The Volokh Conspiracy
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Two Commentaries on the Fifth Circuit's Texas Social Media Law Decision
I'm still trying to fully digest the Netchoice v. Paxton opinions (I've been slammed with several things the last few weeks, including an interesting and unexpected development which I hope to blog about in some detail next month). But for now, I thought I'd pass along two commentaries from top scholars on the subject, one entirely critical from Prof. Genevieve Lakier (Chicago) and one that's mostly critical from Prof. Alan Rozenshtein (Minnesota). Here's the opening of Prof. Lakier's (which is a Twitter thread):
There has been a lot of discussion about the opinion the Fifth Circuit released last Friday upholding Texas's new social media law. Lots of people have criticized the decision for getting the law wrong.
Indeed, the opinion engages in an unapologetic, dramatic, sometimes bizarre rereading of precedents we thought we knew. For First Amendment lawyers—well, for me—reading it feels like entering the upside down. But why exactly?
In this thread, I highlight a few of the really significant departures the opinion makes from established precedent. I focus on the non-discrimination provisions in the law because there's more (much more!) than enough there for a thread.
And an excerpt from Prof. Rozenshtein's:
As someone who has argued for the constitutionality (and indeed desirability) of some government regulation of platform content moderation, I was hoping that the first judicial decision upholding such regulation would be a thoughtful and measured approach to what is indisputably a hard, even wicked, problem.
Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit's decision, written by Judge Andrew Oldham, is decidedly not that. Although not without its good points, it is largely a crude hack-and-slash job that misstates the facts and the law and ignores the proper role of an intermediate court, all in a sneering tone that pretends that those who disagree with it are either stupid or evil. It's an extreme example of First Amendment absolutism: the insistence that the First Amendment has either nothing to do with content moderation or that it provides maximum constitutional protections to such practices. The opinion deserves to be swiftly overruled, either by the full Fifth Circuit or by the Supreme Court.
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"The opinion deserves to be swiftly overruled, either by the full Fifth Circuit or by the Supreme Court."
If I'm on either court I don't rush the case. We're talking about the fringes of the First Amendment here. If the law said something like George Soros can't air his documentary about the benefits of gay frogs, then it would hit close to the core and would deserve expedited review. The big players are not closely held corporations or explicitly political organizations and the conduct being restricted is not official corporate speech. Let the case go through the normal appeals process and treat the law as a valuable experiment in the meantime.
Tone policing is not a legal argument.
Sure it is. A snarky, spiteful opinion suggests bias and a lack of confidence on the part of its author. It's not proof, but a pretty good indicator.
Still wondering why Heart of Atlanta can’t turn their guest policy into a live video performance and claim First Amendment protection to make their live video with whomever they please.
If YouTube and Facebook can claim discrimination is a part of a creative work product, then everyone should be able to make the same claim by live-streaming whatever they want to do.
Think how many other laws can also be avoided that way! Every requirement. No more charging sales tax because, under the Facebook First Amendment, government can’t make you create a video with content showing paying sales tax.
I believe I already answered your question.
Then Facebook can’t do it either and Netchoice loses and Texas and Florida win.
One standard, not a separate standard where Facebook and YouTube get to claim their discrimination is speech and others can’t.
Facebook and YouTube are engaged in speech. Pure speech. Heart of Atlanta is not. If Heart of Atlanta were making a movie about a hotel rather than running a hotel, then it could indeed discriminate based on race.
Man, can I come over and join in the hotboxing of your mom's basement? Whatever it is that you're trying to say can only have come from an extremely augmented mental state.
IANAL and maybe that is why this seems about as transparent as the Emperor's new clothes.
One of the nice arguments from the decision was that of the telegraph companies and the legal issues from the 1800's.
To understand the telegraph companies back then, you need to understand that it was a revolutionary technology that introduced many new legal complications. People would give a telegraph operator a message. That operator would (on occasion) edit and translate the message for transmission. An operator on the other side would translate it again, before handing it over. And importantly, they did not have to send anything and everything. In fact "in a suit to recover the statutory penalty for a failure to transmit, under the Indiana statute, it has been held, that though a telegraph company is not bound to transmit a message couched in indecent, obscene or filthy language, the fact that the company's agent believed the object of the message immoral, is no excuse for failing to transmit"
(https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=3126&context=penn_law_review)
I find that language, from a law review in 1884, enlightening, especially in the context of today's laws.
Now arguably, a telegraph company at the time held similar "free speech" rights that current social media companies do today. They both hold themselves out to the public in general, as willing to transmit almost any message (unlike newspapers or journals who will not transmit anything submitted to them). The telegraph operator could be said to provide an editing function, especially as since they could deny to send certain messages, based on obscenity (not to mention the whole translation thing). And there was substantial social concern over how to regulate this new, powerful technology. Admittedly people "could" just use the US mail or set up their own telegraph network. But Western Union was simply so much more efficient (like Twitter or Facebook today, compared to trying to e-mail people) that it was revolutionary.
Indeed, Western Union, by virtue of its market dominance initially used its power to favor its media partners (and not send messages of its media partners competitors) while also not sending messages critical of Western Union (and supposedly using its power to affect elections).
Yet despite all this, Western Union was declared a "common carrier" and mandated to carry all messages, without discrimination (aside from...interestingly enough...a message couched in indecent, obscene or filthy language).
Western Union, at the time, would appear to have far stronger free speech rights, in terms of publication, than the social media companies do today. Literally every message was hand translated by a WU operator, then translated again, then printed out. Editorial decisions were made before hand on what to send and what not to. Yet...WU and the telegraph companies were still deemed common carriers.
