The Volokh Conspiracy
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"Mistaking Inferences for Penalties"
A very interesting post from Prof. Sherry Colb (Cornell) at Dorf on Law, discussing the "Court Should Start with a Presumption That Art Is Art, Not a Statement of Fact" (Bey-Cousin v. Powell) case; the whole thing is worth reading, but here's an excerpt:
The case involves a man who had some trouble with the law and whose criminal conviction was reversed on appeal. The man brought a civil rights lawsuit claiming, among other things, that police planted a firearm on him. In defending the lawsuit, police wish to introduce into evidence the lyrics of some songs that the plaintiff wrote. Police believe the lyrics undermine the plaintiff's version of events and support the defendants' narrative.
The district court in the case ruled that the song lyrics would be excluded. I have no opinion on whether the particular lyrics should come into evidence or were properly excluded. In so ruling, however, the court invoked the First Amendment right to free expression in the arts. The court said that if an artist's lyrics were freely admissible against him in court, then that admissibility would have a chilling effect on artistic expression. In response to this constitutional concern, the court ruled that before being able to introduce an opponent's lyrics into evidence, the proponent must overcome a presumption that artistic expression is not factual. Furthermore, the court held, it is not enough to show a resemblance between events in the real world and the statements of the artist in his music or other artistic expression.
I have written about the difference between protecting the freedom of speech, on the one hand, and refusing to admit that speech as evidence of other wrongdoing in a court of law, on the other, here. An artist is free to write songs about his encounters with the law and with other people and to fictionalize those songs to his heart's content. But that freedom does not entail a right to suppress relevant evidence of wrongdoing in a lawsuit. He can, of course, argue that a particular piece of evidence, a song, is far more likely to prejudice the jury against him than it is to shed light on what he actually did. The district court did say that such a balance would favor exclusion in this case. But the court appeared to go further than that, asserting that in many cases, relevant evidence that could illuminate the facts for the jury would not come in, asserting that "starting with a presumption that artistic expression is not a factual admission might in some cases lead to the exclusion of admissible evidence. But the First Amendment requires no less." …
Almost everything that goes into evidence in a court case consists of words or expression of one kind or another. If we were to take seriously the idea that the admissibility of speech imposes a presumptively impermissible chilling effect on free expression, then our generally liberal admissibility approach under the Federal Rules of Evidence would morph into a system in which all evidence would be presumptively inadmissible. This regime would completely undermine the principle that the law has a right to "everyman's [sic] evidence."
The court gives a few examples of fictional works of art that have no bearing on reality. One is "I Shot the Sheriff" … Another example is Bohemian Rhapsody by Freddie Mercury and Queen, who were not confessing to mama that they killed a man. Of course, no one ever thought that these works of art corresponded to events in the real world, and their authors were probably not afraid that the songs might become evidence against them.
Statements that people make outside of the artistic area are far more likely to become evidence against them than are song lyrics and therefore much more vulnerable to the chilling effect that the district court discusses. The district court, however, seems to focus exclusively on artistic expression rather than on all speech protected by the First Amendment, perhaps because it correctly understands that a system in which evidence comes in to prove facts requires access to speech and words as proof, regardless of how free that speech might be and how protected from punishment. Artistic expression is, of course, part of the freedom of speech, but the First Amendment does not single it out for special protection and indeed does not say anything about it at all….
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The problem here is that the standard of relevance is extremely minimal. Put another way, this is a FRE 403 problem, not an FRE 401 problem. And the 403 problem is infused with a First Amendment issue.
FRE 401 says that basically anything minimally probative of any material fact is relevant. Under that standard, these sorts of song lyrics can be broadly admissible. FRE 403 says that there are various policy arguments that limit the relevance principle of 401- unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. So you can't always get in minimally relevant evidence.
And the unfair prejudice, misleading the jury, and confusing the issues prongs of 403 are very much at work when it comes to song lyrics. Because there is a separation between art and life, a song lyric can unduly influence a trier of fact into thinking a person did something they didn't do. Essentially, the notion is that juries will treat them the same as, say, a confession in a diary, when songwriting doesn't work like that and involves a more complex interaction of real life and imagination.
And this is especially important because of the First Amendment issues involved. You have a constitutional right to create art, and strictly enforcing a minimal relevance standard for the admission of art in criminal proceedings would chill that right. Indeed, it might chill art that DOESN'T accurately portray real life as well as art that does, because someone could argue that the embellishment was in fact accurate.
(To take a very current example, you shouldn't assume Taylor Swift's songs are accurate recountings of her prior sexual relationships and flings. Those relationships and flings inspire her art, but because it is art, she can embellish or alter the story to make for a better song.)
You have a constitutional right to make a "confession in a diary" (or, for that matter, a letter to the police) as well. Do we need to restrict the use of those statements to avoid chilling first amendment expression?
That ignores the point I made about art's unique blend of fact and fiction
I think a better argument would be that works of fiction should be presumed to be irrelevant until proven otherwise.
Just because someone writes horror fiction does not mean that they are a cannibal murderer. Just because they write vampire love stories does not mean they are necrophiliacs.
Writing crime stories has no bearing on actual guilt, and so it's irrelevant and prejudicial.
That might not be right because of the "Basic Instinct" problem, below.
It's a probative-prejudice balance. In some situations art could meet that test, even with due regard given to the First Amendment interests.
"Artistic expression is, of course, part of the freedom of speech, but the First Amendment does not single it out for special protection and indeed does not say anything about it at all"
I agree that the amendment doesn't say anything specifically about artistic speech. But looking to the prehistory of the amendment, we see this in the Continental Congress's (unsuccessful) appeal to the people of Quebec:
"The last right we shall mention regards the freedom of the press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and *arts* in general [emphasis added], in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated into more honorable and just modes of conducting affairs."
