No Pseudonymity for Former Federal Employees Suing Over Mass Firings

"The fact that disclosure means Plaintiffs 'could be deemed litigious' or that future employers 'may treat Plaintiffs' association with this litigation as a red flag' is not sufficient to allege a substantial privacy interest."

From Civil Servant 1 v. Office of Special Counsel, decided yesterday by Chief Judge James Boasberg (D.D.C.):

Plaintiffs Civil Servants 1–5 are former federal employees whose jobs were "terminated during their probationary periods as part of the Administration's mass firings in February 2025." They each filed a prohibited personnel practice (PPP) complaint with the Office of Special Counsel, only for the agency to summarily close each of their cases because they were probationary employees. Plaintiffs now bring this lawsuit alleging that OSC unlawfully closed thousands of probationary-employee complaints without considering their individual merits, undermining the workplace protections once afforded to probationary workers and violating the Administrative Procedure Act….

Generally, a complaint must identify the plaintiffs. That requirement reflects the "presumption in favor of disclosure [of litigants' identities], which stems from the 'general public interest in the openness of governmental processes,' and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial proceedings." A party moving to proceed pseudonymously thus "bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a concrete need for such secrecy, and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if forced to proceed in its own name." …

Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show that their privacy interests outweigh the public's presumptive and substantial interest in learning their identities.

To begin, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' privacy interests do not implicate "a matter of a sensitive and highly personal nature." Plaintiffs contend that being "publicly linked to litigation" challenging the current administration "could have long[-]term consequences" for their careers. Certainly, when a plaintiff points to concrete career harms that would result from the disclosure of her identity, this factor favors pseudonymity. For instance, the Court granted pseudonymity for a doctor who was accused of misconduct that, if disclosed, would have prevented her from practicing. Doe v. Lieberman (D.D.C. 2020). [Note that not all judges agree on this point; some categorically conclude that pseudonymity can't be justified by a risk of reputational and professional harms, which is a commonplace risk in civil litigation. -EV]

But when identification poses only a speculative professional risk, this factor cuts against pseudonymity. Doe v. FDA (D.D.C. 2023); Doe v. DOJ (D.D.C. 2023). Plaintiffs' arguments, which identify neither concrete career consequences nor specific job prospects at risk of harm, do not rise to the occasion. The fact that disclosure means Plaintiffs "could be deemed litigious" or that future employers "may treat Plaintiffs' association with this litigation as a red flag" is not sufficient to allege a substantial privacy interest. The first factor therefore weighs against pseudonymity.

Next, the Court considers "whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm." Plaintiffs assert that they could face harassment and retaliation "by members of the public or political actors" given the politically charged nature of their lawsuit. To support this contention, they cite instances of federal employees being terminated or put on administrative leave for expressing their opposition to the Administration.

But those examples all feature individuals who were federal employees at the time they opposed the Administration, rather than terminated employees, and the retaliation they faced happened primarily with regards to their employment. It is not clear what analogous harm can be extrapolated from those examples to Plaintiffs, who are not currently employed by the government and thus face no risk of being put on leave or fired.

The other consequences Plaintiffs discuss, such as private-sector firms being unwilling to hire someone "publicly known to have sued OSC and the Administration" are more clearly applicable, but as explained [above], this concern is undercut by the generalized nature of the career harm alleged…..

When plaintiffs sue the government, which way [this] cuts depends on the relief that they seek. If they request programmatic relief that would "alter the operation of public law both as applied to [them] and, by virtue of the legal arguments presented, to other parties going forward," then the "public interest" in their case "is intensified" and this factor cuts against pseudonymity. On the other hand, if plaintiffs seek only individualized relief—say, a judgment that their visas were improperly delayed or that they were unlawfully denied government benefits—then this factor favors pseudonymity. [Here too different judges take different views of the matter; some courts, for instance, conclude that when plaintiffs focus on what happened to them individually, that makes the credibility of their factual allegations and therefore their identities more relevant than if they were challenging a broad policy on its face. -EV]

Here, Plaintiffs seek vacatur of the Probationary Directive and an order that OSC reopen the thousands of probationary-employee complaints it closed, which amounts to programmatic relief. Any ruling in their favor would "alter the operation of public law both as applied to [them] and, by virtue of the legal arguments presented, to" all those whose complaints were disposed of by OSC pursuant to the Probationary Directive. And while programmatic relief need not be fatal to a motion for pseudonymity, this case does not present the "truly exceptional circumstances" that overcome the presumption against pseudonymity for programmatic relief. See Doe v. Hill (D.C. Cir. 2025) ("[T]hose who seek to alter public law by using the federal courts must, in all but truly exceptional cases, reveal their identity.")….