The Volokh Conspiracy
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House Passes Electoral Count Act Reform Bill
The bill is similar to that drafted by a bipartisan group of senators. Either version, or a reconciliation between the two, would be a major step forward relative to the status quo.

Yesterday, the House of Representatives passed a bill to reform the Electoral Count Act (ECA), a vague 1887 law whose loopholes Donald Trump tried to exploit to overturn the results of the 2020 election, and which could potentially be abused by unscrupulous politicians in future elections. The House bill is similar to, but goes somewhat further than a recent proposal developed by a bipartisan group of senators.
Either version of the bill would be a huge step forward relative to the status quo.
In a July post, building on the work of Andy Craig of the Cato Institute (a leading expert on ECA reform), I summarized the three main goals a reform bill achieve:
1. Preventing state governments from, in effect, changing the rules after election day, in order to reverse election results they don't like.
2. Preventing Congress from throwing out electoral votes for bogus reasons (as some GOP members of Congress sought to do after the 2020 election).
3. Making it more clear that the Vice-President does not have the power to invalidate electoral votes (a step then-VP Mike Pence rightly refused to take in January 2021, despite the urging of Donald Trump).
The House and Senate proposals both include major improvements on all three points. In a recent post at the Cato website, Andy Craig provides a helpful summary of the similarities and differences between the two bills, concluding that the House version is actually somewhat stronger:
The two bills are broadly similar in most respects, but with some key differences that will have to be reconciled. It is likely some of these changes will be reflected in amendments made to the Senate's bill, with amendments expected to bring the two closer together in at least some respects.
Broadly speaking, the new House bill reflects a more aggressive approach to constraining the various actors involved in the presidential election process: state legislatures, state governors and executive branch officials, the National Archives, the vice president, and Congress. In some respects, that makes it a more conservative and originalist bill, keen to limit the discretion of political actors in what is supposed to be a mandatory and fundamentally non‐discretionary constitutional process. To do this, PERA provides more specific and concrete limits in the law itself, and it also provides a somewhat more expansive role for the federal courts in enforcing those provisions.
Prominent election law scholar Derek Muller, who was part of a cross-ideological group of experts who endorsed and helped develop the Senate version, offers some potential reservations about one provision of the House bill, which creates a new legal cause of action challenging state officials' refusals to "tabulate" the vote of any person "who is entitled to vote under Federal law or is otherwise qualified to vote." But, as he emphasizes this part of the proposal could easily be severed from the rest of the bill. If it is included, its possible shortcomings strike me as a small price to pay for the major progress the bill makes on other fronts.
Unfortunately, support for the House bill has been more polarized between the parties, than that for the Senate version. While the latter has already been co-sponsored by ten GOP senators (enough to break any filibuster), only 9 Republicans joined 220 Democrats in supporting the former. This divergence may reflect House Republicans' greater subservience to Donald Trump as compared to their Senate colleagues - a difference reflected in the former's vastly greater support for his efforts to overturn the 2020 election, when 147 House Republicans voted to disqualify electoral votes from swing states, compared to only 7 senators). But it is also possible that many of the House Republicans who rejected the House ECA reform bill will ultimately support a reconciliation bill closer to the Senate version.
Partisan politics, notwithstanding, there is a high likelihood that some version of the bill will pass both houses before the end of the year. That's progress worth applauding. ECA reform will not fix all the problems that beset American democracy. But it can close some dangerous loopholes that were revealed in 2020.
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"Preventing Congress from throwing out electoral votes for bogus reasons (as some GOP members of Congress sought to do after the 2020 election)" he says. Bogus reasons such as the fact that the votes, count, and electors were FRAUDULENT as is your #PedoHitler president?
Dems have tried this too.
How do you smooth out the ride in a car that has square wheels? You can put on bigger tires, improve the suspension, put in cushier seats. But it will always be a bumpy ride.
As an engineer that makes my head hurt. If you had square wheels on a car, making them bigger would make it worse; The chordal deviation from round would scale up with the size of the wheels.
If they were small square wheels, the bumps would be small, and more frequent, and more easily filtered out by the suspension.
Or you design a "floating chuck" axle-to-wheel setup so that the axle remains at constant height - basically the reverse design to that employed to drill square holes.
Does it clarify that according to the constitution that only the State Legislatures can create or alter election rules or does it fortify the ability of partisan elected and unelected officials to make up their own rules while voting is under way?
These are good things. Such operations should be obvious and out in the open and out of the hands of inevitably partisan, and therefore hacky, federal politicians.
Like constitutional amendments, it shoud be obvious to all, or it is invalid, and taken out of the hands of devious, motivated tricksters.
What about changing rules once voting has commenced?
Can that still happen?
Just the tmrules about when they're counting, who's allowed to observe and any waivers of custody and sequestration necessary to get the leftist elected. You know, blue politics in a nutshell, full endorsed by Somin.
I would hope so. As I've explained to Brett Bellmore repeatedly, that has happened in every single election since vertebrate life emerged from the oceans. In every one of those elections, there have been precincts that run out of ballots, power outages that prevent machines from working, election workers who forgot their keys so their polling places were delayed in opening, whatever. In every one of those, courts have fashioned equitable remedies (which usually involved extending the hours of voting at the affected precincts). All after voting had started. Nobody ever thought this was a problem, let alone "unconstitutional," until Trump lost the 2020 election.
In 2020, governors, elections officials, and courts all made alterations to election procedures to accommodate a once-in-a-century pandemic. Those changes were done in blue and red states, by Democratic and Republican officials. (For example: https://www.texastribune.org/2020/05/28/texas-2020-early-voting-greg-abbott-coronavirus/ ) Nobody suggested this was a problem, let alone "unconstitutional," except when done by Democratic officials.
