The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
Judge Strikes Trump's Complaint in Libel Lawsuit Against N.Y. Times
"The complaint continues ... with much more, persistently alleged in abundant, florid, and enervating detail." "[A] complaint is not a public forum for vituperation and invective—not a protected platform to rage against an adversary. A complaint is not a megaphone for public relations or a podium for a passionate oration at a political rally or the functional equivalent of the Hyde Park Speakers' Corner."

From today's order by Judge Steven Merryday (M.D. Fla.) in Trump v. N.Y. Times Co.:
As every member of the bar of every federal court knows (or is presumed to know), Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that a complaint include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8(e)(1) helpfully adds that "[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct." Some pleadings are necessarily longer than others. The difference likely depends on the number of parties and claims, the complexity of the governing facts, and the duration and scope of pertinent events. But both a shorter pleading and a longer pleading must comprise "simple, concise, and direct" allegations that offer a "short and plain statement of the claim." Rule 8 governs every pleading in a federal court, regardless of the amount in controversy, the identity of the parties, the skill or reputation of the counsel, the urgency or importance (real or imagined) of the dispute, or any public interest at issue in the dispute.
In this action, a prominent American citizen (perhaps the most prominent American citizen) alleges defamation by a prominent American newspaper publisher (perhaps the most prominent American newspaper publisher) and by several other corporate and natural persons. Alleging only two simple counts of defamation, the complaint consumes eighty-five pages. Count I appears on page eighty, and Count II appears on page eighty-three. Pages one through seventy-nine, plus part of page eighty, present allegations common to both counts and to all defendants. Each count alleges a claim against each defendant and, apparently, each claim seeks the same remedy against each defendant.
Even under the most generous and lenient application of Rule 8, the complaint is decidedly improper and impermissible. The pleader initially alleges an electoral victory by President Trump "in historic fashion"—by "trouncing" the opponent—and alludes to "persistent election interference from the legacy media, led most notoriously by the New York Times." The pleader alludes to "the halcyon days" of the newspaper but complains that the newspaper has become a "fullthroated mouthpiece of the Democrat party," which allegedly resulted in the "deranged endorsement" of President Trump's principal opponent in the most recent presidential election. The reader of the complaint must labor through allegations, such as "a new journalistic low for the hopelessly compromised and tarnished 'Gray Lady.'" The reader must endure an allegation of "the desperate need to defame with a partisan spear rather than report with an authentic looking glass" and an allegation that "the false narrative about 'The Apprentice' was just the tip of Defendants' melting iceberg of falsehoods." Similarly, in one of many, often repetitive, and laudatory (toward President Trump) but superfluous allegations, the pleader states, "'The Apprentice' represented the cultural magnitude of President Trump's singular brilliance, which captured the [Z]eitgeist of our time."
The complaint continues with allegations in defense of President Trump's father and the acquisition of the Trumps' wealth; with a protracted list of the many properties owned, developed, or managed by The Trump Organization and a list of President Trump's many books; with a long account of the history of "The Apprentice"; with an extensive list of President Trump's "media appearances"; with a detailed account of other legal actions both by and against President Trump, including an account of the "Russia Collusion Hoax" and incidents of alleged "lawfare" against President Trump; and with much more, persistently alleged in abundant, florid, and enervating detail.
Even assuming that each allegation in the complaint is true (of course, that is for a jury to decide and is not pertinent here; this order suggests nothing about the truth of the allegations or the validity of the claims but addresses only the manner of the presentation of the allegations in the complaint); even assuming that at trial the plaintiff offers evidence supporting every allegation in the complaint and that the evidence is accepted by the jury as fact; and even assuming that after finally "melting" the defendants' alleged "iceberg of falsehoods" the plaintiff prevails for each reason alleged in the complaint—even assuming all of that—a complaint remains an improper and impermissible place for the tedious and burdensome aggregation of prospective evidence, for the rehearsal of tendentious arguments, or for the protracted recitation and explanation of legal authority putatively supporting the pleader's claim for relief. As every lawyer knows (or is presumed to know), a complaint is not a public forum for vituperation and invective—not a protected platform to rage against an adversary. A complaint is not a megaphone for public relations or a podium for a passionate oration at a political rally or the functional equivalent of the Hyde Park Speakers' Corner.
A complaint is a mechanism to fairly, precisely, directly, soberly, and economically inform the defendants—in a professionally constrained manner consistent with the dignity of the adversarial process in an Article III court of the United States—of the nature and content of the claims. A complaint is a short, plain, direct statement of allegations of fact sufficient to create a facially plausible claim for relief and sufficient to permit the formulation of an informed response. Although lawyers receive a modicum of expressive latitude in pleading the claim of a client, the complaint in this action extends far beyond the outer bound of that latitude.
This complaint stands unmistakably and inexcusably athwart the requirements of Rule 8. This action will begin, will continue, and will end in accord with the rules of procedure and in a professional and dignified manner. The complaint is STRUCK with leave to amend within twenty-eight days. The amended complaint must not exceed forty pages, excluding only the caption, the signature, and any attachment.
You can read the now-struck Complaint here. To be fair, the Complaint is a specimen of a broader phenomenon I've seen in other cases—but it is indeed an unusually aggravated specimen. These sorts of complaints, in criminal and civil cases, are sometimes called "speaking complaints," and have both defenders and opponents; this one, though, speaks a lot, and about many things that don't seem quite relevant to the matter.
Editor's Note: We invite comments and request that they be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of Reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason at any time. Comments may only be edited within 5 minutes of posting. Report abuses.
Please to post comments
I saw a funny video about Trump ("Sayin' a Lie") set to "Stayin' Alive."
Trump's complaint against the press made me think there ought to be one to "Shakedown Cruise." https://youtu.be/i_4OITN0rkU
This judge's argument is disingenuous after Twombly and Iqbal
All those cases hold is that you have to have a little meat on your pleadings instead of making conclusory allegations. One hundred plus page complaints with extraneous detail are not required to survive dismissal.
My legal analysis of Trump's complaint is that it wasn't even intended--by Trump or his lawyers--to prevail in a court of law under the governing law. As far as I could ascertain, Trump and his lawyers used that lawsuit for outright open and notorious extortion--much like I'm certain Trump and his lawyers used other lawsuits previously.
Trump has essentially turned the US government into the O in RICO. It seems that even was his point in laying off or firing all the people who lost their jobs because of Trump. I'm seriously starting to think that Trump hired Guiliani (a former US Attorney who prosecuted organized crime in NYC) at least in part to advise Trump on how to do "business" like a mob boss.
Jack… I think he was aware of how to do the mob business long prior to Giuliani. He just needed a lawyer that would do what he wanted. He lost Cohen so he had to get a replacement and Giuliani was willing. His mob experience was just other bullet point on his resume. And he needed someone who would be loyal. Another bullet point.
Spmosher, agreed. But as Trump proves almost daily, being aware is a world away from being capable.
No mention of rule 12(f)? "The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter."
Since the whole complaint is struck for good and obvious reasons, it seems silly to then strike individual sentences or paragraphs under R 12(f). The whole point of the court’s order is that it’s not gonna parse the complaint at a highly granular level of detail. There’s no complaint left from which to “strike from a pleading”.
Zarniwoop, please see my comment below.
I see it, and it doesn’t address the basic notion that if the whole complaint is struck for failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8, then striking particular parts of a complaint under Rule 12(f) never comes in to play.
I’m glad the judge is willing to call BS when he sees it.
Zarniwoop, what authority authorized the judge to strike the entire complaint in the manner that he did? None. Rule 12 (and Amendment V) expressly prohibited doing so.
We all should be willing to call BS when we see it by Trump or by a judge. Every public servant swore to support our Constitution, not attack and undermine it.
Rule 8. That’s how it works. The judge isn’t going to pick out each thing and say “this part is struck.” When it’s this bad, as the litigators here recognize, striking the whole complaint is appropriate.
Darwinnie, what makes you think Rule 8 authorized striking all or part of a pleading. That precise issue is addressed (repeatedly) in Rule 12. It is not addressed at all in Rule 8.
Are you a lawyer stating your analysis of the law or just somebody talking about law without any basis for doing so?
Are you a lawyer?
David, isn't obvious that I am and you are not?
Well, no. You don't seem to know anything about the actual practice of law; instead, you seem to be very impressed with yourself for having read some things about law.
David, I've asked you many times, are you a lawyer or are you just someone making up stuff about which you know virtually (or actually) nothing? Are you a lawyer?
If you really wanted to know, you could invest the 5 seconds it takes to google his name.
John, there's a "good" reason for that, I think. I'm certain the judge knew he was violating federal law and our Constitution. See my comment below.
Well, that was quick. I can collect my prize* for predicting that it won't make it to discovery.
* a cupon that allows me to buy a latte at Starbucks for only $795.
They have 28 days to refile it with less than 40 pages.
a complaint remains an improper and impermissible place for the tedious and burdensome aggregation of prospective evidence, for the rehearsal of tendentious arguments, or for the protracted recitation and explanation of legal authority putatively supporting the pleader's claim for relief. As every lawyer knows (or is presumed to know), a complaint is not a public forum for vituperation and invective
People who write like this complain about a complaint being too long? Talk about the pot and kettle.
But it's nonetheless elegant and not overly prolix
Agreed.
"elegant "
Is that Latin for "run on"?
improper and impermissible are redundant, as is recitation and explanation
improper and impermissible are redundant,
Not quite - improper has a moral connotation and feel of condemnation that impermissible lacks, and furthermore, there is a nice cadence with the repeated "imp". It reads as though it could be read out loud with advantage.
as is recitation and explanation
Definitely not redundant.
I wonder what Trump's reaction was when reading this paragraph?
1) He thought the judge was praising him.
2) He immediately asked a subordinate to tell him what it means.
3) He tries to figure out a way to blame the judge for his lawyer's mistake.
You know that this complaint was as ridiculous as it was at Trump's insistence, right? So Trump thinks his 2024 election win was the single greatest personal and political triumph in the history of the world. I can hear him dictating that to the lawyer. "No, leave that in there." Suing a 9billion dollar company for 15billion is a nice touch. I am surprised they didn't go for eleventy gazillion.
Clown show.
Too bad there's not something in the federal rules to more clearly address unhinged judicial rants.
LOL, you absurd twerp. I suppose you regard the "complaint" as hinged.
Sure, but so is a toilet seat.
OK I actually lol’d at a comment from SGT. Life is always new and interesting.
Are things really struck? I thought they were stricken.
Or have strucken?
Are you thinking of Carel Struycken?
I certainly agree Trump’s complaint was an abuse of the legal system. It was what the Montana Supreme Court in 2007 called “legal thuggery.” But federal judges must not respond to legal thuggery by violating our Constitution.
Article VI commands that "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of [all] States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution." That governs Trump and even Trump's private attorneys (as judicial officers of the court). It also governs all federal judges, as do their two oaths of office in 5 U.S.C. 3331 and 28 U.S.C. 453.
“No person” may “be deprived” by any federal public servant “of life, liberty, or property" before affording them all “process of law” that is "due." Amendment V. Even Trump arguably is a person.
The very first rule of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure emphasizes that such “rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81.”
The federal rules of procedure and evidence are not mere guidelines. They are governing law. They were approved by Congress, so they have the force of a federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. 2072, 2074.
Federal law explicitly and clearly and precluded striking Trump’s pleading the way it was stricken.
Rule 12(e) is perfectly clear that a district “court may strike” an entire “pleading or issue any other appropriate order” only after affording the process of law that is due. The process of law that is due is prescribe immediately before the foregoing:
“A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order.”
Rule 12(f) is perfectly clear that “[t]he court may act" on "its own” only in a particular manner. “The court” only “may strike [merely] from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
The Court is striking the document for a failure to comply with Rule 8, and providing leave to file an amended complaint in compliance with Rule 8 and the Order of the Court.
