The Volokh Conspiracy
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Licensing of Speaking Professions Doesn't Violate First Amendment
So holds the Eleventh Circuit, as to dieticians, viewing itself as bound by an earlier decision involving interior designers.
From Del Castillo v. Secretary, decided Friday in an opinion by Judge Robert Luck, joined by Judges Elizabeth Branch and Ed Carnes (see the bottom of the post for my thoughts on the subject):
Heather Kokesch Del Castillo, an unlicensed dietician and nutritionist, claims that Florida's Dietetics and Nutrition Practice Act, which requires a license to practice as a dietician or nutritionist, violates her First Amendment free speech rights to communicate her opinions and advice on diet and nutrition to her clients. {Del Castillo owned and operated a health-coaching business called Constitution Nutrition. She started her business in California, which did not require her to have a license to operate it. After moving to Florida in 2015, Del Castillo continued to run her business—meeting online with most of her clients and meeting in person with two clients who lived in Florida. She described herself as a "holistic health coach" and not as a dietician. Del Castillo tailored her health coaching to each client, which included dietary advice.} …
[O]ur decision in Locke v. Shore (11th Cir. 2011) … held that a similar state licensing scheme for commercial interior designers did not violate the free speech rights of unlicensed interior designers. [And we conclude that Locke was not] abrogated by the Supreme Court's decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018)….
[In Locke,] "[w]e conclude[d] that Florida's license requirement [was] constitutional under the First Amendment[.]" … The first reason we gave was that a "statute that governs the practice of an occupation is not unconstitutional as an abridgement of the right to free speech, so long as any inhibition of that right is merely the incidental effect of observing an otherwise legitimate regulation." … The second reason we gave for concluding that the interior designer licensing scheme did not violate the First Amendment was that, if "the government enact[ed] generally applicable licensing provisions limiting the class of persons who may practice the profession, it cannot be said to have enacted a limitation on freedom of speech … subject to First Amendment scrutiny." There was "a difference," we reasoned, "for First Amendment purposes, between regulating professionals' speech to the public at large versus their direct, personalized speech with clients." The interior designer "license requirement regulate[d] solely the latter," we said. This second reason, derived from Justice White's concurring opinion in Lowe v. SEC (1985), is the professional speech doctrine….
Del Castillo argues that … NIFLA rejected the "professional speech doctrine[,]" [s]o the prop supporting Locke's holding has been taken away, and Locke has been abrogated. For three reasons, we disagree.
First, Locke's First Amendment holding relied on more than the "professional speech doctrine." The Locke court also concluded that the interior designer licensing requirement did not violate the First Amendment because it was "a professional regulation with a merely incidental effect on protected speech." "A statute that governs the practice of an occupation is not unconstitutional as an abridgment of the right to free speech, so long as any inhibition of that right is merely the incidental effect of observing an otherwise legitimate regulation."
Second, while the NIFLA Court "refused to recognize professional speech as a new speech category deserving less protection," it also reaffirmed that "[s]tates may regulate professional conduct, even though that conduct incidentally involves speech." The NIFLA Court explained that "regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech" have been "upheld," and the "First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech."
Third, NIFLA did not undermine Locke to the point of abrogation. "We are bound to follow a prior panel or en banc holding, except where that holding has been overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by a subsequent en banc or Supreme Court decision." A prior panel precedent is "undermined," we explained in United States v. Petite, where the "Supreme Court's subsequent decision … so fully undermined our prior panel's decision … as to abrogate its holding." To "fully undermine[]" a prior panel decision, the later Supreme Court decision must "demolish[]" and "eviscerate[]" each of its "fundamental props." Because Locke's holding relied on more than the "professional speech doctrine"—and the only thing NIFLA refused to recognize was the "professional speech doctrine"—both of Locke's props have not been demolished; its holding is still standing.
The NIFLA Court spoke with unmistakable clarity about the line of precedents upholding regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech and another line of precedents (upholding laws compelling the disclosure of information in certain contexts): "neither line of precedents is implicated here." Reasoning based on a line of Supreme Court precedents that the Court itself emphasizes in a later decision is not implicated by that later decision cannot have been rejected, overruled, or abrogated by the later decision.
So what we have here is a prior panel precedent—the holding in Locke—that rests on two bases, only one of which has been rejected by the Supreme Court while the other basis has not been. If anything, that surviving basis or rationale has been endorsed by the Supreme Court. And it takes only one valid basis or rationale for a prior holding to make it binding precedent….