If they were an accurate and exhaustive description, it would be a good thing. I think it leaves some things out, and is a bit sketchy in some respects, such as handing to state Governors the power to certify the EC votes for a state regardless of who the state legislature may have assigned that task to.
And I'm really troubled, (See below.) by their attempt to bypass the procedure specified in the 12th amendment:
"The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice."
They purport to avoid its application by reducing the total of EC votes appointed by however many electors they vote to disqualify. I think this is is a constitutional violation.
Bully for you. I think it's not.
No one of any branch should change the voting rules after voting commences. If something is busted, that sucks, but fix it next time. The potential for hacks to sway things to benefit themselves is too great.
The Holy Right to Vote Uber Alles is blabber for partisan hackery of both sides, smoke and mirrors to distract you while motivated evil occurs.
Notice how this election fortification bill doesn't forbid rule changes after voting commences.
I guess they still want to be able to fortify the election if they see the early voting going the wrong way.
The constitution, of course, says nothing of the kind.
Whose comment is closer to what the constitution says? Yours or mine?
Article I Legislative Branch
Section 4 Congress
Clause 1 Elections Clause
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
You're not even quoting the right part of the constitution, so that's a negative for you. The one actually relevant to this discussion is
Article II Executive Branch
Section 1
Paragraph 2
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress
And, does it say what you said? No. It says that the legislature shall direct the manner of appointing electors. No Court to consider that has ever interpreted it to mean that a state legislature must act as an elections board and micromanage elections. The state legislature decides the manner: i.e., popular vote, direct selection by the legislature, etc. Whether one can vote absentee as of right or only with an excuse is something a legislature can determine, of course, but it isn't of constitutional significance. And at no time in history was it ever suggested that the constitution means that the other branches of state government were excluded from the process — that the governor couldn't veto such a law, or that a court couldn't interpret it if a dispute arose.
They're talking about the Double Secret Constitution.
"2. Preventing Congress from throwing out electoral votes for bogus reasons (as some GOP members of Congress sought to do after the 2020 election)."
Unfortunately, one of the changes in the House version, from the Senate bipartisan bill, was to enable throwing out electoral votes for bogus reasons.
It's got a finite list of basis for challenging EC votes, and one of them is that an EC delegate or the candidate they're voting for is disqualified under Section 3 of the 14th amendment. The statute doesn't, mind you, require any kind of conviction to impose this, it just requires members of Congress to claim that they're disqualified, and if a third so claim, a majority vote will delete the EC vote.
And, interestingly, (And of dubious constitutionality!) the statute states that the total of EC votes is reduced by the votes so disqualified, thus avoiding invoking the Constitutional process for when nobody gets an absolute majority of EC votes.
So, this allows a majority of members of Congress to prevent the winner of an EC majority from taking office, and instead hand the win to the loser. Without anything more than a vote of Congress, no court convictions of relevant offenses. And bypassing the actual constitutional process for resolving such controversies.
It's a roadmap for stealing Presidential elections, built right into the statute.
That's why the Democrats and Establishment Republicans are on board with this.
And I guarantee you that of this process was used to take the election away from say a DeSantis or Trump in 2024 the Democrat bootlickers will wet themselves with giddiness.
First, I continue to doubt that Trump will run in 2024. I think there will be number of Republicans running and there is no guarantee that DeSantis will be the nominee.
I'd put it at about 50-50 him running; He's getting up there in years, but he REALLY wants the validation of being reelected after losing to Biden.
But they'd go after DeSantis the same way, I'm pretty sure, or any other Republican nominee who wasn't a Romney style Uniparty candidate.
I'm going to strangely agree with Brett here: "but he REALLY wants the validation of being reelected after losing to Biden".
The reasons the TFG shouldn't run are legion, but his ego is big enough to overrule them all. Because TFG's decisions aren't about what's good for the country, they're about his ego.
Ego works both ways, Trump wants the validation of beating Biden, but he could lose. What more he could lose in the nomination process. I believe he will way the options, suck as much money as he can from the system, claim it is rigged against him and either not run or drop out.
Ego prevents him from thinking he could lose, though. That's why he was so gullible when sycophants were telling him the election was stolen; Because he didn't think HE could really have lost to a nonentity like Biden.
I expect him to run unless either medical misadventure prevents it, or Millennia talks some sense into him. Though the clever thing would be to pretend he was going to run right up until the last minute, and then throw his weight behind DeSantis.
This is not necessarily true. There are stories from his presidency where he was dissuaded from performing certain actions by advisors he trusts. If he can be convinced that a loss will be devastating to his influence, and that he is not a lock to beat Biden, then yeah, I think he will sit it out.
'But they’d go after DeSantis the same way,'
If you think DeSantis is just as much a corrupt fraudster and national security risk as Trump is, don't vote for him.
I don't. But I do think the criteria here isn't "corrupt fraudster and national security risk", it's "not a reliable member of the uniparty".
I can see Congress throwing out votes by disqualified electors – or cast by them for disqualified candidates.
But then, it was my understanding that (contrary to my own reactionary attitude), a bunch of dumb Congress members shouldn’t be making decisions of such import, and that the courts should be deciding instead.
What happened to this talking point about the untrustworthiness of Congress, and the need to limit their powers in deciding election controversies, if we allow this truly major exception?
Straining at a gnat, and swallowing a camel.
You think that an individual's constitutional ineligibility for his office is a "bogus" reason not to count his vote?
