Let's Go And Say A Prayer For A Boy Who Couldn't Run As Fast As I Could

New at Reason: Does a naturalistic view of the world undermine morality and meaning? Julian Sanchez saves souls from the battle between free will and determinism.

Comments

[TJ]

"Does a naturalistic view of the world undermine morality and meaning? "

Aristotle didn't think so. Neither do I.

Plato thought that an understanding of science was for a through understanding of morality.

It's a never ending source of amazement to me that religionists think morality was invented by Jesus.

[Jean Bart]

TJ,

Or that Jesus makes people "good." 🙂

[TJ]

Yowza, where's my proofreader? I meant to say:
Plato thought that an understanding of science was needed for a thorough understanding of morality.

JB:

Riiight. I wonder why, if good works are not sufficient to get one in the pearly gates, and "faith" is, that Christianity has any bearing on morality at all? The 10 Commandments? Jeez, I'll remember to give my slaves Sunday off.

[Ron Hardin]

Flanagan is an asssoul.

Stanley Cavell _The Claim of Reason_ p.411 on the (inclination to say) soul:

``It may be that the sense of falsification comes from the way I understand
the phrase ``have a body.'' It is really a mythological way of saying
that I am flesh. But I am not satisfied with this myth, for it implies that
I also have something other than a body, call it a soul. Now I have three things
to put together: a body, a soul, and me. (So there are four things to
be placed: I plus those three.) But I no more have a soul than I have
a body. That is what I say here and now. People who say they have a soul
sometimes militantly take its possession as a point of pride, for
instance William Ernest Henley and G.B.Shaw. Take the phrase ``have
a soul'' as a mythological way of saying that I am spirit. If the body
individuates flesh and spirit, singles me out, what does the soul do?
It binds me to others.''

[Tommy_Grand]

Good review, Mr. Sanchez.

[Jim Walsh]

"Does a naturalistic view of the world undermine morality and meaning? "
This is a slightly more sophisticated version of the "argument" that Darwin encourages amorality since people believe thet they are "no better than monkeys." Heard a lot of that crap after Columbine. Not that *fundamentalists* ever shoot anybody...

[TJ]

From Mr. Sanchez's review:

"Flanagan endorses the view that there is no "further fact" of personal identity. When you strip away all of a person?s experiences, memories, thoughts, and dispositions, there is no "self" left over who has all these things: The person just is these things."

Unless I'm not reading this correctly, it seems Flanagan (or Julian?) is saying that a person is all nurture and no nature. Kind of like saying that absent the program code, there is no computer. Really? I thought the (rather obvious) scientific consensus today was that human behaviour is a blend of both nature and nurture.
Not that this implies a soul. Rather, it implies a rather large set of "hardware" and "software" combinatorics comprise an individual.

[Mona]

TJ writes: "Unless I'm not reading this correctly, it seems Flanagan (or Julian?) is saying that a person is all nurture and no nature. Kind of like saying that absent the program code, there is no computer."

I read the inclusion of Flanagan's word "disposition" as pretty well encompassing the nature end. Assuming he believes our dispositions are largely genetically determined.

[Dan]

Unless I'm not reading this correctly, it seems Flanagan (or Julian?) is saying that a person is all nurture and no nature

Dispositions are, presumably, the "nature" part.

[Pavel]

To the extent that my actions are undetermined -- that I could have turned right just as easily as left -- they are not bound to any of my own past mental states. To the extent that my own experience and reasoning do explain my actions, those actions are determined and, therefore, not "free" in the radical sense.

This "radical sense" of freedom, if thought out to its conclusion, is hardly (what Daniel Dennett would call) a kind of free will worth wanting. It certainly doesn't allow for any useful concept of responsiblity.

Freedom isn't an all or nothing affair. So oversimplified versions of liberalism never really cut the mustard anyway.

How to translate a wide spectrum from freedom to non-responsibility even within the human realm into black and white law and public policy...now there's the real Problem of Culture.

