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Claim that "Certificate of Need" Law Lacks a Rational Basis Can Go Forward
“[T]he great deference due state economic regulation does not demand judicial blindness to the history of a challenged rule or the context of its adoption nor does it require courts to accept nonsensical explanations for regulation.”
From Slaughter v. Dobbs, decided Thursday by Judge Carlton Reeves (S.D. Miss.):
This case is a constitutional challenge to Mississippi's Certificate of Need ("CON") program. Under consideration are a set of laws that require health care facilities to apply and receive a state-issued CON before opening, expanding, relocating, changing ownership, or even acquiring major medical equipment. Also at stake are 40-year-old moratoria which bar the issuance of CONs to certain new health care facilities, particularly those that offer at-home health care services.
From 1985, three years after the creation of the moratorium, to 2014, the Mississippi State Department of Health reports that demand for at-home health services tripled. Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, agencies offering these services have taken on critical importance as many of us seek alternatives to hospitals, nursing homes, and other care facilities that increase the risk of exposure to the virus. To protect ourselves and our loved ones, and in our collective effort to stop the spread, some of us turned to agencies like those at issue in this case.
Plaintiff Charles Slaughter alleges that the CON regime, including the moratoria, violates the equal protection and substantive due process clauses of the United States and Mississippi Constitutions. Specifically, he claims that the regime harms Mississippians, protects monopolies, and worsens the very goals it claims to advance. For support, he relies on 40 years' worth of research finding that CON laws stifle innovation in the health care industry and merely protect established companies from competition….
By way of background, CONs were a national phenomenon of the 1970's. The National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 conditioned federal funding upon states adopting CON programs that met federal guidelines. In 1979 the Mississippi legislature, like many other states, adopted CON laws. By 1982, every state except for Louisiana had implemented some version of a CON program. See National Conference of State Legislatures.
In 1987, however, Congress repealed the law. Since then, widespread scholarly and government research has admitted that the experiment was misguided. See Complaint at 70 n.1 (collecting research). Specifically, CONs are ineffective in achieving the desired outcome: less expensive, more accessible, and better-quality health care. Still, today 35 states retain CON laws.
The Board and Health Department, the agencies that administer the CON program, disagree with the research consensus. Citing the State Health Plan, they claim the CON regime is designed to "prevent unnecessary duplication of health resources; provide cost containment; improve the health of Mississippi residents; and increase the accessibility, acceptability, continuity and quality of health services." They review the CON program annually and have recommended it continue….
[T]he CON application and approval process … is lengthy and costly, and ultimately the process can result in what is essentially a trial with attorneys, consultants, exhibits, and written motions. Any "affected persons," including current home health providers, can oppose the application. After the proceeding, the Board and Health Department evaluate whether the applicant has demonstrated need based on several factors, including 16 criteria (e.g., "economic viability," "consistency with the state health plan," and "access by health professional schools") as well as a regional formula to define "need."
Even so, there is a categorical ban on certain new facilities applying for CONs at all. In 1982, the predecessor to the Health Department determined that no new home health care agencies were needed and issued an administrative moratorium on their licensure. During the subsequent legislative session, the administrative moratorium was codified into state statute. It was expanded in 1986. This moratorium, or some version of it, has remained in place for 40 years. Four decades! And, since this moratorium was imposed, the number of home health patients has increased by at least 194 percent. Now, one can only enter the market if a current operator is willing to sell their CON….
Plaintiff's federal due process and equal protection claims are subject to rational-basis scrutiny. Under this standard, Mississippi is afforded great deference. Those attacking the rationality of a legislative decision have the burden of negating "every conceivable basis which might support it."
That is not to say that rational-basis review is a rubber stamp. "Between 1970 to 2000, applying rational-basis review, the Supreme Court struck down at least a dozen economic laws as violating either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause." Tiwari v. Friedlander (W.D. Ky. Aug. 14, 2020) (collecting cases). The Fifth Circuit and district courts in this Circuit have also struck down laws applying the same. E.g., St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille (5th Cir. 2013).
In a recent application of rational-basis scrutiny, the Fifth Circuit held that courts need not take a state's justifications at face value where they seem implausible or impermissible. "[T]he great deference due state economic regulation does not demand judicial blindness to the history of a challenged rule or the context of its adoption nor does it require courts to accept nonsensical explanations for regulation." A state's rationale for economic protection of a favored industry is categorically not a legitimate interest. Accordingly, where seemingly implausible rationales or illegitimate purposes are at play, the Court may delve into evidence of irrationality….