That's in both the House and Senate versions, and what's dubious about not counting an ineligible elector as having been appointed? True, the 12th amendment doesn't explicitly say "a majority of the whole number of Electors validly appointed," but that's implicit. Otherwise a state that is entitled to 12 electoral votes could appoint 15 people, and all of them would count towards that tally.
Which "actual constitutional process" is that? There is no possible textual or logical justification for requiring a court conviction for operation of the 14th amendment disqualification process. It was ratified three years after the civil war, for the express purpose of disqualifying the southern traitors. But by 1868, everyone knew that there weren't going to be mass trials of those people. (And in case there was any doubt about that, Johnson extended blanket clemency to them at the end of that year — and yet, 4 years later, in 1872, Congress removed the 14th amendment disability from the traitors — something that would've been unnecessary if a criminal conviction were required).
The actual constitutional process is the vote by House delegation if nobody gets a majority of Electors. They'd reduce the total of electors by the number disqualified in order to claim that the losing candidate had a majority of Electors, rather than just a majority of remaining Electors.
And the point I keep hammering on is that you can get away with some pretty sketchy moves if you've just won a Civil war, you can get away with pulling some crap that it would be utter madness to attempt under normal circumstances.
Democrats have not just won a Civil war, do not have half the nation under military occupation. And they'd be well advised not to act is if they had and did.
Democrats have not just won a Civil war, do not have half the nation under military occupation. And they’d be well advised not to act is if they had and did.
Well this isn't text at all. It's more a threat based on some handwaiving at history.
It's more in the way of heartfelt advice: Don't think you can get away with outrages that will piss off beyond all recognition half the country, just because they're arguably technically legal. The Republicans pulled some stunts during Reconstruction that would START a civil war if anybody tried them without first winning one.
Forcing state legislatures to ratify amendments at gunpoint, for instance. There's Reconstruction era precedent for doing that, do you think that means you could get away with trying it today?
Disqualifying electors to steal a Presidential election would be just as explosive.
I already addressed this above, but the reason criminal convictions were unnecessary post war under section 3 was because other official documentation existed identifying who exactly had engaged in insurrection in a large majority of cases. Parole records of surrendered Confederate army soldiers, recorded oaths of office/allegiance by Confederate government officials. There was no need for mass trials because they had already been identified and disqualified. Any trial would have been about punishment/accountability.
And while it may be colloquially convenient to call the Civil War-era rebels “traitors”, there’s a reason the Constitution carefully identifies the term. That principle argues against anything short of a criminal conviction (in normal times) triggering section 3 disqualification.
I note that commenters continue their anal-retentive concerns about the election process. In America our election process is conducted as a dispersed yet integrated process. For most people election will come up every two years with 2 to 4 election processes in that year, including primaries and elections. So, for a two year, 730 day period about 4 days are election days or less than one percent of the days. And yet the standard for those 4 days is expected to be perfection. If a pop-up coffee shop were open 4 days every two years would you have the same standards.
The fact is the dispersed, yet integrated process of voting prevents large scale cheating. Little anomalies occur every election, noise in the signal but not affecting the signal. No one cared about the noise until 2020 when Trump lost. Note that no one is questioning any other elections for different years or different candidates. Go back through the years and see that there were also anomalies. Then tell me 2020 was different.
Why do you say only four days when we have election seasons not days.
Voting goes on for weeks and months, surely you know this.
Because the bulk of the work is done on election day and possibly a few days after that. That is also the period when you have the largest number of limited trained staffer. Early voting usually involves a much smaller better trained group. The average number of early voting days is 23 so again in a two-year period with 4 election days (spring primary/election, fall primary election) you are talking 92 days out of 730 or about 13% of the days in the period. Expecting perfection is unreasonable.
I would also like to add that the voter cast a ballot 2 to 4 times in the 730 days period and so it is a bit ridiculous to question why they cannot be perfect in its completion and delivery.
Don't forget the week to count if it's in a close election and Democrats are counting.
I love your attitude, "it's the people in government doing the work, lower your expectations, p.s. also let them control all your healthcare it will be super great!"
I just read an article in my morning paper Wisconsin State Journal, Friday 9/23 talking about Republican controlled states that refuse to allow any processing of mail-in ballots until election day. This lengthens the counting process and result in longer times for vote counts. Florida which does allow preprocessing counted all their votes, mail-in and on-site in one day. Other states should follow this model.
The GOP in PA (and elsewhere IIRC) explicitly required that walk-in ballots be counted before mailed-in ballots so that it would look as through Trump were winning early and a late swing to the Democrats would look suspicious. And lo! It happened, and hysterical schneeflocken reacted as intended/predicted
No offense, but your reasoning is quite bizarre. What do the 638 non-election days have to do with the performance expectations of the 92 election days? What’s special about a two year window?
The behavior of government workers on non-election days has nothing to do with the behavior of government workers on election days.
How dare one expect a first world country to have good & secure elections. Besides, it's a very important 92 days, why not expect them to be extra good just those 92 days? No one expects government workers to even be competent the remaining 632 days. Why can't they step it up when everyone is watching?
Because they're government workers that's why.
Let me try again. I chose a two-year period because most election are on a two-year period. The Presidential year and the midterms. Most state and local will key off these major elections for other offices. My second point has to do with the frequency with which people do tasks. Generally speaking, people are at their best for tasks done daily or weekly. It is therefore not unexpected for work that represent 13% of job to be harder and more prone to small errors. Note that for the voter you are talking about task they do about 0.5% of the days in a two-year period. So, it is unreasonable to suggest that they should not make the small errors. My final point is that to date we have not seen major problems with voting and that people casting doubt are instead point at minor problem, the noise in the signal. There is no evidence that the signal itself is compromised.