It's not a Rule 12(f) issue, it's a pleading requirement issue. I've seen it before, and it is entirely permissible.
From Green v. Secretary (11th Cir. 2022):
Professor Volokh, thank you for that. I agree that a court could issue a different order. I even think I would support a civil contempt order in this case (imposing a fine for every day the complaint isn't remedied). I'm objecting only to the clear illegality (and unconstitutionality) of actually striking a pleading the way the judge did.
Thanks -- is your objection (an assertion of a constitutional violation, yet) just that he used the term "struck" rather than "dismissed"? See, e.g., Vibe Micro v. Shabanets (11th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added, some citations omitted), discussing a related sort of 8(a)(2) short-and-plain-statement dismissal (focused on "shotgun pleadings," another way 8(a)(2) may be violated):
Professor Volokh, thank you for this information also.
But no, my concern is not merely with the judge's choice of words (striking vs. dismissing). And some judges (e.g., the ones you quoted) advising other judges to violate federal law merely even more clearly violates the Fifth Amendment. Rule 12 expressly and specifically governs when and why all or part of a pleading may be stricken or when it may be dismissed.
Please also see my comment below regarding the First Amendment. Judges' efforts to regulate or punish exercises of First Amendment freedoms are governed by SCOTUS precedent construing First Amendment freedoms. Contrary to the pretenses of far too many judges, there is no such thing as a court's "inherent authority" to violate any part of our Constitution, including SCOTUS precedent construing it.
Well, if you think the Rules are the only source of "the law" in federal courts when it comes to civil procedure, and the Eleventh Circuit can't further develop that law, you are certainly entitled to think so. It's just that this means you're describing a hypothetical system that you think we should have, as to opposed to the actual American legal system, in which appellate precedents are indeed treated as the law.
Professor Volokh, clearly I did not say (and I did not imply) that "the Rules are the only source of 'the law' in federal courts when it comes to civil procedure, and the Eleventh Circuit can't further develop that law."
Did you think those judges somehow "further develop[ed] that law" (Rule 12)? If so, how?
Clearly, I'm not merely "describing a hypothetical system that you think we should have, as to opposed to the actual American legal system." I'm describing and stating the legal authorities that establish our actual American legal system. I'm saying exactly what the law says, in particular, the supreme Law of the Land:
"No person” may “be deprived” by any federal public servant “of life, liberty, or property" before affording them all “process of law” that is "due." And "the supreme Law of the Land" is, first, our "Constitution, and" then the federal "Laws" that were "made in Pursuance" of our Constitution (including all federal rules of procedure and evidence) "and all Treaties" and all legislators and "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of [all] States" are "bound" to "support this Constitution."
The point of Rule 1 (which I quoted) saying that the rules (including Rule 12) "govern" is that they govern everyone, including judges and courts. That's the point of the power to "govern."
If you think I failed to state the law or if you think our Constitution vested in federal judges the power to knowingly violate the supreme Law of the Land, please show me any legal authority whatsoever that supports your position.
I'm describing the rule of law required by our Constitution. You're acquiescing in rule by outlaws who are (and whom you know are) knowingly violating our Constitution.
Jack Jordan, your initial post in this thread used the word “only” several times while characterizing what Rule 12 says, but the rule doesn’t use that word (other than in a reference to “a United States officer or employee sued only in an official capacity”). Do you have any authority for the proposition that the actions authorized by Rule 12 are the exclusive or only options available to judges when a litigant violates another rule? I would think the existence of other rules authorizing judges to strike pleadings or take other actions as a sanction for misconduct (like Rule 11, Rule 26, and Rule 37) would suggest that Rule 12 is not exclusive. Likewise, I would think that the inherent-authority cases (like Eberly v. Moore, Chambers v. Nasco, and Dietz v. Bouldin) would similarly suggest that judges have authority beyond that specifically provided by Rule 12.
I see that others below tried to make these points to you and that you (a) didn’t seem to understand them, and (b) didn’t have any response other than to repeatedly ask commenters if they were lawyers. So for the record, yes, I am a lawyer; yes, I have taken courses in civil procedure and constitutional law; yes, I clerked for a federal judge; yes, I have practiced litigation in federal and state courts; and yes, I have taught law-school classes.
Roger, I provided the primary authority immediately above your comment. You're right, I don't understand anyone (especially a lawyer with your qualifications and experience) presuming or pretending that our Constitution is irrelevant or that it somehow vested in judges the power to knowingly violate our Constitution. If you are aware of any such authority, please kindly provide it.
Amendment V and Article VI are perfectly clearly and controlling, are they not?
"No person” may “be deprived” by any federal public servant “of life, liberty, or property" before affording them all “process of law” that is "due." And "the supreme Law of the Land" is, first, our "Constitution, and" then the federal "Laws" that were "made in Pursuance" of our Constitution (including all federal rules of procedure and evidence) "and all Treaties" and all legislators and "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of [all] States" are "bound" to "support this Constitution."
The point of FRCP Rule 1 (which I quoted) saying that the rules (including Rule 12) "govern" is that they govern everyone, including judges and courts. That's the point of the power to "govern." Does Rule 12 not govern courts or judges?
I'm truly astonished that an attorney with your qualifications and experience would question my use of the word "only." I did that for the benefit of those who lacked your experience. But if you think I improperly used "only" in any instance, please show me why you think that.
Is it your position that lower court judges, SCOTUS and Congress went to the trouble of writing and approving Rule 12, which stated express limitations on when pleadings can be stricken but all that effort imposed no limitation whatsoever on the power of a judge to strike a pleading? If so, what authority do you think supports such presumption?
Roger, judges, courts, judicial doctrine and judicial rulings, judgments or orders are not even in the supreme law of the land.
Article III expressly emphasizes that federal "judicial Power shall extend" no further than permitted "under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties" and "Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices" only "during good Behaviour."
I said "only" because it obviously was implicit. “The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior.” Federalist No. 39 (James Madison). Only federal “judges” who “behave properly, will be secured in their places for life.” Federalist No. 79 (Hamilton).
Because the word isn't in the actual text of the rule and you pretended that it was.
Of course it does. It simply doesn't limit them in the ways you inexplicably think it does.
Jack Jordan, are you a lawyer?
Roger, if you think anything I wrote was false or inaccurate, simply prove it. Don't simply misrepresent what I wrote or simply ignore controlling legal authorities.
Clearly I did not state or imply the sweeping straw-man proposition that you did ("that the actions authorized by Rule 12 are the exclusive or only options available to judges when a litigant violates another rule"). I said only that Rule 12 expressly governs (expressly limits) particular circumstances: when Article III and Amendments I and V permit a district court judge to strike all or part of a pleading because of its CONTENT.
Obviously, Rule 11 permits striking an entire filing for a reason that has nothing to do with its CONTENT: failure to verify by signing (but striking is permitted ONLY after affording due process of law, i.e., notice of the failure and opportunity to remedy).
This is a very straightforward concept: rules govern judicial conduct to preclude some conduct. In other words, the rules permit such conduct ONLY in compliance with such rules. That is the precise point of having a rule, including the rule in Amendment V, which I've quoted repeatedly.
It is crucial to bear in mind here that judges are mere public servants and their powers are limited. "In our federal system, the National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.” Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100, 110 (2024)
In Virginia's Report of 1800, James Madison (to oppose the misconduct of the President, Congress, SCOTUS Justice Chase and other federal judges by making and purporting to enforce the Sedition Act of 1798) emphasized the enduring need to remind our public servants of first principles established by our Constitution. Madison accused the foregoing purported public servants of "reproachful inconsistency, and [even] criminal degeneracy."
Madison emphasized that we must consider exercises of power by our public servants “with a reverence for our constitution, in the true character in which it issued from the sovereign authority of the people.”
"[A] frequent recurrence to fundamental principles [in our constitutions] is solemnly enjoined by most of the state constitutions, and particularly by our own [Constitution], as a necessary safeguard against the danger of degeneracy to which republics are liable . . . . The authority of constitutions over governments, and of the sovereignty of the people over constitutions, are truths which are at all times necessary to be kept in mind; and at no time perhaps more necessary than at the present."
“The essential difference between the British government, and the American constitutions, will place this subject in the clearest light.” In Britain, the legislature (Parliament) was and is sovereign and the people were and are mere subjects.
"In the United States, the case is altogether different. The people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty. The legislature, no less than the executive, is under limitations of power. Encroachments are regarded as possible from the one, as well as from the other. Hence in the United States, the great and essential rights of the people are secured against legislative, as well as against executive [and judicial] ambition. They are secured, not [only] by laws paramount to prerogative; but by constitutions paramount to laws."
Roger, further to my last reply, lawyers, judges and law professors need to think much more about the true significance of the words of Chief Justice Marshall speaking for a unanimous SCOTUS in 1819 in McCulloch v. Maryland: “we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”
Marshall didn't mean constitution as noun (a document). He meant constitution as a verb (of a nation). Our Constitution is the written elaboration of how one people constituted one nation.
In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall speaking for a unanimous SCOTUS also elaborated on the most important principles of “the people” and our Constitution that made us a nation:
“The government of the Union” is “emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and [exclusively] for their benefit. This [national] government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated [limited] powers. [ I]t can exercise only the powers granted to it . . . . . That principle is now universally admitted.”
Marshall participated in the Ratifying Convention of Virginia (one of the last states to ratify the original Constitution). He knew what people were thinking around the nation about the foregoing. That's the kind of thinking that is missing here by the many commenters who merely assume that the law is whatever judges merely presume or pretend that it is.
The overarching rule is simple and it was stated simply in Amendment X: federal public servants have ONLY the limited "powers" that were "delegated to the United States by the Constitution." All other "powers" relevant here regarding this particular case were "reserved" to "the people."
Amendment I emphatically established that our Constitution did not delegate any power to any federal employee to make or enforce any law that abridges "the freedom of speech, or of the press." Writing and printing a document and filing it in court (consistent with federal rules) clearly and irrefutably is an exercise of the freedom of expression and communication secured by our Constitution.
Courts constitute a "limited public forum" in which the freedom of expression and communication is rightly subject to regulation regarding time, place and manner. Rule 12 prescribes the ONLY circumstances under which (and the process of law that is due before) a judge may strike all or part of a pleading for CONTENT.
Roger, please also consider my reply to Purple Martin, below, quoting crucial parts of Marbury v. Madison.
Jack Jordan, are you a lawyer? It’s a simple question, one I answered above. If you don’t want to answer it, I will assume the answer is no.
I ask because I do think there are things you say that are wrong, but how one might show that those things are wrong would depend on the background and experience you bring to the discussion.
Roger, please also see my long reply to Professor Volokh quoting our Constitution and Marbury v. Madison.
You say:
"I do think there are things you say that are wrong, but how one might show that those things are wrong would depend on the background and experience you bring to the discussion."
You also said:
"I am a lawyer; yes, I have taken courses in civil procedure and constitutional law; yes, I clerked for a federal judge; yes, I have practiced litigation in federal and state courts; and yes, I have taught law-school classes."
So please bring to bear all possible legal acumen you can muster to show me that something I wrote regarding our Constitution or federal law was false. Please don't write just for me. Please write for everyone who is a lawyer who might read your writing. When you do (or if you need more space) please kindly email me at press@amicuslaw.us. (For some reason that I cannot figure out, I don't receive email notices when someone replies to my replies.)
Roger, when you try to prove your point. Please assume that I (and at least some of the other lawyers who read your writing) understand the following text and principles from Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
The power of courts to dismiss a complaint or to strike all or part of any pleading (e.g., a complaint or an answer) exists only to the extent that it is proper "under a notice pleading system," so, clearly, "it is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead" more than the law actually requires, and (even more clearly) "it is not appropriate" for a judge to dismiss or strike a complaint, in particular, in a manner that violates the rules prescribing the process of law that is due to a plaintiff, in particular.