[TJ]

"Disposition" equals physical self? Hmm, ok. I guess the semantics of "disposition" don't feel right to me. Webster's is no help either, it suggests "personality", which was my first interpretation.
You all must be right however, I can't imagine Flanagan ignoring the hardware.

Pavel,

Well said.

[Matthew Cromer]

Time for a name change to the magazine.

How about "Dogmatic Pacifist Athiest Monthly"?

[Rob R]

"Does a naturalistic view of the world undermine morality and meaning?"

Lets put it this way. Modern (state funded) "science" undermine TRADITIONAL (not necessarily religious) morality--traditions that developed out of the interactions of billions over thousands of years. It substitutes a COVERT morality that the powerful (statist social "scientists") shame and often forcefully impose on lay persons through the power of the state.

Anyone who has read Thomas Szasz or Hayek should know as much.

No one would deny that persuasive moral reasoning depends upon a correct understanding of material reality. This includes understanding how the structure and function of the human brain impacts human action.

Yet, human action cannot be explained solely in terms of material factors, which is what most of the popular presentations neuropsychology suggest. It panders to a person's desire to escape responsibility for bad choices: "It's not me--it's my brain!"

Scientific people tend to elevate "science" over "ethics" because it is assumed ethics is "subjective", while science is "objective." In fact, science is ALSO subjective, in the sense that it developed in response to human needs and wants.

Human needs determine what questions are asked, and how they are answered. This isn't too much of a problem for physics and chemistry. But for questions of human behavior, this is very problematic.

The questions you ask can limit the answers you get. If you study deviant behavior, for example, to focus only on brain function--you will look on ALL problem behaviors as signs of a "malfunctioning" brain. But why should socially stigmatized behaviors signify any type of brain malfunction? Most neuroscience that gets popular attention strikes me as covert moralism. Simply look at research on "drug abuse" for relevant examples.

Science is a community activity. In order to be a scientist, you must share the ethics of scientists. Ideally, a scientist is to pursue the "truth", no matter how unpleasant it is.

So which comes first--science, or ethics? There can be no science, unless there is an ethical obligation for people to communicate with each other in an honest manner.

Ethics is a fundamentally more honest language. You can agree to disagree on ethical principles. There is less room for argument on legitimate scientific issues.

[Rdale]

"Science is barren without ethics, and ethics has nothing to apply itself to without science."

Read that somewhere, can't remember where. It's a bit simplistic and not entirely accurate, but it's not a bad place to anchor the discussion. 🙂

Free will is definitely a slippery substance, hard to truly define, especially if you remove it from realm of the spiritual and try to define it in the realm of only the physical sciences.

Much is argued about the structure of the brain, and the physical underpinnings of its neurochemical and / or electromagnetic character. Arguments for and against 'true' free will have been pulled from quantum physics, chemistry, genetics, and so on. Complexity certainly plays a part. Even if essentially deterministic, the number of degrees of freedom in the structure are near enough to infinite as to allow almost any degree of freedom in the whole of the structure itself.

There's kind of a truism in almost all pursuits, and that is that when you're looking for an explanation for something, you can almost always find the explanation you want. The more complex the thing you want to explain, the more avenues you have for finding the explanation that feels best to you. It is a rare searcher of truth that can divorce their desires from the search, and even the best can only separate them for limited times.

At this point, I'm inclined to view the whole discussion as incomplete. From a practical level, at a human scale, we *effectively* have free will. We can make our choices. While I might concede, in principle, that we are nothing more than supremely complex biological state machines, none of the arguments to define a solely determistic viewpoint of human behaviour are compelling. Interesting, yes, and valid as a discussion point, but far from compelling.

Unless a compelling position can be made and empirically demonstrated, then even if we only have the appearance of free will, we can still treat it as actual free will. Ethics and morality, whether derived from immanence, projection, or self interest, can then be founded from there.

Whether we have 'fake' free will or 'real' free will, we cannot act in any other way than to treat that 'free will' as genuine. We cannot replace it, even as a concept, unless we can *demonstrate* better results with an alternative.