Bridge builders don’t build bridges every day.
Rockets don’t launch every day.
Heart and brain surgeons don’t operate on hearts and brains every day.
Extrapolate your reasoning onto those tasks. Do you not expect your bridge to be safe, or your surgeon to be error-free, and are rocket launch failures tolerated?
There was a ballot harvester and vote buyer literally on video buying ballots and bragging about breaking the law in MN. Literally dead to rights.
No one did nothing. Don’t give me this bullshit about “major problems”. There’s tons of evidence, large and small. Since the people in power benefit from these and this is now baked into their political system there will never be a full accounting.
Further here are a few pieces of data that strongly suggest the signal is compromised:
1.) Incumbency rates are near or above 90% for federal elections.
2.) The will of the people is irrelevant 90% of the time when it comes to legislation being passed.
BTW - Getting this passed is good and hopefully the Senate will also approve the bill.
Directly electing a head of government is always a bad idea, made even worse when he/she is also head of state. The only thing that ameliorates the normally bad outcomes from this situation in nearly every nation are a combination of factors unique to the US. A federal system with states sharing power, the electoral college and a senate representing the states might be included in these factors.
I say all this because the inherent problem in our constitutional system is presidentialism. For over a long time, this was less of an issue because presidential elections were not decided by the voters of each state. Over time there has been a steady shift toward democratizing the election. Now that is is pretty much a done deal, Congress has to step in with laws like this to try to hold things together with spit, baling wire and duct tape.
But as I said, the true problem is a constitutional one. Presidentialism, is an extremely flawed form of government. There is literally no research which shows anything other than that it is ineffective. Global observations ought to also give us an indication of how badly this system works when the head of government is directly elected. They accrue far greater power than their legislatures to the point of totally eclipsing the legislature or turning it into a rubber stamp for whatever he/she wants.
The failure rate for presidential forms of government exceeds all other types including semi-presidential (France for example) and/or parliamentary (European nations for example).
Trying to keep this worst of all possible types of government from failing is really no solution. It is time we rethink things. But honestly, this is not difficult. And the solution can be so constructed as to help kill a number of “birds” with the same “stone”.
We can end the national calamity that is the quadrennial presidential election, depoliticize and remove the courts even further from the realm of politics, separate the roles of head of state and head of government and much more.
How, one might ask?
1. Keep the president as head of state but his electors are actually chosen only by state legislatures, not voters
2. Turn the House into a parliament which chooses a head of government to execute the laws.
3. Define the role of head of state to grant pardons, nominate judges, perform ceremonial functions, etc
Why?
The reasons ought to be obvious given the befuddled Joe Biden and the megalomaniacal Donald Trump. But really, it is deeper than these two idiots. The problem is the office itself. The presidency has become a dangerously powerful office with far too much power (see: Covid, eg) which nearly 50 years ago was labeled the “imperial presidency” by Arthur Schlesinger. Since then, it has amassed even more powers and there are no signs this trend will stop.
Suggested amendment for the head of state:
The Head of State
A. The President of the United States shall be the head of state of the United States. He shall hold his office during one term of ten years.
B. The President shall be elected, as follows:
1. The Legislature of each state shall appoint a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the state may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.
2. The electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice.
3. The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the United States.
4. No person except a natural born citizen shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States.
5. The President shall not be a member of Congress or of the legislature of any state nor shall the President hold any other office of profit or trust of the United States or any of the several states for a period of five years before his election.
C. The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.
D. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."
E. Duties of the President of the United States
1. The President shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.
2. The President shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint judges of the Supreme and inferior Courts and councilors of the Constitutional Council.
3. The President shall be commander in chief of the defense forces of the United States, and of the organized militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States. The command of the defense forces of the United States shall be exercised by the head of government.
4. The President may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper.
5. The President shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers and heads of state.
6. The President shall commission all the officers of the United States.
7. The President shall recognize individuals or groups for extraordinary achievement and acts of bravery and heroism.
F. The President and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, other high crimes and misdemeanors, or other behavior that renders them unfit for office.
G. Whenever the President transmits to the Head of Government his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the President of the Senate as Acting President.
H. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the President of the Senate until a new President is chosen.
Suggested amendment for the President of the Senate
The President of the Senate shall be chosen by the executive authorities of the several states before noon on the third day of January in the years in which a new class of Senators is chosen but following the election of Representatives. Within these time limits, voting shall be by ballot and shall continue until one person shall have attained a majority of the votes. Ballots shall be tabulated by a judge of the Supreme Court or any inferior court in the presence of the Senate.
Suggested amendment for the head of government
The Head of Government
A. The House of Representatives shall choose from among its members the principle officer and such principle officers of each of the executive departments as shall execute the laws of the United States. No individual shall hold the principle office of two executive departments simultaneously nor shall the principle officer hold any other appointed office.
B. The principle officer chosen by the House of Representatives to execute the laws of the United States shall be the head of government.
C. Duties of the head of government
1. The head of government shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
2. The head of government shall give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.
3. The head of government shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators concur.
4. The head of government shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the Head of Government alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.
5. The head of government may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices.
D. The head of government shall remain in office during the pleasure of the House of Representatives and subject to the limits of all Representatives to remain in office.
While we are at it, SCOTUS and the administration of justice:
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court consisting of no more than nine judges who shall serve no more than thirty years, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall, for the thirty-year duration of their term, hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
The judges of the Supreme Court shall appoint the officer in charge of executing the administration of justice for the United States. The officer in charge of executing the administration of justice shall hold his office during one term of ten years.
