The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
The Tariff Case and Veto Overrides
It always takes a veto-proof majority to claw back the President's powers.
During oral argument in the tariff case, there was a recurring theme: if the Court agreed with the President that IEEPA grants this power, it would take a veto-proof majority in Congress to claw back that power.
Justice Gorsuch described delegation as a one-way ratchet that, as a practical matter, cannot be retrieved.
JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. You emphasize that Congress can always take back its powers. You mentioned that a couple of times. But don't we have a serious retrieval problem here because, once Congress delegates by a bare majority and the President signs it --and, of course, every president will sign a law that gives him more authority --Congress can't take that back without a super majority. And even --you know, even then, it's going to be veto-proof. What president's ever going to give that power back? A pretty rare president. So how --how should that inform our view of delegations and major questions? . . . But what happens when the President simply vetoes legislation to try to take these powers back? . . . Yeah. So Congress, as a practical matter, can't get this power back once it's handed it over to the President. It's a one-way ratchet toward the gradual but continual accretion of power in the executive branch and away from the people's elected representatives.
Justice Barrett returned to Gorsuch's question:
JUSTICE BARRETT: Okay. Then a question just to follow up on Justice Gorsuch's thing about how could Congress ever get this delegation back, you said, well, listen, you point to the --Congress's ability to terminate emergencies, which it's done. But, if Congress ever wanted to get the tariffing power back, it would have to have a veto-proof majority because, regardless of the emergency, so if Congress wanted to reject the --let's say that we adopt your interpretation of the statute. If Congress said, whoa, we don't like that, that gives a president too much authority under IEEPA, it's going to have a very hard time pulling the tariff power out of IEEPA, correct? . . . But --but definitively interpreting a statute that grants presidential power makes it particularly hard to get the President to not want to veto something, which, as Justice was pointing out --Justice Gorsuch was pointing out, has him lose power. All right.
I'll admit, I was a bit perplexed by this concern. In any case where the Supreme Court adopts an interpretation of a statute that the President favors, it will take a veto-proof majority to modify that statute. Congress routinely revises statutes after a Supreme Court decision. In some of those cases, the President may favor the Supreme Court's reading, but for many institutional reasons, acquiesces to Congress's approach.
For example, President George H.W. Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990, and Congress failed to override that veto. But one year later, Congress enacted the related Civil Rights Act of 1991. William Eskridge talked about this history here. This law was not a separation of powers bill, like IEPPA, but this history illustrates how politics works. I don't think the Justices fully realized that there are political costs to the President vetoing a bill. Indeed, pocket vetoes are used largely to avoid the spectacle of having to veto a bill.
This issue reminded me of a colloquy in Trump v. Anderson. Recall that a Section 3 disability could be removed by a 2/3 vote of each house--the same standard for overriding a veto. Justice Kagan posed this question:
Elena Kagan: -- because, if Congress has the ability to lift the vote by a two-thirds majority, then surely it can't be right that one House of Congress can do the exact same thing by a simple majority.
Jonathan F. Mitchell: Yeah, there certainly is some tension, Justice Kagan, and some commentators have pointed this out. Professor Baude and Professor Paulson criticized Griffin's Case very sharply.
Elena Kagan: Then I must be right. (Laughter.)
In case you forgot, Jonathan Mitchell represented Trump in this case.
The Justices are very concerned about the difference between a simple majority to pass a statute, and a 2/3 vote to reverse that action. Under the current political dynamic, the override of a veto is fairly rare. But I don't think that likelihood should inform how the Justices decide cases. The Court can only resolve judicial matters, and let the political chips fall where they may.
Editor's Note: We invite comments and request that they be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of Reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason at any time. Comments may only be edited within 5 minutes of posting. Report abuses.
Please to post comments
I do not understand your lack of understanding regarding the concern here.
It’s obvious.
The concern is that when the presidential power is legislative, that he more making up laws than enforcing them, then article 1 is obviated. The president just makes up whatever. And Congress cannot override without a 2/3rd majority.
The dynamic of the constitution, where Congress makes the laws with a simple majority, is flipped. That’s the problem.
I think Blackman's post is best understood when paired with another commentator saying "there's no need for the court to say Congress didn't intend to give the President the power to enact those tariffs since congress can just vote to take them away!".
This goes back to INS v. Chanda. Perhaps Congress cannot make a scheme with a one house veto. Why not? The logic of delegation is no different from the logic of delegation but Congress can veto. Why can’t Congress decide that sure the president can regulate commerce in a certain way but Bob from California has to approve?
