The Volokh Conspiracy
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"Professional Historians" Who File Amicus Briefs Are Motivated As Well
For decades, critics have argued that originalism as a doctrine cannot resolve contemporary questions of constitutional law. However, now that the majority of the Supreme Court is decidedly originalist, the criticism has shifted. In the wake of Bruen, there has been a common refrain: the conservative Court cherry picked history to support its result. After all, professional historians support Justice Breyer's dissent.
I am grateful that the narrative has evolved. Historians cannot simultaneously argue that originalism is bunk and that originalism supports a particular position. They have to pick one side. And those historians who argue that originalism supports a particular position undermine those historians who maintain that originalism is not a valid jurisprudence.
Yet, many historians claim that they are uniquely qualified to engage in constitutional originalism. And, by contrast, untrained, non-professional historians lack those qualifications. Allison Orr Larsen, for example, criticizes the conservative Justices for relying on amicus briefs written by "motivated groups that are pressing for a particular outcome," while disagreeing with "the work product of professional historians who (even when they have a point of view) are trained to gather evidence dispassionately."
These amicus briefs — sometimes signed by historians, sometimes not — are virtually all written by lawyers and often filed by motivated groups that are pressing for a particular outcome. The history they present, in other words, is mounted to make a point and served through an advocacy sieve. That distinguishes this type of history from the work product of professional historians who (even when they have a point of view) are trained to gather evidence dispassionately. As historian Alfred H. Kelly once put it, "The truth of history does not flow from its usefulness." But usefulness is exactly the point when litigating a case at the Supreme Court — and historical sources are being used by the advocates to win.
Larsen does not use the phrase "biased," but she does use the word "motivated" throughout her piece. Here, she channels the concept of motivated reasoning. Non-historians who file originalist briefs are more at risk of motivated reasoning, while trained and disciplined historians who file originalist briefs are less at risk of motivated reasoning.
I'll admit, my view of professional historians is, well, biased by the Emoluments Clauses litigation. In an amicus brief, tenured professors of legal history at elite institutions claimed that Alexander Hamilton signed a document. They were incorrect. Seth Barrett Tillman and I responded with declarations from experts who have authenticated Hamilton's signature. The legal historians withdrew their claim and sincerely apologized. Yet, to this day, the legal historians have never explained how and why they reached their conclusion. Or, to use Larsen's framing, what was their motivation to make the claim in an amicus brief?
Everyone is subject to motivated reasoning especially in high-profile litigation, such as those cases involving guns, abortion, even emoluments. No one--not even a professional historian--is infallible.
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"...Historians cannot simultaneously argue that originalism is bunk and that originalism supports a particular position....
Josh, you have a logic fail here. OF COURSE a person can hold a position that (a) Originalism is bunk, and also hold a position that (b) even if you [wrongly] follow Originalism, it leads to Result X.
I don't believe in phrenology. I think it's bunk. But, if you grope Justice Roberts' head; those bumps tell us that the LA Dodgers will win the National League West division this year. The underlying theory is bunk. But the "conclusion" happens to also be accurate.
There are lots of conservative legal scholars who think Originalism is utter BS. And lots of liberal legal scholars who think the same. And yet, those people have no problem successfully making the argument, "Originalism is a dopey way to look at our rights, 2.5 centuries after-the-fact. But even under Originalism, you--the court--should rule for us, because even Originalism supports X, Y, and Z in our case."
Is it really possible that you cannot see this?
Josh's point here is that, if originalism is bunk, then the position originalism supports will, in any case, be contingent on who the practitioner is. "Originalism" itself would not support a particular position, you'd have dueling originalists, all over the place.
The only way originalism converges on particular positions is if it isn't bunk.
90% of historians are tax sucking Democrats, and their views are dismissed.
If most medical research is garbage without validation, all historical research is toxic waste to be dumped in a brown field.
To be fair, lawyer doctrines and decisions have no research at all. When horrific natural experiments result, they lawyer denies their existence. Mandatory guidelines drop crime 40%, along with lawyer jobs. They get cancelled, with surges in murder. These thousands of murders are denied because lawyers have their jobs.
I don't know if that's Josh's point or not, but it's not a logical claim. As others have already pointed out, one can easily argue that originalism is a bad legal theory even when there's a clear originalist position.
It's trivially easy to construct systems that consistently converge on particular outcomes that are nonetheless wrong.
"Wrong" in what sense?
Normatively?
Empirically?
Theoretically?
I don't think you can declare originalism "wrong" without it being relative to some competing theory of constitutional meaning. What theory are you tacitly using?
I'm not arguing that originalism is wrong, or that a competing theory is right. I'm simply disputing your argument that "[t]he only way originalism converges on particular positions is if it isn't bunk."
A system can regularly converge on particular positions as still be bunk. Thus, the fact that originalism converges on particular positions (assuming that it does so) tells us nothing about the validity of those positions.
Brett,
That is NOT Josh's point. Josh made his own point clearly. But it was a silly argument, and that's why a bunch of us immediately posted, all saying versions of the same thing.
*Your* point, however, is perfectly valid. Yes, Originalism, like all other approaches, means that it can be molded to support or oppose a wide variety of end results. Largely depending on the values, etc of the person advocating at that particular moment.
Or if the people who call themselves originalists tend to share political views that they use the bunk to try to support—which is what the actual criticism tends to be, as far as I can tell.
(I am an originalist and I don't agree with this criticism. But I at least understand what is being argued.)
I would say the criticism is that originalism makes two main claims and both those claims are unsupportable and to the extent they could be supportable there is no coherent or predictable method
The claims are that 1) "original public meaning" is discernable with certainty (even when performed by untrained judges and law clerks) and 2) looking at "original public meaning" is the only legitimate form of interpretation.
