The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions
Grains of sand, detachable pockets, and genuine obliviousness.
Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.
In 2018, Mario Rosales was driving in Roswell, New Mexico, when he legally passed off-duty sheriff's deputy David Bradshaw's personal pickup truck. In a fit of road rage, Bradshaw followed Mario home, blocked him in the driveway, screamed at him, and ultimately pointed a gun at him. Bradshaw was fired and convicted of aggravated assault—but when Rosales sued him for violating his constitutional rights, a federal court granted Bradshaw qualified immunity. This week, IJ Attorney Marie Miller argued his case before the Tenth Circuit, and boy are we glad we weren't the former deputy's lawyers.
- Procedural persnickets, beware thine own petard! Two environmental groups complaining that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission didn't prepare an environmental-impact statement before issuing a permit themselves failed to raise their objection properly. Which means, per the D.C. Circuit, that American Centrifuge is authorized to produce uranium enriched up to 20 percent. Politics aside, that's just very cool as a matter of physics.
- Your editors don't exactly hesitate to nerd out about the Constitution. We know "fire in a crowded theater" is claptrap, we worry about that loophole in the Vicinage Clause, and, heck, we even think the Fourteenth Amendment should better reflect the 1615 Ipswich Tailors' Case. But even we had never seen a case about the Bankruptcy Clause's "uniformity" requirement. (Relatedly, the Second Circuit holds that debtors who paid bankruptcy fees that were mandatory in their district but permissive in others are getting a partial refund.)
- Does the Second Amendment prevent disarmament of a person for an old nonviolent conviction? Third Circuit, conducting much historical analysis in the mode of Bruen: Not if it was the equivalent of a felony. So no hunting rifle for a man who was convicted of about $2,500 in welfare fraud in 1995.
- You've got to feel for the defendant LLC in this Fourth Circuit ruling. It was sued, counterclaimed, won, and was awarded damages and attorney's fees only to have the whole thing vacated on appeal because one of 39 partners in the LP that owns the LP that owns the LLC that owns the defendant LLC lives in the same state as the plaintiff, destroying diversity of citizenship. But "[w]hether mutual contentment with the federal forum or genuine obliviousness brought the parties to this unfortunate juncture, this Court will not condone the exercise of jurisdiction where it did not truly exist."
- After a pair of meth dealers entered into a federal cooperation agreement, they made quite a confession: They previously dumped the dead body of one of their customers into a bayou. The customer had skipped out of town after they bonded him out of jail—putting the bond money at risk—and they offered free drugs to anyone who could get him back. The incentive worked all too well, and the customer was killed in the ensuing retrieval effort. Fifth Circuit: While the cooperation agreement made promises of immunity, it did not apply to "crimes of violence." Murder being a "crime of violence," the district court appropriately considered this conduct at sentencing.
- Challengers to a Texas law criminalizing out-of-state abortions sought to subpoena testimony from Texas AG Ken Paxton, arguing it was necessary to reconcile his public statements threatening to enforce the law with his argument (in a pending motion to dismiss) that he lacked authority to take such enforcement action. The district court obliged, reasoning that "Paxton alone is capable of explaining his thoughts and statements." Fifth Circuit: The district court had to decide the pending motion to dismiss before it could haul anyone in to testify, and, in any event, Paxton can't be made to testify because the challengers could subpoena his subordinates instead. Mandamus granted.
- Voter-registration activists sue Tennessee over a law imposing a raft of new requirements. The trial court grants them a preliminary injunction, and they're able to register new voters ahead of the 2020 election. Seven months later, the state repeals the enjoined provisions. State: So the victory was just temporary and we don't have to pay plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. Sixth Circuit: The decision was final enough; pay up. Dissent: Plaintiffs won the battle but not the war—and only the war would entitle them to attorneys' fees.
