Dissatisfaction Guaranteed

The federal government should stop guaranteeing loans.

Each time an auto company, small business, or homeowner receives a politically motivated loan guarantee, the giveaway creates yet another unfunded liability for future taxpayers. Now, in response to the economic crisis, the feds have provided more than $8 trillion in new guarantees. Aside from attempting to halt an alarming decline in lending, the loans’ supporters give four justifications for the programs.

First, they claim certain entities are being denied access to credit through no fault of their own. Supposedly, even in boom times, lenders pass over many opportunities to issue loans to borrowers who, despite appearances to the contrary, are creditworthy. This argument sounds especially persuasive at a time like now, when interbank lending is frozen and subprime lending has disappeared.

Second, loan advocates argue that the recipients will generate economic growth that otherwise would not occur.

Third, they say additional social goods can be derived from goosing the credit markets. Widespread homeownership, for example, is seen as increasing the country’s stability and prosperity.

Finally, there is the notion that keeping particular firms alive enhances the common good, whether because they provide essential consumer services, add to competition in certain markets, or employ significant numbers of people. In some cases, politicians call for supplying credit to an entire industry (e.g., the banking system) or a huge portion of it (e.g., U.S.-owned automakers).

The federal government guarantees loans to induce banks to lend money to credit-risky borrowers. If the borrower defaults, the government reimburses the lender for either the entire loss that the lender would otherwise sustain or a large fraction of it. With this guarantee, banks are willing not only to lend money to high-risk borrowers who couldn’t get loans without it but also to grant more favorable terms to existing customers.

In a normal year, Washington guarantees roughly $150 billion in loans through more than 20 programs. The Small Business Administration has six loan guarantee programs that total $40 billion. The Department of Energy has a program that places nearly $40 billion in taxpayers’ money at risk each year. The Department of Housing and Urban Development guarantees another $40 billion.

Of course, 2008 was not a normal year. Within just three months, the federal government guaranteed almost $8 trillion in investment, deposits, and loans as part of the financial bailout. On the loan side, Washington will be backing the bulk of Citigroup’s $300 billion portfolio; it will also guarantee an unquantifiable amount of modified subprime loans and lines of credit to the cash-hungry auto industry. In addition, the government will continue subsidizing, through taxpayer guarantees, the expansion of the government-sponsored mortgage buyers Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.

Before the financial crisis, total taxpayer exposure via loan programs—the cost if every borrower defaulted—was about $500 billion, taking interest into account. With the additional guarantees now totaling more than half of GDP, taxpayers’ exposure has grown exponentially while their ability to repay the loans has if anything shrank.

Such a risk would seem to call for strict oversight of how these loans turn out, both in terms of default rates and social goods. Yet until now the federal government has refused to systematically measure the performance of its 40 existing loan programs. Why? Perhaps because the data show that most of them never deliver any of the promised social and economic value.

Historically, loans guaranteed by the government have a very high default rate. The Congressional Budget Office has calculated that the risk of default on the Department of Energy’s nuclear loan guarantee program, for example, is well above 50 percent. The Small Business Administration (SBA), according to its own Inspector General’s Office, has a long-term default rate of roughly 17 percent. This compares to 4.3 percent for credit cards and 1.5 percent forbank loans guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Faced with this track record, lawmakers often counter that the programs charge lenders a fee for each loan to offset the costs that defaults impose on taxpayers. But these fees are rarely high enough to cover the true cost of defaults, especially during economic downturns.

Federally backed loans create a classic moral hazard. Because the loan amount is guaranteed, banks have less incentive to evaluate applicants thoroughly or apply proper oversight. Not only are the borrowers high-risk to begin with, but it’s not necessarily cost-effective for lenders to identify the best of these bad applicants.

These bad incentives are among the reasons for the financial crisis to begin with. For years, the government has encouraged banks to extend credit to noncreditworthy borrowers and to make larger loans than a market would normally bear even to creditworthy borrowers. It did this by explicitly and implicitly guaranteeing certain banks’ losses.

It’s irresponsible to keep encouraging banks to lend money to borrowers they wouldn’t assist if their own money were on the line. It is a good thing that banks today won’t lend money to people who can’t afford to pay it back. That doesn’t mean all credit markets are, or should be, frozen. Even in the current housing market, for instance, borrowers with decent credit histories and down payments still have access to mortgages.

Editor's Note: We invite comments and request that they be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of Reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason at any time. Report abuses.

  • The Federal Government||

    psssst...

    I'm not wearin' any underware.

  • The Wine Commonsewer (you can ||

    The Federal Government | February 9, 2009, 12:53pm | #
    psssst...

    I'm not wearin' any underware.



    [chuckles for a few moments]

  • The Wine Commonsewer (you can ||

    Why the Federal Government Should Stop Guaranteeing Loans

    Preachin' to the choir, Babe. :-)

  • ||

    Lest anyone (like Joe, for instance) trot out that old canard about how the Chrysler bailout in the 1980s was supposedly just peachy because they paid it back, I will point out that the money lent to Chrysler was not available for better, more profitable businesses to borrow to expand their operations or employ people.

    -jcr

  • Alice Bowie||

    The entire America is a Ponzi scheme.

    -Social Security
    -Unemployment Insurance
    -Health Insurance
    -Disability Insurance
    -EVERYTHING

    Let's atleast bail out the little guy and the regular guy. Trust me, if you bail out these people...the big guy will be happy as well.

  • Colonel_Angus||

    But the free market was responsible for the recession. Yeah, this is really a fucking free market. More like corporate welfare ponzi scheme.

  • ||

    Broadly available loan guarantees interferes with the price mechanism on interest rates, thus reducing productivity in the long term, as unprofitable ventures are kept alive, and profitibale ventures are undercut by the supports their competators receive.

  • ||

    Without DOE's program, there will be no new nuclear power facilities in the US.

    Existing fleet covers large baseload megawatts and are competitive with coal (and becoming more so) now that they're paid for. However, state PUCs do not allow pay-as-you-go (i.e., you can't charge current customers till watts are on the grid) so the capital intense nature and long-lead time to get a new 7 to 10B nuke up and running cannot be borne by the utilities and banks will not sign-on without assurances.

    You can argue the merits of that one way or the other and from a financial perspective, that's probably how it should be (i.e., "risky" investments). But if you are at all serious about reducing CO2 emissions, nukes have to be part of the short-term mix. And they have the potential to be moneymakers, just like the current fleet.

  • ||

    Or we could deregulate energy prices, they would double, and nukes would be economically viable. Or we could tax coal. We don't have to fund this as a country - we choose too, because power-grade uranium is a proliferation concern.

  • ||

    You can't have it both ways. You can't call it "Reason" and then just make up the facts to support your argument. For example, Never, in it's entire history, has the SBA done 40 billion in loans in any one year. If it's Reason, you can't make it up.

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