Wat you are talking about is a complete revision of the US governmental system and will never happen. The rise of Presidential power is happening and should be of concern to all. The cause of the problem is that Congress is failing to do its job and legislate. A far simpler solution is to have Congress step-up and do its job. That requires more centrist moderate members.
What we have now is left and right extremist who grid-lock the Congress. People then look for a President who will address issues by EOs.
I wouldn't say it will NEVER happen. Nothing is forever, and our Constitution is unusually old. I'd bet good money on the Constitution not surviving to see its third century.
I'll take that bet.
I don't know why you guys fail to see that we ARE the greatest country in the history of recorded mankind.
Why would we want to drastically change our form of govt?
Just because you guys disapprove of guys getting married and having butt sex?!?
Because some people think we should have a different medical payment system?!?
Because some people don't want religion in schools and in govt?!?
Those are political issues and our country will swing a little to the left and then a little to the right from time to time (with obviously the overall trend to the left).
So if you're looking to violently overthrow our govt, then bring it on and be prepared to die.
"Why would we want to drastically change our form of govt?"
See my response to Moderation4ever for a list of problems associated with presidentialism.
"So if you’re looking to violently overthrow our govt, then bring it on and be prepared to die."
This is ridiculous comment in a thread about using the amendment process to alter the government.
If this is a response to your belief that Bellmore's comment is some sort of call to arms, you are implying something not there. But Bellmore has a valid point. The frequent collapse of presidentialist regimes in dozens of countries that have attempted to establish constitutions based on the principle of “separation of powers” suggests that this political formula is seriously flawed.
"Why would we want to drastically change our form of govt?"
We already have! What we haven't done is amend the Constitution to conform to those changes. "We", which is to say the governing class, substituted suborning judges for actually amending the Constitution.
What I expect is that at some point the pressure for a constitutional convention will become too great to ignore. And with enough states demanding one, one of two things will happen: Either the Constitution gets re-written, or Congress refuses to hold one anyway, and makes a break from the pretense of constitutional government.
Hopefully, you do not mind but I have quoted you recently:
Amendment XII has been called into question and this needs to be addressed.
"Wherein lies the value of having the state legislature, as opposed to the people of the state at large, have a voice in national governance?" - bernard11
"A basic principle of American constitutional design is to limit and safeguard power by dispersing it between entities that, jealous of their own prerogatives, will resist that power being centralized.
This is done by distributing it horizontally, between branches of government that are NOT entitled to exercise each other's power, and shouldn't even be delegated that exercise.
And it's done by distributing it vertically, between levels of government.
Now, state legislators ARE "jealous of their own prerogatives,". State voters? Not so jealous of the legislature's own prerogatives.
So, you have to expect people who actually exercise the state governmental power to put up more of a fight against its centralization in the federal government, than you would people who don't exercise that power, the voters.
And that's the value: The state legislature has an institutional interest in opposing the federal government's power grabs. The voters? Not so much.
I'd add that the voters actually have very little power to oppose that centralization, even if they want to, because voting is a very low bandwidth affair, you can't do anything even slightly complicated with it. And because each individual voter has a negligible influence, it really doesn't make sense for them to devote much effort to the fight.
The smaller number of legislators, who do this for a living, can act much more effectively in this regard." - Brett Bellmore
https://m.facebook.com/103969258882692/
Moderation, you are correct, we are talking about a complete revision. The problem with your idea that Congress cedes too much authority to POTUS is valid but does not address the fundamental problems with our form of government. These include the following:
The Fusion of Roles
As head of government every President has to make controversial policy decisions that unavoidably alienate substantial portions of the population. Yet Presidents, in their capacity as heads of state, are expected to symbolize and attract everyone’s loyalty, providing a common focus of patriotism for all citizens. Clearly, the requirements of the first role often clash with those of the second.
Veto Groups vs Opposition
A President’s role as head of government is also severely limited by the pervasiveness of -veto groups- such as the legislature, the courts, and the bureaucracy, plus a fractionalized party system. Although these diverse bodies can block executive action, they cannot formulate the coherent alternatives that the political opposition can often produce in parliamentary regimes. Such an opposition may also compel Government to modify policies in a consociational direction, something that presidential veto groups normally fail to do. The possibility that an opposition can replace them means that cabinets must take their views seriously, whereas Presidents are tempted to view their opponents merely as hostile forces to be subdued.
The “Winner-take-all” Syndrome
In parliamentary systems, the election of a president means relatively little, while the election of party members to Parliament means a great deal.
By contrast, in presidentialist systems the electoral stakes are much higher and more concentrated because so much hinges on the selection of a governing President–often, indeed, it is more of a personal than a partisan victory. Presidentialism, writes Juan Linz, “is ineluctably problematic because it operates according to the rule of ‘winner-take-all’–an arrangement that tends to make democratic politics a zero-sum game, with all the potential for conflict such games portend”
A Fragile Political/Administrative Base
The institutional foundations of a President’s rule are inherently fragile. We may analyze this problem separately at the political (partisan) and the administrative (bureaucratic) levels, although in fact the two are closely interlocked.
At the political level, the contrast with parliamentary systems is instructive. The dependence of cabinets on parliamentary support means both that party discipline is necessary and that a government without parliamentary support must resign. The resulting fusion of powers often enables parliamentary governments to act decisively. By contrast, no such interdependence occurs under the presidentialist separation of powers where a persistent stalemate can block executive action.