- Ohio man pleads guilty to illegally possessing a gun. But there's no plea deal and nothing specifying the sentencing range—so the court isn't bound by the parties' calculations of the sentencing guidelines (21–27 months' imprisonment per gov't vs. the man's attorney's 12–18 months). Surprise! The court imposes a sentence of 57 months based on the Probation Office's calculation of the guidelines. Sixth Circuit: The district court should've warned the man that it would decide his sentence irrespective of the parties' calculations. Back down to the district court, which may resentence him to a max of 27 months or allow him to plead anew.
- Detainee at Cook County, Ill. jail files putative class action challenging lack of grab bars and other fixtures for disabled people. District court (September 2019): No class certification for you. Seventh Circuit (March 2020): This case seems like a pretty easy candidate for class certification. District court: Okay, class certified. But now decertified (September 2022) because some of the class members might not really be disabled. Seventh Circuit (November 2022) (and without requesting a response brief from the defendants): Seriously? Hasn't the district court even heard of issue certification under Rule 23(c)(4)? We feel like we're taking crazy pills! Reversed. Again. Let the class action proceed.
- In which the Eighth Circuit preliminarily enjoins the U.S. Sec'y of Education's student-loan-forgiveness plan because (a) it is likely that the State of Missouri (one of the plaintiffs challenging the plan) has standing; (b) the legality of the plan "involve[s] substantial questions of law which remain to be resolved"; and (c) letting the plan go into effect would be a big deal while pausing it would not be. Also the preliminary injunction should be a nationwide one.
- Detachable pockets! DETACHABLE. POCKETS. They're breathtaking. But are they entitled to trade-dress protection under the Lanham Act? Eighth Circuit: They are not. To be protectable, trade dress must be "nonfunctional." And Pocket Plus's pocket pouch's trade dress—for example, its shape and the ability to open it—is all functional.
- After Arkansas woman's home burns down, she asks her insurer for money. Insurer: But when you applied for the policy, you said you hadn't had a foreclosure in the past five years, and in fact you'd received a "Notice of Default and Intention to Sell" from your mortgagee six days before. We're rescinding your policy for that misrepresentation and paying you ::slides abacus beads:: precisely zero dollars and zero cents. Eighth Circuit: The policy application's question about whether she "had a foreclosure" was ambiguous. Did it mean has any foreclosure proceeding ever been commenced? Or has any foreclosure sale taken place? If the former, then yeah, the woman made a misrepresentation. If the latter, she didn't. So she gets a pass for giving a bad answer to your bad question.
- Just the Ninth Circuit breezily noting that, though the U.S. Constitution protects some fundamental rights, "the right to use and occupy [your] own property" isn't among them.
- Philosophers may spend their days pondering precisely when several grains of sand become a "heap," but this Ninth Circuit opinion reminds us that lawyers, as punishment for their sins, must spend their days pondering precisely when a device that automatically dials phone numbers becomes an "autodialer."
- Pro tip from the Tenth Circuit: If you're appealing from an order granting summary judgment, your appellate brief should, somewhere in there, use the phrase "summary judgment." As it is, "Plaintiffs-Appellants' appellate briefing is so woefully inadequate—especially in light of the complicated constitutional issues at issue here and the district court's extensive analysis of them—that they have waived appellate review."
- This Tenth Circuit opinion may try to distract you with its lurid facts, which include a vast conspiracy to frame an innocent man for murder, a shocking effort to suppress evidence about the actual confessed killer, and, at one point, a man's attempts to have sex with a dog, but the really exciting part is the question of whether Parratt abstention applies to substantive due process claims.
- From the Eleventh Circuit comes the tale of a man who's pulled over with a blood-alcohol level of .314 and whose day proceeds to get much, much worse.
- And in en banc news, the Fifth Circuit will not reconsider its decision affirming a 70-month sentence for a felon convicted of possessing two shotgun shells that he claimed both to have found and to believe were signal-gun flares. He may not have paid for them, but "the government introduced enough evidence that [the] shotgun shells traveled in interstate commerce, and that is all our caselaw requires to satisfy the interstate commerce element."
