The Volokh Conspiracy
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Pseudonymity for Libel Defendants (Former Co-Presidents of Campus Activist Group) in #TheyLied Claim
The Complaint in Doe v. University of Maryland, College Park (D. Md.) alleges:
After John Doe was fully exonerated of horrendous and malicious false allegations, the University of Maryland repeatedly refused to protect his rights as a student. The University allowed Doe to be publicly defamed as a rapist by students who worked closely with the University's Title IX office. When Doe submitted his complaints to the University alleging violations of University policy, including retaliation and sexual harassment, the University ignored his complaints.
Doe sued the university under Title IX and the two students—who had then been co-Presidents (consuls?) of the UMD Preventing Sexual Assault group—for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. But the defendant students then asked to be pseudonymized (which Doe agreed to, perhaps out of a desire to keep his own pseudonymous status):
Both Defendants take pride in their work on behalf of men and women victimized by conduct ranging from sexual assault to catcalling. They stand accused in this case of defamation committed with malice against the Plaintiff, a very serious allegation indeed.
Both Defendants just graduated from the University of Maryland, College Park. Defendant Two is still job hunting in her field. Defendant Three secured a job in her chosen field of public relations. Defendant Three, who has a less common name than many, was shocked to discover that a Google search of her name yields as the fifth entry, pleadings in this case. For Defendant Two, she shares her name with others with many online entries. Defendant Two is concerned that could change as the case progresses.
For both, however, searches on Google, PACER, Judiciary Case Search, etc. are all standard practices for many employers. They are at the beginning of their professional careers. They are greatly concerned about the potential impact on future employers because of these serious allegations which they absolutely reject. Defendant Two, in point of fact, defends these allegations in that she was simply uninvolved—distinct from Defendant Three who defends these allegations as simply wrong or grossly conflated.
And the court granted the motion, without a written opinion.
This is highly unusual.
Defendants, even ones accused of much more serious offenses than libel (e.g., sexual assault, embezzlement, even professional incompetence) generally have to proceed under their own names. And the parties' consent is generally not enough to justify pseudonymization, because the public has an interest in knowing litigants' identities:
Judicial hostility to a party's use of a pseudonym springs from our Nation's tradition of doing justice out in the open, neither "in a corner nor in any covert manner." In defending that tradition, we have explained that "[p]ublic access to judicial records and documents allows the citizenry to 'monitor the functioning of our courts, thereby insuring quality, honesty and respect for our legal system.'" "Identifying the parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of publicness." That is because—to a certain degree—letting a party hide behind a pseudonym dims the public's perception of the matter and frustrates its oversight of judicial performance.
Lacking knowledge of the parties' names, the public could learn virtually nothing about a case outside the facts and arguments in the record. The record, though, is not the alpha and omega of public concern. To take one example of important extra-record data, the real-world aftermath of a suit will sometimes bear upon the assessment of whether justice was done. Another example is the kind of institutional rot that is scrubbed from the record: judicial conflicts of interest, ex parte contacts, and the like. Anonymizing the parties lowers the odds that journalists, activists, or other interested members of the public would catch wind of such mischief. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski (1st Cir. 1989) (acknowledging "the contribution to governance of investigative reporting" regarding such matters).
An even thornier issue involves protecting the appearance of fairness in judicial proceedings. "Litigating behind a curtain creates a shroud of mystery, giving the impression that something secret is going on." Secrecy breeds suspicion. Some may believe that a party's name was masked as a means of suppressing inconvenient facts and that the court was either asleep at the wheel or complicit in the cover up. It is no answer to dismiss such beliefs as conspiracy theories because "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Distrust is toxic to the judiciary's authority, which "depends in large measure on the public's willingness to respect and follow its decisions." A judicial system replete with Does and Roes invites cynicism and undermines public confidence in the courts' work.
So what's happening here? Perhaps courts are in practice applying a subtle "promising young man/woman" exception to the standard non-pseudonymity norm (which might help explain why a lot of Title IX plaintiffs who claim that they were wrongly found guilty of sexual assault have gotten pseudonymity, see pp. 1401-02 and Apps. 4A & 4B of my The Law of Pseudonymous Litigation article). But any such special exception strikes me as hard to justify. Surely it's difficult to get a job as a young person when there are publicly accessible allegations against you, but it may be even more difficult to get such a job when one is (say) in one's fifties and looking for a new job in one's established career.
I should acknowledge, though, that at this point this is just pseudonymization in the caption; the earlier filings weren't pseudonymized. Reporters, academics, and others who want to research the case can thus find the names of the defendants; and this will in turn help them, for instance, find the news stories that mention the defendants as student activists and discuss their work and their perspectives.
Perhaps this is a plausible compromise: The names aren't hidden from researchers, but are less likely to come up in simple casual Google searches, and less likely to appear in any future published court opinion (see pp. 1423-25). On the other hand, the defendants' motion signaled the possibility of future attempts to conceal the information more broadly (though perhaps such retroactive concealment would be difficult):
For the moment, Your Defendants will be satisfied with removing further use of their names from the public record. They will reserve the question of seeking a re-filing of pleadings to date and hope it is not needed in the future.
