Only the Guilty Need Fear

New at Reason: Charles Paul Freund considers some of the theories about why Saddam acted like a Usual Suspect.

Comments

[Stephen Fetchet]

A good article actually applying reason? to a thorny problem (as opposed to the Official Dogma of the Religion of Libertarianism, which is actually Snark? as far as I can tell).

How refreshing. How like Mr. Freund.

And no, I?m not Charles Paul Freund.

[Mo]

What about this, perfectly logical, reason: Saddam was ruling a country that had a formerly mighty military in a hostile, unstable region and didn't want to get invaded. The WMD bluff wasn't to keep the US out, but rather Iran, Syria, SA or Turkey. With the exception of Syria, none of those countries had any particular love of Saddam's regime. Iran, especially, would have loved to get some payback for the earlier war. Saddam figured the worst case scenario of bluffing was the US invading. If he had admitted he had nothing, his worst case scenario was Iran invading. No matter what sort of personal hatred the US had, the Iranians would have been far more harsh to him and his people than anything the US would do.

[Mo]

Let me note that I doubt Saddam gives a rats ass about how his people were treated, but his own personal punishment by the Iranians would be bad enough. Not to mention it would be personally far more humiliating to get a butt-whipping from Iran than getting one from the US.

[Jason Ligon]

Ahh the one question Raimondo and his clan can't address.

Several key points here. If Saddam knew he didn't have WMD anymore but could put on the appearance of having them, he gains local stature and a level of protection against invasion. WMDs are first and foremost political tools, and being the big kid on the block goes pretty far for a tin pot like Saddam.

If the man is going to act like he has them, and we don't know for sure, why on earth wouldn't we treat him as though he had them? Why is it that WMD served as a deterrent in the build up to the conflict only in hindsight to be laughed off as improbable by the same doves?

Whether he had them or not, because the rest of the world was willing to allow him to, the pretense of having them was just as good. There was no real threat of the UN doing anything if he flouted the terms of his surrender, so he gets to defy the US, set the UN in opposition to the US, and act as a gas toting regional honcho all at once.

[Pete Guither]

I really think that it was a variation on the "Big Man" behavior, but it goes beyond the danger of risking regional standing by appearing weak.

Imagine the ego that it takes to cheat, steal and kill your way up to being a ruthless dictator. You've practically forced your people to worship you as a God, had statues built, and so forth.

Now, you lose a war, you've got economic sanctions, inspectors, no-fly zones, etc., etc. and THEN you're told to publicly admit and document the fact that you are completely weak and powerless. That's right. Drop your drawers in front of everybody, bend over and spread those cheeks so we all can see.

To someone like Saddam, the choice between that humiliation, and the defiant act of throwing thousands of his cannon-fodder at our soldiers to see what might happen was an easy one.

[Mo]

Pete,
Sure it's a variant of the Big Man theory, but the motivation goes from ego to self-preservation. The difference is subtle and probably related (a smaller man is more likely to get killed in a coup). However, there's a critical difference between looking big for egotistical reasons and looking big to save your neck from a bunch of still-angry Iranians. I think both are relevant, but the latter was a bigger reason.

[thoreau]

As I said in another thread, who cares? Anything related to the war turns into a proxy battle over the war itself. There's no way (on this forum at least) of maintaining a nuanced stance like "Regardless of the merits or demerits of the war, if US intelligence was seriously off in its assessments we need to find out why."

[jim]

This article states nothing new. The Big Man/Bad Ass theory has been around for months. Probably true.

[fyodor]

I believe Saddam once said that he preferred a military defeat to a political one. Perhaps he knows himself well?

[Jason Ligon]

Thoreau:

I agree. I want to know why we seem to have so many intelligence problems over there. When people are convinced of coverup, they can't be convinced of an intelligence failure, and so the argument begins again ...

[MK]

What I want to know is why do we have so many intelligence problems over HERE....

[Nick B]

Consider this theory, imagine you are an Iraqi scientist. You are, like most scientists, reasonably intelligent. You probably know Saddam is a dangerous man, and know he has a history of using weapons on his own people. So half of you knows that it would be wrong to help him build up weapon stockpiles. On the other hand, if you refuse to cooperate he will kill you and rape your sister. So what would you? Do nothing and say that bag of salt over there is really anthrax you produced seems like the best solution to me. Worst case you get discovered and get executed, but that could easily happen anyways. Best case you get the US military taking out Saddam for you. I can't say if that is any better than other theories out there (it is sort of like the "Ba'athist underlings" theory just at a different level), but it doesn't require anyone acting completely irrational and it is consistent with Iraq having underdeveloped weapons programs and other suspicious programs (like the hidden mobile hydrogen labs for making weather balloons).

[Gadfly]

This is actually the perfect storm of two incompetent regimes meeting in a crisis. If the US and USSR were this stupid in the 60's we would all be dead now.

[alma hadayn]

Even the BBC has taken up the mantra that Dvid Kay has not found weapons but only weapons "programs."

I would really like some exact information on what these "programs" were, besides the infamous vial of non-weaponized botulinum that had been sitting in someone's refrigerator for the last decade and the efforts to build missiles with prohibited ranges.

As to the question of why Hussein acted like he had something to hide, it's not clear to me that he did. The unsatisfactory cooperation referred to by Blix may have been due to the disarray of the regime, something we apparently underestimated. It may also have been due to a general hostility to the humiliation of UN inspections. "Only the guilty need fear."