The first is conceivably possible when looking at discreet terms or terms of art in legal usage. But for more abstract terms or phrases regarding the mostly hotly debated document in American history it is unclear how that is even possible. Trying to come up with an original public meaning of "liberty" in 1868 would be absurd for instance: the freedman and dispossessed planters would obviously fundamentally disagree on the entire concept. There would be no shared "original public meaning."
It becomes especially nonsensical when you're talking about structural ideas inferred from the document. The idea that there would be an "original public understanding" regarding the existence of a strong non-delegation doctrine is absurd. There were federalist and anti-federalist factions that emerged immediately precisely because they disagreed about how the government worked. So you look at historical practice...and its all over the place. But Gorsuch thinks he can just count up law review articles on one side to disregard the evidence Bagley and Mortensen presented. And actually, he literally can just do that because there is literally nothing forcing him to address or consider any evidence whatsoever. Which is a bit of a sub-criticism of the first point: there are no actual uniform or predictable standards. Do you use dictionaries? Historical practice? State constitutions and statutes? Letters? Op-eds in newspapers? Treatises? Books? Are you really getting at the "original public meaning" of a word or phrase if all the sources come from an extremely small subset of the population with discreet views and agendas and biases of their own? Every "bad" originalist opinion can be disregarded as "no true originalist" (Look at Dred Scott, Taney does many of the things that originalists commonly do today...but they claim he's not actually an originalist because they don't like the result.)
Because of the absurdity of the first claim, the second claim: that it is the only legitimate method of interpretation also is subject to criticism. How can this be the only legitimate method when it is completely incoherent to begin with?
Yes, originalism has an empirical component, "This is the original meaning.", and a normative component, "Constitutional law only changes formally."
Originalists view 'informal' constitutional law changes as being a sort of judicial embezzlement. The people have the exclusive right to alter the Constitution, they exercise that right through Article V, and any constitutional 'change' outside that process is a usurpation by somebody not entitled to make changes to the Constitution.
“Yes, originalism has an empirical component, "This is the original meaning."”
And that bold empirical claim is what historians properly think is nonsensical. There is no single “original public meaning” for the most hotly debated document in American history. We’re talking about a society that couldn’t even agree if the federal government could build or fund roads well into the 1850s.
There are two related problems with "constitutional law only changes formally."
First, constitutional law must change with the times. Even Scalia recognized that. As we come up against novel situations, applying the literal understanding of the founders would lead to nonsensical results. Scalia relied on "analogies," but that's pretty fucking open-ended. You can prove anything with a well-chosen analogy.
Second, the meaning of the constitution changes informally even by its own terms! It appeals to external variables like "unusual punishment," and it invites further interpretation by Congress and the judiciary. It defines no terms. It's clearly written to be a general framework, not an operating manual, with most of the details left as an exercise for the reader.
So even if Originalism's empirical component were correct (it's not, as we've seen as early as Heller), its normative claim is misguided anyway. There's really nothing to salvage.
I'm not a Living Constitutionalist, by the way. I don't really know what that means. I think it's possible to have a text-first approach that leads to objective results even in novel circumstances.
Dred Scott was faux originalism, 'yeah the words say that, but they couldn't have actually meant it':
"The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration; for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted; and instead of the sympathy of mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation."
Taney is full of inconsistencies, he makes much of the fact that there were laws that outlawed interracial marriage and says that means Blacks can't become citizens, but he concedes Indians can become citizens even though the same laws banned marriage to Indians.
Korematsu on the other hand was based on deference to Congress, and tiers of scrutiny balancing constitutional rights with the "needs" of authorities. I guess we have have to throw that standard of constitutional interpretation out as well.
The only way originalism converges on particular positions is if it isn't bunk.
Or if the practitioners are all from a particular ideological cohort...
The only way originalism converges on particular positions is if it isn't bunk.
I don't think so.
Suppose "originalism" is mostly a cover by ideologically like-minded judges. Then it can surely be total bunk and yet seem to converge on particular positions. In fact, it's easier if it's bunk, because then you can just make whatever originalist claim you want to support your position.
But if originalism is always just a cover for a predetermined (conservative) position, then a person of intellectual integrity can't use it, as the historians do, to argue for a position. Demonstrate that it is bunk, and move on. Otherwise it would be like demonstrating that astrology is bunk, and then saying, "Now I'll cast a proper horoscope."
No, it's more like saying "astrology is bunk, but it purports to follow rules, so let's follow those claimed rules and see where it leads".
Or to put it another way... like astrology, tarot and so-on, if "originalism" is actually a coherent theory that follows rules, then your personal belief isn't important as you can follow the rules to a correct result anyway. If you can only get to a "correct" result if you have "belief", however? Then it's not a system, it's a con.
Aren't the historians showing it to be bunk by demonstrating that there will always be a more compelling way to spin the history than the one in the opinion?
They don't need to claim that any take on history is normatively correct, only that there's a better one than the Court chose, and that it leads to a different outcome.
I think this was already well-established following Heller, but Bruen is even worse. The History and Tradition Test will have a mercifully short lifetime, and probably take Originalism down with it.
As I said above, there are three separate ways you can criticize originalism:
1) Normatively.
2) Empirically.
3) Theoretically.
The normative criticism is basically that, even if you could legitimately practice originalism, it would be wrong to, morally wrong. This is the position of people who claim that original meaning should be rejected because it's bad.
The problem with this approach is that, if it's the meaning, and should be rejected because it's a bad meaning, your problem isn't with originalism, it's with the Constitution itself. And that's fine, nobody is obligated to think the Constitution is good.
