The Volokh Conspiracy
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Judge Strikes Trump's Complaint in Libel Lawsuit Against N.Y. Times
"The complaint continues ... with much more, persistently alleged in abundant, florid, and enervating detail." "[A] complaint is not a public forum for vituperation and invective—not a protected platform to rage against an adversary. A complaint is not a megaphone for public relations or a podium for a passionate oration at a political rally or the functional equivalent of the Hyde Park Speakers' Corner."
From today's order by Judge Steven Merryday (M.D. Fla.) in Trump v. N.Y. Times Co.:
As every member of the bar of every federal court knows (or is presumed to know), Rule 8(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that a complaint include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8(e)(1) helpfully adds that "[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct." Some pleadings are necessarily longer than others. The difference likely depends on the number of parties and claims, the complexity of the governing facts, and the duration and scope of pertinent events. But both a shorter pleading and a longer pleading must comprise "simple, concise, and direct" allegations that offer a "short and plain statement of the claim." Rule 8 governs every pleading in a federal court, regardless of the amount in controversy, the identity of the parties, the skill or reputation of the counsel, the urgency or importance (real or imagined) of the dispute, or any public interest at issue in the dispute.
In this action, a prominent American citizen (perhaps the most prominent American citizen) alleges defamation by a prominent American newspaper publisher (perhaps the most prominent American newspaper publisher) and by several other corporate and natural persons. Alleging only two simple counts of defamation, the complaint consumes eighty-five pages. Count I appears on page eighty, and Count II appears on page eighty-three. Pages one through seventy-nine, plus part of page eighty, present allegations common to both counts and to all defendants. Each count alleges a claim against each defendant and, apparently, each claim seeks the same remedy against each defendant.
Even under the most generous and lenient application of Rule 8, the complaint is decidedly improper and impermissible. The pleader initially alleges an electoral victory by President Trump "in historic fashion"—by "trouncing" the opponent—and alludes to "persistent election interference from the legacy media, led most notoriously by the New York Times." The pleader alludes to "the halcyon days" of the newspaper but complains that the newspaper has become a "fullthroated mouthpiece of the Democrat party," which allegedly resulted in the "deranged endorsement" of President Trump's principal opponent in the most recent presidential election. The reader of the complaint must labor through allegations, such as "a new journalistic low for the hopelessly compromised and tarnished 'Gray Lady.'" The reader must endure an allegation of "the desperate need to defame with a partisan spear rather than report with an authentic looking glass" and an allegation that "the false narrative about 'The Apprentice' was just the tip of Defendants' melting iceberg of falsehoods." Similarly, in one of many, often repetitive, and laudatory (toward President Trump) but superfluous allegations, the pleader states, "'The Apprentice' represented the cultural magnitude of President Trump's singular brilliance, which captured the [Z]eitgeist of our time."
The complaint continues with allegations in defense of President Trump's father and the acquisition of the Trumps' wealth; with a protracted list of the many properties owned, developed, or managed by The Trump Organization and a list of President Trump's many books; with a long account of the history of "The Apprentice"; with an extensive list of President Trump's "media appearances"; with a detailed account of other legal actions both by and against President Trump, including an account of the "Russia Collusion Hoax" and incidents of alleged "lawfare" against President Trump; and with much more, persistently alleged in abundant, florid, and enervating detail.
Even assuming that each allegation in the complaint is true (of course, that is for a jury to decide and is not pertinent here; this order suggests nothing about the truth of the allegations or the validity of the claims but addresses only the manner of the presentation of the allegations in the complaint); even assuming that at trial the plaintiff offers evidence supporting every allegation in the complaint and that the evidence is accepted by the jury as fact; and even assuming that after finally "melting" the defendants' alleged "iceberg of falsehoods" the plaintiff prevails for each reason alleged in the complaint—even assuming all of that—a complaint remains an improper and impermissible place for the tedious and burdensome aggregation of prospective evidence, for the rehearsal of tendentious arguments, or for the protracted recitation and explanation of legal authority putatively supporting the pleader's claim for relief. As every lawyer knows (or is presumed to know), a complaint is not a public forum for vituperation and invective—not a protected platform to rage against an adversary. A complaint is not a megaphone for public relations or a podium for a passionate oration at a political rally or the functional equivalent of the Hyde Park Speakers' Corner.