FRCP Rule 8 “provides that a complaint must include only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ Such a statement must simply ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.”
Also, “Rule 8(f) provides that ‘[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.’ Given the Federal Rules’ simplified standard for pleading, ‘[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.’ ”
“If a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice, a defendant can move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) before responding. Moreover, claims lacking merit may be dealt with through summary judgment under Rule 56. The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim. See Conley, supra, at 48, 78 S.Ct. 99 (‘The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits’).”
Notice the Court’s emphasis on "fair notice" and the word “only,” above. “[T]he Federal Rules do address” the process that is due before a judge may strike all or part of a pleading for its content, “but do not include among the enumerated actions any reference to” striking a pleading the way this judge did. “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.”
Roger, when you try to prove your point please assume that I (and at least some of the other lawyers who read your writing) understand the text and principles in my reply to Professor Volokh quoting our Constitution and 28 U.S.C. 2071, 2072, 2074.
Roger, my bad: I was too hasty in copying and pasting text from Swierkiewicz. Obviously, SCOTUS subsequently confirmed the unconstitutional conduct of MANY courts, judges and lawyers over MANY years purporting to apply Rule 8. As I did, such judges and lawyers erroneously said Rule 8 implied a standard that it neither stated or implied: "any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations."
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly in 2007 SCOTUS criticized such judges and lawyers for their conduct and even for their purported thinking: "after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard."
That observation is relevant to our discussion of judges and lawyers continuing to abuse the text of Rule 8 to pretend that it somehow authorizes a judge to strike all or part of a complaint for content even though Rule 12 explicitly emphasized limitations on the powers of judges to strike all or part of a complaint for content that violates Rule 8.
I recently looked up the range of meanings of the Italian word precedente, which is cognate with our precedent. The dictionary felt the need to explain the peculiar legal system some outlying countries use:
Machine translation:
To Italians this fundamental part of our legal system is as alien as putting ketchup on steak.
John, here's the rub. Judges, courts, judicial doctrine and judicial rulings, judgments or orders are not even in the supreme law of the land.
Article III expressly emphasizes that federal "judicial Power shall extend" no further than permitted "under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties."
As Article VI emphasized, "the supreme Law of the Land" is, first, our "Constitution, and" then the federal "Laws" that were "made in Pursuance" of our Constitution (including all federal rules of procedure and evidence) "and all Treaties" and all legislators and "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of [all] States" are "bound" to "support this Constitution."
"No person” may “be deprived” by any federal public servant “of life, liberty, or property" before affording them all “process of law” that is "due." The process of "law," not mere purported precedent, clearly and irrefutably governs all judges and courts. It's impossible for a judicial judgment, ruling or opinion to constitute precedent if it violates our Constitution.
You are free to think that. You are free to express that. You are just not free to apply that in the course of the practice of law.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Professor Volokh, is it your position that lower court judges, SCOTUS and Congress went to the trouble of writing and approving Rule 12, which stated express limitations on when pleadings can be stricken but all that effort imposed no limitation whatsoever on the power of a judge to strike a pleading? If so, what authority do you think supports such presumption?
It did not contain "express limitations on when pleadings can be stricken." Perhaps you meant implied limitations, which would at least have the virtue of not being facially incorrect? That's why you keep having to break up your quotes of the rule and insert the word "only" — because the rule doesn't have that word.
David, please let Professor Volokh speak for himself. You don't really think he needs you to speak for him, do you?
I cannot imagine he would even want you to speak for him in light of your statements above, that you think that "Judges, courts, judicial doctrine and judicial rulings, judgments or orders are" somehow "in the supreme law of the land" and "a judicial judgment, ruling or opinion" that "violates our Constitution" nevertheless does "constitute precedent."
I doubt a first-year law student would even dare to argue either of your positions in class. This is the epitome of black letter law. The obvious opposite of your positions literally is written into our Constitution.
Article III expressly emphasizes that federal "judicial Power shall extend" no further than permitted "under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties."
Amendment V and Article VI are perfectly clearly and controlling, are they not?
"No person” may “be deprived” by any federal public servant “of life, liberty, or property" before affording them all “process of law” that is "due." And "the supreme Law of the Land" is, first, our "Constitution, and" then the federal "Laws" that were "made in Pursuance" of our Constitution (including all federal rules of procedure and evidence) "and all Treaties" and all legislators and "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of [all] States" are "bound" to "support this Constitution."
The point of FRCP Rule 1 (which I quoted) saying that the rules (including Rule 12) "govern" is that they govern everyone, including judges and courts. That's the point of the power to "govern." Does Rule 12 not govern courts or judges?
David, please see my replies to Roger, above. Again, I encourage you to try to prove that something I wrote was false.
I repeatedly proved everything I asserted by quoting controlling legal authority. No mere ipse dixit by you (or anyone else, including any one or more judges) can override controlling legal authority or replace proof that anything I wrote was false or inaccurate.
David, you seem to completely fail to understand how "express limitations" are stated in rules that prescribe the limits of a judge's power to dismiss or strike a complaint. See, e.g., my reply below quoting Swierkiewicz.
Professor Volokh, in this thread you repeatedly at least implied that you thought judges were given the power do something that clearly is prohibited by our Constitution and federal law.
Please reconsider the propriety of your implications. Of course, you know that our Constitution is, in part, a legal document that, every day, actually governs the functioning of our systems of law and government. Of course, you know that one of its primary purposes is to limit the power of all our federal, state and local public servants every day.
The foregoing is the very point of Article VI expressly emphasizing that our "Constitution" is paramount as "the supreme Law of the Land," and further emphasizing that "the supreme Law of the Land" includes two lesser legal authorities, i.e., federal "Laws" that were "made in Pursuance" of our Constitution "and all Treaties." It’s also the point of Article VI expressly emphasizing that ALL state and federal legislators and "all executive and judicial Officers" are not merely bound BY our Constitution, they are "bound" to always in all official conduct "support" our "Constitution."
The foregoing is the point of Article II expressly emphasizing that the president's first, foremost and constant duty is to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States" to "the best of" his "Ability," and the foregoing duty specifically includes the duty to always "take Care that the Laws" enacted or approved by Congress are "faithfully executed."
The foregoing is the very point of Article VI emphasizing that “the Judges in every State” are “bound” by "the supreme Law of the Land" despite “any Thing” that potentially could be construed as any type of authority “to the Contrary.” It’s also the point of Article III emphasizing that federal “judicial Power” can “extend” no further than permitted “under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties.”
The foregoing is why 5 U.S.C. 3331 emphasizes that every executive branch employee below the president and every judge always must "support and defend" our "Constitution" against "all enemies, foreign and domestic" and always must "bear true faith and allegiance to" our Constitution.
The conduct of all federal, state and local public servants everywhere always and constantly is governed by the “the supreme Law of the Land." It makes no sense for you or anyone else to pretend otherwise.
The very dangerous inclination to make our Constitution irrelevant was addressed hundreds of years ago by Chief Justice John Marshall (writing for SCOTUS) in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). He specifically addressed the import of the oath required by Article VI, and his pronouncements necessarily are equally relevant to the oath required by Article II and 5 U.S.C. 3331 and any other federal law.
"[I]t is apparent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct in their official character."
Any person violating the oath in Article II, Article VI, 5 U.S.C. 3331 or other federal or state law prescribing an oath to support our Constitution commits “worse than solemn mockery” of our Constitution, and any person who dares “take this oath” without believing it commits “a crime.”
“Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of [any] legislature" (ANY act of ANY public servant) "repugnant to the constitution, is void.”
Obviously, "the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law," so courts cannot "close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law." Any purported "doctrine" to the contrary "would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, completely obligatory." It "thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions—a written constitution."
Please consider what Marshall said and meant. The approach of many judges (violating our Constitution or federal law) “reduces to nothing what” Americans “have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions—a written constitution."
Professor Volokh, I'm sure you know that additional controlling legal authority states "the law" in governing "federal courts when it comes to civil procedure."
28 U.S.C. 2071(a): The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under section 2072 of this title.
28 U.S.C. 2072(a) and (b):
(a)The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
Clearly, such rules cannot abridge exercises of "the freedom of speech, or of the press" secured by the First Amendment to facilitate proper exercises of federal "judicial Power," required by Article III which "shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties." Clearly (consistent with copious SCOTUS precedent construing (at least) the First and Fifth Amendments, such rules may only reasonably regulate the time place or manner of speech or documents presented in the "limited public forum" of federal courts.
28 U.S.C. 2074:
(a) The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule [if not rejected by Congress] shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law.
(b) Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress.
Loki, sure, you've seen it before. Many of us have. That's why I'm writing about it being clearly illegal and unconstitutional. Judges even know it's clearly illegal and unconstitutional. That's why they don't cite Rule 12 when they're violating it.
This necessarily is a Rule 12 issue. That's the only rule that authorizes striking either an entire filing or part of a filing. Rule 1 (which I quoted also) emphasized the rules govern. Federal law (the supreme law of the land) especially clearly and strongly governs public servants who are bound by our Constitution.
....no. The case is not being thrown out. As the judge (and all appellate courts) note- you have to comply with rules (including Rule 8) for pleadings.
This Complaint did not comply with the rules. Now, whether it is sua sponte dismissed or stricken isn't really relevant (I think that courts will use the phrase "stricken" more often), but you're barking up the wrong tree.
It's just saying- you didn't follow the rules for the pleading. Re-plead.
Again, this isn't very hard. The attorney will re-plead in amended complaint that is compliant with the rules. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Also? Judges do not "know" it is clearly illegal and unconstitutional.
So far, you've had multiple people explain this to you. There's the Court. You were given explanations from practitioners and a law professor (who was nice enough to provide a case citation).
BTW, quoting cases we all know (like Ward) doesn't make you look smarter- quite the contrary. You might want to re-think this quixotic attempt to explain to the rest of us how Federal Procedure and the First Amendment works. Especially when you didn't get the Rule 8 part right to begin with.
Or not! You do you.
Loki, you're right: "this isn't very hard." So why are you trying to make it seem hard?
You're also obviously wrong: "whether it is sua sponte dismissed or stricken isn't really relevant." That's the very difference between Rule 12(e) and Rule 12(f). How do you not see that?
Rule 12(f) clearly and explicitly say a "court" can strike "on its own" only particular parts of a pleading. Rule 12(e) expressly requires not only a motion but also that "the court" first "orders a more definite statement and" IF "the order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets," ONLY THEN "the court may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order."
Apparently repeatedly quoting the law you should know is necessary.
Apparently "quoting cases we all know (like Ward)" is appropriate because you aren't even thinking about how this judge and others that you've "seen before" violated not only the Fifth Amendment re: Rule 12, but also the Fifth Amendment re: the First Amendment and the SCOTUS precedent construing it.
I'd bother engaging with you ... but here's the thing. It's so obvious that you don't know what you don't know, that it's not worth it.
I mean, if you read down below I actually dropped a hint. But you won't get it, because you don't want to. The thing is- anyone with any actual experience that reads this thread already knows, and that's good enough for me.
Loki, show me where I was wrong about anything, if you think you can. Pick even one point to try to prove.
You said things that were obviously false. You said things that you do (by now) actually know were false. I extended to you the courtesy of showing you where you were wrong, so please do the same for me.
Bruh. It's already in the thread. You just don't know it.
I learned a long time ago when I was litigating against a pro se "sovereign citizen" that you can't explain the law to someone who doesn't actually want to learn.
Not saying you're that. But I don't know that you're not.
Loki, if you don't know that your assertion was false and if you cannot prove how even one statement by me was false, then you're not competent to be advising anyone about federal rules.
If the proof that something I wrote was false was already presented by someone somewhere in this thread, then simply copy and paste exactly (1) what I wrote that was false and (2) the proof that it was false.
If you can't or won't even do that much, no one should trust that anything you wrote in this thread wasn't false or that you actually even now believe anything you wrote was true.