The critical inquiry today is whether the Complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plausibly alleges that CON laws and the moratoria do not rationally relate to any legitimate state interests. To that end, plaintiff claims that the laws do not reduce costs, increase access, or improve the quality of home health care, as the State contends. Plaintiff argues that the laws undermine each of these purported goals and instead, protect incumbent health care facilities from competition.
The Complaint is replete with factual support including legislative history, case law, and a substantial body of peer-reviewed studies, publications, and government-backed research. For example, as to costs, the Complaint shows that Congress repealed its CON incentive explicitly because "the evidence showed that certificate-of-need programs resulted in increased health care costs." In 1988, 2004, 2016, and 2020, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice agreed, stating "CON programs are not successful in containing health care costs, and that they pose serious anticompetitive risks that usually outweigh their purported economic benefits." The agencies later added that their position is premised on research showing that CON programs are associated with "fewer hospitals, higher costs, lower quality of services, and increased mortality." The FTC re-urged its concerns considering the COVID-19 pandemic. Numerous peer-reviewed articles and journals bolster these claims.
Plaintiff refers the Court to a recent decision by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky that analyzed whether CON laws encourage or discourage health care accessibility. That court cited a study by George Mason University finding that "while the average state has 362 hospital beds per 100,000 population, this number falls to 263 per 100,000 in states with [CON] programs." Tiwari v. Friedlander (W.D. Ky. 2020) (citing Thomas Stratmann & Jake Russ, Do Certificate-of-Need Laws Increase Indigent Care? 11-12 (Mercatus Center, George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 14-20, 2014)). That court credited allegations that CON regimes generally reduce access and denied Kentucky's motion to dismiss the challenge to its CON laws.
Finally, regarding quality, plaintiff cites substantial research showing that "stringent Certificate of Need programs decrease the quality of care in many settings." The Tiwari court came to the same conclusion at the pleadings stage.
Taken as true, as the Court must, the allegations reveal that CON laws result in more costly, less accessible, and worse quality health care. What's more, plaintiff claims that the basis for CON laws and the moratoria is pure economic protectionism—an illegitimate government interest. "By perpetually shielding the existing home health monopolies from competition and allowing them to continually expand their staffing and capacity within their service areas, Mississippi ensures that the formula it uses will never show a need for a new home health agency," says Slaughter. Startups have no chance. "It is impossible for startups to enter the market, and because nothing prevents incumbents from expanding their staffing and capacity, Mississippi's formula will likewise never show a need."
It is no secret that significant financial interests are at stake when it comes to CON laws. The Tiwari court refers to the interplay of interests as "rent-seeking"—"rents" referring to monopoly profits.
Rent-seeking businesses make a sort-of "extra-legal" contract with politicians: money and votes for the politicians, regulations that ensure a monopoly for the interest group. Mean-while, consumers lose out. Without the market competition that normally regulates businesses' behavior, the monopoly can charge otherwise unsustainably high prices for otherwise unsustainably mediocre products.
The FTC and DOJ similarly warn that "incumbent firms seeking to thwart or delay entry or expansion by new or existing competitors may use CON laws to achieve that end." In practice, plaintiff alleges, current operators do exactly that: expand their offerings to absorb any purported "need," and eliminate the opportunity for any new competitors to enter the market.
In sum, plaintiff has set forth allegations negating the State's purported bases for the laws. At this stage, plaintiff's claims are plausible, particularly within the home health care context. The due process claim may proceed.
The court also concluded the same under the Equal Protection Clause (unsurprising, since the rational basis test applies both to equal protection and substantive due process)….
It is worth noting that several courts have evaluated the constitutionality of various CON programs and come to different results. The Eight and Fourth Circuits have determined that they are indeed constitutional. See Colon Health Centers of America, LLC v. Hazel (4th Cir. 2013); Birchansky v. Clabaugh (8th Cir. 2020). In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has found that CON programs may be unconstitutional to the extent they burden interstate commerce, Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wash. State Dep't of Health (9th Cir. 2011), and the Eastern District of Kentucky has found them unconstitutional. Bruner v. Zawacki (E.D. Ky. 2014).
