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New in Civitas: Trump Is Refighting The "War" That Congress and the Burger Court "Waged" Against President Nixon
"The Burger Court approved this war. Trump is now successfully refighting that war."
Civitas has published my new essay, titled Trump Is Refighting The "War" That Congress and the Burger Court "Waged" Against President Nixon. This essay brings together several threads about Trump, the Roberts Court, the Burger Court, and the fallout from Watergate.
Here is a snippet:
The epochs of constitutional law in the twentieth century are well known. During the so-called Lochner Era in the early twentieth century, the Court carefully scrutinized federal and state economic regulations. The New Deal Court reversed course and largely deferred to these laws. The Warren Court is well known for expanding civil and criminal rights, while reinforcing democratic processes. The Burger Court, if it is remembered at all, unleashed Roe v. Wade (1973) on our polity. But over the ensuing three years, the Burger Court decided three landmark cases that drastically and hastily transformed the structure of the federal government. All of these decisions resulted directly from the Watergate scandal. First, United States v. Nixon (1974) permitted a federal prosecutor to issue a subpoena to President Nixon to produce the Watergate Tapes. Second, Train v. City of New York (1975), found that President Nixon could not "impound," or withhold certain funding. Third, Buckley v. Valeo (1976) largely upheld the Federal Election Campaign Act, as well as the Federal Election Commission that enforces the Act.
There is a fourth decision that bears mentioning. The Ethics in Government Act (1978) created the independent counsel statute as a means to prevent future Watergates. This provision empowered a prosecutor to investigate the executive branch with sweeping authority and broad independence. The Rehnquist Court upheld this statute in Morrison v. Olson (1988) over the vigorous and legendary dissent of Justice Antonin Scalia.
The Supreme Court has already taken steps to deconstruct many of these precedents. Citizens United v. FEC (2010), followed by McCutcheon v. FEC (2014), more or less rendered Buckley a nullity, as vast amounts of money can now indirectly flow to the political process. Both Republican and Democratic politicians have benefited from these rulings. Trump v. United States (2024) granted President Trump broad immunity from criminal prosecutions and scaled back the import of the Watergate Tapes case. I have called on the Court to reconsider United States v. Nixon, which was an early manifestation of lawfare. And this term, the Supreme Court is poised to undermine Morrison by overruling Humphrey's Executor v. FEC, a New Deal era precedent that upheld so-called "independent" agencies.
I write that the Supreme Court's recent decision in the AIDS Vaccine Coalition case should not be viewed as a narrow, one-off. Rather:
This ruling is part of a series of cases in which the Court is scaling back Congress's efforts to control the presidency in the wake of Watergate. An entire structural edifice of government was created to constrain the executive. And the Roberts Court is now dismantling those structures.
I think this framing helps to understand why Justice Kagan referred to Congress as waging a "war" against President Nixon:
In dissent, Justice Kagan charged that the majority misread the Nixon-era statute. But more importantly, Kagan faulted the conservatives for ignoring the context in which the Impoundment Control Act arose. She reminded everyone that the "ICA [was] enacted after Congress waged war with President Nixon over impoundments." Kagan added that "Congress w[o]n its confrontation with the President." It is unconventional for a Supreme Court opinion to describe Congress as waging a war and winning a confrontation with the president. Supreme Court Justices are not political commentators. Yet Kagan, perhaps unintentionally, identified the reason why so much of constitutional law went awry.
Trump is now successfully refighting that war.
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It is a war that presidents should lose but as it's Trump, Josh wants the president to win.
Why, exactly, is this a war that presidents should lose?
Personally, I'm okay with a system that effectively says both branches have to work together to confiscate and spend my hard-earned money but either alone can stop the wasting.
Because the Constitution says that Congress, not the President, is responsible for raising and spending money, and for passing laws. The President is responsible for ensuring those laws are faithfully executed, not just the ones that he agrees with. And nothing in either the Constitution itself suggests that the President should be above the law or immune from subpoena, investigation or prosecution; in fact, the very bloody history that preceded the Constitution argues very strongly for the exact opposite.