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=4104
So at least as far as communication via the press is concerned (and nowadays the courts interpret the press very broadly), "arts" are one of the things to be protected, at least in 1775.
Samuel Johnson's dictionary included dancing as an illustration of "art,"
"The power of doing something not taught by nature and instinct; as, to walk is natural, to dance is an art."
https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/views/search.php?term=vaultage
So there's a case to be made the the Founders thought of what we call "art" as being one of the things the First Amendment was specifically intended to protect.
(The reader will have to enter "art" in the Samuel Johnson dictionary link I gave.)
Or use this link:
https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/views/search.php?term=art
"I'd have to be pretty stupid to write a book about killing and then kill him the way I described in my book. I'd be announcing myself as the killer. I'm not stupid."
"What are you going to do? Charge me with smoking?"
[My how things have changed since the '90s.]
That's the movie where the lady showed the police her privates, isn't it?
I wouldn't know of such a thing. I only watched it for the dialogue.
The questioning scene. Some of us were distracted by her
bosomeyes and missed that part.You mean this?
I think Prof. Colb has the better of this argument. Sometimes song lyrics (or poems or prose fiction) written by a party will be clearly irrelevant, and sometimes they'll clearly be highly relevant. And when there is conflicting evidence as to whether the lyrics are making factual claims or not, then I think that's a matter that gets resolved by the jury, after hearing evidence and argument from both parties. I certainly can't see much basis in either logic or the rules of evidence for the presumption of inadmissibility that Judge Wolson crafted.
Since neither the parties nor the court appear to have offered any explanation of what the songs in this case actually say, I have no opinion as to whether they were correctly excluded or not.
"Sometimes song lyrics (or poems or prose fiction) written by a party will be clearly irrelevant, and sometimes they'll clearly be highly relevant."
Why would an utterance that doesn't purport to be a statement of fact be relevant, let alone clearly highly relevant?
Indeed, why would they?
Would it matter if the songwriter were also the singer? If not, which of the two would the song be evidence against?
Indeed, what is the difference between a song and dialogue in a play, even if the writer is playing the relevant role?
In this case, the plaintiff was stopped by police officers who say that they found a gun on him. He was indicted and convicted by the U.S. Attorney's Office, but the Third Circuit reversed his conviction after concluding that the search and seizure was illegal and that the gun should have therefore been suppressed. In this current lawsuit, he is claiming that he did not have a gun at all, and that it was planted by the police officers.
After his federal arrest, he released an album called "Busted by Da Feds", which features a cover that appears to show the plaintiff in a courtroom escorted by a deputy U.S. marshal. The title song begins with him saying "I've been busted by the feds twice", which accurately describes the plaintiff's involvement in the federal criminal justice system.
Now, having listened to the song (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9A2uTe_bW1o) it doesn't seem to offer anything particularly relevant to the case - rather, he seems to mainly be talking about how the federal government puts a lot of resources into investigating criminals, and that the federal prosecutions can lead to long sentences - so it seems like exclusion was probably correct. (I will admit that I only listened to it once, didn't understand all of the lyrics, and couldn't find them transcribed anywhere.) But it does also seem highly plausible to me that he's talking about his actual case, and if the lyrics did contain something relevant - if, for instance, he'd acknowledged that he did have a gun - that seems to me like it should be admissible.
Well that's kind of my point - sometimes song lyrics do purport to be talking about real things that really happened, sometimes they don't, and sometimes the evidence could support either conclusion.
Why the "sic" in "everyman's [sic] evidence."
Maybe because “everyman” is sexist (just as “everyblack” or “everywhite” would be racist).
A modern reader would expect "every man".
Every Man refers to all of the evidence from every man.
An everyman is a normal person that the audience can relate to.
Without the full quotation I can't tell which is right, but the former seems more likely to be relevant to a court of law.
One of the things I found most compelling on first learning of the analogy to racism (see my earlier comment above) was that when I thereafter encountered comments such as yours, it forced me to imagine the speaker's analogue in racist-English-world, with their blithe assumption that the racist constructs in *their* language (everywhite, chairwhite, "white is the measure of all things," etc.) were just the natural and expected thing, and what's the big deal.
As I couldn't convince myself that black kids growing up immersed in such a language wouldn't be harmed by it (or that mine wouldn't be if colors were reversed), the implications for *our* world's *sexist* English were no longer possible to ignore.
They used to have only male witnesses, that's why they call it "teste-mony."
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=03QuygM0YB8
Except no. That's not the etymology of testimony. See here: https://www.etymonline.com/word/testimony
I want to advance two arguments.
First, what drives the first amendment concern isn't just that it's speech and could be used against one. Sure, that's true of all speech. However, it seems to me that it's quite relevant that the prospect of lyrics introduced as evidence against one is sufficiently chilling that it's likely to deter *innocent* individuals from creating socially valuable artistic works.
How could that be? It seems to me that what's going on is that the unusual nature of a trial makes artistic expressions particularly likely to support prejudicial inferences. Most jurors will have an understanding of gossip or bragging to a friend but may have no understanding of what's normal in a particular form of artistic expression. As art requires preparation it's a lot more likely to be found written down while shit shot with a friend isn't and, worse, those lyrics will be read out without any of the context that would let the jury make sense of them.
Let me add another concern. I think what makes lyric evidence extra bad is that the only testimony that could put them in appropriate context and render them anything but prejudicial is likely going to have to come from the defendant.