Well, I suppose according to Chanda it’s because your bypassing the scheme of Congress passes laws with a simple majority and the president signs. But this is too bypassing that scheme.
I do not understand your lack of understanding regarding the concern here.
It’s obvious.
“It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it.”
― Upton Sinclair
"I do not understand your lack of understanding regarding the concern here."
Here's the issue. It's not the SCOTUS's role to consider the politics. (or at least not so obviously). It's the SCOTUS's role to interpret the law. As Josh states...
"Under the current political dynamic, the override of a veto is fairly rare. But I don't think that likelihood should inform how the Justices decide cases. The Court can only resolve judicial matters, and let the political chips fall where they may."
Let's give an example. In 2012 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius came before the SCOTUS (The Obamacare case). Should the Court's logic really have been "well, it's unlikely that Congress could pass a bill overturning Obamacare without a Veto, even if they have a majority in the House...so we should overturn it"?
That example is inapposite, because NFIB did not involve separation of powers. It would be entirely possible to have a subsequent Congress and President who agreed that Obamacare should be repealed. But when the President has arrogated to himself undue power at the expense of Congress, it is very unlikely that any president would relinquish it. So at that point, it is legitimate to ask whether the Constitution affords Congress a usable mechanism for reclaiming its usurped power, and if it does not, judicial intervention may be appropriate to restore the balance contemplated by the Constitutional scheme.
A few different things.
1. Actually part of NFIB was separation of powers.
2. During NFIB, one House of Congress was clearly against the law
3. In the current case, it's not clear that either House of Congress actually opposes what the President is doing
4. There is a suitable mechanism. Congress can pass another law, revoking such powers
4a. The "objection" such as it is, is that Congress would need to have a veto proof majority "or" a President who didn't veto the bill. But, passing a veto-proof bill is, and has been, done before.
4b. Additionally the objection that "No President" would actually not veto the bill is inaccurate. One can easily imagine a President who is a lame duck and decides that he doesn't want to give the authority to he successor. So, Congress can pass bills restricting authority, and the President may approve, knowing that it will limit his successor...but not him, as he's leaving power.
5. Most importantly, the real risk is that the SCOTUS starts deciding cases on the virtues of the political state of affairs, and not on the law itself. That would simply undermine the SCOTUS further.
Remember that the President CHOOSES to not veto as much as Congress CHOOSES to pass something.
I am mystified as to why Dr. Ed thinks anyone needs to be reminded of it, or how it's relevant to the discussion.
" . . . once Congress delegates by a bare majority . . . "
OK, just a bit of lawyerly picky here; majority is an absolute, not relative.
There is no such thing as a "bare" majority. It is a majority, or it is not.
Like "more unique", it does not exist.
And yet there is such a thing as a super majority.
A "bare majority" certainly exists just like a "blue chair" exists. It is absolutely a chair either way - but it's in the subset of chairs that are blue. A "bare majority" is likewise a majority that is in the subset of majorities that are "barely" majorities (that is, not in the subset of majorities that are overwhelming).
Building off the fine examples of “super majority” and “overwhelming majority”, there is useful information conveyed by the words bare, super, and overwhelming that is not present in “more unique”: a “bare majority” vote can be potentially flipped by only a few defections, while an “overwhelming majority” vote cannot.
And any legislator with two brain cells to rub together immediately appreciates the difference conveyed by the adjectives “bare” and “overwhelming” in this context.
It's in contrast to "super majority", just as "acoustic guitar" is in contrast to "electric guitar". "Majority" alone can refer to any kind of majority, whether 1/2, 2/3, 3/4, or 99/100.
To be clear, the reason veto overrides are rare is not because veto overrides are hard (though they are) -- it is because Presidents rarely (but not never) veto bills that have sufficient support to be overridden. You point to the cost of vetoing but that is reputationally strictly lower than the cost of being overridden. There is quite lengthy literature on veto strategy in political science.
A famous paper is Groseclose and McCarthy 2000 (Groseclose is a conservative political commentator who I would ideologically place pretty near Josh Blackman -- just to defray concerns that political scientists are pinkos who should be ignored). They were responding to the Clinton years.
This is an example of how commenting outside your field leaves you vulnerable to elementary errors. You are not a game theorist or a political scientist by profession. It also belies your commitment to textualism that any time the court offers a concession to practicality, you take off your textualist hat and conveniently conclude your preferred position is practical. Disappointing.
A person acting like he always acts, including in an unprincipled fashion, stops being "disappointing" at some point. That point has far passed for JB.