Well, I guess my actual clients can't trust me then due to my incompetence!
As for anyone else- well, if they actually know and understand the rules and the law, then they are welcome to look at the thread and judge for themselves. 🙂
Loki, is it your position that lower court judges, SCOTUS and Congress went to the trouble of writing and approving Rule 12, which stated express limitations on when pleadings can be stricken but all that effort imposed no limitation whatsoever on the power of a judge to strike a pleading? If so, what authority do you think supports such presumption?
JACK JORDAN is his corporate strawman. You're dealing with Jack Jordan, a flesh and blood man subject only to the Common Law.
It's all fun and games untill he bills you in accord with his fee schedule.
It's easy to demonstrate with an absurd example: Alice lets her cat walk on her keyboard and files it as a complaint. Is the judge constitutionally required to find something to preserve?
Drewski, I hope you see that your "absurd example" did not "demonstrate" what you thought. Intentionally or not, you merely stood up a straw man. Of course, the judge is not "required to find something to preserve."
The judge here clearly did not try "to find something to preserve." He pretended that he had the power to strike a pleading without affording the process of law that was due. He pretended that he had the power to strike a pleading by, himself, violating the process that clearly was prescribed by federal law.
Once again, you keep inserting your own words (like "only") in between half-baked partial quotes. Rule 12(e) authorizes a litigant to make a particular motion, and tells the court how to handle such a motion. It doesn't place limits of any sort on what a court can do in an entirely different situation in which a litigant hasn't made such a motion. And 12(f) doesn't say "only" at all, but in any case, I don't know why you think this judge's order somehow violates it.
David, I've asked you many times, are you a lawyer or are you just someone making up stuff about which you know virtually (or actually) nothing? Are you a lawyer? Have you ever even taken a law school class on civil procedure or the U.S. Constitution?
David, I tried to write it so that even a non-lawyer could understand it. You've represented that you're a lawyer with 25 years' experience, including "practicing law" before two federal courts. So PROVE to me how anything I wrote was false or inaccurate. Don't just keep slinging one baseless ipse dixit after another at me. PROVE me wrong.
Have the courage to do what I've done from the start. Write out what you think that Rules 12(e) and (f) mean in plain English relevant to this particular case.
Loki, please see my replies to Roger, above. Again, I encourage you to try to prove that something I wrote was false.
I repeatedly proved everything I asserted by quoting controlling legal authority. No mere ipse dixit by you (or anyone else, including any one or more judges) can override controlling legal authority or replace proof that anything I wrote was false or inaccurate.
Loki, saying you've seen it before reminds me of a couple things I saw before.
Arbitrary “action becomes no less so by simple dint of repetition,” even by multiple tribunals. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 488 (2011). “And longstanding capriciousness receives no special exemption" from the law. Id.
“While communis error facit jus may be a sadly accurate description of reality, it is not the normative basis of" American "jurisprudence. Courts may not create their own limitations on legislation, no matter how alluring the policy arguments for doing so, and no matter how widely the blame may be spread” among any quantity or quality of courts. Brogan v. U.S., 522 U.S. 398, 400 (1998).
“Lay off” the “excessive” use of “quotation marks”, friend. It’s “silly”. It “does not” make a “person” seem “erudite”.
Zarniwoop, not trying to seem erudite. Just quoting the words actually used to show how I altered the original text. Settle down, fiesty!
When someone uses excessive ellipses, or splits a quote into too many fragments, my first reaction is to wonder what they are hiding, my second reaction is to not trust anything quoted, and my third reaction is to stop reading and disregard it altogether. Unless everything else is of high interest, my fourth reaction is never to find the original source and see what was elided.
Stupid Government Tricks, good for you! Trust no one. Why would you trust anyone? I want people to question whether my statements and analysis are correct.
If you're the kind of person who would want to disregard what I write and choose not to check the original source, then I'm not writing for you.
Thank you, though, for your kind insights.
Stupid Government Tricks, the reason I am determined to quote content is that I don't trust lawyers or judges who don't quote content. Do you? This problem we're seeing with AI hallucinating quotations and citations is really nothing new. It has been going on for hundreds of years, I'm sure.
Many lawyers and judges blatantly misrepresent or violate actual law or precedent. This judge's decision is a case in point. I'm certain he knew he was violating Rule 12 and at least the Fifth Amendment and maybe the First Amendment.
Many lawyers and judges blatantly misrepresent the content of laws, rules or court decisions by representing their content without quoting what they're purportedly presenting. I'm sure that's intended to make it harder to find the text they pretended to present. I don't do that. You can easily find the exact location of the text I'm presenting because I quote it to almost the greatest extent possible.
My objection is not the quoting, it's the fragmentation, and I stated why. It just looks shifty and untrustworthy, and seldom worth untangling.
Why not the Eighth Amendment, while you're at it?
David, I've asked you many times, are you a lawyer or are you just someone making up stuff about which you know virtually (or actually) nothing?
Are you a lawyer? Have you ever even taken a law school class on civil procedure or the U.S. Constitution?
Zarniwoop, my bad. My response to you should have been the following.
The reason I am determined to quote content is that I don't trust lawyers or judges who don't quote content. Do you? This problem we're seeing with AI hallucinating quotations and citations is really nothing new. It has been going on for hundreds of years, I'm sure.
Many lawyers and judges blatantly misrepresent or violate actual law or precedent. This judge's decision is a case in point. I'm certain he knew he was violating Rule 12 and at least the Fifth Amendment and maybe the First Amendment.
Many lawyers and judges blatantly misrepresent the content of laws, rules or court decisions by representing their content without quoting what they're purportedly presenting. I'm sure that's intended to make it harder to find the text they pretended to present. I don't do that. You can easily find the exact location of the text I'm presenting because I quote it to almost the greatest extent possible.
You're waxing eloquent on a rule about how *parties* may move to strike things. And what the judge should do after that.
That rule doesn't talk about what the judge can do on the judge's own initiative. (And see EV's quote from a seemingly definitive explanation in federal court precedent here.)
Plus, read your own quote. It talks about pleadings that are allowed but vague enough to make it too hard to respond to. The judge here is saying the complaint wasn't allowed!
And if you are concerned about a basic question of fairness to Trump:
He has a whole month to try again! He's not being prevented from filing his complaint.
Tim, are you serious? You must not have read the language I quoted from rules. They clearly limit the power of the judge to strike an entire pleading or even part of a pleading. That's the precise point of those rules (and Amendment V).
Rule 12(f) expressly emphasized that a "court" could strike "on its own" only discrete parts of a pleading and only for particular reasons. Rule 12(e) was perfectly clear that the judge had no power to strike an entire pleading on his own before affording the process of law that was due.
I'm concerned that a federal judge would (as many federal judges do) violate our Constitution. Unlike you, I'm not concerned with the identify of their victims. I'm concerned with our Constitution and our rights. You should be, too. We all should be.
JJ here is about 5 minutes from saying that a judge can't force a lawyer to wear pants in court because nothing in the Fed. R. Civ. P. give a judge authority to give orders regarding sartorial choices.
You have this weird habit — which you also exhibited in discussing Charlie Kirk — of putting a bunch of isolated words or phrase in quotes and then just inserting a whole lot of your own words between them and claiming that the thing you're quoting is "clear" based on your insertions rather than the actual text you're quoting.
Rule 12(e) does not say anything at all about a judge "ha[ving] no power" to do anything. It's a grant of power, not a denial of power.
David, are you a lawyer or are you just some guy making up stuff about which you have no idea? That's a serious question. If you're a lawyer, you either do or should know that your assertion is blatantly false.
If you're a lawyer, you do or should know better than to try to make others believe that "Rule 12(e) does not say anything at all about a judge "ha[ving] no power" to do anything. It's a grant of power, not a denial of power."
Yours is actually an absurd position for a lawyer to take. The point of Rule 1 (which I quoted) saying that the rules (including Rule 12) "govern" is that they govern everyone, including judges and courts. That's the point of the power to "govern."
A very similar point was made explicitly and emphatically in Amendments V and Article VI:
“No person” may “be deprived” by any federal public servant “of life, liberty, or property" before affording them all “process of law” that is "due."
And "the supreme Law of the Land" is, first, our "Constitution, and" then the federal "Laws" that were "made in Pursuance" of our Constitution (including all federal rules of procedure and evidence) "and all Treaties" and all legislators and "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of [all] States" are "bound" to "support this Constitution."
That fragmentation has been noted by several real lawyers. Who are you trying to impress? Yourself, or your alter ego? All you're doing here is fragmenting dirt as you violate the first rule of holes.
Stupid Government Tricks, I already explained to you (in detail in this thread) why I quote legal authorities. If you don't like the quotation marks, just ignore them entirely. It's really that simple. You already indicated that you don't care about what actual legal authorities actually say, so the quotation marks should be simply irrelevant to you.
Yes, yes, you've explained the part I didn't question (the quoting) and skipped the part I do question (the fragmentation).
You are a fraud.
Stupid Government Tricks, it should be obvious even to someone not schooled in reading legal authorities that a Constitution written in the 1780's and even federal rules of procedure aren't written in a way that is particular easy for people like you to understand. So their words need to be re-arranged (restated) to make it easier for you to understand. But if you don't like what I write, don't read it. As I said, I'm not writing for you. Besides, what do you care what I write? You cannot (and you aren't even trying to) prove me wrong. Nor can anyone else.
David, at this point (because of all my writing to which you're responding) I'll say that if you are a lawyer, you actually do know that your assertion was false. I'll also say that if you don't know that your assertion was false, you're not competent to be advising anyone about federal rules.
David, I do not think the word "isolated" means what you think it means.
Eugene provides an example on how to write an article without Trump Derangement Syndrome.
I’m not sure this decision this creates a downside or acts as a deterrent. There’s still plenty of advertising value in filing a complaint like this. And with no sanctions or other real costs, the advertising form remains very low-cost for the benefit. As to the judge’s opinion, the fundraising prospects can simply be told what a jerk the judge is. In fact, riling up the judge and getting a few choice zinger quotes out of him to put in the fundraising literature may actually increase the net advertising take from the campaign.
Well, professionalism and norms would be the normal deterrent.
...and that's the problem. Fish rot from the head.
Exactly. We’re dealing with people for whom professionalism and norms are cons that people who were too stupid to study business and studied soft subjects like poetry, basketweaving, science, medicine, or law fall for. Successful people know that the only one who counts is #1 and not to fall for that shit.
The problems is that judges seem to be living in a world where if they just raise their eyebrows lawyers fall in line, where lawyers look up to judges for how to behave. We simply aren’t in that world. We are dealing with lawyers who are completely instrumentalist. The sort of wink-nod eyebrow-raising this judge is doing isn’t likely to change anything.
I'd be impressed with this except for the fact that every left activist group writes similarly long complaints without being stricken.
How many left-wing activist groups have complaints detailing every single one of the plaintiff's cameo appearances?
*citations needed
Every judge should view every court filing with the clear understanding that it is an exercise of the freedoms of expression, communication and association expressly secured by the First Amendment. Courts “may not prohibit” any “modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments” by merely invoking the mere general “power to regulate the legal profession.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. U.S. 415, 428-429 (1963). Judges “may not, under the [mere] guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore” (knowingly violate) “constitutional rights” of lawyers or litigants. Id. at 439. Clearly, “it is no answer” to “constitutional claims” that the mere “purpose of” any “regulations” (court rules or rulings) “was merely to insure high professional standards.” Id. at 438-439.
A judge has no power whatsoever to seek to silence a litigant except to the extent that the judge complies with the law (including our Constitution) governing court proceedings.
Any “regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys” violates our Constitution. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Court “restrictions on the time, place, or manner” of “speech” must be proved “reasonable.” Id. (collecting cases). That principle necessarily governs the execution of a rule (by a judge) as much as it governs the creation of a rule.
