The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
Today in Supreme Court History: May 16, 1918
Editor's Note: We invite comments and request that they be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of Reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason at any time. Comments may only be edited within 5 minutes of posting. Report abuses.
Please
to post comments
The beginning of the holy cause to make the world safe for [American] democracy!
Artie should have a field day with this, except of course it means raining down fire on the religious progressives of that era. But the love of Jesus and America was strong in them, so hold firm Rev.
Artie -- a victim of viewpoint-driven and hypocritical censorship -- was banned by the Volokh Conspiracy Board Of Censors for making fun of conservatives a bit too deftly for the proprietor's taste.
I am Arthur. I have been censored repeatedly when criticizing conservatives at this right-wing blog but have not been banned, at least not yet.
If I were to call you Arthur I would feel much too much like Mrs. Cunningham.
I thought they upheld convictions under the earlier 1917 act, not the 1918 Act.
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (decided May 16, 1988): police can search garbage left out by the curb without a warrant
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (decided May 16, 1905): State of Washington must respect fishing rights granted to Native Americans under treaty made with federal government when Washington was a territory
Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n of Mississippi, 286 U.S. 276 (decided May 16, 1932): a state supreme court court can't evade United States Supreme Court review by basing its decision on state law grounds that are insubstantial and illusory after a party has properly raised a federal issue (the issue was whether state taxation on income from activities out of state is consistent with Equal Protection)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (decided May 16, 2016): Fair Credit Reporting Act suit citing incorrect information as to plaintiff on credit reporting agency web site did not allege "concrete" injury and therefore was not a "case or controversy" sufficient to invoke Article III jurisdiction
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (decided May 16, 2011): "exigent circumstances to prevent destruction of evidence" exception to warrant requirement applied when police officers, having knocked on door, broke it down after hearing noises of frantic movement as if to hide things
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (decided May 16, 1983): attorney in civil rights case (involving treatment during involuntary hospitalization) prevailing on most but not all claims is entitled to recoup fees spent in pursing related though unsuccessful claims but not fees as to factually unrelated claims
Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368 (decided May 16, 1994): ex-felon still bound by federal post-conviction restriction on ownership of firearm even though restriction due to state law conviction had been lifted
Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. 386 (decided May 16, 1850): judgment debtors in suit brought by the United States (for failure to pay a promissory note) are barred by sovereign immunity from moving to enjoin enforcement
Amis v. Myers, 57 U.S. 492 (decided May 16, 1854): in executing a judgment one cannot force the sale of the debtor's slaves
The slave case _Amis v. Myers_ is less exciting than the summary. The slaves in question did not belong to the debtor even though they were on his plantation.
Like a lot of early cases, the language is hard to follow and we don't have a lower court opinion available that might shed light on the facts. Who was "the defendant in the execution"? If the holding was that one can't force the sale of slaves in the execution of a judgment against a third party, then I stand corrected, but why would anyone be able to execute against a non-debtor?
I had to read it a few times. Then a light bulb went on.
David Myers had a judgment against William D. Amis. William D. Amis signed a contract to buy slaves. Something came up to prevent completion of the sale. Junius Amis, who lived on the same plantation as William, assumed the contract and bought the slaves. Myers took Junius' slaves to settle William's debt. His mistake may well have been understandable, but it was a mistake.
The Supreme Court found the execution against the wrong party so clearly erroneous, and the decision below so clearly wrong, that it took the case to prevent it from setting a precedent.
"Purchased" really means "agreed to purchase" (since the sale never really went through). "Defendant in the execution" was William Amis. "Plaintiff" was Junius, whose name was later inserted into the bill of sale as the "vendee".
Do I have this right?
The phrase "defendant in execution" must mean the original defendant, William, because he is distinguished from the plaintiff in the Circuit Court action, Junius.
I misstated the clear error mentioned by the court. The clear error was treating the case as one in equity when there was an adequate legal remedy. Execution against the wrong party was merely an ordinary error.
Correction (h/t to John F. Carr) as to Amis v. Myers: slaves cannot be sold as part of executing judgment because slaves did not belong to debtor
In _Lawrence_ a taxpayer challenged tax breaks given to his competition. The Supreme Court of Mississippi construed the challenge to be an attack on the particular statute granting tax breaks. Invalidating the statute would not change his taxes so he was not entitled to relief.
Yes, that was also true.
Today in Supreme Court history, roughly six of the nine justices will chuckle quietly at the notion that they can do anything to reduce the carnage caused by firearms -- other than offer their thoughts and prayers of course.
What solution do you have to offer, regardless of it's constitutionality?
Better Americans will identify and arrange suitable gun safety laws -- likely involving, for example, effective background checks, registration, and reasonable regulation of gun-related conduct and firepower -- over time.
I hope the predictable mainstream snapback against gun absolutism does not interfere with a right to possess a reasonable firearm in the home for self-defense.
What specifically would these reasonable regulations be - over and above what the State of NY already applies?