A complaint is a mechanism to fairly, precisely, directly, soberly, and economically inform the defendants—in a professionally constrained manner consistent with the dignity of the adversarial process in an Article III court of the United States—of the nature and content of the claims. A complaint is a short, plain, direct statement of allegations of fact sufficient to create a facially plausible claim for relief and sufficient to permit the formulation of an informed response. Although lawyers receive a modicum of expressive latitude in pleading the claim of a client, the complaint in this action extends far beyond the outer bound of that latitude.
This complaint stands unmistakably and inexcusably athwart the requirements of Rule 8. This action will begin, will continue, and will end in accord with the rules of procedure and in a professional and dignified manner. The complaint is STRUCK with leave to amend within twenty-eight days. The amended complaint must not exceed forty pages, excluding only the caption, the signature, and any attachment.
You can read the now-struck Complaint here. To be fair, the Complaint is a specimen of a broader phenomenon I've seen in other cases—but it is indeed an unusually aggravated specimen. These sorts of complaints, in criminal and civil cases, are sometimes called "speaking complaints," and have both defenders and opponents; this one, though, speaks a lot, and about many things that don't seem quite relevant to the matter.
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I saw a funny video about Trump ("Sayin' a Lie") set to "Stayin' Alive."
Trump's complaint against the press made me think there ought to be one to "Shakedown Cruise." https://youtu.be/i_4OITN0rkU
This judge's argument is disingenuous after Twombly and Iqbal
My legal analysis of Trump's complaint is that it wasn't even intended--by Trump or his lawyers--to prevail in a court of law under the governing law. As far as I could ascertain, Trump and his lawyers used that lawsuit for outright open and notorious extortion--much like I'm certain Trump and his lawyers used other lawsuits previously.
Trump has essentially turned the US government into the O in RICO. It seems that even was his point in laying off or firing all the people who lost their jobs because of Trump. I'm seriously starting to think that Trump hired Guiliani (a former US Attorney who prosecuted organized crime in NYC) at least in part to advise Trump on how to do "business" like a mob boss.
Jack… I think he was aware of how to do the mob business long prior to Giuliani. He just needed a lawyer that would do what he wanted. He lost Cohen so he had to get a replacement and Giuliani was willing. His mob experience was just other bullet point on his resume. And he needed someone who would be loyal. Another bullet point.
Spmosher, agreed. But as Trump proves almost daily, being aware is a world away from being capable.
No mention of rule 12(f)? "The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter."
Since the whole complaint is struck for good and obvious reasons, it seems silly to then strike individual sentences or paragraphs under R 12(f). The whole point of the court’s order is that it’s not gonna parse the complaint at a highly granular level of detail. There’s no complaint left from which to “strike from a pleading”.
Zarniwoop, please see my comment below.
I see it, and it doesn’t address the basic notion that if the whole complaint is struck for failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8, then striking particular parts of a complaint under Rule 12(f) never comes in to play.
I’m glad the judge is willing to call BS when he sees it.
Zarniwoop, what authority authorized the judge to strike the entire complaint in the manner that he did? None. Rule 12 (and Amendment V) expressly prohibited doing so.
We all should be willing to call BS when we see it by Trump or by a judge. Every public servant swore to support our Constitution, not attack and undermine it.
Rule 8. That’s how it works. The judge isn’t going to pick out each thing and say “this part is struck.” When it’s this bad, as the litigators here recognize, striking the whole complaint is appropriate.
Darwinnie, what makes you think Rule 8 authorized striking all or part of a pleading. That precise issue is addressed (repeatedly) in Rule 12. It is not addressed at all in Rule 8.