[Robert Hutchinson]

If we don?t believe in free will, the argument runs, then we cannot trust the reasoning that led us to that conclusion, since it is only the upshot of a physical process that would inexorably give rise to the belief whether it were true or not. To see why this is wrong, consider computers, which nobody thinks are endowed with free will. Not only are they capable of generating true conclusions by acting on perfectly deterministic rules, but the determinism is a crucial part of our confidence in their accuracy.

How can we trust the reasoning that led us to the conclusion that computers don't have free will? You're saying that we can trust human reasoning on this matter despite a lack of free will because we can trust human reasoning on another matter despite a lack of free will.

"Logic doesn't exist, and I can prove it!"

[Robert Hutchinson]

Well, that was about my fifth attempt at making a response, and I probably shouldn't have tried at all, considering how tired I was.

Still, I have a big philosophical gripe with the concept of any illusion that one is simultaneously completely aware of and completely unable to abandon.

[John]

Hmm...I question whether Plato and Aristotle were as naturalistic as you say. Certainly the Socrates of "The Clouds" was a naturalist, but one of the underlying premises in both Aristotle and Plato seemed to be the agreement that a soul did indeed separate man from nature. Hence Aristotles "great-souled man." Some (particularly Straussians) would dismiss this as pandering to the audience (future princes) on a level they could comprehend, but reading these Greeks as naturalists in the modern sense of the word would be a bit far-fetched.

Generally the naturalistic arguments posited by the scientific community specifically are not very introspective. Simple observation of the human condition seems to deny that we are essentially "smart apes," and our very irrationality seems to prove some disconnect. This is obviously not a tight philosophic argument, but there are good ones in the new book Natural Right and Human Dignity: Universal Ethics in an Historical World by Eberhard Schockenhoff.

Finally (I promise), Julian makes an interesting series of assertions (and I am sure the book is more thorough in its own account)concerning the possibility for a new understanding of ourselves, morally, as naturalists, but I tend to think the harms of this ideology on a belief in universal ethics based a transcendant self might be underestimated. Indeed, love, even as a series of chemical reactions, is still desirable, but it is no longer love in the meaningful sense of the word. The "eros" may be present, but it would seem irreperable damage would be done to those conceptions of love (and hope) that rely more fully on the intrinsic value and transcendence of the human creature. Just thoughts. Excellent review though.

[Bill]

I'd like to say that this is a great thread. It seems that quite a few smart folks read Reason.

I'd like to ask if anyone finds any of these ideas new to them? I don't assume that I have a soul. I don't assume that my former five-year-old self it the me of today. I don't think "The Right to Liberty" is an absolute truth, it's just something I want.

The more I read philosophy, the less useful I think it is when determining "how things should be," i.e., what laws we should have. Too much philosophy complicates things unnecessarily. I guess that's why I like Occam's razor.

Whether or not a murderer has free will is irrelevant to most people. If left free, he may kill again, therefore, he should be incarcerated. The question of "how free was his will?" is important when deciding the type of institution--prison or mental institution--but not the decision to incarcerate.

Philosophy is great fun. It's mental masterbation.

[Douglas Fletcher]

That ain't love, it's friction.

[Dan]

A computer program can produce any result which its author wishes it to produce

Both computers and human brains are capable of producing either true or false output. So there's nothing special about computers in that regard.

However, you seem to be arguing that computers must have been explicitly programmed with instructions to produce true or false output. This is most certainly NOT the case. It is perfectly possible -- indeed, it is easy -- to write software that creates its own "rules" in response to its environment.

This is very important, because unless you know both (a) what the exact learning algorithm is and (b) the exact values of ALL the stimuli the system has been exposed to, you cannot perfectly predict what output the program will generate. If you do know the exact algorithm and the exact stimuli values, then you *can* predict what the program will do. For most algorithms, the more of the data you have, the more accurately you can predict the system's output.

It isn't possible to track either (a) or (b) for the human brain with perfect accuracy, ergo we can never be certain what output any human brain will generate. In that sense, we all have free will, because we can't possibly know for certain what our next thought would be. However, as we all know, the more you know about a person, the easier it is to guess what they'll think about any given subject. This suggests that we don't actually have free will; if our will was free, knowing more about us wouldn't serve as a guide to our future reactions. It suggests that our minds are the end result of learning algorithms and data inputs.