If sanctions can be “justified without reference to the content” of “speech,” they must be “justified” with proof they were “narrowly tailored to serve” a “significant governmental interest” and proof they “leave open ample alternative channels for communication” of relevant “information.” Id.
At least some judges in the Southern District of Florida routinely strike sua sponte entire complaints on the grounds that they are "shotgun pleadings".
Don't bother. Seriously.
Just get some butter, because he's on a roll.
But you can tell from the case citations and the fact that he didn't recognize the issue at the beginning that he lacks ... an understanding of how it all works together. And for the love of god, don't bring up the Rules Enabling Act. Or talk about stays- that might just destroy the whole thread (WHAT INHERENT POWER!!!!).
DDT, I'll present again for your benefit what I presented to Loki, above:
Arbitrary “action becomes no less so by simple dint of repetition,” even by multiple tribunals. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 488 (2011). “And longstanding capriciousness receives no special exemption" from the law. Id.
“While communis error facit jus may be a sadly accurate description of reality, it is not the normative basis of" American "jurisprudence. Courts may not create their own limitations on legislation, no matter how alluring the policy arguments for doing so, and no matter how widely the blame may be spread” among any quantity or quality of courts. Brogan v. U.S., 522 U.S. 398, 400 (1998).
The whole point of the expression "communis error facit jus" is that MANY judges have violated the controlling legal authority. Many judges violating the law cannot make their violations legal. That is the precise point made explicitly and emphatically in Amendments V and Article VI:
“No person” may “be deprived” by any federal public servant “of life, liberty, or property" before affording them all “process of law” that is "due." It's process of "law" that is required, not a mere judge issuing a mere ruling or a judgment that violates the law.
And "the supreme Law of the Land" is, first, our "Constitution, and" then the federal "Laws" that were "made in Pursuance" of our Constitution (including all federal rules of procedure and evidence) "and all Treaties" and all legislators and "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of [all] States" are "bound" to "support this Constitution."
To Professor Volokh's point, above, quoting 11th Circuit judges invoking mere purported "inherent authority" of court, it's not even potentially possible that any judge whatsoever has any "inherent authority" to knowingly violate the supreme law of the land (which expressly encompasses federal law, which necessarily encompasses federal rules of procedure and evidence).
Striking a pleading which violates the federal rules — there's no real dispute about whether it violates Rule 8, and you certainly haven't tried to make that case — is not "arbitrary." Or "capricious."
The judge's ruling did not deprive Trump of life (as appealing as that sounds), liberty, or property. And your very strong belief that courts do not have inherent authority to manage their dockets will become a valid citation as soon as you get yourself named to the Supreme Court, and convince 4 other justices.
David, I've asked you many times, are you a lawyer or are you just someone making up stuff about which you know virtually (or actually) nothing?
Are you a lawyer? Have you ever even taken a law school class on civil procedure or the U.S. Constitution?
David, clearly a judge violating the rules that expressly govern when he was given the power to strike a pleading clearly is arbitrary and capricious. It's the epitome of arbitrary and capricious.
David, did you ever actually practice law before any court? Do you have any idea what the word "liberty" means? Have you ever bothered to try to find out?
Asked and answered. Did you ever actually practice law before any court — I mean as a lawyer, not as a pro se criminal defendant?
What liberty do you think the court deprived Trump of?
David, you said the judge didn't deprive a plaintiff of any "liberty," but what do you think the right to file a complaint in court is? It's something that we are at liberty to do (in compliance with the law).
You plainly misrepresented that I have a "very strong belief that courts do not have inherent authority to manage their dockets." I never said or even implied any such thing. I said expressly exactly what our Constitution says: Article III did not vest in any court or judge any power to knowingly violate any federal law, much less our Constitution. Do you think Article III did vest in courts or judges any power to knowingly violate any federal law or our Constitution?
Was Trump denied the right to file a complaint in court? No. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 defines what a valid complaint is. What Trump filed did not comply with that rule, and therefore was not a valid complaint, and therefore was stricken. Trump remains at liberty to file a valid complaint, if he can.
You certainly did, since you think a court cannot manage its docket by striking a filing that does not conform to the rules.
David, again, I'm not addressing what I think. I'm addressing what our Constitution, federal law and SCOTUS precedent says and means. I have yet to see you do the same. Again, all you do is asset your own ipse dixit. Nobody should trust a purported lawyer who cannot support his contentions with controlling legal authority.
David, how is striking an entire complaint anything other than a judge's veto of an exercise of the right to file a complaint?
In a nutshell, every person has the RIGHT to file a complaint in federal court. ONLY for limited reasons and ONLY after the process of law that is due (the process prescribed by the relevant rule) was the presiding judge GRANTED the POWER (he MAY) strike all or part of a pleading because of its content. It's that simple. Prove me wrong, if you think you can.
I already did. Next.
Setting aside that this is wrong — you could have at least cited the right to petition in the 1A! — it's also totally irrelevant here. Nobody — least of all the judge — "silenced" anyone.
Nobody — least of all the judge — "silenced" anyone.
Oh, C'mon. Can't you see that what the judge did violates Trump's legal team's first amendment rights to freedom of expression? I mean, he's requiring them to say certain things and not allowing them to say certain other things, and not merely threatening consequences if they don't but actually unilaterally imposing them without due process.
And is that fringe on the edges of that flag in the corner?
David, again, your misrepresentation of law compels me to ask: are you a lawyer or just some guy making up stuff about which you know virtually (or actually) nothing? That's a serious question. Are you a lawyer?
I am a lawyer, and have been such for 25 years.
David, did you actually practice law? What courts were admitted to practice before, and did you actually practice before any?
I did and do actually practice law, before the federal and state courts of NY and NJ. (I am also admitted in the EDMI, but I only ever handled one case there.) Loki is also a practicing lawyer. Prof. Volokh obviously doesn't practice law full time, but has quite a lot of experience in the courts. All of us are telling you that you don't know what you're talking about. You, on the other hand, have conspicuously not revealed whether and where you practice law, and when expressly asked by me you dodged it by answering the question with a qustion.
David, I'm pretty sure that nothing I've seen you write led me to believe that you were a lawyer. I honestly don't even believe it now because the things you write are so totally devoid of any comprehension of even the most obvious legal issues and principles.
When you represent that you "practice law, before the federal and state courts of NY and NJ" are you representing that you actually have litigated in federal court?
You can try to hide behind others, but I've never seen you prove anything. I'm certain you can't prove that anything I wrote about any legal authority was false or even inaccurate. Loki never even pretended to try to do so. Even Professor Volokh never even contended (much less tried to prove) that anything I wrote was in any way false or inaccurate.
Is it your position that lower court judges, SCOTUS and Congress went to the trouble of writing and approving FRCP Rule 12--which stated express limitations on when pleadings can be stricken--but all that effort imposed no limitation whatsoever on the power of a judge to strike a pleading? If so, what authority do you think supports such presumption?
When you refuse to answer whether you're a lawyer, are you implicitly admitting that you are not?
Okay, at this point I admit that it's just got to be a bit. Professor Volokh has expressly told you multiple times that you are wrong.
No. It is my position that Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (it's not "FRCP Rule 12," because the "R" in FRCP already stands for "Rule") does not "state express limitations" on when pleadings can be stricken.
Here is what an express limitation looks like: "Courts may not strike a pleading unless A, B, or C."
Here is what an express limitation also looks like: "Courts may not strike a pleading if A, B, or C."
Here is what an express limitation also looks like: "Courts may only strike a pleading if A, B, or C."
Here is what an express limitation does not look like: "Courts may strike a pleading if A, B, or C." You might want to infer that D is not grounds to strike a pleading, but inference is literally the opposite of express.
David, show me any rule of procedure that governs a court and that is written the way you say it would be written.
David, your rephrasing of my writing is dishonest. I said "Even Professor Volokh never even contended (much less tried to prove) that anything I wrote was in any way false or inaccurate." You contended "Professor Volokh has expressly told you multiple times that you are wrong."
Professor Volokh never even contended (much less tried to prove) that anything I wrote was in any way false or inaccurate. He has presented statements from judicial opinions that differ from the controlling LAW that I presented, but he never said anything I wrote was false.
Your very peculiar purported analysis causes me to ask again: When you represent that you "practice law, before the federal and state courts of NY and NJ" are you representing that you actually have litigated in federal court? May I ask in what areas of law you've practiced?
Of course, the FRCP are generally directed to control the conduct of litigants, not judges, so there aren't many, but see, for example, Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(3): "(3) Venue. If a joined party objects to venue and the joinder would make venue improper, the court must dismiss that party." That does not leave the judge any discretion; it is an express limitation on judicial authority. But almost no provisions of the FRCP are written like that; they almost all say that a party may or must or must not do X, or that a judge may do X.
Repeating it won't make it any less wrong. He has explained that — contrary to your claim — pleadings are not first amendment expression.
David, well done (finally) citing a legal authority (FRCP Rule 19) to support an ipse dixit by you!
You acknowledged that federal rules typically say what a judge "may" do, not what a judge "must" do. Again, I refer you to the controlling language of our Constitution, including Amendment X and Marbury v. Madison and McCullough v. Maryland, below.
The point of emphasizing that the People DELEGATED to federal government only LIMITED powers is that federal officials have no power to do anything they were not AUTHORIZED to do. So federal law typically states what federal officials MAY do. This is an extremely common approach to federal law. Look, for example, at every federal criminal statute. EVERY such statute that I've ever seen written since 1860 states essentially what government MAY do. It prescribes how criminal conduct "shall" be punished to emphasize how criminal conduct cannot be punished (i.e., by anything more severe than Congress prescribed).
A particularly relevant statute is the one governing criminal contempt, 18 U.S.C. 401. It begins by emphasizing what a court MAY do: "A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion" specified "contempt of its authority." Because some judges have proved that judges are too easily tempted to abuse the power of contempt proceedings, SCOTUS has emphasized that the point of the statute was to preclude such punishment except as AUTHORIZED by Congress in 18 U.S.C. 401. See, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873):
"The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power. But the power has been limited and defined by the act of Congress of March 2d, 1831.4 The act, in terms [i.e., expressly], applies to all courts; whether it can be held to limit the authority of the Supreme Court, which derives its existence and powers from the Constitution, may perhaps be a matter of doubt. But that it applies to the Circuit and District Courts there can be no question. These courts were created by act of Congress. Their powers and duties depend upon the act calling them into existence, or subsequent acts extending or limiting their jurisdiction. The act of 1831 is, therefore, to them the law specifying the cases in which summary punishment for contempts may be inflicted. It limits the power of these courts in this respect to three classes of cases."
Judges are authorized — sorry, AUTHORIZED — to exercise the judicial power. Which includes the inherent power to manage their own dockets.
David, think about the implications of your own argument here. The rules of procedure and evidence clearly commonly emphasize how a lawyer, litigant or witness MAY take actions. The necessary implication is that they cannot take actions that exceed what the rules say they may do. The same principle necessarily governs courts and judges, in part, because of the overarching, constantly-governing principle that by our Constitution the People delegated only limited powers to federal public servants to represent the interests of the People.
Yes, and therefore, if they try to exceed what they may do, the necessary implication is that the courts have the inherent power to reject that.
David, you seem to completely fail to understand an extremely fundamental principle of the practice of law in federal courts. A federal rule that prescribes when a judge has the power to dismiss or strike a complaint also expressly limits such power. See, e.g., my reply below quoting Swierkiewicz.
David, may I ask in what areas of law you've practiced? Don't worry, I'm not one of those creeps who tries to cause problems for people because of what they write. I'm just trying to understand the statements and questions you've written today.
You may ask.
David, all your responses except the one quoting Rule 19 are puerile and devoid of any insight. Most, if not all, are facially frivolous. Why do you even bother to comment? Is anything motivating you other than ego and spite?
Yes.