However, if you reject the Constitution on moral or policy grounds, you really ought to admit that's what you're doing, rather than just pretending that the policies you prefer are what the Constitution really means.
The empirical criticism simply asserts that (some?) originalists are doing originalism badly, that if they were doing it correctly they'd arrive at different conclusions. But that's not actually a criticism of originalism, just of actual originalists. Under this criticism you have to explain why, if you've identified mistakes, you don't just correct them, rather than rejecting the whole enterprise.
The theoretical criticism must either declare that the enterprise is fundamentally impossible, or that, while possible, some other approach to determining meaning is better. The latter tends to just devolve into the normative criticism, (The reason for preferring a different approach to interpretation is that you like the results better.) so let's focus on the former.
The claim that (original) meaning is radically indeterminant is a very troubling one. It calls into question the whole notion of constitutionalism; Are constitutions, then, just empty verbiage for people to wave around while deriving everything important somewhere else? If so, why even bother writing them?
My own impression, though, is that the claim of radical indeterminism of meaning is really driven by the normative criticism: If you're going to replace the meaning of the Constitution with something you like better, you have to dispose of the existing meaning first. Denying that anybody can really determine what it means is a way of doing that.
Like Bork and his inkblot, motivated by his dislike of the 9th amendment. Only the critics of originalism want to soak the whole document in ink.
That's all bullshit.
It's simply not true that the only normative critique you can make of Originalism is that the outcome isn't to one's liking. A very fair and accurate normative critique concerns Originalism's context-shifting approach of trying to divine what people hundreds of years ago would have thought about a situation occuring today. First of all, that's pretty silly on its face, and second, why is that even a good idea in the first place? The Constitution is a written document. Certainly, to the extent that words' definitions have changed, we should use the as-written definition, and maybe it's interesting to read the authors' commentaries, but that seems like about all you really need to do. Beyond that, the Constitution speaks for itself. That's why they wrote it down. Why should someone's interpretation from a long time ago matter any more than anyone else's interpretation? There's no good answer to that.
The theoretical critique is just icing at that point. Originalism is impractical even if you wanted to know what people from a bygone era would've thought.
By the way, this sounds a lot like a critique of Originalism to someone like me:
Are constitutions, then, just empty verbiage for people to wave around while deriving everything important somewhere else? If so, why even bother writing them?
Precisely.
Another great normative critique comes from JasonT20 below, who points out that the written Constitution expresses the ideals of people which they themselves failed to live up to in many ways. Shouldn't we interpret the Constitution with fidelity to the ideals rather than fidelity to the failings of old societies?
This critique is related to the "play in the joints" critique I sketched out elsewhere.
Keep in mind the larger context, which is to stop the powerful from increasing their power at their own whim.
I'm fine with new, unenumerated rights that would not have been considered such back in the day. That's living people, who retain all their rights, not a living constitution.
I am not fine with government arrogating new powers that would have been laughed off the stage back in the day. If you want government to have a new power, satisfy the deliberately laborious amendment process. If it's a good thing for the government to have a new power - a new fundamental ability - and government growth of power is always potentially, if not probably, dangerous (proof: the entire world, and all of history) then most will think so, not a bare majority (the skill of the charismatic demagogue to leap) and will think so a few years down the road, to let the winds of passion (the same skill of the demagogue to stir) die down and let cooler heads ponder the wisdom of government power expansion.
"So this is how Liberty dies - with thunderous applause," sighed Princese Padme
This is not fiction. It is decagigadeaths through history.
The problem here is that, once you permit positive rights, the distinction between new rights, and new powers of government, tends to blur. Ask any florist or baker.
Non-discrimination law isn't based on constitutional rights, it's based on duly enacted legislation.
Purporting to defend such rights.
Right...
Obergefel v. Hodges (2015) is so important, that it's importance went back in time and influenced the New Mexico state legislature to pass a non-discrimination law to defend such rights, which was then used to sue Elane of Elane Photography in 2005.
Yeah, that makes sense.
I'll point out that Obergefell was NOT like Roe in one important regard: Roe came out of nowhere, it represented a massive change originating at the Supreme court.
Obergefell came only after the lower courts had imposed SSM on most of the country. The Court wasn't fighting that battle, they were just going out on the battle field killing off any survivors.
So the fact that Elane was sued in 2005 and Obergefell came in 2015 really doesn't mean much. Her liberty was a casualty during the war, not the mopping up phase.
It means even less in response to my point, which was just that positive rights often give government an excuse to act, rather than always limiting it. That's a point that doesn't depend on the Supreme court having originated the 'right' in question.
In her case, the legislature had created the 'right'. Doing so gave the state an excuse to act to constrict her liberty. Thus the point: Positive rights can be excuses to reduce people's liberties.
WWWBS?
(What would Will Baude say?)
Re: originalism:
With originalist judges who subscribe to this view, what other option does an advocate have when making an argument?
"If I'd prefer not to fight on originalist terms, well, that's just the terms that have been given to me."
https://thedispatch.com/p/the-nondelegation-rumble#details
time stamp 33.00 through 35.00
But aren't we all now originalists, just like Justice Kagan?
“ Historians cannot simultaneously argue that originalism is bunk and that originalism supports a particular position. ”
This is false. The two positions are not contradictory but in fact support one another. They amount to the claim that originalism is nonsense because it posits a false account of meaning and that the ‘theory ‘ is rigged to obtain particular results.
If originalism is "rigged" to obtain particular results, then professional historians cannot use it to support their particular conclusion. (Unless it's rigged to produce liberal results, but that is not the common claim.)
If originalism is "rigged" to obtain particular results, then professional historians cannot use it to support their particular conclusion.
But they can point out that the history used to support originalist conclusions is inaccurate, and that therefore the conclusion is unjustified.