[Andrew]

All well said...most of the notes too. As a variant of the last "He DID have something to hide" theory, I would propose that the biggest unanswered question is what has become of the WMD stockpiles which remains unaccounted for. For Saddam it would have been impossible (or just as damning, anyway) to admit he sold them, or passed them along.

At what point Alma, do you believe Saddam became reasonably "pro-active" with inspections? (I assume sometime after he permitted inspectors back into his country.)

[hidden]

Well well Tim, only the guild fear indeed. How much is PNAC PR machine paying you to run this propaganda? Meanwhile know that we are on to you liberventionist traitors. You lifestyle fake-libertarian neocons care more about serving your vile Likud and warmongering corporate masters than serving the true libertarian cause.

Keep waving your flag, stained with blood and oil. We know its colors (blue and white, not red, white and blue) and we know your heros (not Murray Rothbard or other true libertarians, but neoliberal corproate "free market" profiteers, Leon Trotsky and Leo Struass).

You and Glen Reynolds and VodkaPundit and other warbloggers on the PNAC payroll will be exposed.

[Jason Ligon]

I can't ever tell if posts like hidden's are real or not. I know people who talk just like that, so it could be real. Troll mimickery ...

[alma hadayn]

"At what point Alma, do you believe Saddam became reasonably "pro-active" with inspections?"

Well, this is what Blix said on March 7: "It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as ?active?, or even ?proactive?, these initiatives 3-4 months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute ?immediate? cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome and UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues."

My point is not to defend Iraqi compliance with the resolution, it is simply this: many intelligent people thought before the invasion that Saddam was hiding WMD; it now appears that he was not. Before asking why Hussein acted like he was hiding something, those people should consider the possibility that the assumptions that led them to interpret Iraqi behavior as "guilty behavior" were wrong. I don't think that the absence of an "A+" in cooperation is itself proof that Iraq was acting guilty; as I indicated, it could have been due to disarray and/or hostility, both of which were present in abundance. It appears that as the invasio grew more imminent, Iraq tried harder to placate the UN. Why did they wait until the last minute? Who knows? But I don't see that as compelling evidence of "acting guilty".

[Don]

"Regardless of the merits or demerits of the war, if US intelligence was seriously off in its assessments we need to find out why."

Intelligence has always had a bit of a "throw the dart at the board" element to it. It is also rife with interpretation, which is sometimes flawed. The intellignce coups that we take for granted--like the intercpt and decoding of the Japanese radio transmissions that lead to our victory in the battle of Midway -- tend to involve reading between the lines and interpretation. When Intelligence gets it right, its a great victory. When they get something wrong they are a bunch of bums.

[bigbigslacker]

Alma, what does "Even the BBC" mean? Does it mean "Even this unbiased source" or "even this left-wing source" - or right-wing.

I'm under the impression that while many ("progressives") consider the BBC to be high-caliber news, others consider it blatanlt biased. Not sure where you were coming from - not that its much of a big deal.

[fyodor]

So when someone says, "Ya gotta remember, those folks in the government know things we don't" be very very skeptical?

[joe]

So now, when Bushies refer to holding off on war, or avoiding it altogether, as "taking Saddam's Hussein's word," what exactly does that mean?

[Jennifer]

Here's something that just occurred to me: when people say Iraq produced "no evidence" of having destroyed weapons, apart from a few papers," well, exactly what evidence is required? Empty shell casings? Videotape of bomb deconstruction? If paperwork is all that's needed, I can create and destroy enough weapons to conquer the world, in less time than you needed to read my posting.

[UN Resolution 687]

C

7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at
Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972;

8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction,
removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all
related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and
manufacturing facilities;

(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and
related major parts, and repair and production facilities;

9. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following:

(a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of
the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amount
s
and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site
inspection as specified below;

(b) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate
Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World
Health Organization, within forty-five days of the passage of the present
resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan
calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days of suc
h
approval:

(i) The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate
on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile
capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of an
y
additional locations by the Special Commission itself;

(ii) The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for
destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the
requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragrap
h
8 (a) above, including items at the additional locations designated
by the Special Commission under paragraph 9 (b) (i) above and the
destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission
,
of all its missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified
under paragraph 8 (b) above;

(iii) The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and
cooperation to the Director-General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency required in paragraphs 12 and 13 below;

10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use,
develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9
above and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special
Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and
verification of Iraq's compliance with this paragraph, to be submitted to the
Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passag
e
of this resolution;

11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968;

12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or
develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems o
r
components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities
related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the
Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days
of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations,
amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its
nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and
removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the assistance and
cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the
Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in accordance
with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site
inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate o
f
all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13
below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance wit
h
these undertakings;

13. Requests the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, through the Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of
the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in
paragraph 9 (b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's
nuclear capabilities based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any
additional locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for
submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed
in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following
approval by the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account
the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o
f
Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and
verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 above, including an
inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency's verification
and inspections to confirm that Agency safeguards cover all relevant nuclear
activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval withi
n
one hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution;

14. Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9,
10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal o
f
establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction
and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on
chemical weapons;

[Douglas Fletcher]

Considering how this all came out, shouldn't there be a Dumb Ass theory too?

[fyodor]

Douglas Fletcher,

I think it goes without saying that that's a part of 'em all.

[Nick B]

"Intelligence has always had a bit of a "throw the dart at the board" element to it. "
And of course when they do the opposite and underestimate a threat (like terrorists using hijacked airplanes as missiles) they get blamed as well.