David, you seem not to understand the right to petition. The First Amendment secures "the right of the people" to "petition the Government for a redress of grievances" against government, itself. A lawsuit against a non-government third party isn't a petition. Do you think a lawsuit against a non-government third party is a petition?
More fundamentally, the right to petition clearly is merely one small part of the freedom of speech and press. "The right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First] Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression." McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985).
David, please show us that you have some inkling of an idea about the law governing the subject about which you're purporting to speak authoritatively.
I wrote:
"Every judge should view every court filing with the clear understanding that it is an exercise of the freedoms of expression, communication and association expressly secured by the First Amendment."
Your reply was that "this is wrong." Immediately after that ipse dixit, you argued that I "could have at least cited the right to petition in the 1A!" Your second position implied that a petition filed with a federal court would be "an exercise of" a right that is "expressly secured by the First Amendment," did it not?
SCOTUS proved the patent absurdity of your second position: "The right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First] Amendment, and is [ONLY] an assurance of a particular freedom of expression." McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985).
In addition, your first position (that a "court filing" is not "an exercise of the freedoms of expression, communication and association expressly secured by the First Amendment") also is obviously absurd. Take Trump's court filing. First, words were typed into a computer. Then, they were printed on paper. Then the resulting printed document was filed with the government. All those actions necessarily are the very same actions that are protected by the First Amendment as "the right of the people" to "petition the Government for a redress of grievances," are they not?
Even you concede that when words are typed into a computer and then printed on paper and then the resulting printed document is filed with the government to seek redress of grievances, that is petitioning protected by the First Amendment, right?
So what principle (if any) makes you think that when words are typed into a computer and then printed on paper and then the resulting printed document is filed with the government to seek redress for a claim against a third party, such actions are not expression or communication protected by the First Amendment?
Well, you say that court filings are the exercise of free expression rights. But I notice that you don't actually cite any cases that discuss court filings (as opposed to speech by lawyers more broadly).
As a general matter, courts do not treat court filings as means of communicating in general; they are only means for engaging in the business of the courts. There are all sorts of rules constraining who may file things in court, what those filings must contain, what those filings may not contain, and so on. "[A] lawyer's in-court advocacy is not protected speech under the First Amendment." Matter of Jordan (Kan. 2022). Even if there is any such right, “[I]n the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely circumscribed.” Gentile v. State Bar (1991). The same principles apply to written filings.
Professor Volokh, really? Really, do I need to "actually cite any cases that discuss court filings (as opposed to speech by lawyers more broadly)" as being within the freedom of expression and communication secured by the First Amendment? Do you actually doubt that "court filings (as opposed to speech by lawyers more broadly)" clearly are exercises of the freedom of expression and communication secured by the First Amendment? Isn't it obvious to you that words put into writing necessarily are exercises of the freedom of expression and communication secured by the First Amendment? What principles would cause you to even doubt that words put into writing necessarily are exercises of the freedom of expression and communication secured by the First Amendment?
Only if you don't want us to point at you and laugh.
Yes.
No.
David, your post here is exactly what I mean. I'm pretty sure that nothing I've seen you write led me to believe that you were a lawyer. I honestly don't even believe it now because the things you write are so totally devoid of any comprehension of even the most obvious legal issues and principles.
David, you say that you do “doubt that court filings (as opposed to speech by lawyers more broadly) clearly are exercises of the freedom of expression and communication secured by the First Amendment.” Why?
You apparently fail to understand an extremely fundamental principle of the First Amendment’s protection of “the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Show us that you understand the principles that control that concept.
Trump’s filing consisted of words typed, printed on paper and filed as a document with a federal court. What principles make you think that the typing of such words, the printing of such words on paper or the filing of such a document in a federal court is not an exercise of “the freedom of speech, or of the press”? What legal authority states principles showing that typing words, and printing them on paper, and submitting a document to a government office does not constitute exercises of the freedom of expression and communication secured by the First Amendment?
Please understand, I'm not asking for you to merely parrot any idiotic ipse dixit such as “[I]n the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely circumscribed” as some SCOTUS justices very lamely merely asserted (in obviously and utterly irrelevant obiter dictum) in Gentile in 1991. I'm asking you to expressly state any relevant principle and show that controlling legal authority supports any such principle.
Professor Volokh, I apologize for not being more charitable regarding your questions and contentions here. So I’ve done more than present mere citations. Today, I've supplemented my prior submissions by submitting a more fulsome reply in multiple parts. This part is the most fundamental and the most important.
The First Amendment was not written to be construed like a statute. It was written to be construed very liberally, so it used mere idiomatic expressions (freedom of speech, freedom of the press, right to petition). As a result, the admonition of Chief Justice Marshall and SCOTUS in McCulloch v. Maryland is highly relevant here: "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding." He did not mean constitution as a document. He meant constitution as an action, i.e., constituting (creating) one nation of one people.
Chief Justice Marshall and SCOTUS also elaborated on the most important principles of our national Constitution documenting the constitution of our nation:
"The government of the Union [ ] is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and [exclusively] for their benefit. This [national] government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated [limited] powers. [ I]t can exercise only the powers granted to it . . . . . That principle is now universally admitted."
The foregoing addresses principles that are profoundly fundamental and dispositive. In our “republic” clearly “the people are sovereign” and “the ability” (the power) “of the citizenry to make informed choices” about public servants and public issues “is essential.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010). “Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy;” it is “the means to hold officials accountable to the people.” Id. Speech in many court filings (e.g., motions to reconsider a ruling or recuse a judge or appeal judicial violations of law) necessarily is “the means” prescribed by courts and Congress “to hold officials” (judges) “accountable to the people.”
“The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information” is essential “to enlightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it.” Id. Accord id. at 339-341, 344-350. Such “enlightened self-government” and attempts “to protect it” are precisely the point of many court filings (e.g., motions to reconsider a ruling or recuse a judge or appeal judicial violations of law. “Premised on mistrust of [all] governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor” the “subjects or viewpoints” of such lawyer or litigant speech regarding judges’ abuses or usurpations of power. Id. at 340.
“For these reasons,” such lawyer or litigant “political speech must prevail against” regulation “that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence,” so regulation “that burden[s such lawyer or litigant] political speech” is “subject to strict scrutiny,” which “requires the Government to prove” how sanctioning or precluding lawyer or litigant expression verbally or in court filings “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Id.
Our “speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)) (cleaned up). See also Snyder at 453 (discussing when “[s]peech deals with matters of public concern”). It is impossible for anyone to prove (or even rationally believe) that such speech is entitled to less protection because of the mere fact that it is included in a document that was filed with a court to address violations of law or misconduct by one or more judges during judicial proceedings.
Professor Volokh, no offense intended because I know you are far smarter than I am, but any halfwit can quote Gentile v. State Bar (1991) for the proposition that “in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely circumscribed.”
Generations of judges have designed decisions to deceive Americans and deprive us of our privileges and immunities with that idiotic assertion. That far-less-than-half-truth straw man in irrelevant dictum is the darling of judicial despots.
First, you do or should know that assertion is not only obiter dictum, but it also is utterly irrelevant. That decision (and the underlying state action) clearly did not even address ANY speech of ANYONE inside any courtroom.
Second, the truth is far greater and simpler. Every “person” is entitled to “due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV. Nobody (including judges, lawyers, jurors, parties, witnesses or observers) has any contrary right or power. Even so, copious law protects copious speech by lawyers, litigants, witnesses and jurors in courtrooms and court papers.
I'm going to go with Sea Lion. AI Sea Lion.
Professor Volokh, I'll do better than give you a mere citation. Please see the 303 Creative majority opinion. which included the following. Please note the repeated use of "all," i.e., “all persons," "all, including” any speaker or writer “whose motives” someone considers “misinformed or offensive.” “All manner of speech” and "all views."
“The First Amendment” means “all persons are free to think and speak as they wish, not as the government demands.” It secures the “freedom to think as you will” and “speak as you think.” It “extends to all persons engaged in expressive conduct, including those who seek profit.” Its “protections belong to all, including” speakers or printers “whose motives” someone considers “misinformed or offensive.” It “protects” each person's “right to speak his mind regardless of whether the government considers his speech sensible” or “misguided,” even if it causes someone “anguish” or “incalculable grief.”
“All manner of speech” enjoys “First Amendment’s protections.” “A commitment to speech for only some messages and some persons is no commitment at all.”
“The freedom of thought and speech” is “indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.” “[A]llowing all views to flourish” is necessary to “test and improve our own thinking” as “individuals and as a Nation,” so it is a “fixed star in our constitutional constellation” that “government may not interfere” with the “marketplace of ideas.”
Bearing in mind all that I've presented to you today, is there any doubt in your brilliant mind that court filings are exercises of "the freedom of speech, or of the press" secured by the First Amendment, and which may be (as stated in Ward) subject to regulation that complies with (i.e., does not violate) the relevant rules? Is there any doubt in your brilliant mind that court filings are protected by the burdens of proof stated in SCOTUS precedent construing and applying the freedom of speech and press?
There is certainty in my mind that court filings are not exercises of "the freedom of speech, or of the press," as normally understood. I've pointed you to cases so holding, and of course actual practice in our courts is to sharply limit what can be said in court filings -- for the quite sensible reason that filings aren't supposed to be communications to the world, but parts of the adjudicative process.
You have a vision for how our legal system should operate. It is partly a substantive vision about what the rules should be. It is partly a vision of what constitutes law binding on district courts (you seem to conclude that a federal court in the Eleventh Circuit should set aside Eleventh Circuit precedents in favor of your reading of the Rules of Civil Procedure). And it is partly a vision of how precedents should be read: You think that general statements in precedents, which arise in a particular context (e.g., as to regulations that require a private person to create certain speech), are automatically generalizable to very different contexts (regulations on what can and can't be said in court filings).
But that's not how our legal system works. In the words of Nealy v. Warner Chappell Music, Inc. (11th Cir. 2023),
I think you know that as well as I know that. I'm just worried that some readers might not know that, and might understand your confident-sounding assertions as being about our legal system as it actually operates. Instead, they are about a different legal system that is the product of your vision of how it should operate.
Professor Volokh, you said "There is certainty in my mind that court filings are not exercises of "the freedom of speech, or of the press," as normally understood. I've pointed you to cases so holding."
I'm going to challenge you by saying that your statement is actually legally frivolous. You actually know that the expression of words in "court filings" is an exercise of "the freedom of speech, or of the press, as normally understood." You actually know that contending otherwise makes no sense legally or factually. Please prove me wrong. Please show me any court specifically holding that court filings are not an exercise of the freedom of speech or of the press as normally understood.
I know you're sufficiently intelligent and experienced to know what constitutes a court holding. I know that you know (or you should know by now) that the words you quoted from Gentile were mere dicta that was utterly irrelevant (and did not even accurately characterize the facts of that case. I know that you know (or you should know by now) that other opinions repeating that dicta never stated any such holding. But if you think you can find such a holding, please show me. I've looked for it, and I cannot find it.
I also know that you know that words written on paper clearly are within "the freedom of speech, or of the press as normally understood," and I'm confident that you know (because you appear to have tried to find it) that no legal authority even attempts to explain how filing something in court somehow magically converts such speech into something that is not an exercise of the freedom of speech.
Professor Volokh, I think every court filing I've ever made was subject to a limitation expressed in terms of the number of "words" or the number of "pages." Take a SCOTUS petition for cert. The rules expressly limit it to 9,000 words. It is required to be "printed" in a particular format. What possible basis in fact or in law could you have for contending that printed documents comprising 9,000 words are "not exercises of 'the freedom of speech, or of the press,' as normally understood"?
How do they magically convert from being "exercises of 'the freedom of speech, or of the press,' as normally understood" before filing with a court, but somehow cease being "exercises of 'the freedom of speech, or of the press,' as normally understood" upon filing with a court?
