The Volokh Conspiracy
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Judge Oldham Wants To Restore A Judiciary Without Horizontal Stare Decisis
Judges would find the law, rather than mechanically following every word that appears in a published opinion.
This evening, Judge Andrew S. Oldham of the Fifth Circuit gave the Joseph Story Distinguished Lecture at the Heritage Foundation. I was pleased to be in attendance. The topic was provocative and will no doubt be controversial. Judge Oldham favors the elimination of horizontal stare decisis. As a result, an earlier three-judge panel on a court of appeals would not bind a later three-judge panel on that same court of appeals. Judge Oldham would eliminate what the Fifth Circuit calls the "Rule of Orderliness." Why is it called the "Rule of Orderliness"? In the absence of this rule, some would argue, there would be disorder, but this rule maintains order.
At first blush, this topic may seem crazy, even heretical. But Judge Oldham has provided a deep theoretical defense of his position. Given this is the Story lecture, Oldham focuses on one of Justice Story's most revered, yet reversed, decisions: Swift v. Tyson. As every 1L learns, Justice Story argued that the common law could be found by federal judges. Of course, Erie reversed Swift. But Steve Sachs has convinced me that Story was right and Brandeis was wrong. Indeed, the classical view was that law could be found. The seriatim opinions in Chisholm v. Georgia, for example, did not purport to state the law; these decisions attempted to find that law. It is a modern, Holmesean innovation that judge can simply "declare" what the law is. And this declaratory vision of the law has, regrettably, given rise to the scourge of judicial supremacy.
From this premise, Oldham argues that every judge, in every case, should "find" what the law is. The judicial oath demands no less. Yet horizontal stare decisis, and the rule of panel precedent, prevent judges from doing just that. Their hands are tied by the rule of orderliness. Rather, as soon as Panel A decides some issue, panels B through Z are required to mechanically follow every jot and tittle of Panel A's decision. It does not matter how poorly reasoned Panel A's decision was, or whether Panel A consulted the Constitution's original meaning, or whether the parties adequately presented all necessary argument to Panel A. There is a first mover's advantage. And the rule of orderliness is premised on not trusting the Judge of Panel B to faithfully find the law. Instead, they have to be told what to do.
Would eliminating the rule of orderliness bring about disorder? Oldham says no. Indeed, he thinks the current regime is extremely problematic. More than 80% of circuit decisions are designated as "unpublished." Moreover, en banc review is exceedingly rare. For example, the Fifth Circuit the en banc court sits about a dozen times per years. Yet, about 10% of the Supreme Court's merit docket is from unpublished cases. So the Justices do not seem troubled by whether a circuit precedent is itself precedential.
Judge Oldham's speech will, as I noted, prove controversial. I suspect several members of his own court, who are vigorous proponents of the rule of orderliness, will vigorously disagree.
I, for one, need to chew on this topic for some time. I already constrain the scope of stare decisis in the lower courts, to pursue the Constitution's original meaning. Judge Oldham's proposal would likely aid my proposal.
I encourage everyone to watch the lecture, and see what you think. Agree or disagree, Judge Oldham will give everyone some food for thought.
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Erie was based on an interpretation of a congressional statute, so Congress could overrule Erie by amending the law. That it hasn’t is probably because Congress is chosen from state voters who don’t want their state laws and courts being circumvented by unelected federal judges, who would no doubt have a field day “discovering” law, which is just code for doing whatever the hell they want, federalism be damned. It’s odd that any who purports to respect state sovereignty and to be wary of federal judges would want federal courts to abrogate more power for themselves at the expense of both Congress and the states.
Judge Oldham may have been more worried about the establishment of an irrational horizontal precedent within the federal judiciary. Judge Oldham is not a fan of Section 230 caselaw. It is easy to sympathize with him. Few judges and few lawyers understand the operation of the Internet. Many federal rulings make little sense. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Google LLC, 742 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2024) is typical.
The ruling contains the following paragraph.
The above summary is wrong.
Google’s mail servers are not passive endpoints, but integral transport agents that receive, route, filter, store, and transmit the email. Google both accepts and then carries messages either to an intermediate destination or to a final destination—functionally indistinguishable from message carriage duties traditionally imposed on telegraph companies. Google is therefore a carrier of messages, not merely a passive terminal.
You're straining at a gnat. gmail.com is presumably thousands of internal servers, all connected, but they behave like a single server to the outside world. Complaining about calling them a single endpoint is about as relevant as complaining that a single CPU chip actually has "dozens" (for appropriate values of "dozen") of cores of various capabilities, with memory caches of various abilities, all talking to each other.