This case is different. First, to this Court's knowledge, none of the previous challenges to CON laws involve categorical bans on start-ups in certain facilities. Mississippi's 40-year-old moratoria is an outlier. Second, this case involves artificial limitations on at-home health care during the height of a global pandemic. This unprecedented context is highly relevant.
That said, today's Order only speaks to the sufficiency of the Complaint. How plaintiff's allegations will fare at the merits stage is a separate matter. But at this juncture, like the courts in Tiwari, Birchansky v. Clabaugh (S.D. Iowa 2018), and Bruner, this Court will deny the pending motions so that the parties may develop an evidentiary record and proceed to the merits.
{Defendants also argue that plaintiff's administrative moratorium challenge is moot because the administrative moratorium ended in 1982, when the statutory moratorium went into effect. Plaintiff rebuts that the Miss. Admin. Code still includes an administrative moratorium on the books. This Court finds that it is unclear whether the administrative moratorium was ever repealed and thus, the challenge against the administrative moratorium may proceed.}
Again, note that it's not clear that plaintiff will prevail on the merits; and, even if he does, it's not clear that he'll win on an appeal—the rational basis test is indeed (rightly or wrongly) highly deferential, and, as the court notes, two circuit courts have upheld similar (though not identical) laws under that test. Still, the decision struck me as important and worth noting. Congratulations to the Mississippi Justice Institute / Mississippi Center for Public Policy on the victory.
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That a law is bad doesn't make it unconstitutional, and the opinion seems to argue this can go forward because the current context makes it especially bad. That seems wrong? The state provided a rational basis ... its stupid, but it exists.
It doesn't matter regardless because the plaintiff will almost certainly lose on the merits, but I don't really see how this went through.
I don't really understand why states don't repeal these laws. Who exactly do they benefit? I understand that there is a system among doctors and the medical system generally that is protectionist and highly inefficient, but this just seems like it doesn't benefit anyone.
"That is not to say that rational-basis review is a rubber stamp. "Between 1970 to 2000, applying rational-basis review, the Supreme Court struck down at least a dozen economic laws as violating either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause."
Left unstated is that, if you go to the opinion, it is almost all Equal Protection Cases, where, yeah, there is a higher standard the state must overcome. Its not purely a rational basis matter.
Existing market participants, of course. Who always benefits from barriers to entry?
If the basis is stupid then it's not rational. The state claims that the rule's basis is that it lowers costs and/or improves access and/or quality. If the plaintiff can prove that it does none of those things, then those things can't be the state's true motive. Which means it's lying about its true motive, which is to protect its friends, which is illegitimate.
This case is a textbook example of the fraudulence that is so-called "rational" basis review. For something to be rational, it must be justified by some form of analysis, based on some kind of evidence, by definition. The idea that the government can just make up something that might be plausible, and that is enough, is explicitly not rational.
I would say that the justices don't know what rational means, but let's be real. It's a deliberate fraud. Progressives wanted to get rid of Lochner and allow the FDR administration to pass nearly any economic legislation it wanted, so they made up something that in no way holds up to scrutiny, simply because they could. Now we all pay the price, and the Originalists go along with it, for some reason.
Bingo!
Thank you!
The Democrat lockdown killed thousands of Americans, and millions of poor people around the world. Yet, the scumbag lawyer courts allowed them, except in deference to a delusion, religion.
"40 years' worth of research finding that CON laws stifle innovation in the health care industry and merely protect established companies from competition…."
As a very young associate, I saw how stupid the Certificate of Need regime was up close, while it was still a federal requirement. We represented a hospital that wanted to establish specialty care beds that were not part of pre-existing bed categories. We documented that these types of beds were needed for an identifiable patient population, and did not exist anywhere in the region, but the "Health Facilities Planning Board" said too bad, so sad, we have enough total beds in the region and that's all that counts. Needless to say, we also lost on administrative review. But the active opposition and the heavy lifting was from other hospitals in the region who didn't want the competition. ("[T]he CON application and approval process … can result in what is essentially a trial with attorneys, consultants, exhibits, and written motions. Any "affected persons," including current ... health providers, can oppose the application.")
There is an obvious rational basis for certificate of need type regimes. Without it, health care providers can cherry pick services, providing easy, lucrative services for rich people but avoiding services that carry onligations to the poor or are fraught with risk.
Thus there are plenty of areas bursting with cosmetic surgeons and similar wxpensive, elective care for the rich but lacking primary care, emergency care, or facilities able to handle a major accident or pandemic.