I'm ok with congress and president fighting. I don't know if owning the purse strings means you are allowed to tell the executive they have to spend all of it. congress setting a spending floor makes more sense to me than setting a ceiling.
I have no idea what this comment means.
Congress has the power of the purse.
That means that, for example, they say "Spend $1m on widgets."
Then you spend $1m on widgets. Full stop. It does not mean, "Spend $1m on widgets, unless you don't want to."
Normally, the power of the purse is really important because if CONGRESS doesn't want something to continue, then CONGRESS can choose to stop appropriating money for it.
Now, if the President doesn't want something to continue- something that Congress (through law) wants, and that Congress (through the power of the purse) has appropriated money for, and that has not been vetoed (which the President actually can do), then the President can simply unilaterally stop it by usurping the power of the purse.
spending on 1m for widgets, is not representative. A better example. congress wishes to accomplish Y. It budget's Z to accomplish Y. The president spends A an amount less than Z, but fully accomplishes Y. What's the issue? I don't see a constitutional violation, and the executive is fully acting within it's powers and is not encroaching on the legislative power of the purse.
...except that is not what is happening, at all.
If Congress appropriates money to do something, the President cannot choose not to do it by refusing to spend any money on it. Because that's vetoing it.
You're not actually understanding this issue. This isn't "spend $2 on a screw, and the President learns that the screw only costs $1, so he saves a $1"
This is "Spend $2 to buy a screw for the Screw Program that we want."
And the President says, "I'm not spending any money, because I don't want that program. SCREW YOU."
Perhaps pertinent:
Biden's border wall funding freeze was legal, congressional investigators rule
The judiciary disagreed...
Court sides with Missouri in fight over $40M border wall funding plan
"At the center of the case was $40 million set aside during Fiscal Year 2020–2021 for the construction of physical barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border. Missouri argued that the Biden Administration unlawfully sought to divert those funds for unrelated uses, including environmental projects such as wildlife corridors. The court blocked the plan, concluding that the money must remain allocated for its original purpose."
Biden didn't want that border fence, and didn't just refuse to spend the money, he attempted to divert it to purposes it hadn't been appropriated for.
From your own link:
I think loki13 has it right. If Congress says “spend $1m on widgets,” then the executive’s duty is to spend $1m on widgets — not less, not more. If Congress instead writes “acquire X widgets, up to $1m,” then the executive can economize. The difference comes from how the law is framed, but either way it’s Congress, not the executive, that sets the terms.
Because if you look at the way that our government works, the legislature (Congress) has the ultimate power ... the power of the purse. In fact, if you read almost any separation of powers decision (and I know you have), you will see this continually referred to. Or you can look at historical sources.
Congress has the power to raise revenue (taxes, tariffs) and the power to spend. Period. Not the President.
Regardless of what you, Rossami, think might be a good idea (see, e.g., line item veto), that's not how it works.
If the President has the power of the purse, then the entire system fails. Arguably, it is already pretty close to a fail state.
So let me make this as clear as possible to you-
President Woke (or whomever is your current boogieman) refuses to spend any money on the military. Or ICE. Or whatever you (and Congress) thinks is wise. Instead, President Woke uses tariffs (and/or taxes, because they are the same power) to raise her own revenue and spend money on what Woke wants- bringing in transgendered Mexicans to replace you.
See? Either you understand the principle, and recognize we don't give this power to a single person, or you don't.
I understand the principle - I just disagree with you about what that principle means. Specifically, I think that the power to spend does not automatically mean the obligation to spend.
Congress, and only Congress, has the power to raise revenues (unless they unwisely delegate away that power but that's a separate rant). And Congress, and only Congress, has the power to authorize spending. That's the "power of the purse" - the ability to control the pursestrings and to keep others from reaching into the purse for yet more money. Nothing in those constitutional principles, however, requires that 100% of the money raised and authorized actually be spent.