Ideally, perhaps, a President’s authority ought to rest on a party system that mobilizes voters to support candidates for election to public offices so that a winning party can ensure Congressional support for Presidential policies. In fact, however, this rarely occurs. Presidentialist party systems vary widely in their capacity to mobilize political support for a President. Some are highly disciplined and others extremely loose, two equally dysfunctional extremes. Disciplined parties, as found in Chile, have prevented the President from getting necessary Congressional support whenever he lacked a majority. Alternatively, as in Brazil, where party members freely vote their personal preferences, Presidents have responded by flagrantly overriding or flouting the parties that had formally supported their candidacy (Mainwaring, 1990b, 21). Even in the United States, as at present, the majority party in Congress need not be the President’s party, setting the stage for persistent conflict and deadlocks.
The Legislative/Executive Chasm
When a President is “…incapable of pursuing a coherent course of action because of congressional opposition… in many cases, a coup appears to be the only means of getting rid of an incompetent or unpopular president..” (Mainwaring 1989, 165). A similar argument can be found in Linz (1990, 53). Stalemate is even more unavoidable when–as noted above–the President’s party has only a minority in the Congress.
To overcome such impasses, Presidents frequently strive to dominate the assembly, a tendency that, in effect, vitiates the principle of separation of powers, leading to quasi-presidentialism and the erosion (or destruction) of presidentialist legitimacy. Embattled Presidents are often tempted to resort to desperate and even unconstitutional measures in order to bypass Congress and achieve their goals (Mainwaring 1989, 168-9). Sometimes, as in the Philippines in 1972, the President suspends Congress and rules by martial law and executive orders.
The Party System
Since a presidentialist regime is, by definition, a form of representative government, it needs to have an open party system: i.e., it needs electoral competition between two or more effective parties. I believe this is true because the maintenance of genuine legislative power is impossible whenever one party regularly dominates the elected assembly. A one-party system (as in Communist regimes) leads to complete party control of the elected assembly. Even a hegemonic party, in a polity that permits genuine opposition parties, nearly suffocates the Congress. Mexico provides a classic case. There, all the advantages resulting from electoral success belong repeatedly to the PRI and the Congress becomes a pliant legitimizing instrument. The separation of powers required, by definition, in a presidentialist regime is, therefore, incompatible with hegemonic or one-party rule–what I shall refer to as a closed party system. By definition, opposition parties may be permitted to run candidates in free elections, but if they have no real chance of winning power, then the party system is really “closed.”
Bureaucratic Dilemmas
The urgent need of any chief executive to be surrounded by competent and loyal officials capable of managing and coordinating the administration of government directs attention to a major problem that is easily overlooked by analysts predisposed to focus on the “political” aspects of governance at the expense of its “administrative” dimensions. Yet failure to administer well has dire political consequences. Public confidence declines and discontents soar, producing the kinds of unrest that lead, so often, to revolutionary movements and coups.
Moreover, many activities that are nominally administrative in character actually have strong political implications–for example, appointments to public office and administrative reorganizations, including the establishment of new agencies, can vitally affect a President’s power position, and influence the disposition of members of Congress to support or oppose a President’s policies. Perhaps, above all, bureaucratic power often expands to such a degree that public (especially military) officials become major actors in the political arena–sometimes even seizing power by a coup d’etat. Because the political implications of bureaucratic dilemmas are so often misunderstood, we need to take a closer look at these problems as they occur in presidentialist regimes.
The Power of Modern Bureaucracy
The Need for Patronage. The public interest in contemporary societies requires that many bureaucrats, especially those in leadership and technocratic positions, be experienced and highly qualified to perform difficult tasks. The necessary qualifications are best assured by the establishment of a “merit” system designed to recruit well trained persons whose continuing (tenured) experience in government service enables them to perform effectively.
In parliamentary democracies–and even under single-party domination and in traditional monarchies–the development of experienced cadres of public officials is usually possible, and ruling elites or cabinets are able to rely, for the most part, on career bureaucrats to staff and implement their politically-driven policies in ways that are essentially technocratic and professional.
By contrast, in presidentialist regimes, the structurally precarious position of Presidents–for reasons discussed above–would be seriously jeopardized were they to depend on career officials to staff the highest bureaucratic offices, including cabinet positions. Moreover, Presidents cannot recruit sitting members of Congress to serve as cabinet members without endangering the autonomy and power of the executive office, nor is it possible for non-elective cabinet members to hold seats in the assembly without jeopardizing the balance of power. In this necessarily precarious position, Presidents have no option but to recruit a large number of leading officials, starting at the cabinet level, from outside the government service: they cannot be either career officials or elected politicians.
Consequently, heavy reliance on patronage appointments (clientelism, cronyism and spoils) is a prevalent and necessary feature of all presidentialist systems. It entails fateful political and administrative costs. The most apparent is a lack of experience, qualifications, and dependability–Presidents must, on very short notice, try to assemble a “team” of personal supporters to manage the Government and direct a host of subordinates whose interests and obligations often conflict with those of the President.
Members of Congress also have a compelling interest in patronage. They typically seek posts for their supporters (clients) in order to maintain the political support without which they could not be elected. This gives them a powerful incentive and basis for bargaining with a beleaguered President: they can trade votes for favors. This is no trivial matter since their own power base may be seriously undermined if they cannot secure appointments for their proteges. Consequently, the indispensable minimum of political appointees needed to staff a presidentialist regime’s top posts is vastly inflated because both the President and the Congress need patronage to maintain the system.
Here we find a classic double bind: the President needs patronage to secure congressional support and members of Congress cannot abandon clientelism without undermining their own political support base. Only a judicious use of patronage can sustain the separation of power needed for presidentialism to survive. Thus, although both President and Congress need a non- partisan career system in the bureaucracy in order to implement their policies effectively, neither can afford to embrace a merit system without undermining their own precarious power base and threatening the presidentialist balance of power.