There is a difference here. A historian can make that point whether or not he himself thinks originalism is valid.
Exactly. Originalists might claim that X sources prove Y claim definitively for all time. Historians then point out all the reasons those sources don't actually support the claim and all the other sources and evidence out there that dispute the claim. None of this requires a historian to accept originalism as valid.
Sure you can.
"Originalism is bunk, but if you use it anyway [...]"
or "I'm an atheist, but if I believed in the Christian god then [...]"
or "I'm gay as fuck, but if I were straight [...]"
Especially with originalism this makes sense. I can ponder "what did this mean in it's original context?" without thinking "and we should apply that answer today".
Hell, arguing with someone using their assumptions as a basis (even when you do not share them) is a bog-standard persuasion tactic.
"It's impossible to determine exactly what those words mean. Now here's exactly what they mean."
Yes, such a claim would be odd. I suspect you'll have a problem demonstrating that sort of claim is normative among historians critical of originalism.
Yes, it depends what the criticism of originalism is.
Above, LawTalkingGuy says that the primary criticism is that "original public meaning" is not discernable with certainty. So that would seem to fit and I have often heard similar ideas.
But maybe that's not the best or primary criticism of originalism. I don't know, admittedly.
In my comment below I tried to describe a different potential criticism.
... as demonstrated here and below where you attempted to figure out my "take", you can't even determine original meaning of things that were written today, but you think you can determine the original meaning of things written two hundred years ago?
Ironically, this is also a common complaint about "originalists": they'll spill so much trying to figure out "original meaning" of a two hundred year old paragraph, and then turn around and claim they can never know what was meant in a bill that was signed two years ago.
Replied below.
"The legal historians withdrew their claim and sincerely apologized."
No wonder Josh doesn't respect them. When you err, admit your mistake, correct it, and adjust your views like a professional? No thank you! Much better to be like Josh - be egregiously wrong about all the time but just keep plowing ahead!
Josh thinks bias renders your opinions irrelevant.
Luckily Josh's own opinions are from unbiased careful reflection.
Josh is just pointing out that historians, as a group, are no less biased than legal scholars, and no less capable of letting their bias dictate their conclusions.
Indeed, if you look at the political demographics of history faculty, historians are probably MORE biased than originalists.
Yeah, that's because they're biased in favor of the truth and years of studying history (something originalists do not actually do) has led them to their conclusions. You become liberal when you actually understand American history.
But this only matters if having a position renders analysis spurious.
If it does not, than subject matter expertise still matters, biased or no.
And because I believe people can be professionals and set their opinions aside - I see it every day, more than when I was a lawyer even - I think this is quite silly.
No, he's giving a single example of a time when historians made a mistake, (and not, in my view, one that appears to be very significant), and suggesting that their failure to explain "how and why they made the mistake to his satisfaction proves that historians are fundamentally untrustworthy.
This critique seems particularly stupid and nonresponsive to Prof. Larsen's point in light of the fact that three of the five "legal historians" he's upset with are law professors, two of whom don't appear to have any other academic background in history at all.
Not that they are fundamentally untrustworthy. But that they are not fundamentally always trust worthy.
Saying something is not 100% true does not mean the same as saying it is only and always 0% true (ie, always false).
Beat up on straw men much?
It is a required link in his bad logical chain.
Is the growth in the number of amicus briefs a help or a hindrance to the Court.
I don't see how it can really be much of a hindrance, since the Court is perfectly capable of ignoring them if it wants. Unless you have the permission of all the parties to the case, you actually need to file a motion with the Court to submit such a brief, and the Court doesn't have to grant it.
"No one--not even a professional historian--is infallible."
Indeed. Even more so for amateur historians like originalist judges and originalist "scholars" like Blackman. Say what you will about "living constitution" opinions - and that approach certainly has its drawbacks - but at least they're honest. You read an opinion and actually know why the court decided the case as it did, instead of pretending that it was because of some definition in a dictionary from 1807 or because some medieval judge who believed in witchcraft thought abortion was bad or whatever.
I read The Three Little Pigs once. Why did I believe the story was about three pigs and a wolf blowing down their houses?
Either because words mean what they mean, or I got really lucky in my goal-oriented construction of the meaning of the words on the page.
Stevens dissent in heller claimed that there was no historical writings regarding the individual right to keep and bear arms claiming the the only historical writings were for the collective right. Granted there was a lot more writings about the rkba for common defense but he claimed that none existed for the individual right.
Furthermore there was no historical writings limiting the rkba to serving in a militia or common defense.
If there had been any such discussions limiting such , then there would have been volumes of historical writings
You mean Justices sometimes get history wrong?
Pretty often, I'd say.
In stevens dissent in heller. , he knew he was intentionally misstating the historical record
Scalia provided several citations showing otherwise
Telepathy!
The only way it required telepathy is if you assume Stevens wasn't reading the opinions and briefs being circulated; Stevens was denying the existence of evidence that he'd already been provided.
Brett Bellmore
July.27.2022 at 6:19 am
Flag Comment Mute User
The only way it required telepathy is if you assume Stevens wasn't reading the opinions and briefs being circulated; Stevens was denying the existence of evidence that he'd already been provided."
That demonstrates the Stevens dishonesty in Heller along with devastating any claims that Stevens ' dissent was based on "originalism"
Stevens was engaged in genuinely fake originalism.
The problem advocates of living constitutionalism have is that, outside the legal community, it's in generally bad repute. The people don't WANT judges making shit up as they go along!
So, when a high profile case comes up, the living constitutionalists have to pretend they're engaged in originalism, as Stevens did.
Prof. Blackman can't comprehend that an expert can be wrong without their error being the result of bias. I suppose that is understandable if you view all controversies as exercises in advocacy and that winning the debate trumps all, but there are professions where finding the truth matters more.
