Safe, But Also Sorry

Security expert Bruce Schneier talks about privacy and property in the information state

Katherine Mangu-Ward | January 16, 2009

As Washington, D.C., gears up for the inauguration, there's one thing that you're not seeing around town. Shoe-checking stations. While one attempted shoe bombing was enough to make all of us wander unshod through the airports of this great nation for years—there will be security check points all over Capitol Hill—shoe checking will not be part of the action.

Why? It's not that the chance of a shoe bombing has somehow been definitively eliminated. It's because the costs (frostbitten toes and long delays) have been weighed against the (low) possible risk of Richard Reid II. We probably should have reached the same conclusion about airports long ago. But this particular brand of cost-benefit analysis often eludes security officials, especially in the public sector.

Security officials at the inauguration are taking one tip from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), though. They're dictating bag sizes. Nothing bigger than 8 inches by 6 inches by 4 inches will be allowed, according to The Washington Post. Basically, we're talking fanny packs here, people. So get ready for Obama's America to look something like this. The Washington City Paper is on the case, trying to figure out what the heck officials thought we were going to be packing our lunches in while we stand (since chairs are banned as well) along the parade route after waiting in a three-hour line to get in.

The TSA, meanwhile, is planning to phase out the small-bag-of-liquids regime this year after realizing that it may have overreacted to the single threat of a liquid-based bomb. New machines will be put in place to detect explosives, allowing the rest of us to pack our saline solution in peace. And so the security merry-go-round whirls on.

Wired columnist and BT chief security technology officer, Bruce Schneier, who started out as a cryptologist and has since expanded his portfolio to all things security, is the TSA's worst nightmare. A lot of what Schneier says sounds like the common sense you'll hear at the far end of the security line in any airport—you know, the stuff people say before they get within earshot of the badged and businesslike men and women who hold the fates of our vacations in their latex-gloved hands. Schneier adds some serious geek street cred and a respect for individualism to that common sense, and comes up with analysis and suggestions guaranteed to drive the TSA up the wall.

Associate Editor Katherine Mangu-Ward interviewed Bruce Schneier last week about his book, Schneier on Security (Wiley), and his thoughts on security, privacy, and profit.

Reason: You coined the phrase "security theater" and you've been critical of the TSA's choices on priorities and tactics. What has the TSA done wrong that's fixable? What has the TSA done right?

Bruce Schneier: The TSA focuses too much on specific tactics and targets. This makes sense politically, but is a bad use of security resources. Think about the last eight years. We take away guns and knives, and the terrorists use box cutters. We confiscate box cutters and knitting needles, and they put explosives in their shoes. We screen shoes, and they use liquids. We take away liquids, and they'll do something else. This is a dumb game; the TSA should stop playing. Some screening is necessary to stop the crazy and the stupid, but it's not going to stop a professional terrorist attack. We don't need more and better screening; we need less. On the other hand, I like seeing the direction they're heading in terms of behavioral profiling, though we need to be careful. Done wrong, it's nothing more than stereotyping; but done right, it can be very effective. It needs more focus on people and less on objects. We can't manage to keep weapons out of prisons; we'll never keep them out of airports. Oh, and stop the ID checking—the notion that there is this master list of terrorists that we can check people off against is just plain silly.

Reason: What would success look like for the TSA? If you were made King of Airport Security tomorrow and given the entire current budget of the TSA to do whatever you wanted, what kind of system would you design?

Schneier: If I were in charge of the TSA's budget, I'd give most of it back. Politically, I wouldn't be able to, of course, but it would be the best thing to do. Spending money on airport/airplane security only makes sense if the bad guys target airplanes. In general, money spent defending particular targets or tactics only makes sense if we can guess them correctly. If tactics and targets are scarce, defending against specific ones makes us safer. If tactics and targets are plentiful—as they are—it only forces the bad guys to pick new ones. Spending money on intelligence, investigation, and emergency response is effective regardless of the tactic or the target. Airport security is a last line of defense, and not a very good one at that. We need to remember that at budget time.

Reason: One theme that comes up in your book and some of the interviews you've done recently is the idea that when money/profit is involved, security operations tend to be tighter and more efficient. Explain to Reason.com readers—or at least speculate on—why that's the case.

Schneier: The person or organization who is subject to the risk needs to be responsible for risk mitigation. In banking, for example, the banks need to be responsible for their own risk. They lose money if the bank is robbed, so they're in the best position to weigh the cost of security measures against the risk of robbery. Customers don't lose money when there's a bank robbery, so they can't balance the risks and costs. Conversely, it makes no sense for bank customers to be penalized for identity theft losses. They're in no position to mitigate the risks—whereas the banks are—so customers shouldn't be responsible for the losses.