Auto-expire laws. Amend the Constitution to require it. The current shutdown orients about such a beast. But never forget, adding auto-expire is the negotiated price to pay to get some things passed.
There's much philosophical value to forcing the Congress, and We The People, to re-evaluate laws from time to time. Both sides screetch this is a good thing, depending on the issues of the day. One side even has a faction generating memery about how we shouldn't be bound by dead white guys hundreds of years ago!
Why in god's name grants of emergency authority don't have auto-expire as a regular feature is, and this is a technical term, stupid.
What would be the constitutional rule set forth to across the board provide auto-expiration? There is a two-year limit for funding certain things in the Constitution. But your rule is complete.
It would be rather difficult to craft an amendment that is flexible enough, especially since it is hard to pass new laws. We would not want every type of law to have the same expiration date.
Legislatures continuously re-examine laws, especially when there is a change in party control. It is hard to pass new legislation with so many constitutional and political bottlenecks.
Emergency authority should be more carefully provided, such as the "clock" found in the War Powers Resolution. Our Constitution, however, encourages flexibility, and Congress has long broadly delegated the details to the executive.
I can't speak for Krayt but my proposed amendment would be something like to amend the last bullet of Article 1, Sec 8 to read
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. Such Laws shall expire X years after passage.
My gut says X should be 2 but I could see arguments for 4, 5 or 10 year renewal periods. There would probably need to be an additional paragraph about implementation timing but long-term, matching the review/renewal to 'passage' would spread the burden across the legislature's term.
I disagree with your claim that "legislatures continuously re-examine laws". There are just too many examples of obsolete or nonsensical laws still on the books for that claim to be credible. Yes, they sometimes reverse the worst excesses of their political opponents but there's nothing close to a comprehensive cleanup cycle.
All that said, there's an alternative to Krayt's proposal that might get to the same result but be easier to implement - simply reverse (perhaps by statute, perhaps by amendment) the court's presumption that 'ignorance of the law is no excuse'. If ignorance of the law was a legitimate excuse, that would create an incentive for legislatures at every level to keep their corpus of laws pruned to something that a reasonable person actually could read and understand.
If Trump can pretend that decades-old trade deficits can constitute sudden emergencies, I don't think he'd have any qualms about periodically redeclaring fake emergencies every time they expire.
Congress could take a stab at that with a clause that forbids taking the same or similar executive action (for example, arbitrary and capricious tariffs because the President is butt-hurt about a TV ad) in sequential “emergencies”.
Sure, but the context of that here is exactly the legislative veto. It's not pretending. The statute just doesn't require any particular justification beyond him saying so. (As SCOTUS oral arguments illuminated, because that wasn't a question the Court agreed to consider or seriously inquired about.)
Everyone running around with their hair on fire screaming that's not an actual emergency!, demanding federal judges second guess a presidential declaration because somebody has to, is ignoring in this case that the ultimate judge of that was originally supposed to be Congress. Via the legislative veto.
I think that's why the statute didn't attempt to define an "emergency" (it's hard, often a pornography you know it when you see it), thinking it a political question which Congress could ultimately decide.
An alternate constitutitonal mechanism should be revisited for all such things. Of course, in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, we allegedly had such a mechanism too. Where the legislature could override a governor emergency declaration. But during the COVID, the state Supreme Court struck down the legislature's decision, for reasons I don't completely understand. But not under the same theory as the federal invalidation, because the commonwealth has a line-up veto, so not the same strict separation of powers.
The statute just doesn't require any particular justification beyond him saying so.
Begging the question. And reading the word 'emergency' out of the statute.
I think that we're going to see a move towards auto-expiration in future grants of emergency authorities. Abuse of so-called emergency powers has existed, but Trump has taken it to a new level - a 10% tariff for having hurt fee-fees about a TV ad; a 50% tariff on Brazil for the purely internal matter of prosecuting attempted overthrow of their gov't. Congress will (hopefully) learn from this and stop presuming good faith and adherence to old norms is a sufficient check on the executive branch.
I hope Congress has also learned not to grant completely open-ended permission to use military power; the 2001 AUMF is similarly toxic and has somehow transformed from "get the dudes who perpetrated 9/11" to a hand-waving "anyone we call a 'terrorist', anywhere, anytime".
Gorsuch was responding to an argument the government made that reversibility by Congress was relevant to the decision. Why not criticize the original argument?
And while we're at it, also criticize the relevancy of how difficult it would be to repay the tariffs.
Why would it be difficult to repay the tariffs? There are records of who paid them. Just pay them back.
If you mean politically difficult, say so. But it should not be hard from an accounting point of view.