- And in more en banc news, the Eighth Circuit will not reconsider its decision preliminarily enjoining an Arkansas law that prohibits healthcare professionals from providing "gender transition procedures" to any individual under 18. Five judges dissent, arguing that the panel opinion "draws a major piece of Arkansas legislation into doubt and recognizes what amounts to a new suspect class."
- And in additional en banc news, the Tenth Circuit will not reconsider its decision that a religious school may not immediately appeal an interlocutory ruling denying summary judgment on the school's "ministerial exception" defense after it fired a chaplain who gave a presentation on race and faith. Three judges dissent, arguing that the ministerial exception provides immunity from suit—not just immunity from liability—and therefore its denial must be immediately appealable.
- But in further en banc news, the Ninth Circuit will reconsider its decision affirming a land-exchange agreement between the Secretary of the Interior and an Alaska Native village corporation, which would allow the corporation to build a road through the Izembek National Wildlife Refuge to facilitate medical evacuations.
- And in extra, bonus en banc news, the Ninth Circuit will also reconsider its decision that a taxpayer may "file" a return—thus triggering the IRS's three-year period for adjusting the taxpayer's liability—by providing a copy of the return to an IRS official who asks for it, even if the return has not also been mailed to an IRS service center.
Friends, with Thanksgiving fast approaching, we at Short Circuit are particularly thankful that, on Thursday, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the constitutionality of the state's Hope Scholarship Program. This paves the way for families to use scholarships for private school tuition, therapies, and a wide variety of other education expenses. The 4-1 decision overturns a lower court injunction that halted the program in July. Following a constitutional challenge to the program in January, the Institute for Justice (IJ) intervened on behalf of Morgantown, West Virginia parent Katie Switzer and Albright, West Virginia parent Jennifer Compton to defend the program's constitutionality under the West Virginia Constitution. Learn more about the case here.
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In retrospect, they probably shouldn't have argued that committing aggravated assault by pointing a gun at someone for no reason was an attempt to "deescalate" the situation.
Yeah, you generally don't get to escalate a situation and then pull out a gun to solve it.
Bonus question: let's say Rosales had been armed . . . .
Rosales was armed, actually. Legally, and in his own driveway.
Man, that could have gotten out of hand. He clearly had a good reason to fear for his life--one wonders what would have happened to him had he used the gun.
QI in that case was crazy,
"Shoot, shovel, & shut up"?
Just sayin....
Might not work that well with a dead cop.
It might depend on what the rest of the cops thought of him...
Fifth Circuit: While the cooperation agreement made promises of immunity, it did not apply to "crimes of violence." Murder being a "crime of violence," the district court appropriately considered this conduct at sentencing.
One wonders whether their lawyer ask them before signing such a plea agreement whether they had ever committed a "crime of violence."
To me that reads like it was immunity in exchange for testimony against someone else, not a plea agreement.
The states get to regulate medical procedures, and given the obvious problems with some of the "gender-affirming care" (e.g., double mastectomies on teen girls), the judges here own some of these butcheries.
As for the standing issue when it comes to the loan forgiveness program--why in the world does MOHELA get to insert itself into the government-borrower relationship?
As a loan servicer, MoHELA it's already in the middle of the loan relationship.
As a servicer . . . . not as a party with the right to veto any altering of the loan arrangement--come on, you can do better than that.
The servicer is not claiming or asking for the right to veto any alteration whatsoever.
The claim is that the DOE didn't have the authority to make this particular alteration in the first instance.
That this particular alteration reduced the servicer's revenue is enough of an injury for standing.
Don't they get paid to service?
also, once the govt writes off a default, they get to keep anything they get out of the debtor.
It’s aside from the main issue but from the foreclosure case:
“Arkansas substantive law applies in this diversity case, see id., and under that law an insurer may rescind an insurance policy if the policyholder made a material misrepresentation on the application, even if the misrepresentation is unrelated to the loss sustained.”
