The Volokh Conspiracy
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Judge's Advice That Party "'Zip It' on Social Media" Isn't an Injunction
From U.S. v. Haight v. RRSA (Commercial Division), LLC, decided Wednesday by Judge Karen Gren Scholer (N.D. Tex.):
Two weeks after announcing [that the case had settled], Defendants filed the instant Motion requesting dismissal as a sanction against Plaintiff-Relator Tina Haight or, alternatively, "other appropriate sanctions," based on Relator's alleged "defamatory and false statements" on social media regarding Defendants, the litigation, and the parties' recent settlement. Defendants assert that Relator "continues to disparage and damage the reputations of the RRSA Defendants through unsupported and factually false allegations," and that this conduct has negatively impacted settlement negotiations and "cannot be stopped without judicial intervention." Defendants further request an order enjoining "Relator from making any further posts, comments or messages on social media related to this case or the RRSA Defendants, or from otherwise defaming or disparaging the RRSA Defendants." …
Defendants' Motion does not claim that Relator's conduct violates any term of the parties' settlement agreement, such as a confidentiality provision or non-disparagement clause. But in any event, such a garden-variety breach of contract claim is an independent cause of action not before the Court.
Similarly, Relator's alleged defamatory statements are not inherently abusive of the judicial process as required to warrant the Court's exercise of its limited discretionary power. Nor is the Court convinced that the requested injunctive relief is within the scope of its inherent authority to sanction—even ignoring the potential First Amendment ramifications of enjoining a private litigant's out-of-court statements as a sanction for other out-of-court statements. Defendants' allegations of disparagement and reputational harm are actionable, if at all, in a suit for defamation.
Finally, Defendants' Motion references the Court's statement at the December 9, 2021, hearing in an attempt to establish violation of a court order. However, the Court's off-the-record suggestion to Relator's counsel that their client "zip it" on social media was informal advice to facilitate settlement, not a court order for sanctions purposes. Accordingly, because Relator's statements are "neither before the district court nor in direct defiance of its orders, the conduct is beyond the reach of the court's inherent authority to sanction."
For defendants' side of the matter, see the motion.
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I assume that this decision was followed by an order for costs against the defendants?
The motion was denied before the plaintiff responded, so her costs should be zero.
Parent to Child: Zip-It!
Child to Parent: That's not an order, just advice.
Wasn't there a Kozinski opinion that included the line, "the parties are advised to chill."
Not a legally binding order, it turns out.
Yes. Mattel v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002)
https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1260576.html
That was later echoed by Michael Mukasey, then SDNY judge, later Attorney General. Tommy Hilfiger Licensing v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/221/410/2486298/
I am waiting for the judge who says to a party: "Settle down, Beavis."
Even better would be if the court advised counsel to "Get [his] thumb out of his ear, and put it back in [his] butt where it belongs."
I have on several occasions advised internal clients to "knock it off." In fact, I held several such clients in contempt, but not the kind you spend the night in jail for.
Apart from the fact that something a judge says to a party at a hearing, about what the party must or must not do out of court, is not an enforceable court order.
This concept played a significant role in a contempt defense I did many years ago. Can't put my hands on it but I am vaguely recalling a very pithy Seventh Circuit ruling from Posner or EasterBunny to that effect