The Volokh Conspiracy
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Not Quite How Get-Out-the-Vote Is Supposed to Work
From Eighth Circuit Judge David Stras (joined by Judges Steven Grasz and Jonathan Kobes) in yesterday's U.S. v. Taylor:
Taylor, who was born in Vietnam, moved to the United States over 20 years ago. Along with her husband, she settled in Sioux City, Iowa, where she was active in the local Vietnamese community.
In 2020, Taylor decided to run her own version of a get-out-the-vote campaign. The idea was to help Vietnamese Americans, some of whom struggled with English and were unfamiliar with our election system, register and vote. Her motives were not purely altruistic: she hoped they would vote for her husband, who was a candidate in the election.
Absentee voting was common during the pandemic. Taylor made it easy by bringing the necessary forms, translating them, having voters complete them, and returning them to the county auditor's office. Once the ballots arrived in the mail, Taylor would come back and help fill them out.
Sometimes, however, Taylor did more than just help. If she learned that a voting-age child was away from home, perhaps at college, she would instruct someone else in the family to complete the necessary forms and then vote on their behalf. For others, she just completed those steps herself. She turned in a total of 26 doctored documents, all with handwriting or signatures that were not the children's own….
Unsurprisingly, the convictions were affirmed.
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So somehow the federal government comes down hard on her, because her husband whom she assisted is a Republican, but when Stacey Abrams does this in Georgia on a massive scale to get people to vote for people purely on the basis of their race, that's just fine!
And if you care accuse her and her henchmen of cheating, you get a $150 million defamation judgment.
Congratulations! You've finally uncovered the voter fraud of 2020. Not surprisingly...Republican.
Obviously the Trump administration and the GOP-dominated Georgia government, knew that Abrams had "done this" and said, "that's just fine," right?
Mail in ballots - who woulda thunk there wouldnt be any fraud with limited ability to check Voter ID
No-one denies that mail-in fraud happens. The competing claims are that it's widespread, and that it's rare. The evidence overwhelmingly supports the latter claim.
The evidence doesn't support it, because the left has made it impossible to actually collect data which would demonstrate one way or another.
Why create a voting system that facilitates voter fraud?
Then there's my voting system. You vote, in person, at a terminal which generates a "ballot receipt" showing the election, polling station, all the votes, a random receipt ID, and a crypto hash. It can send this to your phone in the booth, email it to your home computer, or print it out. A phone app can verify the hash in the booth, a web app can verify the receipt at home. You don't leave the booth if the verification fails, you scream fraud.
Precinct watchdogs count all voters, in real time.
At no point are voters identified, not by the watchdog counters or by the ballot receipt.
When polls close at the end of the day, every precinct publishes all their ballot receipts. This means several things:
* Only poll workers with access to the crypto private key can add extra ballot receipts or alter existing ones.
* Any discrepancy with the watchdog counts will stand out. Watchdogs might have minor discrepancies due to bathroom breaks and such, but because their logs include timestamps, it's impossible to flood the precinct with mysterious voters who only show up after the polls close.
* Every voter can compare their ballot receipt against the published receipts. If theirs is missing or different, scream fraud.
* Everyone can add up all the voting totals. No need for trusting government workers to count them up, no worries about mysterious boxes of paper ballots showing up at the last minute.
Fraud can be detected within hours and force a precinct revote the next day, along with hefty punishments for the miscreants and rewards for the reporters.
And the elderly, and members of the armed forces stationed overseas, and college students, and anyone sent on a business trip, can go fuck themselves, right?
Perhaps you simply lack the imagination to think for yourself. If you are so devoid of that capability, then perhaps your vote is not wanted.
While it varies from election to election at the high end around 65% of registered voters actually vote with around 40% at the low end. Most places make special efforts for active duty military to vote.
The EU seems to view American elections with jaded eyes. The EU has a higher % of eligible voters with single day in person voting with results quickly revealed. They wonder why with mail in ballots and early voting not only is the % of American voters lower but there always seem to be delays in the results.
But can we find a voting machine company owned by Hugo Chavez to build all that?