"2. Preventing Congress from throwing out electoral votes for bogus reasons (as some GOP members of Congress sought to do after the 2020 election)."
The constitution doesn't give Congress the power to throw out electoral votes for any reason, bogus or not.
Piss off fucktard wanker.
The issue has never been decided and I pointed out that both parties have made claims to disallow electors.
Do you think ballot drop boxes with no chain of custody on ballots are secure, or insecure?
If you believe they are secure, can you articulate your reasoning as to why?
It is unwise to change the law because it helps you now, but hurt you in the past.
This is the flip flop waffle disingenuous situational ethics goal-oriented cavalier attitude to philosphical part of flip flop waffle disingenuous situational ethics goal-oriented cavalier attitude to philosphy.
Ballot drop boxes are a fantasy and haven't actually been used and are being used for elections?
lol how gd ignorant are you? No wonder you're a Lefty, you don't know nothing about anything lol
You need to court to tell you that officials other than State legislatures altered election rules in 2020?
You can't be serious.
I'm not going to beat the fraud drum, but in Pennsylvania where the Secretary of State, citing COVID as a reason, altered the rules governing absentee ballots to allow anyone, when the State Constitution clearly says election laws can only be changed by the Legislature, is a huge problem.
I don't care what the reason is, or how good your intentions are, making it up as you go by proclamation is not rule of law. It's arbitrary and capricious, no matter what the State Supreme Court says.
When the court rules explicitly contrary to the unambiguous wording of the State Constitution then they are wrong, and should be ignored or removed. Ultimately the Constitution, not a court, is the final word on the law, particularly when a ruling is completely contrary to the plain text. It would be like the USSC saying you have no 5th Amendment Right during a trial, or no 1st Amendment Right to publish a newspaper editorial when it's plainly written you do.
There is no "higher good" beyond our foundational governing documents. To suggest otherwise is chaos.
Does that article refute the use of ballot drop boxes?
Was the SCOTUS wrong with Dodd?
Ballot drop boxes have similar security to postal boxes which are just as legal. Chain of custody is not as well defined as you might think. The level needed for criminal prosecutions is well above that accepted for most other things including ballots. It is also worth mentioning that many mail in ballots are tracked on-line so the voters can see where their ballot is at a given time.
They didn’t think a conviction was needed for participants in the Civil war, but that was just a bit clear cut, no? The one guy after the civil war who got Section 3’d, it was after a conviction, and when the conviction got overturned (On a technicality, I believe…) Congress considered him to be un-disqualified, and seated him.
I think they’d probably have put some more due process in Section 3 if they hadn’t been so laser focused on the Civil war, and had considered that it might eventually be seen as a political weapon.
I think it got put in there because they needed a few Republican votes, and the only ones plausibly available were all Never-Trumpers.
So no, no it doesn't.
Here’s one rule we really can’t have: that internet poster current IT guy decides when the
stateSupreme Court got something “obviously” wrong.lmao moron
What's "Dodd"?
Putting unaccountable and unfireable Federal Democrats with institutions like the FBI and IRS protecting them and oppressing their victims in charge of our elections is the way to end them forever.
When the court rules explicitly contrary to the unambiguous wording of the State Constitution then they are wrong
But they didn't. Check out the opinion - it cites the Constitution!
Ultimately the Constitution, not a court, is the final word on the law
What you really mean is ultimately *you* not a court is the final word on what the Constitution means.
Good luck with that. Our country runs on institutions, not random people. Many on here are so self-sure they think of themselves as an institution.
You are not. You certainty does not make your opinion more valid than mine, and neither of ours matters compared to the PA Supreme Court's
You can make all the wild comparisons to dark hypotheticals you want. But they're not going to buy you any more credibility.
You can actually read Section 3, and confirm for yourself that it provides no due process for determining that the disability applies, and just a bit for removing the disability:
"No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability."
And it was adopted shortly after the Civil war. Yes, I get it: You don't want to add 1+1 and get 2.
I'm complaining about the lack of a court conviction provision opening the door to abuse. This wasn't a problem at the time the 14th amendment was ratified, because it was dead obvious who had taken part in the Civil war. You didn't have one political party claiming there had been a civil war, and the other denying it.
It also wasn't a problem right after the Civil war because there HAD been a civil war, and the side invoking Section 3 had won it. Just as a practical matter, you can get away with a lot of procedurally dubious things if you're the winning side in a war doing them to the losing side, with soldiers backing you up.
You don't have that today, you've got total division over whether there really was any insurrection, and the side you'd be applying Section 3 to didn't just lose a war, doesn't worry that you'll have soldiers round them up and execute them if they resist.
Under modern conditions, you NEED a criminal trial, you need procedural due process up the wazoo, if you expect the side being subject to this to accept it. You can't cut corners on something this politically explosive! You would literally be firing the starting gun for a second Civil war if you disqualified a winning President on a basis this dubious, just on a near party line Congressional vote.
And, as a matter of history, the one solitary time Section 3 has been applied NOT in the context of the Civil war, they DID do it on the basis of a criminal conviction, and when the conviction was overturned, they seated the guy. So there's precedent in favor of it.
But they didn't include any requirement for a conviction in this statute, and why?
Because they intend to use it on people no court has found guilty, that's why.
To put this in context, let's suppose that Republicans don't blow it in November, and end up with a majority in both chambers of Congress. It could plausibly happen.
Then in 2024 they challenge some of the Democratic nominee's EC votes on the basis that some of his or her electors were involved in the BLM/Antifa riots, and thus are insurrectionists. And on a party line vote disqualify enough Democratic electors to give Trump the majority, and declare him President.
That's just peachy, right? No problem? It would be legal to do, per this statute we're discussing.