It reminds me of arguments over whether the CDC 6600 had one PPU or several, since what it really had was, to simplify immensely, one set of computer logic and multiple sets of memory and registers, I believe called the barrel because the computer logic rotated its connections among the different sets of memory and registers. One or multiple? Irrelevant, just as is your quibbling about whether gmail.com is one or thousands of servers internally.
ETA: Or to simplify even further, your complaint is equivalent to arguing that a huge corporate building with its own mail room is not in fact a single address for mail purposes, because it distributes mail to different floors and offices and cubicles. It's a useless confusing quibble, and you do yourself no favors by advancing it.
Please correct me if I’m mistaken LivvyLawyer, but I do not believe the argument addressed the number or structure of the Gmail servers or service, but rather the function of Gmail in the process that results in an email ultimately delivered (or not!).
The assertion that the Gmail service is simply a passive participant in an email delivery process is clearly incorrect. It’s far more than even a mechanism to reassemble packets (cringe) and sort email into the appropriate inbox.
For example, it employs server-to-server security, provides end-user authentication, and so on. It also provides user- and system-level filtering. The former is controlled by the account owner, the latter by Google.
So yes, the summary provided by LivvyLawyer is incorrect, and in more ways than the example I provided above.
The Complaint and Order from the Trial Court can be found at Republican National Committee v. Google LLC (2:22-cv-01904), District Court, E.D. California.
I asked a transmission technology expert, who is also an historian of science.
The expert proposes that an email service is functionally a telegraph that encodes a message (intangible property) via ascii in IP packets instead of via Morse code. Both legacy telegraph service and also modern Internet service transmit a digitally encoded message by electricity over wire or over wireless means.
It makes no difference whether the RNC is a customer of Gmail or whether the RNC's Email Service Provider obtains service from Gmail via SMTP or some other Gmail server. A message (intangible property) is transported from the RNC's originating location to the destination recipient's monitor. If the recipient is a Gmail user, he is runnning Gmail software (probably a JavaScript program) on his computing device.
Loper Bright Enterprises, et al. v. Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al. (No. 22-451) seems to require the Trial Court to determine whether Gmail service is functionally a telegraph service or some other type of service of common carriage of a message on the basis of facts that are presented to the Trial Court.
The Trial Court seems to have made multiple judicial errors.
Right. And Josh being convinced of what the "classical view" was does not mean it is the right view of what the statute is. And Congress has gone with the Erie view now for almost a century, legislating against it in numerous respects so it's kind of irrelevant what the "classical view" is unless Josh thinks Article III somehow magically incorporated the "classical view".
Also, whether or not the "classical view" is right or even applicable (it's not, see Erie) is a separate question from whether to maintain horizontal stare decisis in intermediate appeals courts. Notably, California's intermediate appeals court - the Court of Appeal of which there are several Districts and then Divisions therein but it is all one court - has no horizontal stare decisis and it's really not a big deal. Districts and Divisions are not bound by a prior decision of anywhere in the Court of Appeal, including from same District and Division. The trial courts are bound by a Court of Appeal decision unless there is a conflict between decisions and, in that case, the trial court gets to pick which one to follow (regardless of where an appeal from that trial court will be taken, i.e., court can choose to follow a decision from another District that conflicts with decision from District where appeals go).
Source (among many) here https://purposedrivenlawyers.com/stare-decisis-faq/
Remember that Oldham issued an opinion where he deliberately misquoted sec. 230 to say "...similarly objectionable" instead of what it actually says ("otherwise objectionable") and then proceeded to rule as if it said what he falsely claimed it said.
There is no reason to have any respect for what this man says. Deliberately misquoting statutes should be grounds for dismissal, or at least being told to sit in the corner and rewrite your opinion based on what the law actually says.
Judge Oldham quotes Section 230 accurately, and his argument is consistent with longstanding caselaw. See NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 20 F.4th 528 (5th Cir. 2021). For obscure or unknown reasons, a large part of the federal judiciary is trying to give plutocrats like Larry Ellison control over public discourse despite the express intent of Congress.
47 U.S. Code § 230 – Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material
(a) FINDINGS The Congress finds the following:
(1)
The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens.
(2)
These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology develops.
(3)
The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.
(4)
The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.
(5)
Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
(b) POLICY It is the policy of the United States—
(1)
to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2)
to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3)
to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4)
to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5)
to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.
