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Brett Kimberlin (Speedway Bomber) Loses Attempt to Vacate Long-Past Convictions, Including First Amendment Challenge to Impersonating-Federal-Official Conviction
Kimberlin is also known for having accused Dan Quayle of having bought marijuana from him, and has since become a frequent litigant, including against bloggers Patrick Frey (Patterico), Aaron Walker, and others.
I wrote about the district court decision in this case two years ago; here's yesterday's Seventh Circuit decision, Kimberlin v. U.S.:
Almost 20 years after serving his sentence for felonies related to a series of bombings, Brett Kimberlin petitioned for a writ of coram nobis, seeking to set aside some convictions in order to obtain relief from civil disabilities. The district court denied his petition. It correctly reasoned that, even if some felony convictions were overturned, Kimberlin does not (and cannot) successfully challenge others. Because his remaining felony convictions mean that the civil disabilities that he protests will remain intact, the equitable relief of coram nobis is unavailable; thus we affirm.
In 1979, Kimberlin was arrested after he tried to procure counterfeit government documents—including a presidential seal, military driver's license forms, and military license plates. Federal officers eventually connected him to eight bombings in Speedway, Indiana. He was later convicted of several felonies, including impersonating a federal official by wearing a uniform representing the Department of Defense. We affirmed Kimberlin's convictions and sentence on direct appeal and collateral review. Kimberlin was paroled in 1994, but his parole was revoked in 1997 for submitting a fraudulent mortgage loan application and for failure to pay a civil judgment to victims of the bombings. He completed his prison sentence in 2001.
Nearly 20 years after his release, Kimberlin petitioned for a writ of coram nobis. This equitable remedy may be available in rare cases where the defendant is no longer "in custody" (rendering 28 U.S.C. § 2255 unavailable) yet collateral relief is necessary to eradicate unjustified civil disabilities. He wants the district court to vacate his convictions for impersonating a federal official, illegally using the presidential seal and an insignia of the Department of Defense, and his role in the bombings. Kimberlin asserts that, because of these convictions, he faces civil disabilities: he cannot obtain grants for his non-profit organization, qualify for loans, serve on a jury, or renew his pilot's license.
The district court denied Kimberlin's petition. It observed that Kimberlin could obtain coram nobis relief only if all his felony convictions yielding the unwanted civil disabilities were removed, and Kimberlin could not prevail against all his convictions. First, the court noted, United States v. Bonin (7th Cir. 2019), foreclosed Kimberlin's argument that the First Amendment conflicts with his convictions under § 912 for impersonating a federal official. Second, Kimberlin had felony convictions (for marijuana possession and perjury) that he was not challenging in the petition. These alone were sufficient to maintain his civil disabilities.
On appeal, Kimberlin maintains that his § 912 conviction is invalid. He relies on United States v. Alvarez (2012). There, a decade after Kimberlin's release, the Supreme Court held that the free-speech protection of the First Amendment invalidated a part of the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 that criminalized "falsely representing" receipt of military decorations or medals. Kimberlin argues that Alvarez undermines his § 912 conviction because wearing a uniform of the Department of Defense could involve protected speech like "a protest, theatrical performance," or a "Halloween party." Kimberlin adds that, because he used the uniform for "commercial" transactions, he did not meet § 912's requirement that he "act as such" officer that he impersonated.
These arguments ignore the restrictions on the writ. Because it upends finality, a writ of coram nobis requires not just a fundamental error affecting a conviction, and civil disabilities from it, but also good reason that the defendant failed to seek relief while in custody. We can focus on the § 912 conviction because, as the district court noted, a coram nobis challenge that might eliminate some felony convictions but leaves intact others that yield the same civil disabilities does not warrant relief…. "Indeed, even one count stating an offense would be the end of things, for a single felony conviction supports any civil disabilities … [the plaintiff] may have to endure." … For three reasons, the district court rightly denied Kimberlin's petition.
First, nothing prevented Kimberlin from raising on direct appeal or in his prior petition under § 2255 the legal arguments that the defendants advanced in Alvarez (about the First Amendment) and Wade (about "act as such") and that Kimberlin urges now. Rather, he pursued his one opportunity that Congress allowed him under § 2255 to challenge his § 912 conviction without mentioning these arguments. "[I]t is entirely inappropriate for the judiciary to invoke the common law" with coram nobis "to override limitations enacted by Congress." Thus, Kimberlin cannot use these arguments in this petition to challenge the validity the § 912 conviction.
Second, in any event, Kimberlin's arguments about errors in his § 912 conviction are meritless. As the district court observed, in Bonin we rejected the First Amendment argument that he raises. We noted that the plurality opinion in Alvarez distinguished § 912 from the Stolen Valor Act and ruled that § 912's "act as such" element is a constitutional, narrowly drawn ban on false speech (impersonation) that protects compelling interests in government processes, reputation, and service. Wade does not help him either. We explained there that § 912 validly criminalizes "overt action taken to cause the victim to follow a course of action he would not otherwise have pursued." Kimberlin's impersonations violated that statute.
Third, as the district court also recognized, Kimberlin is not challenging his felony convictions for marijuana possession and perjury. And he does not contest the district court's conclusion that his ongoing civil disabilities will remain intact by virtue of these unchallenged convictions (as well as by virtue of the intact § 912 conviction). Thus, for this reason as well, he cannot obtain relief he seeks in his coram nobis petition….
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I talked to an old Mecklenburg County (Charlotte, NC) judge once who told me had in his time on the bench seen a number of petitions for writs of coram nobis, and never saw a one that wasn't "worthless as the teats on a boar hog."