This doesn't mean there's no place for government to be responsible for risks. In airline security, the risks are far greater than any one airline. It makes no sense for airlines to hire security screeners—they can't do a proper risk analysis—and a lot of sense for the government to step in to fill that role.

Reason: In Schneier on Security, you emphasize that technology isn't the only (or even the most important part) of a security solution. Why do people tend to systematically discount cultural and economic factors in considering questions of security?

Schneier: We live in a technological world, and it's common for us to believe that technology can solve our security problems. It solves so many of our other problems, so it's a plausible belief. It's also easier to believe that a shiny new piece of technology—a new ID card, a new airport scanner, a new face-recognition system—can solve our problems than boring old concepts like culture and economics. Admitting that technology isn't the answer is admitting that there isn't an answer that will solve the problem, and many people can't do that yet. We've forgotten that risk is an inherent part of life.

Comments

Naga Sadow|1.16.09 @ 3:13PM|#

Fantastic article! He outlined why, unless I'm flying to LA or Denver, I don't fly.

Mad Max|1.16.09 @ 3:14PM|#

This Schneier guy sounds like a suspicious character. He should be on a list, if he isn't already.

Kolohe|1.16.09 @ 3:15PM|#

Basically, we're talking fanny packs here, people. So get ready for Obama's America to look something like a href="http://www.hotelchatter.com/files/admin/fanny_pack.jpg">this

How long have you lived in DC? That's what every single mall denizen has looked like for nearly three decades now.

Kolohe|1.16.09 @ 3:19PM|#

A quibble with this:
Conversely, it makes no sense for bank customers to be penalized for identity theft losses. They're in no position to mitigate the risks-whereas the banks are-so customers shouldn't be responsible for the losses.
They're in no position to mitigate the risks-whereas the banks are-so customers shouldn't be responsible for the losses.

There are certain de minimus steps that individuals need to take to mitigate identity theft risks. Failure to do so makes any broader system implemented by the industry worthless.

Kolohe|1.16.09 @ 3:19PM|#

man I suck

SpongePaul|1.16.09 @ 3:23PM|#

The security protacalls that were in place prior to 9/11 were sufficient, the info was not acted on, that is a failure to act, not a need for more gov intrusion. the patriot act and all laws since tsa homeland etc are just ballast weighing America down. WE need MUCH FEWER LAWS AND SECURITY, BUT WELL ENFORCED AND Getting the info out, then acting on it is what is needed! Rem. the cia fbi and even the pres were briefed on the people that pulled off 9/11. it was ignored as not a threat!

Kolohe|1.16.09 @ 3:27PM|#

Nonetheless I will try one more time:
I believe that approximately two security improvements since 9/11 have made airplane travel safer: reinforcing the cockpit door, teaching passengers they have to fight back, and-maybe-sky marshals.

But the reinforcing the door is not without it's downside either. There is evidence that a Greek plane crashed a few years ago because they suffered a depressurization event, and the cabin crew could not get into the cockpit after the flight deck crew was incapacitiated.

I agree that tech isn't the sole part of a security solution. And we can only mitigate not eliminate. But saying that 'boring old concepts like culture and economics' will solve our problems evades the question. (much like when people say "we need to do more diplomacy")

SpongePaul|1.16.09 @ 3:36PM|#

I believe that approximately two security improvements since 9/11 have made airplane travel safer: reinforcing the cockpit door, teaching passengers they have to fight back, and-maybe-sky marshal
__________________________________________
I will give ya the doors, but that was just a simple fix. as far as sky marshals, we already had them, just not as many. And as far as fighting back, that would be common sense no? At least to me it would have been. my motto is dont go easy into the good night. people being pussies and not standing up for themselves and others, by LETTING and yes i mean LETTING the hijackers take over. 4 guys with box cutters against a plane full o people, no contest. If peeps had balls the planes would still be flying

Leftiti|1.16.09 @ 3:36PM|#

If we save the life of just one elitist crook it'll all be worth it.

JW Gacy|1.16.09 @ 4:16PM|#

Not to be a snob, but I saw SpongePaul's mutilation of the word, "protocol" and made a mental note to disregard his future posts.

|1.16.09 @ 4:23PM|#

No mention of an armed citizenry, or at least armed pilots?

Paul|1.16.09 @ 4:29PM|#

Great article. I have one minor quibble. The reason we focus on airline security is because historically, terrorists have had an odd fascination with the airlines.

