The SEC's Disastrous Distractions: Former commissioner Paul Atkins on how the regulatory agency's inattention contributed to the financial crisis
Nick Gillespie and Matt Welch | December 22, 2008, 4:30pm
Appointed to the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2002, Paul Atkins was a persistent-and unfortunately prescient-critic of the agency's failure to execute its regulatory functions in an efficient and effective manner.
Instead of working to make financial markets more transparent, argues Atkins, who stepped down from his post earlier this year, the SEC spent its time and resources focusing on irrelevant or secondary issues, allowing all sorts of problematic behavior to flourish and grow.
In December, Atkins sat down with Reason's Nick Gillespie and Matt Welch for a wide-ranging 45-minute conversation about the proper role of government oversight in a free enterprise system, the dangers of regulation, and what's likely to unfold as the Democrats take over the White House.
For an audio podcast version of this conversation, go here.
For downloadable versions of the video and related materials, go here.
Amakudari | December 23, 2008, 3:50am | #
I offer as evidence all of the proposals for greater regulation of the financial markets, particularly of MBSs and CDOs, coming out of the bureaucracy that were shot down the political appointees, out of a wrong-headed belief that the markets could police themselves.
What evidence do we have that
regulators can police financial markets? The SEC had been receiving actionable intelligence on Madoff for a decade. The OTS just got caught red-handed for letting IndyMac backdate a capital infusion, and I figure they'll be dismantled now that most major thrifts with an OTS charter have imploded. The FDIC totally bungled the Wachovia-Citi-Wells catfight, and moreover, Wachovia was
solvent when they were threatened with receivership. The Treasury's picked winners in Bear, AIG and Citi and losers in Lehman, which has destroyed market stability. The Fed's responsible for the interest rate component that got us into this mess. And this is all ignoring the role of non-regulatory government actors like the FHLBs, FNMA and FHLMC, and their supporters in Congress. Given the same Fed rate policy, do we really think that financial results would have been radically different under a Democratic administration? They would have been the ones to pull away the punch bowl?
Say even that federal regulators had the ability to look into MBS and CDOs. Keep in mind, of course, that Fannie Mae was the first to sell MBS (agency securities = packaged FHA and VA loans), and I doubt the government's official analysis would differ substantially. What would they have learned that would cause them to pull the plug? They couldn't access documentation on underlying collateral, and they would have no incentive to probe. Go ask someone who worked in banking back then, and you couldn't even find an
auditor who would let you take large overprovisions against future losses (they feared you were managing earnings). Mortgage defaults were at a record low, and would naturally continue to be that way. It's like falling 90 stories off a 100-story building and extrapolating that the next 10 stories will end just as uneventfully. Now imagine everyone on Wall Street thinking that way, and figure how regulators with one or two less zeroes on their paycheck would have made a stand against financial innovation.
I'd say that we do need changes, but the changes that the Republicans and Democrats would make versus the other seem more like window dressing. We still would have encouraged very risky lending through a cheap funds rate, a deposit put (i.e. FDIC insurance increases a bank's desired size and risk appetite), and a huge government-backed mortgage finance regime. I don't know we can assume things would have been better if only we'd done this, that, or the other. The problem is the system.