Think of where that analogy comes from. I as head of household open the purse and give you 5 shillings to go buy groceries. 1. You can't have more than the 5 shillings I gave you. 2. You can't spend them on anything but groceries. But 3, I'm not going to chide you when you come back and say 'I got the groceries for 4 shillings 9 pence and here's your thrupence change'. Saying 'I gave you 5 shillings and you must spend all 5' goes beyond any traditional understanding of the power of the purse.
That's why Congress has to pass the ICA - because the Constitution doesn't require the money to be spent. I am arguing (and yes, this argument currently favors Trump but that's beside the point) that as a normative policy choice, the ICA was bad law. Executives should be allowed to spend less than the amount allocated. And doing so is not a violation of the power of the purse.
Complete disagreement there. Not only because, um, history and text, but also because this was thoroughly discussed at the time.
If the President can unilaterally decide to spend or not spend the money appropriated, that's simply a veto of Congress's law without ... you know ... doing the veto. But not just any law- the most fundamental power of Congress.
Because it's not a question of delegated power- unless Congress explicitly states it. If Congress passes a law stating that "up to X" can be spent at the discretion of an agency, that's a discretionary amount. But if Congress appropriates money for something, then that is money that the President cannot unilaterally withhold. Period. Because for the President to withhold it is to nullify the intent of Congress.
So this is the actual example-
Your friend says- The TV at the store costs $100. I am giving you $100. I want you to go to the store and spend the money I give you to buy the TV.
You go to the store, see the TV, and think, "Eh, I think he watches too much television. I'm not going to buy the TV. I'm not going to spend the money."
Except with the other ability Trump has claimed (to be able to move funds around as he pleases), you would then go and spend money on snacks for yourself.
I actually agree that a presidential decision to not spend is a de facto veto of the spending. And as a normative matter, I'm completely okay with that. The "most fundamental power" of Congress that needs protection from abuse is the raising of revenues, not the spending of those revenues. It's the ability to put your hand in my pocket that I (and the Founders) fundmentally objected to far more than what you do with the money after you seize it.
As to remedies, yeah, a President flouting the will of Congress by not spending everything they allocated could be a problem, though neither any Congress or President thought so until the Nixon fight that led to the ICA. My counter-argument is that the ICA is the wrong remedy. If a President refuses to spend, then we the people can vote the bum out or Congress can impeach. I don't think the ICA was the right answer. It has led to far more waste and abuse than it could ever have fixed.
I am going to try this one more time.
It's NOT JUST the spending. It's the actual law.
Congress passes a law. It's called, "What Rossami Wants." The WRS Law costs $1. So Congress appropriates $1.
Now, let's say that President Woke vetoes WRW. And Congress overrides the veto. All kosher so far, right? WRW is now law!
EXCEPT ... the President is just like, "Ima not spend that money. No money, no law." See how it works? The reason the power of the purse is fundamental is because ... things (life, laws, doing stuff) costs money. If the President can choose not to spend money on stuff, then the President can choose what valid laws ... are valid, and what don't actually exist. Because a lot of laws actually require some amount of appropriations to make valid (and conversely, the power of the purse allows Congress... NOT THE PRESIDENT... to defund things that they don't want).
This is Civics 101. This is basic separation of powers stuff. This is so fundamental to the structure of our government it would be akin to allowing the Supreme Court to make rulings about any issue they want, whenever they want. It might be something you think is a good idea in the abstract, but there is a reason that we limit the judicial power to actual cases and controversies- it's inherent in the system.
Again, NOBODY thought that until the Nixon fight that led to the ICA. You are inflating this into a 'separation of powers' argument far beyond what it justifies.
By the way, I do know that the ICA is "the law". That's why I keep saying that in my "normative opinion", that was a bad choice. The ICA shouldn't be "the law". We should return to the policy where underspending was rewarded (or, if rejected, redressed through political means instead of court challenges).