Are you supposed to be able to use the hash to prove that the system recorded the vote you intended? If so, my understanding is that one of the principles of our system is that we don't want to allow that on the premise that you might use it as part of a scheme whereby someone pays you for your vote. If not, I'm not sure what the point is.
Having a human-verifiable paper trail (either a Scantron ballot or a receipt that is viewable by the voter but stays on the machine) seems to strike the right balance of concerns here. Mail in ballots also do well here, with the tradeoff they do make it easier to commit frauds like the one posted here.
SGT wants to ensure that the system can't show you a correct receipt but record your vote differently, that's why he publishes all the recorded votes and their hashcodes. You're right that it would also enable verifiable vote selling.
Plus, your email address is PII, if the system knows where to send the receipt then it has identified you.
Yes to both -- it does allow vote selling. But plenty of vote stuffing has been proven already, and nothing prevents taking a picture of your ballot today, whether before mailing it in or in the booth itself.
And if you do want to mail the ballot receipt to yourself or send it to your phone instead of taking a picture of the terminal, yes, you have identified yourself -- potentially. Nothing in the process inherently depends on recording that association.
Vote selling isn't good, but isn't the principal evil to be worried about: it's vote extortion. "Vote for X or bad things will happen to you."
Same thing, different names.
The principle evil is not selling or extorting votes. It is stuffing the ballot box and throwing out ballots. No one, not a single voter, has any way to verify that their ballot was counted, that its choices were recorded properly, or has any way to know how many fraudulent ballots were tabulated. It is wide open to corruption. No one knows how much ballot box stuffing and ballot spoilage has occurred. It's what allowed Hillary and Trump to claim their elections were stolen from them, and no one can refute them because no one wants to admit it is possible. That is the real scandal that no one wants to fix.
How does having a copy of your ballot prove your ballot was actually counted, and that its choices were actually taken as you selected?
That's what my system aims for, to reduce the chances of fraud in all steps, including counting.
If we're willing to give up on the principles of a secret ballot, we can just publish everyone's actual votes and then we'd have a really good audit trail.
But your compromise might actually be pretty reasonable at this point--now that you can carry a smartphone into the voting booth, you could just video yourself voting for a candidate to sell your vote. Not as definitive as your hash code, but I'd imagine good enough. So given that it's almost impossible to enforce a truly secret ballot, maybe we should look for ways to allow for a stronger audit trail that generally keep votes secret but allow voters to verify that their ballots were recorded correctly.
Let's keep in mind, though, that some fraction of people are going to mess up their votes through their own error. People make mistakes. We'd have to figure out how what the noise floor of those errors would be to find instances where actual fraud was taking place versus people either mistakenly voting for the wrong candidate, or changing their mind after the fact and trying to make it the system's problem.
Secret ballots were not standard for the first 100 years. Grok says the first state to require secret ballots was in 1888. People would cut pre-printed pre-chosen ballots from newspapers and turn them in, in public.
I like secret ballots. But legislators don't have secret ballots and the public would not stand for such a concept.
There are some subtle quirks with selling votes, ballot receipts vs cell phone pictures.
* A cell phone picture doesn't prove that the ballot was actually submitted; a video does, but if it's a mail ballot, it has to be from markup to dropping it off, continuously. It still doesn't prove the votes were actually recorded; the voter could do something to invalidate the ballot which was not obvious in the picture or video.
* The ballot receipt does prove what votes were recorded, but not whose receipts they are. People could trade receipts, individually or in a group throwing dozens of receipts in a hat and drawing random ones. I wouldn't be surprised if most voters threw printed receipts in the trash where anyone could pick and choose which votes that wanted to "prove" for sale.
In the end, I don't think there is any way to stop selling votes, not now, not any time in the past.
"The ballot receipt does prove what votes were recorded, but not whose receipts they are."
Oh, I had assumed that the hash would include some sort of identifying information such you could verify which vote it went with. Otherwise you'd end up with duplicate hashes for everyone that voted for the same set of candidates.
And to be clear: I'm not necessarily advocating for secret ballots, either. I don't actually have a strong opinion. But I think many people think it's an important feature of the current system, so we at least need to acknowledge proposals that get rid of that particular feature of the status quo.