Maybe math, but certainly not history, especially political history.
You're onto something else, how long a mistake can be maintained. Certainly the hard sciences make that difficult, as Pons and Flieschmann (RIP) could testify, and it is easier in other professions where there are less objective standards of proof.
In contrast I'm saying that some professions have the truth as a core objective and tend to attract people who also value that goal. It doesn't mean that in those professions you'll never find a fraudster or, as with P&F, someone whose enthusiasm leads them to rush to print (and destroy their careers). It's just very different from professions like legal advocacy or marketing where being biased is part of the job, to balance out the biased advocacy of the opposing side.
Kazinski, you have no idea what you are talking about. Get yourself any of Eric Hobsbawm's canonical works: The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789–1848, The Age of Capital: 1848–1875 and The Age of Empire: 1875–1914, and see if you can find any work by anyone who can match that achievement. I guarantee you that reading any of those works will make you smarter, and more surprisingly, make you acknowledge a debt to Hobsbawm for doing it.
Howbsbawm remained an unreconstructed Stalinist his entire life—and went to his grave with the cream of the historical profession—including many staunch political conservatives—singing his praises as an unrivaled source of historical insight and literary excellence.
The best historians are measured by their peers for their command and presentation of a factual past, mostly untainted by ideological priors. To the extent that ideology affects their work, it delivers an effect on their choice of subjects—as it did with Hobsbawm—but much less than you suppose with regard to how those subjects get treated.
Hobsbawm shows how that can be done, and you should read him to find out for yourself.
An expert can be wrong without it being the result of bias, but if they're not occasionally wrong against interest? Yeah, bias.
Prof. Blackman gave a single example of historians making an error (for which they apologized when the error was demonstrated).
Perhaps there's a reason to think that the original error was the result of bias, but if so the post certainly doesn't provide it.
Yes, this is one of the complaints about "originalists", who always find that the history matches their preferred future. Even when there's plenty of conflicting history showing that they are obviously cherry-picking.
"An expert can be wrong without it being the result of bias, but if they're not occasionally wrong against interest? Yeah, bias."
So you agree that Blackman's legal analyses (and your own claims to expertise in various disciplines) are at best highly suspect and at worst spurious rhetoric.
I don't know what the argument is about, everything I read I consider whether it makes sense to me or it's just viewpoint tainted crap, whether I agree with the viewpoint or not.
Every brief, every court opinion, every science article, every speech.
" Historians cannot simultaneously argue that originalism is bunk and that originalism supports a particular position. "
That is an unusually stupid assertion.
Is this blog genuinely the best that right-wing law professors can offer?
Here's a much simpler solution for Prof. Larsen:
The Supreme Court should not permit unsolicited amicus brief at all.
The 84 amicus briefs filed in Bruen seems excessive.
Historians cannot simultaneously argue that originalism is bunk and that originalism supports a particular position. They have to pick one side. And those historians who argue that originalism supports a particular position undermine those historians who maintain that originalism is not a valid jurisprudence.
It's almost as if Josh thinks historians have to agree about this.
I suspect he is also confused about the difference between:
"History does not support your legal argument," and "History means my legal argument is correct."
bernard11 — That sums it up pretty well.
Both of these opinion pieces by Josh Blackman today are almost devoid of any actual content or substance. Even for straight up opinions. Mushy sources, mushy broad statements & cheerleading for originalism. Which continues to be right up there with the "beautiful orthodoxy" of the fundamental Christians as far as I'm concerned. They have that same problem with historians.
Well go do something else with your time then.
Correcting the record and mocking clingers are worthwhile endeavors.
Another thought: it has occurred to me that Blackman, like many judges, lawyers and such, has never actually had to be an unbiased professional. His entire life, he has been free to inject his bias into his profession with no consequence.
So it's no surprise that he balks at the idea of an unbiased professional. After all, neither he nor any of his peers are any such thing.
Unlike judges, today's historians generally don't pretend they don't have personal biases or that their work is somehow neutral and objective. They're interested in facts and truth of course...but years of studying historiography and messy historical records demonstrates that there is no such thing as being truly objective, and there never was. Despite years and years of specific research study, and training, they're often much more modest about their historical claims than people who have three year degrees in reading pre-selected excerpts of cases out of case books!
Perhaps someone should tell Prof. Larsen, since her entire point is premised on the neutrality and objectivity of academic historians.
Maybe she fell asleep reading Novick.
This is quite true. In other fields experts have to be objective because people acting on their opinions will prove them to be right or wrong based on the unforgiving ultimate objectivity of the natural world.
A plumber based on his expertise believes the leak is due to the toilet on the third floor. It gets fixed. The leak continues. He is proven wrong.
An auto mechanic believes the backfiring is due to overly advanced timing. The timing is retarded (sorry, that’s the word for it). Backfiring ceases. He is proven right.
Nothing like that happens in Josh’s world. Josh can never be “proven right” or “proven wrong”. As you put it, there are no consequences.
You own a car with a distributor?
That you even have to apologize for using "retarded" says something about how screwed up the world has become.
Yeah, I'm going to have to go ahead and disagree with you there.
Well . . . not in a way that he will be forced to admit.
A plumber will not be able to deny the leaking continuing. It will be on video.
The mechanic will not be able to deny the backfiring. There will be a recording of it.
Critics of originalism are actually not critics of originalism. They are just critics of originalist conservatives. The basis of their criticism is that conservatives are doing originalism wrong, and the critics would know because actually they love originalism and are like really good at being originalists, better than the, uh, original originalists.
This is what some of the comments here seem to be suggesting.