Side (rhetorical) note: was Rob R's rant not the weirdest thing you've seen in weeks? Sheesh.

[garym]

Response to Julian Sanchez:

"What's the evidence that we *have* a program? Well, all of evolutionary biology and neurology, for starters."

I think this is called the fallacy of the glittering generalization. Waving the names of sciences around isn't a demonstration of anything.

"Truth preservation" can be achieved simply with writing in a book. It's an entirely different matter from validating knowledge.

Response to Dan:

Free will isn't the same as capriciousness. If someone holds contradictory opinions on successive days, that isn't evidence of "freer" will than someone who holds consistent views. It could well be evidence that the person is being jerked around by outside influences. (Recall the dialogue from _Fiddler on the Roof_: "They can't both be right!" Tevye: "You're right, too!") Rather, we see that people sometimes break out of patterns when they're unreasonable, and sometimes keep following the same patterns, and perhaps more importantly, we can recall that we have done one or the other at different times (well, at least I have).

If having chosen to break out of a comfortable pattern is merely an illusion of programming, then the notion that it even was breaking out of a pattern is also an illusion; it was simply part of a higher-level pattern. Returning to the computer analogy: certainly a program can generate its own rules adaptively. But the rules which it generates are ultimately dependent on the original programming and the data. If there's an error in the original programming, it can propagate itself through all the rule-generation, and the program can't correct itself. Human consciousness is quite a different thing.

[Gary McGath]

Sanchez offers computer programs in support of his claim that valid knowledge can be achieved in the absence of free will. But in fact, they show the exact opposite.

void certainty ()
{
System.out.println ("2 + 2 = 5");
System.out.println ("This result was produced deterministically,
therefore it is certain.");
}

A computer program can produce any result which its author wishes it to produce. It will ignore all data that are not included in its design, and will take whatever leaps of logic or illogic are written into it. Sanchez says that computer programs' "determinism is a crucial part of our confidence in their accuracy." But the key word in that is "our." We can have confidence in the accuracy of computer programs only because we aren't computer programs, and are capable of making choices that keep us from being bound in any predetermined framework of rules for generating conclusions. Thus, computer programs provide a perfect example of the very point which he is attempting to rebut: that the ability to choose is a necessary precondition of validated knowledge.

[Rob R]

"Side (rhetorical) note: was Rob R's rant not the weirdest thing you've seen in weeks? Sheesh"

Weirdness is in the eye of the beholder. From my POV, the speculations about computers are not only strange, but irrelevant.

The question was: "Does naturalistic science undermine traditional morality."

Any libertarian worth his salt has read Hayek and Szasz. Hayek was certainly no conservative, but he had great respect for tradition, for the simple reason that traditions are discovered and evolve through market-like processes. The functioning free market assumes certain legal and moral concepts without which it cannot function. I believe much of so called "social science" DO undermine these traditions, which I consider an evil.

The naturalistics social "sciences" are predominantly state-funded enterprises. As such, there is no incentive of these "sciences" (save, maybe, economics) to view human beings as competent individuals who can make "free" choices. After all, if people are free and intelligent enough to look after themselves, the is a limitted amount of things government should do.

Without the idea of a "free" (uncoerced) choice, and a corresponding responsibility for the results, a market economy cannot function. Conracts cannot be enforced, and no one is accountable for what they do.

It seems almost perverse to me that so called libertarians can seriously entertain the idea that humans are not free in some fundamental sense, and are really just lumbering robots who are slaves to genetics, environment, or neuortransmitters.

For the most part, human behavior is limitted by the constraints we imagine. If we believe we are ONLY biological machines, we will perceive our existence to be mechanical and lifeless. If we believe we are free (and responsible) for our choices, we will act in ways consistent with that belief.

Which world do you prefer? The choice is yours...

