Who said the following, in regards to the government's method for handling and classifying sensitive information?
the present system is unnatural, far from optimal, and … ought to be radically changed. […]
We have been living with systems that try to minimize risk. That is the wrong metric! We actually want to maximize information flow, subject to the overall constraint of not exceeding the acceptable risk levels…. This means that instead of minimizing risk, we actually want to ensure that it is increased to its tolerable maximum (but no higher). […]
In the war against terrorism, our front-line troops are not all soldiers, sailors, fliers, and marines. They are also police, firefighters, medical first responders, and other civilian personnel. These are groups whose historical access to sources of national intelligence has been near zero; yet their need for real-time and analytical intelligence is now critical.
Was it: A) Dan Gillmor; B) some damned Seymour Hersh-reading hippie; or C) a shadowy independent scientific advisory board, with the Bond-like name of JASON, that provides research to the Dept. of Defense?
I guess I telegraphed the answer…. At any rate, JASON's December report (PDF), brought to you by the good folks at Secrecy News, is stimulating stuff for those interested in the history and modern practice of government secrecy and info-management, and welcome button-downed support for those of us who believe that openness can actually increase, rather than decrease, National Security.