Are you a lawyer stating your analysis of the law or just somebody talking about law without any basis for doing so?
Are you a lawyer?
David, isn't obvious that I am and you are not?
Well, no. You don't seem to know anything about the actual practice of law; instead, you seem to be very impressed with yourself for having read some things about law.
David, I've asked you many times, are you a lawyer or are you just someone making up stuff about which you know virtually (or actually) nothing? Are you a lawyer?
John, there's a "good" reason for that, I think. I'm certain the judge knew he was violating federal law and our Constitution. See my comment below.
Well, that was quick. I can collect my prize* for predicting that it won't make it to discovery.
* a cupon that allows me to buy a latte at Starbucks for only $795.
a complaint remains an improper and impermissible place for the tedious and burdensome aggregation of prospective evidence, for the rehearsal of tendentious arguments, or for the protracted recitation and explanation of legal authority putatively supporting the pleader's claim for relief. As every lawyer knows (or is presumed to know), a complaint is not a public forum for vituperation and invective
People who write like this complain about a complaint being too long? Talk about the pot and kettle.
But it's nonetheless elegant and not overly prolix
Agreed.
"elegant "
Is that Latin for "run on"?
improper and impermissible are redundant, as is recitation and explanation
improper and impermissible are redundant,
Not quite - improper has a moral connotation and feel of condemnation that impermissible lacks, and furthermore, there is a nice cadence with the repeated "imp". It reads as though it could be read out loud with advantage.
as is recitation and explanation
Definitely not redundant.
I wonder what Trump's reaction was when reading this paragraph?
1) He thought the judge was praising him.
2) He immediately asked a subordinate to tell him what it means.
3) He tries to figure out a way to blame the judge for his lawyer's mistake.
You know that this complaint was as ridiculous as it was at Trump's insistence, right? So Trump thinks his 2024 election win was the single greatest personal and political triumph in the history of the world. I can hear him dictating that to the lawyer. "No, leave that in there." Suing a 9billion dollar company for 15billion is a nice touch. I am surprised they didn't go for eleventy gazillion.
Clown show.
Too bad there's not something in the federal rules to more clearly address unhinged judicial rants.
LOL, you absurd twerp. I suppose you regard the "complaint" as hinged.
Sure, but so is a toilet seat.
OK I actually lol’d at a comment from SGT. Life is always new and interesting.
Are things really struck? I thought they were stricken.
Or have strucken?
Are you thinking of Carel Struycken?
I certainly agree Trump’s complaint was an abuse of the legal system. It was what the Montana Supreme Court in 2007 called “legal thuggery.” But federal judges must not respond to legal thuggery by violating our Constitution.
Article VI commands that "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of [all] States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution." That governs Trump and even Trump's private attorneys (as judicial officers of the court). It also governs all federal judges, as do their two oaths of office in 5 U.S.C. 3331 and 28 U.S.C. 453.
“No person” may “be deprived” by any federal public servant “of life, liberty, or property" before affording them all “process of law” that is "due." Amendment V. Even Trump arguably is a person.
The very first rule of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure emphasizes that such “rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81.”
The federal rules of procedure and evidence are not mere guidelines. They are governing law. They were approved by Congress, so they have the force of a federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. 2072, 2074.
Federal law explicitly and clearly and precluded striking Trump’s pleading the way it was stricken.
Rule 12(e) is perfectly clear that a district “court may strike” an entire “pleading or issue any other appropriate order” only after affording the process of law that is due. The process of law that is due is prescribe immediately before the foregoing:
“A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order.”
Rule 12(f) is perfectly clear that “[t]he court may act" on "its own” only in a particular manner. “The court” only “may strike [merely] from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
The Court is striking the document for a failure to comply with Rule 8, and providing leave to file an amended complaint in compliance with Rule 8 and the Order of the Court.
It's not a Rule 12(f) issue, it's a pleading requirement issue. I've seen it before, and it is entirely permissible.