No! Nothing personally identifying. Not even the time of day, which would allow some correlation with when people voted.
Precinct / election ID, votes, crypto hash, and ballot receipt ID.
The purpose of the hash is to prevent alteration of existing ballot receipts and creation by outsiders of fake ballot receipts. The receipt ID shouldn't be serialized either; random 64-digit numbers are good enough, and far too unlikely to ever have matches.
I don't think any system can guarantee secret ballots. It might have been possible to pretend they were unphotographable before cell phones, but the Minox and 110 cameras still made it possible.
I was going to respond in much the same way because this is somewhat similar to a scheme I've been proposing for years.
I think the "vote cast validation" should not be possible except through a judicial process (election judges - not some full blown lawsuit required). Basically there would be several parts to the inputs to the hash. One of these inputs would be provided by the voter and be a secret known only to them (and, presumably, communicated to the person "buying" their vote). One would be controlled by the election judges. One would be randomly assigned and show up on the receipt.
The process to "verify your vote" would be "in person" and private to the person (unless they later decide to waive confidentiality through another process) and an election judge. The judge would never see the voters "hash contribution" (it would be entered by the voter privately) NOR the actual counted vote displayed once the decryption/hashing had revealed which ballot corresponded to the voter. If the voter had a language or disability issue, a process would be established for a randomly assigned translator or helper to assist them in any phase where the voter's private key OR their ballot could be visible.
If the voter viewed the "counted ballot" and it didn't match what they claimed they voted, they could then pursue the matter (presumably with other similarly situated people) via a process that would reveal the miscount. If a simple recount of that ballot didn't resolve the issue (such as it was obvious why it was miscounted - a crushed cockroach that looked like a vote etc) it might require the voter to reveal more information under seal to prove their challenge.
This would protect voter confidentiality and stymie most attempts to "buy votes". Some busybodies would check their votes regularly so their might have to be some limits for resource reasons. However, ANY discrepancy would result in serious investigation so significant "remarking" of ballots, "losing" ballots, etc would have a high risk of being detected and result in serious prison time.
Of course this doesn't address all voter fraud issues - just correct counting of vote of those who want to verify their vote while not facilitating vote buying schemes.
Do you know what an optimisation problem is?
What evidence?
Are you being purposefully ironic by making an evidence-free statement about evidence?
Who woulda thunk that Pennsylvania's order to destroy the outer envelope that contains the information necessary to verify the ballot, making it impossible to check for fraud. In that same election I got six mail in ballots, when I didn't request any.
If you had returned all six, what would have happened?
Doesn't this case demonstrate that it's possible to detect and prosecute such fraud, though?
Guys, we just have to accept that fraud happens because there's just no other way.
Walk on the moon? Check.
Voter fraud prevention? Beyond us.
No, you're right. We can reduce credit card fraud down to zero. We can eliminate pickpocketing, and carjacking, and marijuana consumption, and tearing the tags off mattresses. The only limit is our will; obviously if any of those things exist it must be because people aren't sufficiently committed to eradicating them.
I think shoplifting is an interesting analogy here: stores have various dials that they can use to decrease shoplifting. They can get rid of self checkout; they can hire more guards; they can put some or all of the items behind "glass" that staff has to unlock to allow you to get at the merchandise.
All of these things come with costs. Some of them, like the guards, are mostly financial. But others, like making it harder to get to the merchandise, come with the downside of decreasing sales because people get frustrated and don't want to have to wait for the staff to show up. The store has to decide how much in sales they're willing to give up in order to decrease the rate of theft.
Most of the discussions around voter fraud treat it as binary--either there is fraud or there is not--and make no attempt to weigh the costs versus benefits of any particular anti-fraud measure. But the reality is we're always balancing cost, fraud, and voter access. I've noticed that the folks who are worried about fraud tend to think that it's worth it to get as close to zero fraud as possible, even if it has a dramatically negative effect on voting participation. But other than doing this for partisan reasons, I don't really get it: why is a fraudulently cast ballot worse than a person who is eligible to vote but can't because the anti-fraud measures accidentally excluded them? In both cases, it's exactly one vote towards the outcome of the election, so I think from first principles you'd want to weigh the risk of fraudulent votes and the risk of lost votes in the former of lower participation at roughly a 1:1 ratio when thinking about policy in this space.