[Jason Ligon]

Gary,

I don't follow the connection between choice and your concept of 'validity'. We have confidence in computer programs because we have confidence in logic as a universal system. Our confidence in logic has nothing to do with choice.

We can't detect our own program, but that is not to say that it isn't a program. Why would you believe that we aren't bound by predetermined framework rules for generating conclusions? We have an evolved framework. You have only demonstrated that we are not simple, non iterative and non recursive programs.

[Jason Ligon]

"Simple observation of the human condition seems to deny that we are essentially "smart apes," and our very irrationality seems to prove some disconnect."

What simple observations are these? No one is claiming that the programs of a mind must produce the correct answer every time. All the smart apes argument says is that our program is better than the one used by the apes.

I think that ultimately, we will arrive at a place where "Do unto others" is universal in the way that "All men are created equal" is. It is something that we must accept on a practical level to live in a society where freedom is valued. Depressing as it is, liberty is just a value, not a truth. Ethics are not universal, because they are just rules that are consistent with sets of values. Hence one man's unethical government theft is another's enhancement of equality.

[John]

"I think that ultimately, we will arrive at a place where "Do unto others" is universal in the way that "All men are created equal" is. It is something that we must accept on a practical level to live in a society where freedom is valued. Depressing as it is, liberty is just a value, not a truth. "

Why? This seems an assertion, not a proof (admittedly my assertions were too, but I admitted such). By stating the need for a practical acceptance of certain ethical rules you are automatically adopting a set of underlying ideological universals--namely, and at least, that mutual self-preservation of the physical self is the highest good and that this good is best preserved by individual liberty. This preservation would be a good in and of itself with no logical justification. Additionally, it is very difficult empirically to prove that physical self-preservation is either universal or the highest good. Expanding the doctrine of self-interest to include even actions of self-sacrifice certainly, in an amorphous way, explains how those actions are self-interested (ie I believe I will go to heaven, etc.) but it is not parallel to extending a universal value fo self-preservation. It is not logical inconsistency that sometimes allows humans to act in ways that unnecessarily threaten their physical selves (ie. even smart apes make mistakes) but often willful human action in defiance of the principle of self-preservation, placing something else as a higher good. These actions are not the exception, but, in 6,000 years of human existence, the rule. I believe that empirical evidence would demonstrate that we are not better, but worse than most animals when it comes to pure self-preservation, at least individually.

My only point is that some of the "logic" seemingly accepted by this board thus far, is not really as accepted as one would believe. Indeed most Americans, Europeans, and others still believe in a soul whether they believe in a theistic God or not. Rule utilitarians (as you yourslef seem to be--I am sorry if I have miscategorized you) are by far a minority, and are generally inconsistent (at least in action if not in logic) in their own willful self-preservation.

[Jason Ligon]

John,

I have always found ethics to be the most difficult aspect of philosophy to pin down. I know for certain that I am essentially a Humean skeptical empiricist, but I can find problems with the 'gut check' of Aritotelian ethics, the prescriptive kind outlined by religious texts, and even the utility of the Categorical Imperative.

All I can tell you is that to me, ethics are value driven. I don't know that my ethics are any more inconsistent than any one else's, as I have a very stong sense of certain values (human liberty is VERY high up there). Ethical considerations tied to less strongly held values will likely be wishy washy for me, but I suspect that is true for everyone. I would argue that a recognition of this tendency helps me to avoid inconsistency that a universalist might blow right past, but I claim to be no expert.

[Dan]

certainly a program can generate its own rules adaptively. But the rules which it generates are ultimately dependent on the original programming and the data.

Exactly. And in the case of the human brain, the way our neurons are "wired" is the programming, and sensory input is the data. The data we receive alters the "wiring" of our neurons, resulting in different processing of new data.

If there's an error in the original programming, it can propagate itself through all the rule-generation, and the program can't
correct itself.

That's completely wrong. Programs are quite capable of self-correction; all they need is feedback indicating whether their current output was correct or incorrect. Humans need the exact same thing, otherwise we don't self-correct either.

Human consciousness is quite a different thing.