From Green v. Secretary (11th Cir. 2022):
Professor Volokh, thank you for that. I agree that a court could issue a different order. I even think I would support a civil contempt order in this case (imposing a fine for every day the complaint isn't remedied). I'm objecting only to the clear illegality (and unconstitutionality) of actually striking a pleading the way the judge did.
Thanks -- is your objection (an assertion of a constitutional violation, yet) just that he used the term "struck" rather than "dismissed"? See, e.g., Vibe Micro v. Shabanets (11th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added, some citations omitted), discussing a related sort of 8(a)(2) short-and-plain-statement dismissal (focused on "shotgun pleadings," another way 8(a)(2) may be violated):
Professor Volokh, thank you for this information also.
But no, my concern is not merely with the judge's choice of words (striking vs. dismissing). And some judges (e.g., the ones you quoted) advising other judges to violate federal law merely even more clearly violates the Fifth Amendment. Rule 12 expressly and specifically governs when and why all or part of a pleading may be stricken or when it may be dismissed.
Please also see my comment below regarding the First Amendment. Judges' efforts to regulate or punish exercises of First Amendment freedoms are governed by SCOTUS precedent construing First Amendment freedoms. Contrary to the pretenses of far too many judges, there is no such thing as a court's "inherent authority" to violate any part of our Constitution, including SCOTUS precedent construing it.
Well, if you think the Rules are the only source of "the law" in federal courts when it comes to civil procedure, and the Eleventh Circuit can't further develop that law, you are certainly entitled to think so. It's just that this means you're describing a hypothetical system that you think we should have, as to opposed to the actual American legal system, in which appellate precedents are indeed treated as the law.
Professor Volokh, clearly I did not say (and I did not imply) that "the Rules are the only source of 'the law' in federal courts when it comes to civil procedure, and the Eleventh Circuit can't further develop that law."
Did you think those judges somehow "further develop[ed] that law" (Rule 12)? If so, how?
Clearly, I'm not merely "describing a hypothetical system that you think we should have, as to opposed to the actual American legal system." I'm describing and stating the legal authorities that establish our actual American legal system. I'm saying exactly what the law says, in particular, the supreme Law of the Land:
"No person” may “be deprived” by any federal public servant “of life, liberty, or property" before affording them all “process of law” that is "due." And "the supreme Law of the Land" is, first, our "Constitution, and" then the federal "Laws" that were "made in Pursuance" of our Constitution (including all federal rules of procedure and evidence) "and all Treaties" and all legislators and "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of [all] States" are "bound" to "support this Constitution."
The point of Rule 1 (which I quoted) saying that the rules (including Rule 12) "govern" is that they govern everyone, including judges and courts. That's the point of the power to "govern."
If you think I failed to state the law or if you think our Constitution vested in federal judges the power to knowingly violate the supreme Law of the Land, please show me any legal authority whatsoever that supports your position.
I'm describing the rule of law required by our Constitution. You're acquiescing in rule by outlaws who are (and whom you know are) knowingly violating our Constitution.
Jack Jordan, your initial post in this thread used the word “only” several times while characterizing what Rule 12 says, but the rule doesn’t use that word (other than in a reference to “a United States officer or employee sued only in an official capacity”). Do you have any authority for the proposition that the actions authorized by Rule 12 are the exclusive or only options available to judges when a litigant violates another rule? I would think the existence of other rules authorizing judges to strike pleadings or take other actions as a sanction for misconduct (like Rule 11, Rule 26, and Rule 37) would suggest that Rule 12 is not exclusive. Likewise, I would think that the inherent-authority cases (like Eberly v. Moore, Chambers v. Nasco, and Dietz v. Bouldin) would similarly suggest that judges have authority beyond that specifically provided by Rule 12.
I see that others below tried to make these points to you and that you (a) didn’t seem to understand them, and (b) didn’t have any response other than to repeatedly ask commenters if they were lawyers. So for the record, yes, I am a lawyer; yes, I have taken courses in civil procedure and constitutional law; yes, I clerked for a federal judge; yes, I have practiced litigation in federal and state courts; and yes, I have taught law-school classes.