Professor Volokh, I do know and agree with the statement in Nealy. The court certainly was correct that "we must consider the context" including the material "facts of the case."
The context necessarily is expressly addressed in the First Amendment. We are talking specifically about court filings, which necessarily are documents. Briefs and petitions almost always are required to be printed and required to be below a specified word or page limitation. Complaints (as FRCP Rule 8 emphasizes) necessarily consist of a "statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction" a "statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" and "a demand for the relief sought."
How can you (or any judge) rationally believe any of the foregoing is not an exercise of the freedom of speech or press merely because it was filed with a court? The very precise freedom of speech and press at issue is expressed in writing in the actual rules permitting such court filings. Court rules of procedure are obviously restrictions on the time, place and manner.
Professor Volokh, to be specific, the freedom of speech and press at issue (the liberty at issue) is stated in the law, i.e., in the rules of procedure that expressly state that particular documents that meet particular requirements can be filed in such court (sometimes upon the payment of a required filing fee).
Anyone who wishes to have a pleading or part of a pleading stricken must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it violated Rule 12(e) or (f). “[T]he substantive law” identifies “proof or evidentiary requirements,” including “which facts are material,” i.e., “might affect the outcome” under “governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[T]he First Amendment mandates a ‘clear and convincing’ standard” of proof. Id. at 252.
Consistent with considerable SCOTUS precedent, no judge or court may restrict or sanction a court filing because of any mere viewpoint expressed therein or because a filing or a statement therein somehow merely offended a judge's sensibilities.
Consistent with considerable SCOTUS precedent, disciplinary rules punishing criticism of a judge copy the standard from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. See, e.g., ABA Model Rule 8.2 prohibiting "a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge." Comment 1 thereto emphasizes that "Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. Conversely, false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice."
As SCOTUS unanimously emphasized in Sullivan, somebody must prove that the statement was false. "The constitutional guarantees require" a "federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages" unless he proves the statement was a "falsehood." "A rule compelling the critic" to "guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount—leads" to "self-censorship." "Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth—whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials—and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker."
Professor Volokh, of course it's true as a matter of law (not merely of practice) "to sharply limit what can be said in court filings." That does nothing to even indicate, much less establish, that court filings or speech in court is not within the freedom of speech and press. It establishes only what I've said and what I've seen you say about a "limited public forum."
I've seen you and others comment on the freedom of speech in a university classroom, and you referred to a university classroom as "limited public forum." A courtroom, court proceedings and court filings are at least as public. Public access to a university classroom is far more restricted that access to most courtrooms during court proceedings. People typically must be enrolled in a course or at least be enrolled at the university to sit in on a class being taught. Students cannot speak whenever they want or say whatever they want. Professors cannot either.
Courts necessarily are public. Amendment VI expressly acknowledges and commands that criminal trial is "public." Courthouses, courtrooms and court filings necessarily constitute a limited public forum. Virtually anyone who wants to do so can go into almost any courthouse and courtroom and sit in on court proceedings for any reason or no reason whatsoever if space is available.
Court filings are especially public. People can register for PACER accounts and access court filings electronically, and such access even is free, up to a fairly significant limit. Anybody can go to a court and request a copy of nearly all filings, subject to very limited exceptions.
Okay, so you're just proving you aren't a lawyer. A "public forum" of whatever flavor (limited, designated, etc.) addresses the rights of speakers; it does not refer to the fact that the public can observe. The sixth amendment (for example) announces the right to a "public trial" in criminal proceedings, but that means that the public is required to be allowed to be present; it does not give the public any right to speak at such a trial. That the word "public" is present in both does not in any way mean that they're being used in the same sense. A courtroom, indeed, is a non-public forum.
David, I think the word "proving" does not mean what you think it means.
Please think at least a little about your ipse dixit that "a courtroom" necessarily "is a non-public forum." Think of all the people who actually have a right (and sometimes even a duty) to speak in a courtroom, including the judge, jurors, lawyers, litigants and witnesses. All those people enjoy the freedom of speech and press, subject only to reasonable rules governing time, place and manner. ANYBODY (any member of the public) can speak during a court proceeding, subject to reasonable rules governing time, place and manner. See, e.g., Amendment VI ("confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence").
Do you disagree? If so what legal authority supports your belief?
Professor Volokh, you said, "There is certainty in my mind that court filings are not exercises of 'the freedom of speech, or of the press,' as normally understood." You think that the mere ipse dixit of judges who take offense at lawyer or litigant speech supports your position. But your statement is clearly inconsistent with the freedom of speech and the right to petition as normally understood, and the judicial contentions on which you relied are clearly unconstitutional as established by reasoned opinions construing our Constitution.
Both the right to petition and the freedom of speech necessarily secure the right to type words into a computer, print words on paper and submit the resulting document to the government, including a court. Each such action necessarily is an exercise of the freedom of expression even though the third act occurs in a limited public forum.
"The right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First] Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression." McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985). The “right to petition” is “one of the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights;” such “right is implied” by “the very idea of a government, republican in form,” and it “extends to all departments of the Government” including “courts.” BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 524-525 (2002) (citing United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967). “[T]he rights of free speech” and “free press” are “not confined to” (or from) “any field.” United Mine Workers at 223. “[T]he principles announced in Button,” infra, govern “litigation” (necessarily encompassing both verbal expression and court filings) “for political purposes” or “solely designed to compensate” alleged “victims.” Id. That is true because preparing, printing and filing court filings necessarily are three exercises of the freedom of expression.
Consistent with the foregoing, it is important to recognize that court filings seeking to remedy judicial misconduct or judicial violations of law or our Constitution (even in litigation that is not against the government) necessarily are exercises of the right to petition the government to redress grievances. Examples of such motions include to reconsider an illegal ruling or to recuse a judge. Appellate practice necessarily almost (if not actually) always is an exercise of the right to petition the government to redress grievances. Appeals necessarily seek redress of grievances for judges’ violations of law.
Courts “may not prohibit” any “modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments” by merely invoking the mere general “power to regulate the legal profession.” N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-429 (1963). Judges “may not, under the [mere] guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore” (knowingly violate) “constitutional rights.” Id. at 439. Clearly, “it is no answer” to lawyers “constitutional claims” that the mere “purpose of” any “regulations” (court rules or rulings) “was merely to insure high professional standards.” Id. at 438-439.
Furthermore, “(I)t is a prized American privilege to speak one’s mind” on “all public institutions.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). “[T]his opportunity” must “be afforded” for “vigorous advocacy” in litigation. Id. (quoting Button at 429 (“the First Amendment” necessarily “protects vigorous advocacy” in litigation “against governmental intrusion”) (collecting cases)). In motions and appellate practice, the vigorous advocacy necessarily occurs primarily (if not exclusively) in court filings.
Judges “cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels,” e.g., attorney, discipline, reciprocal or judge. Id. at 429. No “regulatory measures” (court rule or ruling), “no matter how sophisticated,” can “be employed in purpose or in effect to stifle, penalize, or curb” any lawyer or litigant “exercise of First Amendment rights.” Id. at 439.
Professor Volokh, you said, “There is certainty in my mind that court filings are not exercises of ‘the freedom of speech, or of the press,’ as normally understood.” The support you offered were wholly unsupported conclusory contentions in two opinions, e.g., "[A] lawyer's in-court advocacy is not protected speech under the First Amendment." For a reason I cannot understand, you contended, “The same principles apply to written filings.”
Neither you nor anyone else I’ve ever seen articulated any principles that could explain why anyone should believe that words typed into a computer, printed on paper and submitted to a court as a document are not within the freedom of expression secured by the First Amendment. So please share with us the principles that give you the certainty you expressed. I shared with you the principles and the authorities that prove the opposite of the conclusions you presented, so I respectfully request that you show the principles that you think are relevant.
Professor Volokh, we should start where SCOTUS recently said to start.
Again, I ask you to identify any principle that could cause you to believe that words written in a court filing somehow are not expression or communication that is within "the freedom of speech, or of the press."
An “Amendment’s plain text covers” the freedom of expression and communication, so “the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022). Each court must “justify” any “regulation” thereof, i.e., “must demonstrate” that any sanction for any court filing was “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition” of protecting speech/petitions. Id. Each court “must affirmatively prove that” such sanction was within this nation’s “historical tradition” of protecting speech/petitions within “the outer bounds” of each “right.” Id. at 19.
“An informed, independent judiciary” must have “an informed, independent bar.” Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001). Judges cannot “prohibit[ ] speech and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise” of “judicial power.” Id.
Judges and “courts depend” on an “independent bar” for “the proper performance of [judges’ and courts’ constitutional] duties and responsibilities. Restricting” conscientious, capable “attorneys” from “presenting arguments and analyses to the courts distorts the legal system by altering the traditional” (constitutional) “role” of “attorneys.” Id. at 544.
Judges cannot “exclude from litigation those arguments and theories” they deem “unacceptable but which by their nature are within the province of the courts to consider.” Id. at 546.
Please also consider Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 137 (1961) (Black, Douglas, JJ., Warren, C.J., dissenting):
The “important role” of “lawyers” in “our society” makes it “imperative that [lawyers] not be discriminated against” regarding “freedoms that are designed to protect” Americans “against the tyrannical exertion of governmental power. [Indeed,] the great purposes underlying [such] freedoms [include affording] independence to those who must discharge important public responsibilities. [Lawyers], with responsibilities as great as those placed upon any group in our society, must have that independence.”
Professor Volokh, regarding the arbitrary distinction you made (between attorney speech in a courtroom and attorney speech in court filings) Gentile did not address (or even pretend to address) any court filing. It addressed actual verbal speech. It addressed speech completely outside a court and obviously outside any court proceedings. Even the language you quoted purported to address actual verbal speech, albeit inside a courtroom and during "judicial proceedings."
Professor Volokh, you apparently (improperly) believe the misrepresentations or implications of some judges that judges have some special power to retaliate against lawyers or litigants for content of speech in court or the content of court filings that merely (somehow) offends a judge. You apparently (improperly) believe the misrepresentations or implications of some judges that judges have some special power to retaliate against lawyers or litigants even for the viewpoints expressed in speech in court or in court filings. All such misrepresentations are clearly and irrefutably false. They all violate our Constitution as emphasized by copious SCOTUS precedent construing (at least) the First and Fifth Amendments.
Please note also that Chief Justice Roberts pointedly included this gem in his 2024 Year End Report (https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2024year-endreport.pdf):
"Chief Justice Taft is the only person to have served as head of the judicial and a political branch. As he put it, 'Nothing tends more to render judges careful in their decisions and anxiously solicitous to do exact justice than the consciousness that every act of theirs is to be subject to the intelligent scrutiny of their fellow men, and to their candid criticism.' ”
Chief Justice Roberts was quoting W. H. Taft, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, American Law Register and Review 43(9) 577 (1895) (https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5392&context=penn_law_review).
Taft's remarks were delivered to, essentially, the entire American Bar Association. At that time, Taft was a U.S. Sixth Circuit judge. Later he became President and then Chief Justice. Much more of Judge Taft's remarks are well worth considering and quoting, including the following.
“The judge [sometimes] has a power over which no review can be exercised,” so he often “is amenable only at the bar of public opinion” and “it is unwise to [contend] that public opinion [of a judge] with such power shall neither be expressed nor led.”
"The opportunity freely and publicly to criticize judicial action is of vastly more importance to the body politic than the immunity of courts and judges from [even] unjust aspersions and attack. Nothing tends more to render judges careful in their decisions and anxiously solicitous to do exact justice than the consciousness that every act of theirs is to be subject to the intelligent scrutiny and candid criticism of their fellow-men.… [Regarding] judges having a life tenure, . . . the right freely to comment on their decisions [is] of greater importance, because it [may be] the only practicable and available instrument in the hands of a free people to keep such judges alive to the reasonable demands of those they serve…. [Clearly,] those most competent to express their judgment in such matters [are attorneys] belonging to the great and honorable profession of the bar."