There isn't actually any evidence of that, although a lot of people believe it. Ironically, this is an example of error propagating in the absence of feedback. We have no way, yet, of objectively quantifying consciousness, ergo countless human beliefs about consciousness -- most of them mutually contradictory and/or logically inconsistent -- continue to spread.

[Jason Ligon]

Also,

I disagree with your analysis of self sacrifice. There is issues of scope, conflicting motivators and the like. I am not arguing that self preservation will trump every other consideration every time. There is an evolutionary argument for social animals to have an element of sacrifice built in, because such actions improve the survivability of the tribe. Often, the issue of self sacrifice is incorrectly looked at as a binary problem: either you are a suicidal lemming or you will never ever sacrifice anything. There is no reason to formulate the argument in radical terms.

[garym]

Responding to Jason Ligon:

Valid knowledge requires more than just confidence in logic as an abstract set of rules. Arriving at any non-trivial conclusion requires an ongoing process of identifying and weighing evidence, and errors are possible at many points. This requires that we be able to distinguish between a sufficient or insufficient consideration of the evidence.

If we are programmed, as opposed to being capable of choices in this regard, then any errors which we make are part of our programming. We would not be able to choose to change the "program" and look at things in a different way in order to correct previous errors.

You say that "we can't detect our program." Doesn't that mean that it's just a matter of faith that we are programmed? Why should I believe in an all-controlling force -- er, program -- that directs my life, yet which I can't perceive?

[Dan]

The naturalistics social "sciences" are predominantly state-funded enterprises.

Ah, now you're changing your claim. Originally you said:

"Modern (state funded) "science" undermine TRADITIONAL (not necessarily religious) morality

You didn't say "social sciences", few of which are considered "sciences" by most people. For example, even if you have a Ph.D. in Political Science, if you went around saying "I'm a scientist" or "I do scientific research", people would look at you funny.

In any case, Flanagan's fields are philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology, none of which fall into the "state-funded social sciences" you're so concerned about; I think your rant was off-topic.

It seems almost perverse to me that so called libertarians can seriously entertain the idea that humans are not free in some fundamental sense, and are really just lumbering robots who are slaves to genetics, environment, or neuortransmitters

I don't define "libertarian" as "slave to Hayek's opinion". Perhaps you do. I am a libertarian because game theory indicates it's the best option; should reality dictate otherwise, I would change my opinion, regardless of what any of various dead philosophers might have to say about it. 🙂

The chaos and the uncertainty principle make it impossible to perfectly predict how humans will think, even if we could somehow record everything we ever experience and compare it to our brains' wiring. The complexity of the human brain, and of the universe around us that provides that brain with input, further complicates matters. The long and the short of it is this: we have no "free will", but as our own minds are utterly beyond our own comprehension, we act as if we do.

Libertarian philosophy requires merely that people act as if they have free will and self-interest. It does not require the actual, objective existance of those things.

Or -- put simply -- the fact that we're all slaves to genetics and neurotransmitters, yet still libertarians, proves that libertarianism is compatable with slavery to genetics and neurotransmitters. 🙂

[Julian Sanchez]

First, the second order question of validating a program shouldn't be confused with the first order point, which is just: A deterministic system (a well designed program) can be truth preserving. But they're related, insofar as once we recognize that freedom of choice isn't a necessary condition of a truth preserving process, there's very little reason to suppose that our own process of validation is somehow different in kind, rather than in complexity.

And of course we partly rewrite our own "programs"--just like many AI systems do. I still don't see how or why "choice" should be supposed to play any role here. What's the evidence that we *have* a program? Well, all of evolutionary biology and neurology, for starters.

Robert, for his part, has I think mistaken the argument I made. Neither with nor without the assumption of free will can you prove in any non-circular way that human reasoning is somehow transcendently valid. As I observe in the article, for instance, any argument for the soundness of (say) logical principles is, pretty much by definition, going to rely on those very principles. So that's a non-starter. I was just trying to rebut the narrower claim that "free choice" plays some sort of crucial role in making valid inferences. If anything, the opposite is true.