Still don't see why the question of repaying the tariffs have any relevance.
SCOTUS is not going to rule against the president just because the tariffs are difficult to repay. It has no influence on the ultimate decision. That can always be handwaived away. It's not a valid argument that we need to continue doing something against the law, because we can't undo all past wrongs that resulted.
What Josh and seemingly everybody else misses is that the President's veto of revocation legislation is a pure conflict of interest since it involves his legal authority directly. Letting the President veto that revocation is akin to letting employees vote on whether they can be fired.
Of course it would take an amendment to cure this, unless some bold Supreme Court discovers something in the penumbras and emanations that says it is highly illogical and therefore unconstitutional for Congress to pass any legislation delegating any of their authority to the President.
This is correct. The idea is that, under separation of powers theory, no president would voluntarily surrender a delegated power. So if the court incorrectly interprets a statute as delegating more power to the president than congress intended to delegate, it will require a veto-proof majority to claw that power back. By contrast, if the court incorrectly interprets a statute as delegating less power to the president than congress intends to delegate, then congress can correct that misinterpretation by a simple majority vote (presumably no president would veto a bill that gives the presidency more power). This structural dynamic does not arise in statutory interpretation cases where delegation-of-powers is not at issue, so, contra Josh, it isn’t at play “[i]n any case where the Supreme Court adopts an interpretation of a statute that the President favors.”
I took this as an interesting twist on statutory super-stare-decisis. The court’s especially loathe to reverse erroneous statutory precedents because, unlike with constitutional precedents, congress can comparatively easily correct the erroneous interpretation. But separation of powers theory says it’s not as easy – it will require a veto-proof majority – if the court’s erroneous statutory precedent erroneously confers extra power on the president at the expense of congress. So, in doubtful cases, the same considerations that counsel in favor of statutory super-stare-decisis also counsel in favor of interpreting statutes not to confer extra power on the president.
Of course, here on planet earth, we have party politics so we all know classic separation of powers theory – the idea that congressmen and presidents are looking out for their institution’s interests, as opposed to their party’s interests – is largely if not entirely bogus. But separation of powers theory underpins the constitution so I guess the court feels like it needs to profess fidelity to the idea.
There is no "conflict of interest" clause in the Constitution.
Sure, this is bad. Which is why some of us have been rather strenuously opposed to delegations of authority to the president or executive agencies. Because they are very difficult to revoke.
The relatively recent creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau being the latest example, as originally designed independently funded from the Federal Reserve AND even independent of the president. No, trying to create competing authorities to the president not democratically accountable to anyone is not better. It's worse.
Which is why, after Trump 1.0 experience with tariffs, I remained shocked (not shocked) that the Biden administration and a Democrat Congress never attempted to address this critical issue. I find the crocodile tears disingenuous.
The Justices made a very good point. If a president abuses power that Congress delegated to them, it is very hard to get that power back. It is a bit like the legal doctrine that you can't pass a law that requires a super majority to repeal. SCOTUS should require a sunset provision on any and all laws that give the president emergency powers that are Constitutionally given to Congress.
Where, exactly, would SCOTUS find any such sunset provision which is not in the Constitution?
I'm skeptical too. But were I trying to make such an argument, it would go something like:
If Congress can delegate some powers for "emergency" situations (as appears to be generally accepted these days) it is nonetheless possible to have unconstitutional delegations, and those could be more than one flavor:
1) scope of the power - the word "emergency" has to involve a real, substantive, unpredictable situation. For example, President can't be given an unconstrained power to declare war any time his ego is bruised by a TV ad. If Congress doesn't define "emergency" to include subject matter limits that have actual teeth, it's an unconstitutional delegation of core Art. I power;
2) duration of the power - the word "emergency" has to have some temporal meaning as well, so there must be some intelligible principle that prevents completely open-ended abdication of core Art. I powers for all time (see: 2001 AUMF in the War Powers context). If Congress doesn't define "emergency" to include time limits that have actual teeth, it's an unconstitutional delegation of core Art. I power.
Will this S.Ct. go there? I highly doubt it. But I think a different S.Ct. probably could if they wanted to.
Yes, somewhere in those emanations and penumbras. I highly doubt any Supreme Court is going to do that again any time soon.
Sameplace they find every other bullshit thing they write into the Constitution.
Decisions I agree with are a sacred part of the Constitution! Decisions are disagree with are made-up bullshit!
[shrugs shoulders]
Decisions based on the actual text are good. Decisions based on words SCOTUS added to the Constitution are BS.