Huh... Rereading my comments, I say "By the way" far too often. It's getting boring. I'll try to work on my wordsmithing.
As far as I can tell, it really all depends on the language in the law. If Congress writes “up to X,” that leaves discretion. But if Congress writes “shall spend X,” Train v. City of New York makes clear the executive has to carry it out.
I agree with you that discretion for efficiency is a good thing and should be encouraged.
Another place we have to be careful, though — as loki13 noted with the “snacks vs. TV” analogy — is reprogramming. That’s where ADA violations can come into play.
By the way, I completely agree that moving funds around and spending on things not authorized by Congress is prohibited by both the Constitution and the more general principle of the power of the purse. You don't get to spend my 5 shillings on hookers instead. You don't even get to spend the thrupence change on hookers. That practice should be stopped by the courts. But that problem is not directly at issue in the article above or in SRG2's original comment, therefore it was out of scope of my replies.
If "lawfare" is what it requires to ensure a president is not a king, it is not a bad thing. We are a nation of laws, not men.* Of course, besides being the name of a blog, the label is used negatively.
The Burger Court, if it is remembered at all, unleashed Roe v. Wade (1973) on our polity.
The right to privacy was "unleashed" by a nation with a limited government. Applying that principle equally to women was a long process, and the Burger Court (7-2) was voicing the ethos of the age. See, e.g., Sex and the Constitution: Sex, Religion, and Law from America's Origins to the Twenty-First Century by Geoffrey R. Stone.
I do think it is sad if we don't remember other things from that Court, including an 8-0 ruling protecting republican principles or a 6-3 opinion (Pentagon Papers), quickly honoring freedom of the press. These days, both opinions would not have been handed down, or would only have been significantly later.
==
* Hegseth is concerned about being "manly" enough.
The 1970s-
"When the president does it, that means that it is not illegal." - Nixon
Congress- "Not so fast."
The 2020s-
John Roberts- Hey, when the President does it, that means it is not illegal.
Josh Blackman- Yeah! Congress sucks! Also, Roberts needs to resign. Except when he declares Trump king.
It’s really odd to be dismantling the fire alarms, ditching the fire escapes, and chain-locking the doors right at the moment that the smell of smoke is becoming distinctly acrid and it’s starting to feel uncomfortably hot.
“If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face—forever.” ― George Orwell, 1984
"Well, if there's a boot, it's going to need to be licked!" ― Josh Blackman, now
Yes, Trump is indeed fighting a war against both the American people and their representatives, which he thinks should represent only him. And he does appear to be winning. Congratulations, Josh.
I found this interesting, from Josh's Sith Master :
https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2025/09/how-department-of-state-v-aids-vaccine.html
The gist seems to be that Congress is indeed King when it comes to the spending of money ...... but only if it words its statutes to remove all discretion from the executive. If it leaves wriggle room, the executive can wriggle. The answer to the puzzle is therefore not really a broad sweeping constitutional principle, but the actual text of each appropriation or spending statute.
A constitutional distinction is also made between statutes ordering subsidiary officials to do something, and statutes ordering the President himself to do something.
I don't find SBT's unsupported musings particularly interesting to begin with, and all he's doing in that essay is creating a Magic Words™ rule: it's not enough for Congress to order that funds be spent; Congress must say, "And we're not kidding; we really mean it. No fooling. Spend it. Period." Otherwise we'll assume that there's an implied, "Spend this money if you feel like it." Even if that were a supportable interpretation of the constitution, it seems kind of pointless. And irrelevant to the public debate, since Trump isn't saying, "I don't have to spend this because you didn't say 'Simon Says.'" He's saying, "I don't have to spend it if I don't want to."
" United States v. Nixon, which was an early manifestation of lawfare."
No, it was not. The Special Prosecutor refused to indict Nixon. The audio tapes were needed in order to prosecute Nixon's co-conspirators.