As a young lawyer in the seventies I had one in front of him in Buncombe and you can imagine the outcome. The petitioner had been imprisoned as a felon for just a few flakes of marijuana in a plastic baggie found in his home pursuant to a search warrant. At sentencing officers, mostly in chambers, had told Judge Harry Martin, who legislated for the occasion, that the defendant was a reputed dealer.
Remember when little Oliver Twist was convicted of picking pockets, and the news then came in overwhelming veracity that he was innocent?
"I have already ruled," said the judge.
Back when the net was young, one of the things floating around alongside the advice to sign your traffic tickets "without prejudice UCC ..." was the idea that the writ of coram nobis cured all ills if only you knew to invoke it.
It strikes me that part of the problem here is that people who’ve done their time face far more disabilities than what is necessary to protect society. Why should someone with a felony conviction be barred from getting a pilot’s license? I’ll understand if Delta doesn’t want to hire him, but depriving him of a license altogether strikes me as a bit much.
I kind of agree with you on this. I think it is logical that once someone serves their sentence, in full, including any required restitution, then they should be civilly rehabilitated. The concepts of felon for life, former felon, etc., and permanent civil disabilities are immoral and unjust, in my opinion.
A good example of this is how people can become permanently prohibited persons under GCA68 for offenses that were once considered somewhat minor. So, get a DUI conviction twenty years ago, and never be able to exercise your 2nd Amendment rights.
Do you see any boundaries on that? E.g.:
1)A cop is convicted of excessive force, serves his time. Is it OK for him to resume a career as an LEO?
2)A CPA serves time for embezzlement. Does he get the CPA license back?
3)The convicted child molester applies for a license to open a day care? Can you hold the conviction against him?
4)A nurse is convicted of stealing patient's painkillers. Can he resume his nursing career?
While I agree with you that some crimes should have permanent effects, there really should be a requirement to link the crime and the punishment.
A DUI depriving you of a career as a commercial truck driver makes sense; depriving you of your gun or voting rights doesn't.
What Toranth said. I once handled a probate matter in which the only child of the deceased could not serve as executor of the estate because of a 20 year old felony conviction for DUI. The practical consequence is that the estate paid out a lot more in fees than it would otherwise have had to.
If there is a direct link between the crime and the disability, fine. I agree with you that a convicted rapist shouldn't be opening a day care center. But where there's no link, more often than not the disability does far more harm than good.
"the only child of the deceased could not serve as executor of the estate because of a 20 year old felony conviction for DUI."
(K's example, but a reply to T and K) Sure, that's a pretty egregious example.
What makes the line drawing hard is that we want executors to be honest, reliable people. After all, their client isn't there to object to malfeasance, and money is always a temptation. A long ago DUI, and clean record since, isn't evidence of low morals or sticky fingers. OTOH, what about someone with a long and recent history of shoplifting and kiting a few small checks. That history has a bearing on the likelihood they will faithfully discharge their duties as an executor.
Or what about a rapist who never used a weapon, he just pulled joggers into the bushes using physical force. If he pleads 'I should be able to have a gun, because I never used one in my rapes', personally, I don't find that persuasive.
My sense is that many criminals don't limit their criminality to narrow specialties. For example, Mr. Kimberlin here was wholesaling drugs, setting off bombs, maybe a murder, and whatever he was planning with the fake id, etc. He just doesn't seem to believe that society's rules apply to him at all. With a long enough, recent enough pattern of that I don't think it is out of line to view such a person as generally not trustworthy.
Absaroka, you’ve made the argument on the other side, that people with felony convictions have proven they can’t be trusted to follow the rules. But I think that sweeps too broadly because an unwillingness to follow a specific rule on a single occasion doesn’t necessarily show a disinclination to follow any rules.
Marky Mark famously can’t open a restaurant because he assaulted someone out of race based animosity years ago. Who seriously thinks that racial prejudice, even violent racial prejudice, which he may not even still have, means he can’t run a restaurant? I suppose if you squint hard enough you might see a connection. In the unlikely event he assaults a customer he’ll lose his restaurant and he knows that.
And hovering over all of this is that people are less likely to re-offend if they’ve successfully been re-integrated into society. That includes not erecting artificial barriers that make it harder for them to find work.
By the way, a former lawyer who has been disbarred for stealing from clients is allowed to be an estate executor. Someone with a drunk driving conviction can’t.
"But I think that sweeps too broadly because an unwillingness to follow a specific rule on a single occasion doesn’t necessarily show a disinclination to follow any rules"
'Specific rule' and 'single occasion' are rather different than 'a long and recent history' and 'a long enough, recent enough pattern', wouldn't you say?
I agree that if someone is a life long recidivist who commits crime after crime they shouldn’t be trusted. So maybe you have a three strikes rule or some such, or maybe you look at it case by case, or maybe you put a time limit on it. Keep your nose clean for a year after you’ve completed your sentence.
But that’s not what we have. We have one strike and you’re out for life.
I think we agree on the principle, although not perhaps on the parameters - I'm not sure one year of not getting caught gives me a huge amount of confidence. But that is going to depend heavily on the specifics - what they did, how many times they did it, how long they have been (apparently) reformed, etc, etc.
People can surely turn around. I've read a number of bios of e.g. WWII MoH winners who entered the military because a judge gave them the choice of enlisting or jail, and after the war led exemplary lives. Frank Abagnale is an example of someone who turned around even after a long and diverse criminal history. But, sadly, the recidivism percentage is non trivial.