Judge Oldham quotes Section 230 accurately,
Um... no. From the Oldham opinion
He does quote it accurately in a footnote on page 43, so, perhaps one can argue you are correct in a narrow technical sense, but he's basing his argument on his misrepresentation of the statute, which seems to me to be just so much tendentious dissembling.
Please read the document. Judge Oldham quotes § 230(c)(2) on p. 40.
On p. 43 Judge Oldham interprets § 230(c)(2) according to the guidance of SCOTUS.
You and Judge Oldham seem to have a very different definition of the word "otherwise".
And your contention that "Judge Oldham interprets § 230(c)(2) according to the guidance of SCOTUS." is laughable. It ignores over a century of 1A precedent, as was explained by SCOTUS:
Judge Oldham wanted to interpret § 230(c)(2) under the principle of ejusdem generis. Most courts have applied the principle of noscitur a sociis.
Judge Oldham seems to have wanted to participate in an appellate revoew of a common carriage statute, which HB20 is not.
The common carriage question was not before SCOTUS. Common carriage is a question of contract and not of First Amendment.
Here are the questions presented.
For NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton (No. 22-555)
“Whether the First Amendment prohibits viewpoint-, content-, or speaker-based laws restricting select websites from engaging in editorial choices about whether, and how, to publish and disseminate speech — or otherwise burdening those editorial choices through onerous operational and disclosure requirements.”
For Moody v. NetChoice, LLC (No. 22-277)
“(1) Whether the laws’ content-moderation restrictions comply with the First Amendment; and (2) Whether the laws’ individualized-explanation requirements comply with the First Amendment.”
If RNC v. Google goes to SCOTUS, SCOTUS may decide to address the common carriage issue for an email service.
Here in Japan, a civil law country, we never had to deal with the absolute stare decisis like America. Instead stare decisis is enforced through appellate jurisdiction.
In criminal cases, if a decision contradicts an earlier appellate decision, the Supreme Court has mandatory jurisdiction (Code of Criminal Procedure §405(iii)) - it has to hear the case and hold oral argument. Defense counsels often raise doubtful claims of split of authority, because that forces the judges to read the briefs (at least in theory), and because filing a certiorari (which is the correct thing to do for novel questions of law) is way more burdensome than appeal.
In civil cases, it is a ground for certiorari (Code of Civil Procedure §318), so not much of a difference.
In Florida, the Supreme Court does not have discretionary jurisdiction over most cases. It has discretionary jurisdiction over circuit splits in the intermediate appeals court.
It seems to me to be just as "orderly" for en banc review to be like SCOTUS certiorari review. Panel decisions could be persuasive but not binding on other panels, and a "panel split" signals a reason for the circuit to take it up en banc.
Judge Oldham’s lecture raises fascinating questions about judicial independence and the role of precedent. While digesting these legal ideas, for practical matters like commuting to events or court visits, https://ouremirates.com/rta-bus-timetable/ is a handy resource to navigate Dubai’s transport system efficiently.
The idea that the law has an absolute objective existence that one “discovers” is a recipe for judicial hubris, for the tendency to believe that whatever comes into your head is absolute objective truth. Take obscenity. Believing that obscenity is something objective that judges “find” led, for a couple of decades, to the absurdity of the Justices screening movies and deciding for themselves if they are obscene. Laws reflect a society’s norms, customs, values and opinions. These things are NOT objective. To believe one is finding objective law is simply to elevate ones own norms, customs, values and opinions above everyone else’s.
Deference to political branches is premised on the idea that law is not an objective thing but reflects people’s opinions, and different people have different opinions.
As to horizontal stare decisis, I think Constitutional Due Pricess requires courts to maintain uniformity in the law, leaving it to higher courts to override precedent. The Constitution prohibits vagueness and requires people to have notice what the law is. A system in which every judge believes himself to be the fount of objective truth and “finds” the law to be as he sees it is a system rife with arbitrary caprice, where citizens have no idea how a judge will rule and hence can have absolutely no clue what is required of them.
Such a system violates the foundational Due Process right of people to have notice of what the law requirses of them.
And the fact that this doesn’t seem to have occurred to Judge Oldham says a great deal about how the usability of the judicial product ti the people, not to mention people’s fundamental right to notice and to have some stability in the law so they can predict how to behave, ranks in his system of thinking. This is not a person who ho thinks a lot about how his ideas will affect others.