Professor Volokh, you said: “As a general matter, courts do not treat court filings as means of communicating in general; they are only means for engaging in the business of the courts. There are all sorts of rules constraining who may file things in court, what those filings must contain, what those filings may not contain, and so on.” But your two observations and copious SCOTUS precedent establish nothing more than that a court is a limited public forum. See, e.g., Ateba v. Leavitt (DC Cir. 2025):
a "limited public forum" is government property that is made available for "use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects." Price, 45 F.4th at 1068 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 [ ] (2009)). Such a forum is generally open to the designated groups or for the designated purpose of discussing particular topics. See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of L. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 681 [ ] (2010) ("a defining characteristic" of limited public forums" is the government's authority to "reserve them for certain groups" (cleaned up)); Perry, 460 U.S. at 47-48 (noting that a limited public forum would be open only to groups of "similar character").” Accord Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 823-26 (1995).
Moreover, the essence of your first observation applies to every government office. Your second observation also applies to many opportunities available to the public to comment, e.g., regarding proposals to create or modify agency or court rules, Even so, the First Amendment expressly secures “the right of the people” to “petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” So mere limited access or mere regulation of expression (or both) cannot establish that such conduct is not an exercise of “the right” to “petition” or “the freedom of speech” secured by the First Amendment.
I'm going to follow your fragmentation process here, since you seem so enamored of it.
Weird renaming, but association? Where is that mentioned in the First Amendment? Do you have some super super secret first draft passed down the male line?
Nope. No freedom of association, unless you think the only association worth protect is assembling.
Stupid Government Tricks, your comments compel me to ask you the same question I asked David Nieporent: are you a lawyer or are you just someone making up stuff about which you know virtually (or actually) nothing? That's a serious question. Are you a lawyer?
If you're a lawyer, you do or should know that your assertions (in this forum regarding this issue) are shamefully ignorant of the law:
"association? Where is that mentioned in the First Amendment? Do you have some super super secret first draft passed down the male line?
Nope. No freedom of association, unless you think the only association worth protect is assembling."
In this very thread, I provided the following from SCOTUS back in 1963:
Courts “may not prohibit” any “modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments” by merely invoking the mere general “power to regulate the legal profession.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. U.S. 415, 428-429 (1963). Judges “may not, under the [mere] guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore” (knowingly violate) “constitutional rights” of lawyers or litigants. Id. at 439. Clearly, “it is no answer” to “constitutional claims” that the mere “purpose of” any “regulations” (court rules or rulings) “was merely to insure high professional standards.” Id. at 438-439.
Do you think they just made up the freedom of association? If you're a lawyer, look it up. If you admit you're not a lawyer, I'll show you more.
My objection to your fragmented quotes has nothing to do with lawyering.
Stupid Government Tricks, as I suggested previously, you should simply ignore the quotation marks. Just don't see them.
As you suggested previously, you don't even care about the original sources. The only reason I quote text is to help people who actually do want to find where in the original source they can locate the text I'm talking about. I quote text to help people verify (if they want) that my use of the text is accurate.
Stupid Government Tricks, the First Amendment used mere idiomatic expressions, e.g., freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to assemble, the right to petition. The First Amendment was designed NOT to be precise. It was designed to sweep extremely broadly.
You won't find the "freedom of thought" expressed explicitly in the First Amendment, but the First Amendment necessarily secures it. “The First Amendment” means “all persons are free to think and speak as they wish, not as the government demands.” 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570, 603 (2023). It secures the “freedom to think as you will” and “speak as you think.” Id. at 584.
You won't find the "freedom of expression" expressed explicitly in the First Amendment, but the First Amendment necessarily secures the freedom of expression and communication. "The right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First] Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression." McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985).
You won't find the "freedom of association" or "the right to vote" in the First Amendment, but the First Amendment necessarily secures both (suffrage clearly is the quintessential speech of the sovereign people). "We have repeatedly held that freedom of association is protected by the First Amendment. And of course this freedom protected against federal encroachment by the First Amendment is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from infringement by the States. Similarly we have said with reference to the right to vote: 'No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.' " Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968).
Nobody thought that on its face, Trump’s complaint stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dismissal at the outset is thus appropriate.
Kafantaris, what actual law (rule of procedure) says that "Dismissal at the outset is thus appropriate" here.
OK I'll play.
Rule 3 says that a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint. No other rule provides an alternate means.
Rule 8 details what is required of a filing for it to be a complaint.
Here the court determined the filing in question didn't meet those requirements and rejected it. That is what means in this context. The action wasn't dismissed per se, for lack of a valid complaint one was never started, but they get to try again.
Voize, that's a pretty good start.
The starting point is that every person has the RIGHT to file a complaint in federal court. That right is secured by First Amendment. That right also is secured by federal law (Rule 3).
Writing and printing a document and filing it in court clearly and irrefutably is an exercise of the freedom of expression and communication secured by our Constitution. "The right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First] Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression." McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985).
Courts constitute a "limited public forum" in which the freedom of expression and communication is rightly subject to regulations regarding time, place and manner. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). (“limited public forum[s]”); Shurtleff v. City of Bos., 596 U.S. 243, 273 (2022). (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“limited public forum”).
As emphasized by Amendment X, McCullough v. Maryland and Marbury v. Madison (all of which I quoted above), all federal employees always must act under a power that was granted by the supreme law of the land (here, the Constitution and federal law).
Rule 12 prescribes the ONLY circumstances under which (and the process of law that is due before) a judge may strike all or part of a pleading for CONTENT. Only for limited reasons and only after the process of law that is due (i.e., the process that was prescribed by Rule 12) was the presiding judge GRANTED the POWER (he MAY) strike all or part of a pleading because of its content.
They do. But they do not have a right to file whatever-they-please and demand that the court accept it as a valid complaint sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction.
Voize, you're right. That's why I wrote:
Courts constitute a 'limited public forum" in which the freedom of expression and communication is rightly subject to regulations regarding time, place and manner.
Rule 12 prescribes the ONLY circumstances under which (and the process of law that is due before) a judge may strike all or part of a pleading for CONTENT.
Courts do not constitute a limited public forum; you're using a term of art you don't understand. And again: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 does not include the word "ONLY."
David, prove that courts do not constitute a limited public forum. Show us that you understand the principles that control that concept. Please don't expect us to believe any ipse dixit by you. Your contentions are obviously false extremely often.
David, please say in plain English what you think constitutes a "limited public forum." Then, if you can, please show us the legal authority that states the principles that you think establish the scope of the concept "limited public forum."
Don't compel us always simply to assume that you know what you're talking about. You obviously have absolutely no idea what you're talking about almost every time you've posted in this thread. Ignorance of the law is no excuse for a purported lawyer (purportedly with 25 years' experience) purporting to tell people the truth about the law.
David, so that you don't waste any more of our time with your ignorance or your pretense that you somehow possess superior knowledge regarding this subject, please show us what you think is either false or inapplicable to federal courts in the following principles articulated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Ateba v. Leavitt in 2025:
a "limited public forum" is government property that is made available for "use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects." Price, 45 F.4th at 1068 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 [ ] (2009)). Such a forum is generally open to the designated groups or for the designated purpose of discussing particular topics. See Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of L. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 681 [ ] (2010) ("a defining characteristic" of limited public forums" is the government's authority to "reserve them for certain groups" (cleaned up)); Perry, 460 U.S. at 47-48 (noting that a limited public forum would be open only to groups of "similar character"). For example," the government's decision to "provide funds for all extracurricular activities that were 'related to the educational purpose of the University' was deemed a limited public forum. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 823-26 [ ] (1995) (cleaned up)."
Capitalizing the word ONLY does not in fact cause that word to magically appear in the text of the rule.
David, if you had any idea what you were talking about, you'd understand the
the following text and principles from Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
The power of courts to dismiss a complaint or to strike all or part of any pleading (e.g., a complaint or an answer) exists only to the extent that it is proper "under a notice pleading system," so, clearly, "it is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead" more than the law actually requires, and (even more clearly) "it is not appropriate" for a judge to dismiss or strike a complaint, in particular, in a manner that violates the rules prescribing the process of law that is due to a plaintiff, in particular.
FRCP Rule 8 “provides that a complaint must include only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ Such a statement must simply ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.”
Also, “Rule 8(f) provides that ‘[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.’ Given the Federal Rules’ simplified standard for pleading, ‘[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.’ ”
“If a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice, a defendant can move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) before responding. Moreover, claims lacking merit may be dealt with through summary judgment under Rule 56. The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim. See Conley, supra, at 48, 78 S.Ct. 99 (‘The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits’).”
Notice the Court’s emphasis on "fair notice" and the word “only,” above. “[T]he Federal Rules do address” the process that is due before a judge may strike all or part of a pleading for its content, “but do not include among the enumerated actions any reference to” striking a pleading the way this judge did. “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.”
OK, After skimming a bit, I went back and read the whole comment string. And the strong evidence is that Jack Jordan is a fairly simple crank of the Sovereign Citizen variety (same methods, just a different interest). Or an AI bot designed to relentlessly reword and repeat the same argument, either forever or as long as someone responds, whichever comes first.
Was kind of entertaining, once. But life's too short to waste it reading thaaaaat volume of repetitive logorrhea, never making a point or providing evidence of anything beyond I'm right and the entire world is wrong.
Muted
Purple, I added some clarifications in my replies to Roger, above. Nothing I'm saying deviates from the statements of many SCOTUS opinions (including those of Chief Justice John Marshall) about our Constitution and the meaning of the relevant provisions.
Regarding the particular misconception under which many commenters on this thread are laboring, one of the most famous SCOTUS decisions is (further) dispositive. It emphasized the point of the language that I've quoted, above, from Article VI. Chief Justice Marshall (writing for SCOTUS) in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) emphasized the following.
"[I]t is apparent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature.
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct in their official character."
'It is emphatically" the "duty of the judicial department to say what the [existing governing] law [actually] is. [Judges must] apply [a] rule to particular cases [so they] must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." The judge in this case failed to address any legal authority (Rule 12) that authorized him (and simultaneously limited his power) to strike all or part of a complaint because of its content.
“Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of [any] legislature" (ANY act of ANY public servant) "repugnant to the constitution, is void.”
Moreover, any person violating their oath to support our Constitution in Article VI or the president violating his oath in Article II commits “worse than solemn mockery” of our Constitution, and any person who dares “take this oath” without believing it commits “a crime.”
Obviously, "the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law," so courts cannot "close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law." Any purported "doctrine" to the contrary "would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, completely obligatory." It "thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions—a written constitution."
The primary point made in Marbury is that our Constitution is the "paramount" law. It binds all public servants in all official conduct, so even if all 3 branches of federal government conspire (as they did) to make and implement a law that violates our Constitution, they all merely managed to violate our Constitution and all their conduct is "void."
“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.” The protection of the laws included the restrictions on judicial power (to strike all or part of a complaint because of its content).
The primary point made in Marbury is that the judiciary, not Jack Jordan, decides whether something violates the constitution.
David, you continue to say things that are facially frivolous (especially for a purported lawyer with 25 years' experience). I'm surprised you even bother to comment. Chief Justice Marshall and SCOTUS in Marbury emphasized exactly the point of the Preamble: the People decided what conduct violates our Constitution. That's precisely the point (as Chief Justice Marshall expressly emphasized, above) of "the greatest improvement on political institutions—a written constitution."
Even if for the past 25 years you completely failed to grasp the foregoing fundamental principle, at the very least, you should have realized that was the point of the first 10 amendments to our Constitution. More specifically, you should have realized that was the point of the First and Fifth Amendments.
" ...the strong evidence is that Jack Jordan is a fairly simple crank ... Or an AI bot ...."
I think you win the Jackbot.