Applying Locke to this case, we conclude that the Act's licensing scheme for dieticians and nutritionists regulated professional conduct and only incidentally burdened Del Castillo's speech. Because the burden on her speech rights was only incidental, the Act's licensing scheme did not violate her First Amendment free speech rights.
The Act regulates "dietetics and nutrition practice," which involves
assessing nutrition needs and status using appropriate data; recommending appropriate dietary regimens, nutrition support, and nutrient intake; ordering therapeutic diets; improving health status through nutrition research, counseling, and education; and developing, implementing, and managing nutrition care systems, which includes, but is not limited to, evaluating, modifying, and maintaining appropriate standards of high quality in food and nutrition care services.
And the Act regulates "nutrition counseling," which entails "advising and assisting individuals or groups on appropriate nutrition intake by integrating information from the nutrition assessment." In enacting this regulation, the Florida legislature specifically found that "the practice of dietetics and nutrition or nutrition counseling by unskilled and incompetent practitioners presents a danger to the public health and safety."
Assessing a client's nutrition needs, conducting nutrition research, developing a nutrition care system, and integrating information from a nutrition assessment are not speech. They are "occupational conduct"; they're what a dietician or nutritionist does as part of her professional services.
The profession also involves some speech—a dietician or nutritionist must get information from her clients and convey her advice and recommendations. But, to the extent the Act burdens speech, the burden is an incidental part of regulating the profession's conduct.
The Act's effect on speech for dieticians and nutritionists is as incidental as was the licensing scheme in Locke's effect on speech for interior designers. The interior designer licensing scheme in Locke defined "interior design" as "designs, consultations, studies, drawings, specifications, and administration of design construction contracts relating to nonstructural interior elements of a building or structure." Interior design included "reflected ceiling plans, space planning, furnishings, and the fabrication of nonstructural elements within and surrounding interior spaces of buildings."
But interior design also involved some speech. An interior designer not only creates designs and drawings of nonstructural interior elements of a building; she also has to talk to her clients about their preferences and communicate the final designs and drawings to the clients. Even so, the fact that the profession involved speech did not mean that the licensing scheme for interior designers violated the First Amendment. Rather, because "the [interior designer] license requirement [was] a professional regulation with a merely incidental effect on protected speech," we held that it was "constitutional under the First Amendment."
We're bound by Locke to reach the same conclusion here. Like the interior designer licensing scheme in Locke, the Act regulated the professional conduct of dieticians and nutritionists and only incidentally burdened Del Castillo's free speech rights. Because the Act "is a professional regulation with a merely incidental effect on protected speech," it is "constitutional under the First Amendment." …
Here's my view (cf. pp. 1043-49 of this article): Regulation of (say) surgery or the distribution of pharmaceuticals is regulation of conduct, and the speech between surgeon and patient might well be incidental to that conduct. Likewise, regulation of the filing of documents in court on behalf of clients might be labeled as regulation of conduct, or at least of speech in a nonpublic forum.
But the regulation of people who give advice about diet (or who give psychotherapeutic advice, without prescribing drugs) is all about regulating speech. To be sure, giving such advice requires "[a]ssessing" the facts, "conducting … research," "developing" a plan of action, and integrating information into that plan. That, though, could equally be said about journalists or historians or political activists, who also assess facts, conduct research, develop a plan for their own writing and perhaps for the conduct of people who pay attention to them, and integrate information into the plan. Surely that can't be enough to justify regulating such speakers, on the theory that they are actually "professionals" engaged in "conduct."
And the government is regulating the dietary coach's speech precisely because it communicates information to people—information on which the people might act in ways the government might think is harmful to themselves (or perhaps, as to some professions, to others). The government is thus regulating the speech, and the assessments and research involved in producing the speech, precisely because of what the speech communicates.
This is a speech restriction, and relabeling it a conduct restriction strikes me as just obscuring the matter. As the Eleventh Circuit held en banc in Wollschlaeger v. Governor, "the enterprise of labeling certain verbal or written communications 'speech' and others 'conduct' is unprincipled and susceptible to manipulation," even when that speech happens within the practice of a profession (there, medicine). "[C]haracterizing speech as conduct is a dubious constitutional enterprise."