[Jason Ligon]

garym:

"Arriving at any non-trivial conclusion requires an ongoing process of identifying and weighing evidence, and errors are possible at many points. This requires that we be able to distinguish between a sufficient or insufficient consideration of the evidence."

You mean like setting the input weights of a logic gate by way of a continual feedback mechanism?

Feedback and recursion are definitely two things that a smart program has, but include them in many types of programs.

You can look at neurophysiology and see logic gates, which is the hardware used to run programs. You can also look at how something like perception works and extrapolate based on observations in cognitive science.

I've done so before around here, but I will again recommend Steven Pinker's "How the Mind Works" if you are not sold on the computational theory of mind. It is very convincing.

[dhex]

i can't define free will, but i know it when i see it. 🙂

the sheer amount of micromanagement involved in all of our decisions to log onto reason, read the story, and post (or not) combined with all the factors not under our control - available net connection, not being hit by an asteroid or out of control bus, and so on - make arguing about whether or not we have free will sort of inconsequential. (not useless, just secondary i guess)

whether or not love is just a biochemical reaction (on one level it is) doesn't mean anything if one decides love is worth pursuing. ity's real enough for me (and for most of us, i would think) to treat as "real."

and i guess in my head all of these factors lead me to a conclusion that my sense of "real" isn't strong enough to coerce others to live in it, but real enough to encourage me to defend it when necessary. but not real enough to encourage neurosis or psychosis (to a certain degree). and so on.

or maybe i'm just stuck on some "will above all" crap. who knows?

[Rob R.]

Dan Wrote:
"The naturalistics social "sciences" are predominantly state-funded enterprises.

Ah, now you're changing your claim. Originally you said:

"Modern (state funded) "science" undermine TRADITIONAL (not necessarily religious) morality"

You didn't say "social sciences", few of which are considered "sciences" by most people.

I reply: Nitpicking about what are "real" sciences aside, are you trying to tell me that neuroscience and psychology are COMPLETELY value neutral in regards to the image of human beings that they present? Is it not possible that the allegedly _descriptive_ languages of these sciences is really _prescriptive._

Example: Rather than say "Drug use is a moral wrong", those who wish to use the prestige of science to push a moral POV will say "Drug use is addictive, unhealthy, and socially disruptive."

They will do all sorts of research allegedly "proving" that some drugs are more addictive than others, and that these
"addictions" are due to the actions of neurotransmitters. A host of evidence disputing the biological POV is ignored.

I stand by my claim--various areas of science--both the social and biological, are biased against the idea of free human beings who are responsible for their choices.

[Dan]

Isn't the very foundation of scientific thinking that a hypothesis contradicted by observation is necessarily false?

It's also a foundation of scientific thinking that observations that cannot be independently confirmed -- as in your case -- shouldn't be considered, since the observer might be biased (which you are), mistaken (which you certainly could be) or lying (but I'll take your word for it).

It is also a general rule that observations should not be subjective. You say that your thoughts feel like free will. How do you know what free will feels like, or what non-free-will feels like? All you know is what your *own* thoughts feel like; you can only correlate that feeling with "free will" or "unfree will" if you can independently confirm that you're doing one or the other.

I perceive that I am choosing

Computers also choose; do they have free will? Perhaps you meant "you are choosing in a manner unconstrained by any rules". How can you know this? More importantly, how can you know that computers don't also feel that they are thinking in a manner unconstrained by any rules?

[Dan]

I reply: Nitpicking about what are "real" sciences aside, are you trying to tell me that neuroscience and psychology are COMPLETELY value neutral in regards to the image of human beings that they present?

First of all, I'm going to assume that when you say "neuroscience" and "psychology" you mean "as a whole", not "each and every neuroscientist and psychologist, taken individually". Science assumes individual bias; that's why everything needs to be independently confirmed, and is generally believed in proportion to the frequency of its confirmation. That said:

"Neuroscience", if by that you mean neurobiology, neurochemistry, etc, is completely value-neutral, yes. It is entirely based in empirical observation and scientific methodology.