In both cases, it's exactly one vote towards the outcome of the election, so I think from first principles ...
I don't think this the right way to think about it.
Deciding to watch a football game instead of voting, and having some clerk secretly destroy your ballot, both change "exactly one vote". Most people would not say those are equivalent from first principles.
Maybe you'll say the football game isn't "policy in this space". OK what's your "space". One could note that the number of traffic lights between the average house and its polling place, whether the queue outside the polling place is on the shaded side of the street, and gasoline taxes all deter people from voting. Would you rate all of those as "equivalent from first principles" to fraudulent voting?
Instead of "staying home for a football game", what if the answer on the opposite side is that the burdens on voting become so laborious that more than half of people who show up to vote aren't eligible to. Maybe the voter ID law is you need a RealID plus you need a notarized letter from a neighbor who has seen you enter your residence within the past month. That seems obviously to me just as bad as shredding half the votes.
So then what if we drop the notarized letter requirement, and suddenly only 25% of people are getting turned away because they don't have RealIDs. Is the harm to those 25% of people less bad than when it was 50%? What if we allow military IDs and passports and get it down to a 15% rejection rate? At some point we're going to say okay, it's easy enough to vote, but it's because we're weighing those burdens and trying to understand just how much voting they're dissuading.
Similarly, in the fraud space we're also talking about probabilities. Sure, in your scenario the clerk definitely shredded the ballot, but the reality is that a clerk could probably shred any random single ballot and get away with it. The system isn't going to be able to prevent errors on that small of a scale. People will just chalk it up to the chaos of election night. Could the clerk shred two ballots? Also, probably. Could they shred a hundred? Things are starting to look fishy; someone will probably notice. And if they shred a thousand, they'll probably end up going to jail. So we build the system to try to put enough checks and balances in place to prevent fraud that's going to move the needle, and we acknowledge that we're doing it in a space that's about how likely these are happening, not any certainty of specific outcomes.
So viewed through that lens, when what we're weighing is probabilities on both side: no, i don't really see any difference between a policy that makes it more likely that one person who intended to vote but is prevented from doing so versus one that will make it more likely that one ballot will be shredded. What I want is the maximum number of valid ballots to be cast and counted, and I don't see a principled reason to count errors in one direction more strongly than the other.
But let's turn this around: if we shouldn't count them both the same, what is the right ratio? Do you accept 10 people not voting to prevent the clerk from shredding 1 ballot? Do we disenfranchise 100 people to get there? 1000? If you have some ratio that's not 1:1, what do you think the right balance is and what's your rationale for whatever value you think is correct?
To be fair, in that walking-on-the-moon thing, a success rate of 86% was considered acceptable, and 12 successes was okay as long as the two failures didn't actually kill anybody.
Voter fraud prevention has to work 10 million times as often, and 20 million failures would not be considered acceptable even without fatalities. Although voter fraud has anti-fatalities, with dead people occasionally voting.
-dk
Your tally omits Apollo 1. Apollo I not only was a failure, it killed people. All three crew members. Given that the program continued, that was considered acceptable.
Veteran volunteer poll worker here. There is no single thing that will make elections secure, election integrity is a non-trivial task with many facets and layers.
Voting must be done in private. A specific ballot must never be tied to a specific voter. This is a highly unusual requirement, and it makes election security very different from other systems such as banking, etc.
There are two key control points: when we authenticate a voter, and when we secure the chain of custody of a voted ballot. Both of these control points are very hard to defraud if they are done IN-PERSON. Conversely, they are much easier to defraud if they are done remotely (third-party registration, registration harvesting, ballot harvesting, mail-in balloting, drop-box balloting, anything transmitted over the public Internet).
All of the "innovations" of the last decade or so to make voting "easier" have absolutely made voting LESS SECURE.