I agree with much of what you say. But I don't see how it implicates horizontal stare decisis. District judges are not bound by interpretations of the law by other district judges, even within their own district. And they sometimes disagree with one another. (I have a pending case now where the judges within the district disagree on a point of law.)
For that matter, many state appellate courts do not follow horizontal stare decisis, and you can have conflicting views even within the same court.
And, of course, there are Circuit splits in the federal system on points of law. Sometimes those are not resolved for decades.
I don't see how any of that violates Due Process. Courts sometimes differ on how to interpret the law, and it is up to higher courts, ultimately the highest court of the state, or SCOTUS in the case of federal law, to resolve the question.
Well said. Whether law is supposed to be "discovered" (which Congress has rejected by acceding to Erie and legislating against it) is a separate question from whether to have horizontal stare decisis. Your example of district courts is a good one. As I said above, the California Court of Appeal has no horizontal stare decisis and it's really not that big a deal at all. That said, I prefer the federal system of having horizontal stare decisis.
That sounds like a race to the courthouse. It should be the best reasoning that prevails, not the first.
The court can impose a rule on its own by designating more opinions as unpublished.
Here is a sample policy: Most cases will be disposed of by summary order with minimal explanation. More complicated cases will be decided with an unpublished, nonprecdential opinion. If two members of the panel want the decision to be published it will be circulated for review by the full court. If there is a substantial disagreement the case will be heard en banc. Otherwise the opinion will be published and precedential.
The intermediate court of appeals in Massachusetts used to circulate precedential opinions for review. If a majority of the court disagreed the panel would be packed until it got the "right" answer. So a tentative 2-1 panel decision for party A would become a 3-2 panel decision for party B, if a majority of the court sided with party B. Now the court has an en banc procedure.
I have seen decisions from a federal Court of Appeals noting that the opinion had already been circulated to the full court and no judge had called for en banc review.
I think Congress should abolish unpublished opinions. Every opinion should be published and the judges making them should stand behind them. If a situation is very similar to a precedent the opinion can be very brief. But it should be published all the same.
Imagine there is a case where the court would normally write only
"Affirmed for substantially the reasons given by the District Court."
Does the District Court decision become binding precedent? Does the Appeals Court have to reproduce as much of the District Court decision as it agreed with?
I think that Chesterton called and wants his fence back.
[A]n earlier three-judge panel on a court of appeals would not bind a later three-judge panel on that same court of appeals.
It's been quite some time, but I seem to recall learning that within a court past opinions on point were persuasive authority, not binding authority.
A cursory Googling is equivocal. Do I have it wrong, or did I fall for trusting Blackman on the law again?
He’s correct. Under the Fifth Circuit’s “Rule of Orderliness,” earlier precedential (meaning published) panel decisions are binding on subsequent panels, absent intervening en banc or SCOTUS authority. The circuits vary on this point. For example, I believe that in the Seventh Circuit a panel can overrule a prior panel if they circulate the proposed opinion and the other judges on the circuit are cool with it.
Well and concisely stated. Ty.
When I was an extern oh so many years ago, there was a squabble about horizontal precedent in our intermediate appellate court. I was asked to to a survey of horizontal precedent in all states with intermediate appellate courts. I don't have it at hand, but I was surprised to learn that there was quite a diversity of rules.
In some states, decisions bind both lower courts and other panels; or they bind both within a geographic division. In some states, decisions bind the trial courts, but not other panels. In some states, decisions bind all trial courts, but only other panels within a geographic division.
It sounds like you may be a national expert in the area, if you could dig up that survey.
Though it may be out of date by now.
We don't have it in California and it's no big deal.* That said, I prefer the federal system on this where horizontal stare decisis is the rule (at least in all the Circuits I've practiced in - 2d, 9th, 5th, 11th and Federal).
*Source here - https://purposedrivenlawyers.com/stare-decisis-faq/
"n California, there is NO horizontal stare decisis between any of the Court of Appeals. (It’s different in Federal court, as you will see below).
Crazy!
This means none of the 19 divisions of the 6 Appeals Court districts are bound by each other’s rulings, EVEN in the same district."
When there is a conflict, a trial court can choose what to follow without regard to which district an appeal from that court will be taken.
Oldham doesn't have much respect for vertical stare decisis either; in the NetChoice case that Oldham and the 5th Circuit got wrong,¹ he whined that the plaintiffs cited lots of 1A precedent in their briefing rather than the "history and original understanding" of the 1A. (He apparently confuses a brief with a law review article.)
¹My opinion, but also SCOTUS's.