Tweet Accusing Man of Rape Led to Gag Order Against the Accuser
The trial judge concluded the Tweet was “harassment by defamation.”
The trial judge concluded the Tweet was “harassment by defamation.”
So a Minnesota Court of Appeals panel concluded this Summer, over a sharp dissent.
under California's "anti-SLAPP" statute (which allows for prompt dismissal of claims brought based on certain kinds of speech).
Harvard concludes that it is, but I’m skeptical that this is right—just as I’d be skeptical that an employer’s restricting pro-Hamas speech constitutes such discrimination or harassment.
Hustler Magazine v Falwell comes to small town politics.
Repeatedly saying so isn't harassment under Florida law, court says.
So holds an Eleventh Circuit panel; Judge Andrew Brasher's concurring opinion that notes the potential First Amendment problems with imposing liability for such speech.
leads some readers to engage in "threats and harassment" against the business.
can go forward, says a federal court.
An Oregon trial court allowed the case to go forward, but the Oregon Court of Appeals threw it out.
"that which may be immediately or remotely interpreted as demeaning or belittling to him" struck down as unconstitutionally vague.
So holds the D.C. Court of Appeals, D.C.'s equivalent of a state supreme court.
The student had “posted a screenshot of a friend with a cosmetic mud mask on her face with the caption ‘when he says he’s only into black girls’ on her Instagram account.”
No success for the plaintiffs, at least at this stage.
"If I disagreed or offered another opinion, I was told I had cognitive dissonance," Josh Diemert says.
Threats of suicide and of disclosing an ex's sexual orientation may count as threats for harassment purposes (for the non-polyamorous as much as for the polyamorous, of course).
but the Michigan Court of Appeals reverses.
“Students ... remain free to express offensive and other unpopular viewpoints [at least outside school], but that does not include a license to disseminate severely harassing invective targeted at particular classmates in a manner that is readily and foreseeably transmissible to those students.”
Trial court: "I understand that you have a first amendment privilege, but sometimes the first amendment privilege contravenes certain statutes that are enacted by the State ...." Appellate court: That's "a misunderstanding of the relationship between statutes and constitutions."
So holds the Pennsylvania intermediate appellate court, rejecting a First Amendment defense.
Gov. Gavin Newsom signed a bill in September that will chip away at a policy that has long been criticized as enabling racially-motivated policing.
The return of the trollish forum demonstrates the futility of bans on bad speech.
How, if at all, should we try to be nice in an inherently not-nice occupation?
My argument: "Petitioner Jane Doe—a frequent unsuccessful litigant—is asking this Court to impose unconstitutional prior restraint to prevent a law professor from writing about important, publicly available cases about pseudonymity."
Cloudflare's decision brings up fundamental questions about how internet infrastructure companies should operate.
Clearly hostile, but was it threatening?
The Eighth Circuit tries to rein in the criminalization of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort.
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