Give me an in-person registration process, an in-person ID that must be presented to authenticate, an in-person validation that the voter is authorized to vote, a ballot that is filled out by the voter in complete privacy but under observation in real time, and a ballot that goes straight from the voter's hand to the counting device while it is under observation, and you will have an extremely robust and hardened process.
DaveM - thanks for the informed comment
Veteran paid poll worker.
The "various things" part is fine. But, there are various ways to lessen problems with mail-in, dropbox, and other such voting.
These methods help ease voting for many people. For some, in-person voting is difficult. They too have a right to vote.
Mail-in and dropbox voting has shown to be generally safe & cost/benefit-wise is worth the candle. I question internet and phone-in voting, but that has a smaller sample size.
Mail-in balloting is extremely problematic. It is not secure, it is not private, and it does not provide a guarantee of either delivery or timeliness.
As an example of just the latest issue with mail-in balloting, the USPS has a proposed change to its delivery standards that "clarifies" that a postmark does not indicate the date mail was received, it only indicates when it was first processed. See https://about.usps.com/newsroom/statements/082625-federal-register-notice-of-additional-postmarking-information.htm
If a voter can make it to the grocery store to do their shopping, they can make it to the local registrar to deposit their ballot. There is absolutely no reason we need to make this simple procedure "easier", it is already easy.
Unpossible! We have been reassured over and again by many commenters here that this never happens.
I can never decide if the MAGA crowd is actually stupid or just completely unwilling to actually engage with their opponents' arguments.
Meanwhile, it's obvious to all of us that you are malicious enough to post a false dichotomy while also being too stupid to make an actual argument.
Wow, I didn't expect anyone on team MAGA to come out and say "it's not that we're stupid OR unwilling to engage in good faith, we can be both!" You're right, though, I guess it is a false dichotomy. Point to you!
As for actual arguments: see further above. Engaging with "but you guys said fraud was impossible!" is just dumb, though, since no one actually makes that argument.
Except you guys made that argument.
Nope. Just in case you're just horribly misinformed, I'll repeat the general claims that people in favor of easier ballot access make:
1) There is no evidence of large-scale voter fraud sufficient to affect the results of a national election*, and
2) If someone were to attempt such a thing, it would be noticed and they would get caught.
This present case actually serves as good evidence of #2 and certainly does not operate at the scale as to disprove #1.
* There have actually been cases of voter fraud in local elections sufficient to swing the results, e.g., Mark Harris's election in North Carolina in 2018. (Although apparently Republicans don't really care about voter fraud because they ended up electing him to the NC House last year.)
Our opponent's argument was that there was no evidence of voting schemes *exactly like this one*. There was no evidence of tampering or other misconduct.
Therefore a) there was no need to investigate to see if this was happening - because there was no evidence it was happening we didn't need to look for evidence - and b) since things are so secure we can clearly move forward with absentee voting for everyone who wants it, including pre-emptive mailing of ballots that are not requested.
As always: yes.
Why yes, snark is how one engages your opponent in reasoned debate.
"Her motives were not purely altruistic: she hoped they would vote for her husband, who was a candidate in the election."
Such a blatant conflict of interest should be covered in any law that allows for this sort of voter assistance.
Most secure elections in history! No credible evidence!
Totally why we need unrestricted absentee ballot voting.
We could save a lot of time and money by just letting the Google algorithm tell us who will win.
Much of the problem with mail-in ballots is that they are not secret. No one can bribe (or threaten) a voter to vote for a preferred candidate when voting occurs in a secure booth. But corrupt types can buy unfilled mail-in ballots from willing voters (or employers could demand to see their employees' ballots). It is especially disconcerting that California had voting locations only about 40 minutes apart, to make in-person voting maximally inconvenient. And then Democrats cite the number of mail-in voters as proof people prefer that.
Correct, and in addition, mail-in ballots can sit for days at a time in unsecured mailboxes, they are sorted, packaged, and transported multiple times by different systems, the chain of custody is broken literally at both delivery and return. The USPS is not a guarantee-delivery service, it was never meant to be one, it is not designed to be one, and using it to send time-sensitive ballots that must be delivered is a misuse. The rate of misdelivery alone is in the high single digits as a percentage. The mail is entirely unsuited for large scale balloting.