This having been said, perhaps there is room, even after NIFLA, at greater restrictions of professional-client speech. (NIFLA expressed some skepticism about such restrictions, but expressly declined to "foreclose the possibility that" there is "a persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles.") Perhaps, just as concrete solicitation of specific illegal behavior involving specific items or targets is more regulable than abstract advocacy of illegal behavior, so concrete urging of specific legal but potentially harmful dietary changes by the particular client should be more regulable than abstract advocacy. Or perhaps that's especially so when combined with the client's having deliberately sought out the professional for individualized advice, and often having paid the professional handsomely for such advice. Certainly American law has long allowed the licensing of speaking professions (such as the giving of legal advice, even without filing documents in court, or such as psychotherapy); perhaps the Supreme Court will ultimately recognize that this tradition is constitutionally permissible.
But I think courts should recognize that this does indeed require recognizing a zone of special regulation for professional-client speech, rather than pretending that it's "conduct."
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Wouldn't it be easier to agree that this is definitely a regulation of speech, but to discuss whether it is a proportionate regulation? Given that strict scrutiny = government loses and rational basis = government wins, maybe it's time to develop a third option in between.
Intermediate scrutiny? Genius! Glad you thought of that.
But this is regulation of speech because of its content -- because it is about nutrition and diet. So you would need a theory as to why this regulation of content is deserving of a lower level of scrutiny than normal content-based regulations (which are assessed under strict scrutiny). I believe that was Prof. Volokh's point.
The justification for intermediate scrutiny would probably be related to the facts that (1) it is outside the core of First Amendment protection (i.e., it's not political); (2) it is sold for profit; and (3) it can involve implicitly misleading consumers (which is the justification for intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech).
Now will SCOTUS create a new category of less protected speech? I'm skeptical, but those would be the reasons to do it.
3 is the only concern, akin to truth in advertising. The other two are bs made up of whole cloth, yea, e'en unto Supreme Court decisions.
Know ye then politicians live for corruption, to get in the way, to get paid to get out of the way, or to help their connected cronies. It is why they go into politics.
Quit giving them easy cover stories to block things.
2 is the only one that makes sense to me. In some sense it can be seen as not a prohibition/prior restraint on speech itself, but rather on the commercial act. "You can speak all you want, but the government will regulate the transaction, define when you can charge."
1 is, as Krayt put it, BS. That's not what the Constitution actually says. 3 is just a subcategory of 2 - or a reason why you might want to regulate the sale as distinct from the act of speaking. Speech made without a commercial transaction can be just as misleading (and arguably, is more likely to be so because the person trying to earn a living through speech has extra incentive to be accurate, lest they lose their audience).
Note that I don't AGREE with the heavy licensure of advice-based professions, but I think the commercial transactions can be regulated in a way that speaking without being paid can't.
"Wouldn't it be easier to agree that this is definitely a regulation of speech, but to discuss whether it is a proportionate regulation?"
Easier? Sure. Correct? No.
The burden of proof should be on the scumbag lawyer profession to show that a license is safe and effective at protecting the public. Have unlicensed nutritionists or interior designers hurt more people compared to licensed ones. There is a natural experiment in California to answer that question.
The empirical basis of lawmaking, safe and effective, is so beyond the intelligence of these scumbags as to be inconceivable to them.
I'd rather get the government out of psychotherapy businesses such as mass formation psychosis. Many doctors have been censored the past 2 years.
The general rule seems to be that, as soon as money changes hands, constitutional rights leave the room. I'm kind of at a loss for any basis for that.
Unless you are selling a newspaper, or broadcasting a news show with advertisements. Then the 1st Amendment counts double.
So, it counts as 1st amendment if you're in a position to effectively give politicians bad PR, not otherwise.
This is a made up rule whose purpose is to reinstall corruption that exists worldwide, here. The impulse is always with us, but is blocked.
Was blocked.
"a similar state licensing scheme for commercial interior designers"
Person A: What an ugly sofa. You should get another one.
Person B: That's unlicensed interior design advice! Call the cops!
Almost as if "commercial" was meant to convey doing something for profit instead of a random comment.
That's glossing over it. The practice of law can easily be done without filing any documents. A law license is the #1 analogy to this case.
I think the court was right that they were bound by precedent. But that just makes even clearer that the precedent was wrong.
Yes, the logic seems at least arguable here, in that overseeing health and safety of citizens in the practice of relevant professions such as medicine has long been considered an appropriate government function. Nutrition is at least related to health so some connection could be argued.
