The Volokh Conspiracy
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No Pseudonymity in Ex-Associate's Sexual Assault Claim Against Major Law Firm
"Permitting Doe to proceed pseudonymously while the Firm defends itself publicly, particularly where there seems to be material factual disputes between the parties, presents an unfair asymmetry that also weighs against anonymity ...."
From Judge W. Scott Hardy in Doe v. Blank Rome LLP, the opinion was issued under seal in May, but just unsealed last week (at my behest):
Plaintiff is an attorney who filed a detailed, 197-paragraph Complaint under the pseudonym "Jane Doe" against Defendant Blank Rome LLP …, her former employer, alleging claims for sex discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation pursuant to Title VII …. Her claims arise from the Firm's purported failure to respond appropriately after Doe allegedly was sexually assaulted by another associate attorney, identified in the Complaint as "Associate A," while they and others were socializing at the home of a Firm partner on a Saturday evening after leaving a graduation party hosted by another partner of the Firm. The Complaint details Doe's professional background, including where she attended law school, when she began her employment at the Firm, and the type of law she practiced while at the Firm.
Doe's Complaint similarly details Associate A's professional background, including his law school and year of graduation, and the names of his prior law firms. The Complaint does not identify Doe by her own name, nor does it identify by name "Associate A" or any other attorney at the Firm. The only person identified by name in the Complaint is the Firm's Chief Human Resource Officer, who is named 24 times….
The court noted the strong presumption in favor of parties litigating in their own names, and concludes this presumption wasn't rebutted here:
A mere showing of embarrassment or economic harm is not enough [to justify pseudonymity]. Rather, there must be a showing of both: (1) fear of severe harm, and (2) that the fear of severe harm is reasonable. When a litigant sufficiently alleges that he or she has a reasonable fear of severe harm from litigating without a pseudonym, the Third Circuit instructs that "district courts should balance the plaintiff's interest and fear against the public's strong interest in an open litigation process." {"[T]he Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff's concerns, and understands that, unfortunately, victims of sexual harassment and assault often face ridicule and further harassment when they file lawsuits or otherwise publicly disclose their allegations, especially in the internet age. However, these concerns, while certainly reasonable, are not sufficient to outweigh the public's right to access court proceedings."} …
It also expressed its concern about one-sided pseudonymity (a concern that some courts weigh heavily and others don't, as this article lays out in detail):
Doe is not the only party exposed to public humiliation and reputational harm. The Firm itself and its chief human resource officer have been identified publicly in the Complaint (and other current or former Firm attorneys have been described with sufficient identifying indicia in the Complaint to be identified by implication). Permitting Doe to proceed pseudonymously while the Firm defends itself publicly, particularly where there seems to be material factual disputes between the parties, presents an unfair asymmetry that also weighs against anonymity ….
And it noted,
Doe … plead[ed] highly detailed factual averments in her 197-paragraph Complaint that inform the reader of her law school, her prior law firm affiliation, the month and year she commenced work at the Firm, the general nature of her practice, and the date of her departure from the Firm. Similar factual averments were plead regarding Associate A, including by naming three firms at which Associate A had previously been employed. The Firm's identity has also been revealed both in the caption of the Complaint and in its detailed factual averments. Many of these averments supply indicia of identity of both Doe and Associate A even though they would not have been necessary pursuant to applicable pleading standards set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)…. [This] weighs against anonymity.
The court also mentioned Doe's argument "that there are social stigmas that attach to victims of sexual assault and harassment, and that using her real name would subject her to 'ridicule, scrutiny, and alienation' by her own colleagues and would jeopardize her reputation within the local legal community," but responded that (1) "Doe is an adult, not a minor" and that (2) she "does not contend that she would forgo her claims if her motion to proceed pseudonymously were to be denied and there is no indication from the record that Doe would be deterred from proceeding if she identified herself." For whatever it's worth, plaintiff dismissed the case a few months after the decision denying pseudonymity, presumably pursuant to a settlement. Because of the dismissal, neither Doe nor Associate A were publicly identified in the docket.
Finally, the court discussed in some detail the question "whether either party stakes out their respective positions here for illegitimate ulterior motives," a factor that some courts' multi-factor tests for pseudonymity mention but that rarely gets much elaboration:
Doe contends that the Firm would have no reason for opposing her motion other than her bald accusation that such opposition is being undertaken to "perpetuate ongoing harm" and to "further humiliate her, undermine her professional reputation and potentially deter her form continuing with this litigation." Doe proffers no particularized basis for this accusation beyond her objection that the Firm's General Counsel circulated an internal communication within the Firm itself about Doe at or near the time her Complaint was filed, to contend that the Firm opposes her pending motion for illegitimate and "nefarious" motives, further suggesting the Firm is opposing it as a "litigation tacti[c]."
For its part, the Firm similarly accuses Doe of illegitimate tactical motives for seeking to proceed pseudonymously despite filing a factually detailed Complaint with enough content for a reader to know or surmise the identities of its personnel so that she may "cast[] aspersions upon the character of others about whom she publicly alleges information that makes them readily identifiable." The Court notes, too, that Doe filed her detailed Complaint without seeking leave to file it under seal or in redacted form and did file it on the public docket approximately a week before seeking to proceed pseudonymously. {In saying so, the Court is not suggesting that proceeding in this manner is inappropriate or that that seeking to file such a pleading under seal or in redacted form is the better course. Though, there may be circumstances when doing so is advisable.}
On the present record, the Court discerns no illegitimate or nefarious motives by either party. In reaching this conclusion, the Court notes that there are known and anticipated vicissitudes and adversities to litigants involved in presumptively public judicial proceedings.
Here, the Defendant is a large, multi-office law firm and Doe is one of its former lawyers. Both parties are experienced with the judiciary and presumably familiar with the reasonably foreseeable extrajudicial consequences litigation has on parties and witnesses.
Moreover, lawyers representing their clients in court, such as counsel of record here, are expected to prepare and file pleadings and briefs on court dockets for legitimate purposes that subject them to potential sanctions if such filings are presented for an improper purpose. Of course, pleadings and briefs having a proper purpose may also have attendant collateral adverse extrajudicial consequences, but such consequences do not necessarily transform a proper filing into an improper one. Sometimes those boundaries are clear, sometimes blurred. {Here, on the present record, the Court detects some potential tactical and strategic efforts by both parties within the context of otherwise legitimate and proper lawyering but cautions both parties and their counsel to stay within those boundaries going forward.}
As noted above, Doe has a legitimate interest in seeking to proceed pseudonymously to avoid potential embarrassment, humiliation, emotional distress, and professional reputational harm. Those are reasonable and understandable concerns. Likewise, the Firm's opposition to Doe's request is grounded on the desire for symmetry in the transparency of the Court's administration of justice so that Doe may not be permitted to "hurl accusations … from behind 'a cloak of anonymity.'" The Court agrees that such rationale, rooted in fairness and tethered to the presumption of transparency in court proceedings, is also reasonable and legitimate. Accordingly, the parties' respective motives neither favor nor disfavor Doe's continued anonymity.
And the court concluded by noting "the presumption in favor of open judicial proceedings," and by saying that, "[w]hile the parties here are not public officials or public bodies, the strong presumption in favor of open judicial proceedings is not outweighed by the other … factors considered above."