which extended parliamentary privilege to those who published reports pursuant to the orders of Parliament.
The Supreme Court would not retreat form this hyper-literal reading of the Clause until Gravel v. United States (1972), in which the Clause's protection was extended to legislative aides when they act as the "alter-ego" of a member of Congress. "[T]he privilege available to the aide is confined to those services that would be immune legislative conduct if performed by the Senator himself." The four dissenters would have extended the privilege even further than the majority did. (Needless to say, a legislative aide is not a "Senator or Representative", so the answer to the question, "Is the Vice President a Senator?" is hardly illuminating.)
The relevant text of the Constitution in the instant case provides:
Perhaps notably, the text reads "the President of the Senate", not "the Vice President". Prior to the adoption of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, there was no provision to fill a vacancy in the Vice-Presidency, so the position just remained vacant, and had indeed been vacant on sixteen occasions when the aforementioned quadrennial electoral count was scheduled. Naturally, on these occasions, the Senate President pro tem would fill in. Would the Speech and Debate Clause have applied to the Senate President pro tem on those occasions? Or is a Senator not a Senator when he is presiding over the Senate? Would it be logical to extend the protection of the President pro tem of the Senate but not to the actual President of the Senate? This would be analogous to claiming the Acting President possesses some power the President does not.
I believe the Vice President, when acting in his capacity as President of the Senate, enjoys the protections of the Speech and Debate Clause. Of course, the Supreme Court might see it differently. I'm not emotionally invested in the issue as Mike Luttig and some of the commentariat here seem to be. But I see Luttig's op-ed as less of a legal argument and more of a political screed, fulminating at Mike Pence, "How dare you throw up obstacles that might prevent us from finally getting our hands on Trump!"
Is the VP really a member of the Executive branch, though? Glenn Reynolds says, maybe not.
Let's remember why this is even a thing: A special counsel.
"Is the VP really a member of the Executive branch, though? Glenn Reynolds says, maybe not."
And for good reason since all executive power is vested in the President. Those roles proscribed for the VP by the Constitution would seem make them nowhere men (and one woman) in nowhere land.
The truth is, the Framers gave almost no thought to the Vice President — and none at all to this issue being discussed — and just made him President of the Senate to give him something to do. They just didn’t care.
That is kind of interesting, isn't it? The Founders left it ambiguous. I wonder if they meant for that.
I think you've nailed it here. It was originally a consolation prize for coming in second, and they were just giving him something to do until the actual President died somehow. Probably so he'd hang around the Capitol, and they wouldn't have to track him down in that event.
In other words the equivalent of Prince Harry; a spare.
Mostly, though probably having a convenient way to break ties may have entered into it.
Yes — with two senators per state that would always be a danger.
They also weren’t picturing a Vice President who was connected to the President through the Presidential candidate's choice and the approval of a political party. They were picturing more like Jefferson as Adams’ VP. Essentially two independent actors.
The policy argument in favor of immunity is, you don't want people suing Pence for counting the fake votes from seven states instead of the real votes, and you don't want the Trump(2) Justice Department prosecuting Pence for counting the fake votes. If you think he should have immunity in such cases, where does it come from? Interpreting legislative immunity to cover Pence's official acts related to electoral vote counting is a straightforward way to avoid such a crisis.
Straightforward except for the unavoidable fact that he was a member of neither chamber of Congress at the time.
I personally suspect that Pence doesn't actually mind testifying. He's just checking off boxes so that it's perfectly clear that he didn't volunteer to testify.
1: Lawyers aren’t cheap, 2: He will have to justify not getting into the USSS car. 3: We don’t know what secrets he has.
I and probably millions of others would, in fact, want the VP sued (and criminally charged, as applicable) for counting fake electors.
This is really very simple. Was Pence associated with Trump or not?
If so, he is guilty; if not, he is innocent.
Why clutter it all up with this silly "constitutional or not" nonsense?
This is 2023, and the democrats won in 2020.
"Was Pence associated with Trump or not?"
Associated in what respect and what guilt or innocence?
Also, you overlook that "winning" is not enough for the Democrats and thus the two impeachments in four years, equal to the number of Presidential impeachments from the previous two hundred or so years.
I think he left off the sark mark
Hadn't considered that. Guess I need to reread Know Your Commentators.
I never use it.
There is no longer a significant difference between sarcasm, prophecy, and editorial commentary.
(especially here)
Yes, there is mainly just boring partisanship, like all your comments.
they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
So what exactly does that mean? If a legislator were to have witnessed a murder, could they be questioned as to what they saw? Or, to be more concrete, if they were in the chamber or hall when they saw a Capitol police officer shoot a woman trying to force her way into the chamber of the House, could they be a witness and be questioned as to what they saw?
Or does questioned only relate to their legislative acts or duties and not to other acts at times after the legislative duties would not be impacted?
Could they voluntarily, or does “shall not be” dictate no even in that case?
Or if he were en route to do his ministerial task (which I don’t think is pure pomp and circumstance, given he must report he received it all properly) and someone tried to pull him over for not fully stopping at a stop sign, could they block him?
I think not guilty addresses some of this in his comment up thread.
An interesting question from a comment to Adler's post on the subject:
Cheerio 7 mins ago
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Sorry if I missed this somewhere, but what about the Speaker of the House? He/She is notably not required to be a “member” of Congress, and if he’s not, would his immunity likewise be in question…?
It's time for Pence to call on the aid of E. T. - the Extra Textual.
This obfuscatory pedantry needs to go straight in the trash.
The Department of Justice is investigating an attempt to effect a quasi-legal coup by means of dubious (and knowingly false) claims of election fraud and defects, slates of fake electors, behind-the-scenes pressure on state officials, preposterous legal theories, and finally (of course) actual physical violence orchestrated to trigger a crisis. To say that members of Congress (or the VP and President) are in some sense immune from investigation for their participation in this scheme because the Constitution said so is fundamentally bizarre. The Constitution cannot and should not be bent to protect and shield efforts to render it null.
Anyone treating this as a banal exercise in legal analysis is either hopelessly lost in sophistry, or motivated in their reasoning.
Maybe just a personal issue, trying to help un-American insurrectionist and fellow clinger John Eastman avoid jail?
There's certainly something Eastman-esque about treating the slow-motion destruction of our republic as just an interesting academic exercise or a career opportunity.
And the Supreme Court, in Gravel v. United States, held that an aide who functions as an alter ego to a legislator can qualify for legislative immunity, which illustrates that the text’s limitation to Senators and Representatives is not absolute.
Sure, but you can’t seriously argue that the Vice President was acting as an alter ego to any “Senator[ or] Representative[].” Or are we going to give similar immunity to the Architect of the Capitol, the Chief of the Capitol Police, the Librarian of Congress, and the Comptroller General (all of which are legislative branch officers, carrying out tasks assigned to them by Members of Congress)?