That is why mail-in voting is almost as fraud prone as drop boxes are. Plenty of videos showing people driving around every night dropping bundles of ballots off in those drop boxes. And, yes, there is some tracking of US mail - you can typically tell where mail was dropped off and when from the envelopes, and esp combined with USPS routing info.
That's true, they didn't originally require court convictions. What I'm saying is that the situation is sufficiently different today that it would be utter madness to try to apply it today without a court conviction, it would be playing with matches while standing in a pool of gasoline level madness.
You just don't do that sort of thing without having a criminal conviction, if you want civil peace!
And, again, you need to look at the precedent from the one application that wasn't in the context of the Civil war: Victor L. Berger. While Congress declared that they weren't bound by a court decision, the truth is that they did take the conviction into account, and when it was overturned they seated Berger, though nothing about his actions had changed.
The most likely reason why section 3 wasn’t written more explicitly (to consider a court conviction) was because the context/circumstances in the aftermath of the Civil War didn’t require it. There existed good documentation about who exactly had engaged in insurrection: the recorded paroles Confederate of soldiers after surrender, recorded oaths of office/allegiance by Confederate government officials, etc. These things were not going to be criminally litigated in a civil court, and indeed, the parole granted to the Army of Northern Virginia complicated the attempted treason prosecution against Robert E. Lee. At the same time, did anyone at the time doubt his disqualification under section 3? No, and that was all entangled with the contemporary politics over presidential pardons and generous terms being granted to many (but not all) notorious ex-Confederates.
As for actual disqualification for a court conviction, they also had the pre-war example of John Brown’s Harper Ferry insurrection. It’s likely the ratifiers of the 14A had that precedent in mind, that any such person guilty of insurrection would be criminally prosecuted for it. It doesn’t pass the sniff test that having just gone through a Civil War, and particularly its aftermath of dealing with conquered rebels, that they would enshrine in law a vague/open-ended disqualifying mechanism that could be wielded against political enemies willy nilly. That’s why the Founders also carefully defined treason in the original Constitution. And they were wise to do so, considering the way people throw that accusation around even today.
All over the place? wtf are you talking about?
Here is an axiom, if it's a bill written by Democrats and supported by Establishment Republicans, it corruptly helps them.
That's a simple truism of power.
Yes, it would be a worse idea today than after the freaking Civil war. Hugely worse.
After the Civil war was after a war. The people being disqualified were the losers of that war, beaten down and defeated. The states where they were being disqualified were under military occupation. They weren't going to rebel if they thought they were being treated unfairly, they already knew they'd lose that fight, HAD lost that fight. All rebellion would mean at that point was military tribunals and executions.
You don't think any of that influenced what the winners could get away with doing? You honestly think one party in modern America could get away with treating the other like the losing side in a war?
Flip it around. Suppose Republicans end up with the majority in both chambers, and decide to disqualify any Elector they can connect to the BLM/Antifa riots, and hand Trump the White House in 2024 after he lost the election. How would you feel about that? What would you expect in the way of a reaction?
You expect Republicans to take that sort of crap sitting down? You think you can treat people like the losers of a civil war, without sparking one? What would make you think that?
But that's exactly what's going on here: Making rules based on the derangement of the Democrats and a handful of retiring Republicans.
All good points. Many good stories, that are just that stories.
Brett, you're making a functional, explicitly anti-originalist argument.
Consider why you've wandered so far from your usual principles.
Uh, maybe that was because the presumed, given their belief in the rule of law, that any crime NOT defined in the Constitution would be defined in law. The Founders didn't bother defining bankruptcy in the Constitution either, yet authorized such laws could be created by Congress. John Brown was tried and convicted under state law (at the acquiescence of the federal government) included inciting a slave insurrection, even though his attack had taken place on federal property. As A14.3 does not narrowly define under which sovereignty a disqualifying insurrection must occur, and Article IV Section 4 requires the Union to protect each state from invasion and domestic violence, it's perfectly reasonable to conclude any state law insurrection conviction would also be disqualifying under Section 3.
What isn't defensible is the proposition that an arbitrary attainder of insurrection without any due process. Which is most of what is being talked about with January 6 adjacent individuals. So I'll continue to enjoy my cake, because what your suggesting doesn't apply.
I'd argue attempting to circumvent the House vote the Constitution mandates if nobody gets a majority by claiming fewer Electors were selected is a constitutional violation. But disqualifying Electors based on just claiming they're insurrectionists, rather than on the basis of a criminal conviction?
That's not a constitutional problem, it's just a cosmically ill advised policy.
Your accusation that he's offered an anti-originalist argument is without support or merit. As I've again mentioned on this topic here, the actual operation of the disqualification in the post Civil War era has little in common with recent events, because there were few if any disputes of who the disqualification provision applied to with respect to their conduct in support of an actual insurrection. Today we have no equivalent of prisoner of war paroles or sworn oaths working for a rebel government. Such people were disqualified without a criminal conviction because their offenses were otherwise documented.
Attempting to apply such a disqualification without due process of law smells an awful lot like a bill of attainder.
"It's obvious" is not actually a response to "Due process is required."
Except for the fact that disqualifying someone from office is not a criminal punishment.
What sort of mental malfunction do you have to have to think that disqualifying somebody from a major office the people elected them to, WITHOUT a criminal conviction, is remotely a good idea?
I have constitutional problems with the effort to bypass the House vote, but I think I'm being really clear here: This represents awesomely, frighteningly bad policy, unless you actually WANT major civil unrest.
And by "plenty" Bruce means "none, but I'm gullible enough to believe a debunked-by-all-sane-people-across-the-spectrum convicted felon."