Which leads us to today. The social media companies hold themselves out as transmitting whatever is posted, to whoever wants to post it, without delay, without editing (in 99.9% of cases). No real human oversight. Not unlike Western Union...just show up and transmit..no problem. (Even if they had human oversight)
This is very different from classic publishers which curate a selected number of articles, videos, etc. Everything sent in is definitively NOT published by the classic publishers (NYT, Fox News, Penguin Books, etc). And classic publishers hold themselves out as such....no one expects them to publish everything they get. But if you sign up for Twitter...you expect your post to go out. Like you expect WU to send your telegraph. Because that's how the companies hold themselves. That is their "business".
Because of that, it seems clear to me that the social media companies are not "publishers" for first amendment concerns, but actually resemble communications companies (like WU). And thus the laws regulating them as communications companies...like the telegraph companies...are appropriate.
Thanks for the history. Have you ever read The Victorian Internet? It's a short fascinating book, light on the legal details you mention, IIRC. For instance, stockbrokers and rich people resented "having to" install ticker tape machines in their houses, and ship owners resented getting telegrams from, say, Florida, that their ship had been sighted and would be arriving in 7 ... 10 ... 12 days; they preferred only knowing when it was visible locally.
The opinion shot itself in the foot by being snide and extreme. The comparison of social media to telegraphs and telephones is pretty simplistic and fails to capture what's really the whole point of them: curation. Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, really all of them work by selecting -- based on viewpoint -- which content to feature for which users. The whole experience is designed around viewpoint discrimination. The opinion missed that entirely.
The part of the opinion that was good, and probably could have stood alone effectively, was the part arguing that a pre-enforcement facial challenge isn't appropriate here. Just say that, leave the snark out, and let the substantive arguments come later in as-applied challenges. But since they went to the substance and missed, the dissent -- which gets that part right -- ends up coming across as the more reasoned opinion.
Some elements of the social media platforms are like telephones, places where there is no curation anyway. If I post a comment on my Facebook timeline, and someone else actively goes to read my timeline, they should see my comment there. That part could probably be regulated in a common-carrier style, exactly because it isn't being curated anyway. But it's entirely up to Facebook ('s algorithms) whether that comment appears in your feed. That curation is First Amendment protected. The government can't regulate how Facebook decides to select curated feed content.
This is the sort of distinction that could play out in as-applied cases, if the Fifth Circuit hasn't already poisoned the argument.
The "featuring" argument (selecting which content to feature) is certainly an interesting argument. But I think it fails on two levels.
1. "Featuring" does not convert the primary business (communications) to publishing.
2. The decision did not regulate "featuring."
Let's illustrate point 1 with the original Telegraph company example, then several others. Imagine the telegraph company prominently posts in each telegraph office the first telegraph received. It has now "featured" a telegraph. One has been selected prominently for the local area. They have every right to do so. But that doesn't convert the entire business to a publisher, with the right to select which content to send and what not to send.
Likewise, with the social media companies, featuring certain items doesn't mean they can ban certain other items from being sent. (Now, yes, there's a grey area here where they can effectively "shadow ban" some items...make them unfindable. That would be a violation.) But merely not featuring them would not be a violation, and importantly the decision did not indicate it would be.
Using other examples of "featuring" are common across industries. Bookstores select and feature certain items up front. That doesn't make them a publisher. Cigarette manufacturers prominently advertise their product on the package (with tiny writing indicating the warnings). That doesn't mean that cigarette manufacturers are suddenly publishers, and that their products and packaging are immune to interference by the government.
That's why, while an interesting argument, it does appear to fail. "Featuring" is secondary to the primary business of communications.
Social media companies do not "send" anything at all. That's why they're nothing like telegraphs. They display content.
No difference from a telephone company. A telephone company could equally well provide free service in exchange for receiving ads, and choose to transmit the messages that tend to result in people paying attention to ads and not those that don’t, or those according with its policies and not those that don’t. It could make its will and not the will of its customers more relevant to whether messages get transmitted or not.
Such a business model would be illegal. But then why wouldn’t the law making it illegal be equally unconstitutional?
Maybe it would be. Why do you think otherwise?
If you operate the only warf, you don’t have to represent that your warf is open to the general public. This tends to suggest that when a monopoly or oligoppoly situation is involved, affected by the punlic interest is the sole criterion.
Completely agree 19th century telegraph companies, which used human operators who made editiorial decisions, had at least as much claim to be providing curated content as today’s social media companies.
Did telegraph companies make such an argument? Did they even want to do so?
And given that at the time the 1A didn't even apply to the states, who were doing most of the regulating of the era, would that even have been relevant?
Social media companies do not do any such thing, no matter how many times people pretend otherwise.
Of course, obscenity isn't constitutionally protected, so even if they had full 1A rights it wouldn't have been relevant.
First the govt colluding with any private digital bulletin board (and that is all the social media companies are) should be struck down. Second, while FB has the right to censor any customer's content..the pesky CRA of 64 does come into play. If FB censoring has a disparate impact on one race, ethnicity, religion, they they are guilty of discrimination. I would bet if FB was forced to segment who they are censoring it would have a disparate impact on say catholics or Irish or Italian...see my point? FB and Twitter also censor based on tribe.."marginalized" groups are "protected" and can also be allowed to engage in content that "non margianlized groupd" get kicked off for. Again a CRA violation.
FB needs to submit to free speech. If not, their servers should be impounded, and management replaced.