Roger, I provided the primary authority immediately above your comment. You're right, I don't understand anyone (especially a lawyer with your qualifications and experience) presuming or pretending that our Constitution is irrelevant or that it somehow vested in judges the power to knowingly violate our Constitution. If you are aware of any such authority, please kindly provide it.
Amendment V and Article VI are perfectly clearly and controlling, are they not?
"No person” may “be deprived” by any federal public servant “of life, liberty, or property" before affording them all “process of law” that is "due." And "the supreme Law of the Land" is, first, our "Constitution, and" then the federal "Laws" that were "made in Pursuance" of our Constitution (including all federal rules of procedure and evidence) "and all Treaties" and all legislators and "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of [all] States" are "bound" to "support this Constitution."
The point of FRCP Rule 1 (which I quoted) saying that the rules (including Rule 12) "govern" is that they govern everyone, including judges and courts. That's the point of the power to "govern." Does Rule 12 not govern courts or judges?
I'm truly astonished that an attorney with your qualifications and experience would question my use of the word "only." I did that for the benefit of those who lacked your experience. But if you think I improperly used "only" in any instance, please show me why you think that.
Is it your position that lower court judges, SCOTUS and Congress went to the trouble of writing and approving Rule 12, which stated express limitations on when pleadings can be stricken but all that effort imposed no limitation whatsoever on the power of a judge to strike a pleading? If so, what authority do you think supports such presumption?
Roger, judges, courts, judicial doctrine and judicial rulings, judgments or orders are not even in the supreme law of the land.
Article III expressly emphasizes that federal "judicial Power shall extend" no further than permitted "under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties" and "Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices" only "during good Behaviour."
I said "only" because it obviously was implicit. “The tenure by which the judges are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good behavior.” Federalist No. 39 (James Madison). Only federal “judges” who “behave properly, will be secured in their places for life.” Federalist No. 79 (Hamilton).
Because the word isn't in the actual text of the rule and you pretended that it was.
Of course it does. It simply doesn't limit them in the ways you inexplicably think it does.
I recently looked up the range of meanings of the Italian word precedente, which is cognate with our precedent. The dictionary felt the need to explain the peculiar legal system some outlying countries use:
Machine translation:
To Italians this fundamental part of our legal system is as alien as putting ketchup on steak.
John, here's the rub. Judges, courts, judicial doctrine and judicial rulings, judgments or orders are not even in the supreme law of the land.
Article III expressly emphasizes that federal "judicial Power shall extend" no further than permitted "under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties."
As Article VI emphasized, "the supreme Law of the Land" is, first, our "Constitution, and" then the federal "Laws" that were "made in Pursuance" of our Constitution (including all federal rules of procedure and evidence) "and all Treaties" and all legislators and "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of [all] States" are "bound" to "support this Constitution."
"No person” may “be deprived” by any federal public servant “of life, liberty, or property" before affording them all “process of law” that is "due." The process of "law," not mere purported precedent, clearly and irrefutably governs all judges and courts. It's impossible for a judicial judgment, ruling or opinion to constitute precedent if it violates our Constitution.
You are free to think that. You are free to express that. You are just not free to apply that in the course of the practice of law.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
Professor Volokh, is it your position that lower court judges, SCOTUS and Congress went to the trouble of writing and approving Rule 12, which stated express limitations on when pleadings can be stricken but all that effort imposed no limitation whatsoever on the power of a judge to strike a pleading? If so, what authority do you think supports such presumption?
It did not contain "express limitations on when pleadings can be stricken." Perhaps you meant implied limitations, which would at least have the virtue of not being facially incorrect? That's why you keep having to break up your quotes of the rule and insert the word "only" — because the rule doesn't have that word.
David, please let Professor Volokh speak for himself. You don't really think he needs you to speak for him, do you?