It is absolutely rational for government to step in inthwse situations and say another cosmetic surgery practice isn’t needed and won’t allowed unless the public’s need for primary care, emergency care, and other core health services desparstely needed by the general punlic are addressed.
Libertarians may not like it. But libertarianism isn’t the only philosophy government is allowed to consider.
There’s a huge difference between “I disagree with it” and “its irrational.” Courts are obligated to try to understand the reasonings behind laws. The constitution is not supposed to reward the blindest and most narrow-minded judges, the judges least able to see reason in others.
I hope you are being sarcastic because that is in no way how CON laws work (neither in theory nor in practice)
FIFY (both the typos and the logic). But as Kevin Smith says below, that's not what CON are about at all.
Funny, the things I repeatedly see CON laws preventing are charity hospitals, neo-natal treatment units, and at-home health care.
Lack of CON laws means lower prices for services and more availability of services. That explicitly benefits the non-rich.
Are you trying to give an example of an argument that fails the rational basis test? Because the one you're making fits the bill.
You're imagining CON to be something it's not. To the best of my knowledge, there's nothing in it that says you can open business type A only if we have enough of business type B. It's not rational to have a CON law for this purpose when the law doesn't actually do that.
I think you mistake the argument. I understood it to be that CON laws limit the number of "frivolous" providers, like plastic surgeons, and so those doctors instead seek less-served fields like neonatal ICUs where CONs are available.
I think it's a very poor argument, for three reasons, but it's better than how you represented it. Those reasons: It assumes market failure rather than equilibrium in the absence of CON laws, it ignores that doctors choose their specialty in their training and can easily open shop in another jurisdiction (especially in their first job), and it assumes that CONs are in fact granted based on the public interest when evidence shows they are mostly captured by private interests.
That is the argument ReaderY seems to be making, but it's an inaccurate representation of what CON laws are intended to accomplish. They don't limit frivolous services to ensure there are enough necessary services, they limit necessary services to prevent over-saturation of the market.
According to the theory behind CON laws over-saturation leads to higher prices, because if a hospital is half empty a patient occupying a bed will have to be charged for their own bed, plus whatever the costs to upkeep the empty rooms/beds and duplicative staff, etc. So the idea is ensure that hospitals operate at or near capacity, where they would operate with the most economic efficiency.
Of course in the last 2 years we have seen that hospitals that operate at or near capacity in normal times are severely overwhelmed during a pandemic, and we've seen for several decades how regulatory capture twists CON laws so they don't serve the public interest at all (which just makes the capacity during a pandemic issue that much worse)
Yes, but if CON laws do prevent "over-sauration" of the market -- particularly with regard to something like plastic surgery -- then it is at least remotely conceivable that the supply of medical care would instead go to other healthcare specialties. I'm just not sure why we should believe that happens in practice; the "socially beneficial" specialties appear to be just as restricted by CON limits as the "frivolous" ones.
Except, Mike. That's not how it works. Plastic surgeons, who have extremely specialized surgical expertise, aren't going to just give up and become general practitioners. Plastic surgeons can simply go outside the area to somewhere else. People are able and willing to travel to get a nose job or liposuction that they are paying for out of their own pocket. These aren't competing fields because they don't compete for customers, and providers don't overlap.
How does reducing the supply of "unnecessary" practices increase the supply of "necessary" ones? Suppose I say I'm only interested in running a cosmetic surgery practice, and I have no interest in and no intention of ever running a
"primary care, emergency care, or other core health service"? The government can't force me to run one of those, so what is its rational basis for forbidding me from running the kind of practice I do want to run?
Can a legislature also say that until there are enough good meat restaurants around we're not going to allow you to open a vegan restaurant? Or that until there's enough supply of winter coats to meet the demand we're not going to allow anyone to sell fancy gowns and other "frivolous" clothing worn only by ca-PIT-alist bitches and parasites on the working class?
If a court finds that laws have to be rational, the criminal code is going to get a lot smaller.
We can only hope.
CON is one reason why we had hospitals and nursing homes near capacity for the pandemic. (The others being greed and mandates).
The hundreds of thousands of deaths provide all the evidence that there is no rational basis to allow CON laws to continue.
Perhaps a future generation of lawyers will learn about the _Slaughter_ cases as a watershed moment in constitutional law.
what is the standard of review under the mississippi constitution?