I question the wisdom of this substantive rule. Especially because, if there’s no claim, the insurance company will pocket the money. But if there is a claim, suddenly they’re going to go Sherlock Holmes and try to find a mistake no matter how unrelated. Sets up a clear incentive to ask a bunch of irrelevant questions (“Who was your First Grade Art Teacher?)” then find a slip-up in the event they’re called upon to make a large claim. Which further makes the contract borderline illusory, insurance company is cashing checks for a policy they’ll refuse to pay out on.
Seems like the misrepresentation should have to be reasonably related. e.g. if they ask the insured if they store fireworks at home, they say no, and then their fireworks collection catches fire, burning the place down.
Feels like whatever Arkansas agency that regulates insurance oughta look at this--a shield is a sword in this case. The question is ambiguous, and it appears that what she says is technically true (i.e., actually true), so the refusal to pay is garbage.
The misrepresentation must still be material to the issuance of the policy.
I wondered this. Do they have actuarial statistics that people foreclosed on are more likely to have fires, mysterious or otherwise?
There might (emphasis on might) be a legitimate concern that someone facing foreclosure might be particularly likely to resort to insurance fraud by arson.
Where's the misrepresentation? Commencing proceedings that could lead to foreclosure is not the same thing as an actual foreclosure. For one thing, it could be mistakenly or wrongly initiated, and then quickly undone. If you want to know whether someone tried to foreclose on the applicant in the past five years, ask that question -- which certainly seems like it will sweep up every instance where there is an actual foreclosure, too.
"70-month sentence for a felon convicted of possessing two shotgun shells that he claimed both to have found and to believe were signal-gun flares. "
Dude just wasn't a left winger, too bad for him!
"Former lawyer who threw a Molotov cocktail at an NYPD vehicle during a police brutality protest has been sentenced to 15 months in prison"
By Brian Vitagliano and Alaa Elassar, CNN
Published 2:56 PM EST, Fri November 18, 2022
What was the basis of his thinking they were signal flares?
And signal flares can be every bit as lethal -- the Geneva Convention prohibits shooting people with them because the damage is so horrendous (I believe burning magnesium is part of the round).
So, other than USCG requirements for possession, why aren't they considered "firearms"?
Cause the flare doesn't count as a projectile.
I've seen a few cases involving felons who claimed they picked up a discarded gun because there were kids around and they didn't want the kids to get their hands on it. What else can you say when you're caught red-handed?
Same thing the lawyer profession says about doctors who run up to help in a car accident: let them die because there's no shortage of lawyers wanting to line their pockets with money from good samaritans who goof.
".. the Charlotte County Jail’s health care provider—however, had a policy not to honor prescriptions from other doctors. Rather than prescribing Ireland the potassium chloride that the hospital recommended, Dr. Gonzalez ordered a blood draw, which was scheduled for August 24, to find out whether Ireland was still suffering from hypokalemia."
This is bull bleep for a very different reason -- blood testing is regulated by state approved/licensed labs and then the Joint Commission on Accreditation and Medicaid/Medicare gets into it -- it's quite a bit of bureaucracy but the hospital blood test *itself* ought to have been accepted as valid. Perhaps having their own MD evaluate it and decide about ongoing treatment but lab tests are considered accurate regardless of who did them.
What I suspect is that the jail prison doctor wanted to bill Medicare for another blood test, possibly getting several hundred dollars from them, and this likely would be Medicare fraud. Moreso if it is a policy.
Potassium Chloride is sold in most grocery stores as a salt substitute ("salt" being Sodium Chloride). The Sodium & Potassium ions (in the blood) are electrolites which are necessary to keep the heart beating, and Tasers work by (essentially) messing up what the electrolytes are doing, i.e. data transmission on the neural network.