I cannot imagine he would even want you to speak for him in light of your statements above, that you think that "Judges, courts, judicial doctrine and judicial rulings, judgments or orders are" somehow "in the supreme law of the land" and "a judicial judgment, ruling or opinion" that "violates our Constitution" nevertheless does "constitute precedent."
I doubt a first-year law student would even dare to argue either of your positions in class. This is the epitome of black letter law. The obvious opposite of your positions literally is written into our Constitution.
Article III expressly emphasizes that federal "judicial Power shall extend" no further than permitted "under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties."
Amendment V and Article VI are perfectly clearly and controlling, are they not?
"No person” may “be deprived” by any federal public servant “of life, liberty, or property" before affording them all “process of law” that is "due." And "the supreme Law of the Land" is, first, our "Constitution, and" then the federal "Laws" that were "made in Pursuance" of our Constitution (including all federal rules of procedure and evidence) "and all Treaties" and all legislators and "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of [all] States" are "bound" to "support this Constitution."
The point of FRCP Rule 1 (which I quoted) saying that the rules (including Rule 12) "govern" is that they govern everyone, including judges and courts. That's the point of the power to "govern." Does Rule 12 not govern courts or judges?
Loki, sure, you've seen it before. Many of us have. That's why I'm writing about it being clearly illegal and unconstitutional. Judges even know it's clearly illegal and unconstitutional. That's why they don't cite Rule 12 when they're violating it.
This necessarily is a Rule 12 issue. That's the only rule that authorizes striking either an entire filing or part of a filing. Rule 1 (which I quoted also) emphasized the rules govern. Federal law (the supreme law of the land) especially clearly and strongly governs public servants who are bound by our Constitution.
....no. The case is not being thrown out. As the judge (and all appellate courts) note- you have to comply with rules (including Rule 8) for pleadings.
This Complaint did not comply with the rules. Now, whether it is sua sponte dismissed or stricken isn't really relevant (I think that courts will use the phrase "stricken" more often), but you're barking up the wrong tree.
It's just saying- you didn't follow the rules for the pleading. Re-plead.
Again, this isn't very hard. The attorney will re-plead in amended complaint that is compliant with the rules. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Also? Judges do not "know" it is clearly illegal and unconstitutional.
So far, you've had multiple people explain this to you. There's the Court. You were given explanations from practitioners and a law professor (who was nice enough to provide a case citation).
BTW, quoting cases we all know (like Ward) doesn't make you look smarter- quite the contrary. You might want to re-think this quixotic attempt to explain to the rest of us how Federal Procedure and the First Amendment works. Especially when you didn't get the Rule 8 part right to begin with.
Or not! You do you.
Loki, you're right: "this isn't very hard." So why are you trying to make it seem hard?
You're also obviously wrong: "whether it is sua sponte dismissed or stricken isn't really relevant." That's the very difference between Rule 12(e) and Rule 12(f). How do you not see that?
Rule 12(f) clearly and explicitly say a "court" can strike "on its own" only particular parts of a pleading. Rule 12(e) expressly requires not only a motion but also that "the court" first "orders a more definite statement and" IF "the order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets," ONLY THEN "the court may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order."
Apparently repeatedly quoting the law you should know is necessary.
Apparently "quoting cases we all know (like Ward)" is appropriate because you aren't even thinking about how this judge and others that you've "seen before" violated not only the Fifth Amendment re: Rule 12, but also the Fifth Amendment re: the First Amendment and the SCOTUS precedent construing it.
I'd bother engaging with you ... but here's the thing. It's so obvious that you don't know what you don't know, that it's not worth it.
I mean, if you read down below I actually dropped a hint. But you won't get it, because you don't want to. The thing is- anyone with any actual experience that reads this thread already knows, and that's good enough for me.
Loki, show me where I was wrong about anything, if you think you can. Pick even one point to try to prove.
You said things that were obviously false. You said things that you do (by now) actually know were false. I extended to you the courtesy of showing you where you were wrong, so please do the same for me.