No, I'm a critic of originalism-as-theory and I think self-described originalists are just using it as a rhetorical device to justify their pre-determined outcomes. The two really aren't contradictory.
Ok. So your take is that while original public meaning can be determined, that is not the proper method or theory for applying the Constitution -- and even if it were, originalists are just cherry picking history or using this as a rhetorical device rather than following the original public meaning.
I'm not sure yours is the most common "anti-originalist" position or thinking. Regardless, the proper theory or method of applying the Constitution is what then? Judges are free to reinterpret or change meanings but should use empathy and do the morally right thing, or something like that?
I'm curious why you think that's a reasonable conclusion about my "take".
Because you implied it above.
But ok, if your position is that original public meaning cannot be determined, then back to my original comment demonstrating why Blackman has a point:
"It's impossible to determine exactly what those words mean. Now here's exactly what they mean."
Are you conflating conversational precision and legal precision on purpose?
I don't get the "Now here's exactly what they mean" part. I don't think that's what the historians are doing.
They're just saying, watch this! I can weave a way better story than you just did, and which argues for the opposite outcome.
They don't need to say that their version is "true," just "more compelling." I think they would agree that more research or some new discovery could always change the analysis.
I would think the question is not whether a "story" can be "weaved" using facts selectively, but whether on balance all of the historical facts taken together support a particular meaning of a word or interpretation of a phrase.
But the criticism you describe, assuming it is in good faith and not just trying to sow doubt, seems to embrace the principle that original public meaning should control. It only questions, somewhat timidly, whether conservatives have identified the original public meaning accurately. It would be stronger if it made a more affirmative case for the correct resolution of a case or controversy based on original public meaning given the weight of historical facts available.
I used "weave a story" intentionally because that's the only way it works.
Even if we had all of history laid bare for examination, there's no objective way to analyze it to arrive at a single answer. There are always contradictory signals. How much weight do you give to each? Why? We see that just with Breyer's dissent. Originalist opinions can simply never be fully convincing.
And that's assuming we have all the history. Hint: we do not. So add to the above the fact that we're mostly shooting in the dark, plus, as more research comes to light, the analysis and hence the meaning of the Constitution changes over time! That's not great.
I know you see these exact problems in Heller's abandonment of Miller. Well, they're not going away. They're inherent to Originalism.
But you're discussing a problem that's a thousand times worse for living constitutionalism. Originalists might pull a meaning out of their fecal orifices if history fails to adequately constrain meaning, or they're incompetent/dishonest. Living constitutionalists are formally committed to obtaining their meaning there!
Because they're committed to the notion that constitutional change happens informally, and informal changes have no formal anchor for their meaning. No text. Just penumbras and sweet mysteries.
So, your worst case with originalism, your absolute worst case, is that it devolves into living constitutionalism.
Yeah, that's the whole point.
The vast majority of the time, it's not very difficult to analyze what the words mean that are used in the Constitution. Yes there are hard cases. The thing is, even if originalist opinions can never be fully convincing (in your opinion), a non-originalist opinion can never be even partly convincing -- unless you adopt a "living constitution" theory which says that judges should just do the morally right thing, or whatever.
Cases and controversies have to be decided, and the arguments briefed. The fact that some hypothetical knowledge or history may exist somewhere out there in the ether doesn't really come in to play. In any event, it seems extremely doubtful that new information would be discovered that bears significantly on the original meaning of most constitutional provisions. Of course, entirely new facts develop, and new research and technology reveal or shed light on existing facts. So facts change and the application of the law to those facts is often uncharted territory, but that's not the same thing as the Constitution itself changing.
This is, of course, totally false.
The thing is, even if originalist opinions can never be fully convincing (in your opinion), a non-originalist opinion can never be even partly convincing
A set of constitently applied "Constitutional Construction" rules, similar but different from the statutory construction ones, would do just fine. You just wouldn't like the outcomes, because you've been sold the Originalist lie that the parts of the Constitution you don't like (such as the Militia clause) can be fixed by simply ignoring them, "as is traditional."
M L, this may be hard for a lawyer to grasp, but in the unlikely event that a professional historian takes an interest in originalism, it will not be with an eye to affecting legal outcomes. It will be with an eye to explaining why historical methods chosen to affect today's legal outcomes cannot be reconciled to methods necessary to think forthrightly about the past.
What historians understand, and lawyers do not, is that the past is a far stranger place than anyone with a typically present-minded point of view can grasp. Novice historians discover that first-hand. They commence reading original sources, beginning with an uncorrected present-minded frame of reference for context. They discover it does not work.
Narratives from the past—for instance in the form of historically archived court cases, news reports, or exchanges of correspondence—time and again touch on topics which the modern reader recognizes with an expectation of familiarity. He naively expects each such narrative to take a modernistic turn, and to deliver historical nuggets applicable to modern considerations.
Time and again, nearly every time, it does not happen. The conversation disclosed by the documents typically veers off in an unexpected direction, almost never again to touch on anything which a similar modern conversation would consider.
At first that experience seems curious—as if a bunch of cases which seemed promising all went off-course together, perhaps by a quirkish spate of bad luck. Later, when enough work has been done to show that the phenomenon is not only persistent, but also nearly universal, the real work of historical insight begins.
The new premise, unavoidable given the evidence, is that the past has little indeed to do with the present. Reflection provides an explanation. Every historical document depends on context for its principal meanings. Each is endowed with the historical context which existed at the moment of its creation. That fact frustrates accurate insight based on modern context.
Almost everything comprising modern context is a product not of the historical past under study, but instead of the interval which lay in the unknowable future of those historical figures, but closer to our own time than they were. That modernist context—no part of the historical context of any document studied—is all but indelibly imprinted on the modernist critical faculty.