I don't pretend to know how low his Potassium was, i.e. how serious the particular level was, but when you have a licensed lab giving you a reading and a licensed MD saying what should be done, how do you nonchalantly ignore *both*?
And septic shock being missed?!? See: https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/sepsis/symptoms-causes/syc-20351214
I can see cops missing it, or confusing it for the DTs, but RNs?
This is medical malpractice -- folks ought to lose medical licenses for it...
But they did not follow the procedural formalities to make a medical malpractice claim.
"folks ought to lose medical licenses for it…"
Folks ought to find themselves on the other side of the bars over it...
Agreed.
And that happening a few times would solve a lot more problems than a mountain of litigation and arguing about QI.
And I'm serious about my suspicion of Medicaid Fraud.
Forget the Medicaid fraud, they should be in prison over what happened to the inmate in this case, but the government rarely prosecutes it's own agents.
So how many people went to the link to find out if the Parratt abstention applied in the murder conviction conspiracy case? I know I did.
Wow. Am I alone in sensing that John Ross must have been smoking something when he wrote this week's summary?
Short Circuit is a team effort. Every IJ employee might be smoking something different.
I don't care what they are smoking as long as they bring enough to share with the whole class.
Just the Ninth Circuit breezily noting that, though the U.S. Constitution protects some fundamental rights, "the right to use and occupy [your] own property" isn't among them.
Please tell me SCOTUS is going to smack the 9th on this one.
It's not quite as absurd as the summary suggests. The 'event' here is a landlord/tenant relationship, and how the government is regulating it.
If I'm reading this correctly, the tenant became un-evictable. Now the owners want the property back but can't have it. They sued LA, calling this a taking, and here the court said 'Nah' on the basis that the initial rental was voluntary, and that at-fault eviction was still possible.
it's close . . . . rental contracts have terms, so anything past the initial date is not voluntary . . . .
Ummm -- IANAA but I'd check my state's landlord/tenant law before coming to that conclusion.
I've heard something along the lines of that as long as the tenant is honoring the expired contract, it remains valid on a month-to-month basis and that you have to go through an eviction proceeding to remove said tenant.
Sure, but a "right to use and occupy [your] own property", generally, is clearly found in the 4th amendment right to be secure in your "houses, papers, and effects".
I'm not saying the landlords have a good case here. As a rental situation, there was clearly a contract at some point, and the contract should be enforced. But to say there is no such right is just nonsense.
Prohibiting owner occupancy has been part of rent control for a long time. Maybe not all ordinances do it, but I know some of them did 40 years ago. The Supreme Court has not intervened.
"the Tenth Circuit will not reconsider its decision that a religious school may not immediately appeal an interlocutory ruling denying summary judgment on the school's "ministerial exception" defense after it fired a chaplain who gave a presentation on race and faith"
Diagramming that sentence should be an extra credit question in English class.
Sadly, I don't think you'd find a teacher who could do it today.
On occasion I teach certification classes to graduate students seeking to become teachers and every time I have to throw a temper tantrum about how I expect "most" sentences to start with a capitol letter, "most" of them to end with some form of punctuation, and that I'd really rather have more than just one sentence in an essay.
Political correctness and grievances they are good at -- punctuation and grammar, not so much.
Your ongoing fantasies about being a teacher, permitted to instruct students, are one of the more amusing lunacies among these comments. It's an interesting way to characterise sitting on a park bench mumbling nonsense at the voices in your head and occasionally shouting and shaking your fist at the sky-people.
I've never seen that in my teaching evaluations -- at least not yet...
That's because they aren't teaching evaluations, they're psychiatric reports.
Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce. I really don't see how that gives it the power to regulate things that at one point passed through interstate commerce but aren't currently doing so.
Claiming the power to forever regulate things because they once travelled in interstate commerce is kind of like claiming the power to forever search someone because they once crossed the border.
If I am not mistaken, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) was based on the fact that Ollie's Diner used catchup which had traveled in interstate commerce and hence Ollie's Diner had to let Black patrons eat in the dining room so as to preserve the interstate commerce of catchup. Or to regulate it. Or something.