But the precedent concerned the non-structural components of...Interior Design? I mean, I've been in theatre lobbies that could be considered crimes against humanity, but there were no non-structural elements that presented an actual physical danger.
I'm too lazy to look it up. Does anyone know the rationale of the court justifying government regulation of the Interior Design profession?
"Does anyone know the rationale of the court justifying government regulation of the Interior Design profession?"
Because Fuck You, That's Why.
The arrogance of the scumbag lawyer profession and of its wholly owned subsidiary, government, knows no bounds. Rent seeking is its only aim.
Hey crazy, stupid, racist person: it has nothing to do with lawyers.
Cronies donated, and got protection from the mafia.
It' s not a bright line rule, but when the stakes of the advice are really high (your health, going to prison or getting sued), the justification for licensing and regulation are higher. But yeah, interior designers? Fortune tellers? Strip clubs?
"It' s not a bright line rule, but when the stakes of the advice are really high (your health, going to prison or getting sued), the justification for licensing and regulation are higher."
Well, that works both ways. Regulation can silence good advice when the stakes are high just as easily as it can silence bad advice.
I could see the govt would want fire and safety codes enforced for interior design.
Don't use flammable material, e.g. curtains.
Ensure Exits paths are free and well marked.
Don't store things under stairwells.
This just in: The Dursleys only put Harry Potter under the stairs because of insufficiently regulated interior decoration advice.
David Bernstein's ears are currently aflame.
ALSO EYEBROW-RAISING: ANOTHER REGULATED PROFESSION
We had a good one a few years ago on licensing of eyebrow threaders in Texas. It got litigated under the state-con law version of due process. Successfully.
Justice-now-Judge Don Willett did a fine job expounding on Texans' natural birthright to eye-thread concurringly. Jonathan Mitchell (of SB8 fame) was on the case for the regulatory agency as-then state Solicitor General and Greg Abbott was the head honcho at the OAG at the time.
C. W. 'Rocky' Rhodes, a colleague of a certain notable if not notorious Nonblackman at the South Texas College of Law in Swampland City weighed in as one of the amici.
See here: Patel v. Texas Dep't of Licensing and Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015),
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7017811002225614343&hl=en&as_sdt=6,44
"In this declaratory judgment action several individuals practicing commercial eyebrow threading and the salon owners employing them assert that, as applied to them, Texas's licensing statutes and regulations violate the Texas Constitution's due course of law provision. They claim that most of the 750 hours of training Texas requires for a license to practice commercial eyebrow threading are not related to health and safety or what threaders actually do. The State concedes that over 40% of the required hours are unrelated, but maintains that the licensing requirements are nevertheless constitutional. The trial court and court of appeals agreed with the State. We do not. We reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings."
AND NOW, THE PUBLIC EDUCATION PART, FOR ALL THINGS HAIR-RAZING
Threaders tightly wind a single strand of cotton thread, form a loop in it with their fingers, tighten the loop, and then quickly brush the thread along the skin of the client, trapping unwanted hair in the loop and removing it. In 2011, commercial threading became regulated in Texas when the Legislature categorized it as a practice of "cosmetology."
TEXAS OCCUPATIONS CODE § 1602.002(a)(8) ("`[C]osmetology' means the practice of performing or offering to perform for compensation ... [the] remov[al] [of] superfluous hair from a person's body using depilatories, preparations, or tweezing techniques....").
Seems to me this is an example of commercial speech vs private speech.
"But three tires get one free!," is commercial speech but if I get four tires and you charge me for four tires, then we have a problem.
So, if you're paying for a good or service, then the govt can regulate.
The problem in your hypothetical exchange is fraud, not commercial speech, and speech integral to fraud has never been within the First Amendment's ambit.
Right, that's why govt has to regulate commercial speech in order to detect/fight fraud.
I think we're just going to have to agree to disagree there. I agree with the Supreme Court that the relevant kind of unprotected speech here is speech integral to a crime (fraud) rather than "commercial speech" in a general sense. Laws against fraud cover both traditional business transactions and other kinds of fraud.
Let's say, that as part of my decorating aesthetic I have an old advertisement from a tire shop that says "Buy 3 tires get the 4th free" and I later decide to sell a set of 4 tires I took off my car on Craigslist or Facebook Marketplace, etc. Is it fraud if I don't give the buyer the 4th tire free? Most people would say no, since the decor of my personal garage falls into the category of private speech.