Of course, you seem to define "value-neutral" as "presents an image of human beings you find acceptable". In that sense, it isn't "value-neutral". 🙂

In the case of psychology, it depends on which branch of psychology you're talking about. Cognitive psychology is value-neutral; behavioral and Freudian psychology, I would say, are not.

Rather than say "Drug use is a moral wrong", those who wish to use the prestige of science to push a moral POV will say "Drug use is addictive, unhealthy, and socially disruptive."

You're complaining about the use of scientific research by non-scientists to support their own moral claims. Obviously this happens -- although blaming it on "modern science" ignores the fact that the practice dates back at least to ancient Greece.

The statement "drug use is addictive, unhealthy, and socially disruptive", however, is not the statement of a scientist. For starters, some other scientist would quickly refute the claim by observing that moderate alcohol consumption is healthy, aspirin is non-addictive, and Albuterol has no observed socially disruptive effects.

Also, medical researchers don't declare that things are "unhealthy"; they describe the effects on human health. And the term "socially disruptive" belongs to the fuzzy pseudosciences, like sociology. 🙂

They will do all sorts of research allegedly "proving" that some drugs are more addictive than others, and that these
"addictions" are due to the actions of neurotransmitters.

Specific examples always work better than paranoid rants. If you're claiming that the government buys off some scientists to trump up the dangers of illegal drugs, you're correct. However, we only know the studies are trumped up because OTHER scientific studies refute them. So claiming that science is "biased" here is, obviously, a remarkably silly claim to make.

A host of evidence disputing the biological POV is ignored.

If a drug is empirically observed to do something to your body, what exact "evidence" do you use to prove that it's not having the observed effect? Are we just taking the subject's word for it that they're not addicted?

Why do I get the feeling I'm talking to a drug addict who's pissed at what doctors keep telling him?

I stand by my claim

Undoubtedly. But(to paraphrase Phil Dick) reality doesn't go away even if you stop believing in it.

[crimethink]

It's quite possible that everyone else in the world does not have free will. Memory and disposition can explain all their actions, from my point-of-view.

It gets more complicated when I try to explain my own experience of consciousness. I perceive that I am choosing, despite the fact that factors such as memory and disposition influence me. My perception of my existence totally contradicts the hypothesis that I have no free will.

Isn't the very foundation of scientific thinking that a hypothesis contradicted by observation is necessarily false?

[Rob R]

Just a couple of points:

No science is value neutral. Any science, in order to be relevant, must address some human need. Even physics, the father of all sciences, deals with the human need to understand how to cope with matter and energy. Since all humans have an incentive to understand effective ways to cope with matter and energy, comming to agreement on methods and results isn't too difficult.

Science is humanity's collective attempt to deal with the challenges living in a confusing and complex world. As such, all disciplines we call "sciences" implicitly search for ways to either predict, explain,or control the environment.

The activity of science presumes at the very least, that people have the freedom (I cannot think of any better word) to choose alternate courses of action, in light of evidence.

I think it is naive to believe science
"discovers truths" about "reality." I find them to be meaningless terms. In this sense, I'd consider myself an a pragmatic instrumentalist. Scientific theories are true because they appear to help us deal with the world.

Now, for scientific theories about humans, this is different. People have different goals and values. The state has an interest in techniques to control and manipulate people into behaving in predictible ways. In order to manipulate and control behavior, you must restrain it. The very activity of research on humans simply defines freedom out of existence. This is convenient, of course, for those who desire power over others. The more people believe they are unfree, the easier it is to lead them.

Your dispute with my position seems to be that anything that scientists do that is of questionable value has nothing to do with science. If I quote scientists who promote an unfounded chemical theory of addiction, you will poke fun at me for considering them
"scientists", or that their behavior reflects on them as a scientist. That approach is simply a word-playing game. It is not too different from the logic of the Catholic Church. They teach that the credibility of the Church is unaffected by the sinful actions of its members. Well, I find that theory hard to believe. "By their fruits, ye shall know them" has always been my motto.

Bottom line, all human pursuits, science included, is subject to the collective folly human beings all too often fall victim to. Science is no exception.