While I like the outcome of the case, I still considered the rationale to be bullbleep.
Same thing here -- preventing felons from possessing a couple of shotgun shells would (possibly) affect interstate commerce in shotgun shells because two less would be shipped interstate to replace the two possessed by the felon.
then you would not be Dr. Ed.
Since you are Dr. Ed, you are mistaken.
"...viewed in isolation, the volume of food purchased by Ollie's Barbecue from sources supplied from out of state was insignificant when compared with the total foodstuffs moving in commerce."
-- Page 379 U. S. 301
I read the 10th Circuit's decision in the Bledsoe case and then looked around for more, and there's one huge question, which is motive.
Why did all these cops and attorneys conspire to convict Floyd Bledsoe rather than Tom Bledsoe, whom they knew to be guilty? Why did Bledsoe's parents provide an alibi for their son Tom that would help to inculpate their son Floyd? There is no indication that Tom had friends on the force, or that Floyd had pissed off some important people, or any other of the usual reasons for a cover-up and conspiracy like this.
The suggested motive is in footnote 5: the prosecutor had misappropriated funds before and was indebted to the murderer's attorney.
Yes, but why would Tom's attorney be so concerned to get Tom off that he'd engaged in a conspiracy like this? You'd think that if the prosecutor owed him, he'd reserve the obligation for a better case.
I guess he simply doesn't want to lose a case and a case where your client has repeatedly confessed to the crime is the best case to use a "free win" coupon.
Footnote #5 "At this point, the motive for the scheme is unclear, but one theory alleged by Bledsoe is that the prosecutor Jim Vanderbilt—another named defendant who is not involved in this appeal—was indebted to [Tom's Attorney] Hayes for helping Vanderbilt “avoid . . . legal exposure for Vanderbilt’s appropriation of county funds for personal use.”
IANAA but 5 years seems like a sweet deal for rape & murder of a child, which makes me think this was more an attempt to protect Tom and make the whole mess go away than to maliciously convict Floyd. Footnote #4 stated that Attorney Hayes was a party to the lawsuit but not the appeal and it would be interesting to see what that meant, and if he still has his bar card. I somehow suspect that he might not...
"Nice Trade Dress."
"Thanks, it has POCKETS"
"in any event, Paxton can't be made to testify because the challengers could subpoena his subordinates instead". Whatever happened to no man being above the law?
Sovereign immunity. They tried to force him to testify before affirming they had jurisdiction. They also tried portray it as testimony from a "witness" even though he's the defendant, which doesn't really work. The "subordinates" bit is just part of it, but the court isn't supposed to compel testimony from high-ranking officials without a very good reason. Instead, they get a subordinate from the office.
Sounds like the state, retreating back to its pre-war boundaries, surrendered after a seven-month war, and the plaintiffs are receiving reparations.
Uhh, there was a Supreme Court decision on the Uniformity Clause less than six months ago. Maybe the dear editors didn't get far into it, but it literally began with the sentence: "The Bankruptcy Clause empowers Congress to establish 'uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.'"
I didn't know that a lawyer could “waived appellate review” by writing a really bad appellate brief. The opinion cites U.S. v. Fisher (805 F.3d 982), where one of the two claims raised on appeal was ruled to have been waived because it was inadequately briefed as well, as because it wasn't raised in the district court. It also cites Utah Environmental Congress v. Bosworth, Phillips v. Calhoun, United States v. Lamirand, and Exum v. United States Olympic Committee, each of which contain footnotes mentioning specific arguments that the appeals court declined to address because they hadn't been adequately argued. But this appears to be the first time an appeals brief hasn't presented any argument with sufficient clarity for the court to consider it.
If my internet skills are working today, the lawyers responsible for this brief are Marshall Jason Ray and A. Blair Dunn, both with offices in Albuquerque, NM.