It will be interesting to see whether defendants seek such more comprehensive pseudonymization—and whether other defendants in similar cases will start to seek pseudonymity as well.
Congratulations to John J. Condliffe of Levin & Gann, P.A., who obtained this unusual benefit for his client.
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I don't know about it being such a big principle that no one may use the court system, unless they lose all privacy.
To the extent that this causes people to not pursue their legal rights (or to be unduly intimidated by the threat of a lawsuit), I believe that is a very bad thing.
The logic of both torts and contracts is usually merely to make the plaintiff whole, and no more. To the extent that the plaintiff has to pay a lawyer, of course, the lawsuit makes them less the whole. But, if the lawsuit ACTUALLY did reputational damage that destroyed their career prospects, it seems like they would lose even if they won. If merely participating in litigation destroyed careers, that would render legal rights illusory for all people except the wealthy or corporations.
I think what makes it acceptable to deny pseudonymity is the sense that people have exaggerated fears about the likely social impact of litigation. We hear EV go on about how maybe it would be worse for the 50 year old than the young person to be unmasked as a litigant. Not once does he say, well, maybe it isn't so bad, after all. This seems to buy into the idea that it is SO horrible to be associated with litigation or at least expresses a complete indifference to it. But what if being involved in litigation REALLY was career death??? Then we would be talking about something that would change the legal system entirely. Legal rights would be largely theoretical for most people (at least those who needed jobs). That WOULD matter. It would really call into question whether we were in a society under the rule of law at all.
So, while I am generally in favor of people proceeding in litigation under their own names, it isn't because I think that it just wouldn't matter if it would otherwise result in career death. I just don't think involvement in litigation will ACTUALLY result in career death. Sure, a person may lose a particular opportunity or something like that. (And isn't that just life for all of us?) But the sun will rise for them once again.
Huh. I read exactly the same passage but interpreted it very differently. I heard Prof V say it's maybe worse for the 50 year old but that's well established as not enough to trigger pseudonymity therefore the 20-something's fears are probably exaggerated.
To your larger point, I agree that "being involved with" litigation will not result in career death. On the other hand, being involved with (and especially instigating) frivolous litigation can (and probably should) have career consequences.
But it is very hard for outsiders to tell if litigation is frivolous. In any case, if that does happen, should you blame the party or the party's lawyer? It is unethical for an attorney to bring a frivolous lawsuit or maintain frivolous defenses or frivolous legal positions.
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_3_1_meritorious_claims_contentions/
Unless the party has lied to their lawyer, I believe that the blame for frivolous litigation should go to the lawyer. What if the litigation is pro se? Then I guess the blame belongs to the party, but it shouldn't shock us if someone not trained in law brings incorrect arguments that a lawyer would not bring.
Sorry, I used a phrase that has a technical meaning in a context where that technical meaning could have been appropriate but intended the non-technical meaning.
The technical threshold for a "frivolous" lawsuit is quite high. I meant something closer to 'obvious loser' (recognizing that merely losing is too low because that includes losing on a technicality and other borderline cases). I'm not sure what the right word should have been but the general idea is that people should not be able to dodge the social consequences of making accusations they can't back up.
I certainly agree that social consequences are appropriate in some cases.
The root cause of the problem is the lack of transparency in campus title ix proceedings. Make those public (naming both accuser and accused), and one no longer needs to give up privacy to challenge them in court.
And the public has a much better handle on how fair they actually are.
As I understand it, the Plaintiff is suing as a "John Doe" in a suit based on allegedly false statements about him. How can he do that? Unless the false statements identified him (even if not by name), he wasn't injured by them, right? If UMd protected his identity during the investigation, where are his damages?
The Complaint alleges that the defendant students told various "student organizations at the University, of which Doe is a member, that Doe was a 'rapist,'" and "repeated these false allegations to various students and student organizations, telling them not to associate with Doe"; Doe also claims he lost some social opportunities as a result (e.g., was kicked off a club sports team). I infer that the claim is that they mentioned Doe by name. That would generally be enough for a defamation claim, if the statements were false.
But it sounds like those allegations didn't really hit the Internet, and Doe wants to avoid their hitting the Internet -- he doesn't want Google searches for his name to inform prospective employers and others that he had been accused of rape, even when the complaint makes clear that he denied the accusation, and that he claims the college exonerated him. That doesn't resolve whether he should be entitled to pseudonymity, but it explains why he might want it, despite some people at college already having heard the allegations.
"But any such special exception strikes me as hard to justify. Surely it's difficult to get a job as a young person when there are publicly accessible allegations against you, but it may be even more difficult to get such a job when one is (say) in one's fifties and looking for a new job in one's established career."
Well, obviously not. If you are a kid, just starting out, you have no track record of performance in whatever field. A potential employer will weigh you up against other kids with no experience, and in that scenario the reputational issues will be significant even though very slight. Why employ a potential troublemaker when there are equally qualified alternatives?
With older workers, with experience and a career, there are many more factors to outweigh slight reputational issues. Obviously actually being a complete scumbag won't override being better than average at a common job, but that's hardly the same thing as being in a situation where littering - "Yes, sir, Officer Obie, I cannot tell a lie, I put that envelope Under that garbage." - is enough to make you completely unemployable.