Thus, the inevitable result of every modernist reading is that modern premises affecting meaning get read back into past documents, mistakenly attributing to the past inflections which instead accumulated later—during an interval which was then yet to come. Paradoxically—in the same way that time travel is paradoxical—the unknowable historical future re-emerges as the well-known modern past. Historical figures' unknowable destiny did not affect anything they said or did, not in the slightest. Ingrained as that same interval is in our own formative experience, it affects everything we think we understand about the past. Posing as analytical insight, that false knowledge hides from us the full measure of history's unfamiliarity.
That is a problem which academic historians recognize, study, and work to circumvent. But it is a problem not even slightly suspected by almost anyone else. It has become an imposing stumbling block in the way of intellectually respectable originalism. A professional historian would be far more interested in telling you that—if you were equipped to listen to it—than to try to mobilize for present purposes the flawed methods historical study has already taught historians to avoid.
So the answer is "M L is bad at reading comprehension and not giving into projection".
Here's a hint: you are setting up a false dichotomy and then expecting others to play along.
Or maybe, you're bad at explaining yourself. Or some combination of the two!
Do you think the original meaning of a word or phrase in the Constitution can be reasonably determined by weighing the historical facts, as necessary to decide a case or controversy arising under it?
If yes, do you think that original meaning should control?
If the meaning is not reasonably determinable, or should not control, then what theory or method or sage advice would you offer?
If you think I've presented a false dichotomy, can you explain what it is and why it is a false dichotomy?
Professor Blackman levies a major don’t-trust-the-elites charge against professional historians, saying that their opinions and their work is not to be relied on, at least when they support conclusions Professor Blackman disagrees with. Do not historians bearing briefs.
His evidence? In one particular incident a group of academic historians filing an amicus brief were allegedly wrong about the genuineness of an Alexander Hamilton signature.
A sweeping generalization about a whole group. One single anecdote about one instant.
The gap between the theory and the evidence boggles the imagination. It’s as bad as claiming an entire election is fraudulent because a few people who cast early mail-in ballots died by election day, or maybe by the day one checked.
It's not even that compelling; as I noted above, most of the amici were law professors, not academic historians.
His specific complaint, I gather, was that they couldn't explain how they'd gotten it wrong: "Yet, to this day, the legal historians have never explained how and why they reached their conclusion."
In the National Archives, among Alexander Hamilton's papers, there is a handwritten document with an endorsement that says "Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury". How much of an elaboration do you think Prof. Blackman is entitled to as far as why someone might think that the document was signed by Alexander Hamilton?
Good thing Blackman never reads the comments - this one was a scorcher!
The more most people scorn and mock him, the more convinced he becomes that his crusade is the one true way
The real problem with the relationship between history and originalism isn't actually whether judges or Justices will use motivated reasoning as they try to use history to justify their rulings. The problem is with the history itself.
The United States began as a nation with some wonderful, lofty ideals about liberty and the just powers of government being derived from the consent of the people. But from that beginning, it wasn't living up to them. It was always going to be a work in progress. So, to take that flawed implementation of the high ideals written about in the Constitution as what must still be implemented now is wrongheaded. Why should we take cues about constitutional protections for voting rights now from a time most of the country did not allow women or people that weren't white to vote? Some places even restricted voting to people that owned property. Why should we take cues about how to apply the Establishment Clause from a time when anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant sentiment were intertwined?
Originalism inherently lines up with conservative thinking. Conservatives often look at the past with rose-colored glasses and yearn for those more "pure" times. It is not likely to be a coincidence that originalism wants to hold that constitutional meaning now must come from a time when some parts of the population were denied political power.
There is some truth in some of that.
If you really think the work in progress is to live up to those lofty ideals about liberty and the just powers of government being derived from the consent of the people, then you should consider a few propositions, 1) that decentralization of government power is a necessary condition to any sort of self-government or consent of the governed. There is no self-government in a semi-globalized system where people on different sides of a continent are ostensibly deciding what kind of dishwashers everyone is allowed to have among everything else, supposedly by voting for 1 of the 2 establishment party figureheads that are put forward every 4 years. 2) Following the rule of law or the original meaning of the Constitution is also a necessary condition to having self-government or consent of the governed. 3) Decentralization of government power is also a better protection of liberty in the long run. It doesn't seem like that to you because of emphasis on the narratives where states infringe on liberty and the federal government comes riding to the rescue. But the reality is the federal government infringes on liberty far more all around the world, and even when it protects liberty against state infringement it is usually using the opportunity to centralize government and expand its own powers. Any power that is used "for good" can also be used for bad and in fact is used that way, always and repeatedly.
1) What people on one side of the continent do can affect people on the other side of the continent. That includes what kind of dishwasher they use. Energy efficiency and water use matter to a lot of people. Enough people using inefficient appliances raise costs and reduce supplies of energy and water for everyone else. Detergents end up in wastewater that flows downstream and can contribute to dead zones and algae blooms that affect people hundreds or thousands of miles away. Environmental regulation is just one example of national, even international, cooperation that is necessary for the collective interest.
That may not be a term that conservatives or libertarians like, but the collective interest is the point of having government in the first place. There are needs that individuals are not capable of providing for themselves, unless you're talking about returning to basic subsistence, rather than having civilization. And purely voluntary associations are to be preferred, when that will work. But a central decision for the whole populace will need to be made in at least some cases. It is a political question itself to figure out when that is necessary. The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, and that is good since what is produced, bought, and sold ends up affecting more than the buyer and the seller.
2) Following "original meaning" is not a necessary precondition of self government. That is giving weight to those long since dead in governing the living. Consent of the governed is a continual process that relies entirely on the consent of those being governed now. The only meaningful difference between originalism and 'living constitutionalism', as I see things, is whether more weight is given to interpreting the words to those currently long dead or those currently alive. My preference is clear, I think.