A business on the other hand has to abide by different rules, their decor can't take the form of advertising without them being obligated to abide by that advertisement, because commercial speech is regulated differently
The New York Times charges for its newspapers. Does that mean the government gets to regulate what the papers contain?
Can the government impose a licensing scheme for anyone who wishes to publish and sell newspapers?
If one pushes the First Amendment principle to its maximum, a state school would violate it if it treated students differently based on the answers they give on tests. Moreover, leaders of organizations don’t do the work themselves. They give orders. So criminal laws could only touch the underlings who actually do the dirty work.
So there must necessarily be a set of exceptions, generally rooted in the common laws, that avoid First Amendment maximalizing leading to a completely ungovernable society.
I suspect that there probably should be an exception for progessional speech, perhaps somewhat analogous to but not necessarily the same as commercial speech.
But I think the 11th Circuit is right that this concept is not strictly needed. It seems to me that the type of recommendations dieticians make can straightforwardly be categorized as solicitation of conduct. Dieticians recommend that people change their behavior. Those recommendations are solicitation of conduct.
The concept of solicitation of conduct is most clearly seen in the context of criminal behavior. In that context, counseling people to engage in specific behavior in specific situations has a long history of being distinguished from abstract advocacy.
But the general advocacy/specific solicitation distinction can be made whether or not the underlying conduct is criminal. One can argue that just as the state’s power to prohibit conduct implies a power to prohibit soliciting it, its power to regulate conduct implies a power to regulate the act of soliciting it (as distinct from engaging in abstract advocacy for it). So if the state can licence dieticians as a profession, it can require people who give specifically tailored advice about diet for a fee to be licensed. That is, dietician-related solicitation.
Our current legal system makes a big distinction between “prescribing” a medicine and “recommending” a diet change. There are many entrenched reasons for this distinction. But I don’t see why it should make a constitutional difference. I don’t see why “prescribing” a medicine should be classified conduct but “recommending” a diet regimen in the context of a particularized individual counseling should be classified speech. Of course a state can make a distinction between the two, and doubtless there are many good policy reasons for doing so. But why in the world should the constitution? Indeed, it’s not clear that “diet change” and “medicine” are as intrinsically different as made out. Is recommending that people eat citrus fruits to prevent scurvey really “diet” and not “medicine?” It was considered medicine when the link was first discovered.
There’s a close enough, indeed obvious, link between nutrition and health that it’s entirely rational for a state to classify dieticians as an allied health profession analogous to the practice of medicine, and limit the construction of individually tailored diet plans to licensed professionals.
Libertarians may not like it, but the constitution does not enact the general Libertarian agenda, and courts exceed their authority if they attempt to use their powers to ram it down people’s throats. Professional licensing of dieticians is well within the power of the state.
The purpose of speech is to get others to change behavior. Even abstract transfers of data or art ultimately has that purpose. And I mean purpose, not just effect. It would be a funny First Amendment indeed that used that core reason for speech to abridge speech.
But as I note, the maximalisitic position would protect organized crime leaders, who merely use speech to influence their followers’ behavior and don’t actually fo anything. So there has to be a line.
Your argument, which Is maximalist in character, would if completely accepted leave the organized crime boss protected (plus prohibit states from discriminating against students for the content of their speech or their choice not to speak (e.g. not take tests, not turn in papers) when speaking. After all, the organized crime boss ordering a hit is doing exactly what you say should be protected - tryijg to influence people’s behavior. If that is entirely protected, so is the crime boss.
So unless you’re really prepared to defend the maximalist position and say the organized crime boss and the student who takes no tests are protected, you have to allow for a limiting principle. What’s your limiting principle and where would you draw the line? And why shouldn’t the line let the state do this?
That would be a real discussion.
If we accept that if the state can criminalize conduct it can criminalize soliciting that conduct (which includes advising a specific person to do it in a specific context, as distinct from abstract policy), it’s at least rational to argue that if the state can regulate conduct, it can also regulate soliciting that conduct, at least in a commercial context.
And you make no contrary argument. The only argument you make would equally protect solicitation of criminal conduct unconstitution. If you don’t actually want to do that, you have to make an argument that excludes what you don’t want protected. And you don’t.
No, they're advice.
Moreover, every one of us can give (and probably has given) advice to people about their diets. Either you have to argue that the state can punish us for doing so, or you have to have a theory as to why that's different.