SpongePaul|1.16.09 @ 4:38PM|#

JW Gacy | January 16, 2009, 4:16pm | #

Not to be a snob, but I saw SpongePaul's mutilation of the word, "protocol" and made a mental note to disregard his future posts.
____________________________________________
I am dyslexic, thank you! At least my handle is not that of a serial killer mr gacy

|1.16.09 @ 5:37PM|#

SpongePaul, your assumption that we fight back against hijackers being common sense is fine. Now, anyway. Hijackers USED to take a plane to a foreign country somewhere, make a bunch of demands, maybe kill a few passengers to show how serious they were, and then let most people go. So resisting the hijackers back then may not have done any good. Actually, it may have gotten more people killed. So before 9/11 you may have been better off just sitting quietly, trying not to draw any attention to yourself.

Now? Hell yeah people are going to fight back. The second that hijackers decided that they'd fly planes into buildings they changed the game. I don't think you'll ever see that again, unless the hijackers can incapacitate every passenger and member of the flight crew.

But the passengers of those flights couldn't even conceive of a group that fanatic. They probably thought they'd end up at a deserted airfield in Mexico and that they may get out of things okay in a few days. Now we know better. I think the lesson was learned.

geniusiknowit|1.16.09 @ 5:42PM|#

Let the market meet the security needs of airline passengers.


Awww hell, who am I kidding? The market is prone to failure and only the government can protect us!

cuernimus|1.16.09 @ 7:31PM|#

The turnout for the Obama inauguration will be a major boon for Republicans come the next election. So many excited people coming out to see Obama, only to be really cold and really bored for a really long time. If enough presidents engage in such over the top and ultimately unfulfilling self-congratulation, eventually the Pavlovian shudder these people will suffer from any mentioning of politics will lead to libertarians being the majority party! Of course, we'd still lose every election, but at least it's a start.

|1.16.09 @ 8:04PM|#

Only Fanny Packs huh? This one appears to be an officially approved size.

|1.16.09 @ 8:08PM|#

Oops... This one appears to be an officially approved size. ... er... if you get the "small" version.

|1.16.09 @ 10:49PM|#

Very wise comment at the end, regarding talking to strangers. If a kid is running away from danger, he shouldn't be afraid to ask a stranger for help.

-jcr

|1.17.09 @ 4:58PM|#

With a little help for my friend.

The fear of
the darkness
again disappears
when my
memory lives,
saving the pleasure
of a natural life;
and a thanks
overcomes, like
a delicate bird
near a shining
fountain.

Francesco Sinibaldi

|1.18.09 @ 8:34PM|#

Bruce Schneier is the man when it comes to security. I've been following his work since I first read "Applied Cryptography" back in '97.

|1.19.09 @ 11:58AM|#

Hijackers USED to take a plane to a foreign country somewhere, make a bunch of demands, maybe kill a few passengers to show how serious they were, and then let most people go. So resisting the hijackers back then may not have done any good.

I disagree. The passive submission doctrine was always a bad doctrine, on moral and practical grounds. Passenger resistance would have brought an end to highjacking very early on. Not only would it have made successful highjackings virtually impossible, it would have made even a successful highjacking a PR disaster for the perps. It would have made the whole thing a no-win game for the bad guys.

|1.20.09 @ 12:12AM|#

You know what's ironic.. Holsters have been available in fanny pack styles for so long, my police friends tell me they always assume that's what they are.

NM|1.24.09 @ 10:21AM|#

@Nick: "No mention of an armed citizenry, or at least armed pilots?"

There are several orders of magnitude more idiots and crazy people than terrorists. Take 200 people, put them in a confined space; there's gonna be on average one with some form of psychosis, drug withdrawal or anger management problem. In fact, probably more. How likely is it that a bona fide terrorist be on any given plane? One in ten millions?

Do you seriously believe that this is a reasonable security trade-off?

@SpongePaul: "At least to me it would have been. my motto is dont go easy into the good night. people being pussies and not standing up for themselves and others, by LETTING and yes i mean LETTING the hijackers take over. 4 guys with box cutters against a plane full o people, no contest. If peeps had balls the planes would still be flying"

That is precisely Schneier's point; before 9/11 the common "wisdom" was to let the hijackers take over, because it was assumed that they were just going to take the plane somewhere, not crash it on purpose. It had nothing to do with having cojones or not. Nowadays I'm pretty certain that anyone would fight back, esp. considering that you'd expect that everyone else will, thus making the risk of being injured for any one person quite low.