3) Those cases where state and local governments were restrained from violating the liberties of those under their jurisdiction are extremely important. There is emphasis placed on that for good reason. A balance between central government and local government is good, but basic rights are universal, not dependent on whether a local majority agrees to honor them.
The majority of complaints about excessive federal power in the U.S. from libertarians are centered around economic and environmental regulation. Or, as we have seen in the last few years, public health and public education issues. The kinds of violations of basic human rights you seem to be referring to "around the world" from central governments are exactly the kinds of things the U.S. federal government was needed to prevent in our history. We probably share skepticism of the 'surveillance state', but I think we can walk and chew gum and the same time. I think that we can try and hold the federal law enforcement and intelligence communities to a higher standard than we currently do while also using the federal government, especially the courts, to make sure that local majorities don't abuse their power.
Any power that is used "for good" can also be used for bad and in fact is used that way, always and repeatedly.
And it requires the current voting population to be wary of those that they elect. The power wielded by those that wrote the Constitution and its most important Amendments for constraining government power was not always used for good, so relying on their understanding of government power is not always going to be good either.
Too many voters on all sides, left, right, middle, up or down, are only wary of what the other sides want to do with power. That is what leads to most of the dysfunction in democratic republics. I have long thought that it was more important for people to focus their skepticism on what they tend to agree with than with what they disagree with. People are already well motivated to exercise skepticism towards the opposition. It is those that think like we do that are the most likely to fool us, or more accurately, to convince us to fool ourselves. That is why we must always make a special effort to look carefully at our own beliefs and arguments and those of our allies.
1) You can have self-government, or you can have centralized control over large areas and many disparate groups. You can't have both. Of course, there are many arguments in either direction. Generally those who argue for a strong centralized government or even global government say that it is more efficient, more profitable, necessary for industrial and technological advancement, necessary for military reasons of defense or imperialistic expansion and influence, or necessary due to some existential threat. Centralized power and imperialism is the norm throughout human history from ancient times, whereas decentralization and self-government is a much newer idea. Obviously I favor decentralization. Voluntary cooperation where necessary for collective action problems is better than force and coercion and violence.
2) I disagree. The government does not have the consent of the governed to flout the Constitution. Not following the original meaning is flouting the Constitution.
The Constitution does not govern the people or any private party. It governs the government. You can't choose to disregard or change the laws that apply to you, and the government shouldn't be able to disregard or change the law that applies to it. The Constitution can be amended and has been many times. That is how living people can easily change the constitution if they really want government to be more powerful and more centralized. For the reasons I have been discussing, it was originally contemplated that state governments would be the primary governments directing the vast majority of government impacts on peoples' daily lives.
3) "basic rights are universal, not dependent on whether a local majority agrees to honor them."
I didn't take you for a natural rights/law kind of person. But I agree the founder's theory is compelling that there are inalienable natural rights, independent of whether those rights are respected or protected. I think that women in Afghanistan have inalienable rights that are not respected or protected. That doesn't mean going in and imposing "liberty" at gunpoint is a good solution. And I doubt that's what the US does in practice anyway. I don't see what liberty was advanced by Gaddafi being knifed in the rear end. I think it had the opposite effect, and that he was probably killed because of oil and other menacing plans like an African gold-backed currency.
"Too many voters on all sides, left, right, middle, up or down, are only wary of what the other sides want to do with power. That is what leads to most of the dysfunction in democratic republics. I have long thought that it was more important for people to focus their skepticism on what they tend to agree with than with what they disagree with."
I agree somewhat, but the real cause of our dysfunction is trying to impose one-size-fits-all government policies on a vast empire, instead of having local self-government. The dysfunction works very much to the benefit of those who promote and profit greatly from the continued inversion of our founding structure into the opposite form of unlimited centralized government power.
I'd think that anyone who went to college would know that there's no such thing as an unbiased academic. And that goes ten-fold for anyone in the humanities. The idea that "professional historians" don't have huge axes to grind is too preposterous for any serious person to seriously entertain.
Yet, many historians claim that they are uniquely qualified to engage in constitutional originalism.
I doubt there is much evidence of leading historians making any such claims. If you are talking about using the historical record to decide important present-day legal questions, why would you even consider the advice of any but the most respected historians?
If you do consult those historians, do not expect much cooperation in what most will criticize as an intellectually bankrupt premise. By intellectually bankrupt, by the way, they will not mean that they disapprove; they will mean the originalist premise is impossible to vindicate in any intellectually respectable way.
To understand why historians say that, originalists would have to think much harder about the problems of interpreting the past than most of them have ever tried to do.
Science told me masks work, the polar ice caps would melt, and coastal cities would be under water.
Science, especially when funded by governments, can have its own biases. Give the govt what it wants, or you don’t get any more money.
I guess you are probably right.
There are a lot of gullible people out there, and lots of people who claim to be experts but aren't.
However with legal briefs as is the subject here, on most high profile cases there are a half dozen briefs with opposing viewpoints. Even if you decide to only give credence to viewpoints you support, there are still often contradictory reasons on why that viewpoint is correct, and it's often quite educational to see where they differ and why.
And sometimes everyone's argument is convincing even when they come to opposing conclusions. I found that the case in Van Buren v. United States, where I favored the result in Van Buren v. US, and found Barrett's opinion convincing, but then read Thomas's dissent and found it just as convincing.
Well no longer in more and more locales. Does that make you happy?
Professionals tend to be properly educated, reasoning, modern, and inclusive.
There is nothing there for conservatives.
Jazzizhep — Do you think the polar icecaps are not melting?