Bruh. It's already in the thread. You just don't know it.
I learned a long time ago when I was litigating against a pro se "sovereign citizen" that you can't explain the law to someone who doesn't actually want to learn.
Not saying you're that. But I don't know that you're not.
Loki, if you don't know that your assertion was false and if you cannot prove how even one statement by me was false, then you're not competent to be advising anyone about federal rules.
If the proof that something I wrote was false was already presented by someone somewhere in this thread, then simply copy and paste exactly (1) what I wrote that was false and (2) the proof that it was false.
If you can't or won't even do that much, no one should trust that anything you wrote in this thread wasn't false or that you actually even now believe anything you wrote was true.
Well, I guess my actual clients can't trust me then due to my incompetence!
As for anyone else- well, if they actually know and understand the rules and the law, then they are welcome to look at the thread and judge for themselves. 🙂
Loki, is it your position that lower court judges, SCOTUS and Congress went to the trouble of writing and approving Rule 12, which stated express limitations on when pleadings can be stricken but all that effort imposed no limitation whatsoever on the power of a judge to strike a pleading? If so, what authority do you think supports such presumption?
JACK JORDAN is his corporate strawman. You're dealing with Jack Jordan, a flesh and blood man subject only to the Common Law.
It's all fun and games untill he bills you in accord with his fee schedule.
Once again, you keep inserting your own words (like "only") in between half-baked partial quotes. Rule 12(e) authorizes a litigant to make a particular motion, and tells the court how to handle such a motion. It doesn't place limits of any sort on what a court can do in an entirely different situation in which a litigant hasn't made such a motion. And 12(f) doesn't say "only" at all, but in any case, I don't know why you think this judge's order somehow violates it.
David, I've asked you many times, are you a lawyer or are you just someone making up stuff about which you know virtually (or actually) nothing? Are you a lawyer? Have you ever even taken a law school class on civil procedure or the U.S. Constitution?
David, I tried to write it so that even a non-lawyer could understand it. You've represented that you're a lawyer with 25 years' experience, including "practicing law" before two federal courts. So PROVE to me how anything I wrote was false or inaccurate. Don't just keep slinging one baseless ipse dixit after another at me. PROVE me wrong.
Have the courage to do what I've done from the start. Write out what you think that Rules 12(e) and (f) mean in plain English relevant to this particular case.
Loki, saying you've seen it before reminds me of a couple things I saw before.
Arbitrary “action becomes no less so by simple dint of repetition,” even by multiple tribunals. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 488 (2011). “And longstanding capriciousness receives no special exemption" from the law. Id.
“While communis error facit jus may be a sadly accurate description of reality, it is not the normative basis of" American "jurisprudence. Courts may not create their own limitations on legislation, no matter how alluring the policy arguments for doing so, and no matter how widely the blame may be spread” among any quantity or quality of courts. Brogan v. U.S., 522 U.S. 398, 400 (1998).
“Lay off” the “excessive” use of “quotation marks”, friend. It’s “silly”. It “does not” make a “person” seem “erudite”.
Zarniwoop, not trying to seem erudite. Just quoting the words actually used to show how I altered the original text. Settle down, fiesty!
When someone uses excessive ellipses, or splits a quote into too many fragments, my first reaction is to wonder what they are hiding, my second reaction is to not trust anything quoted, and my third reaction is to stop reading and disregard it altogether. Unless everything else is of high interest, my fourth reaction is never to find the original source and see what was elided.
Stupid Government Tricks, good for you! Trust no one. Why would you trust anyone? I want people to question whether my statements and analysis are correct.
If you're the kind of person who would want to disregard what I write and choose not to check the original source, then I'm not writing for you.
Thank you, though, for your kind insights.
Stupid Government Tricks, the reason I am determined to quote content is that I don't trust lawyers or judges who don't quote content. Do you? This problem we're seeing with AI hallucinating quotations and citations is really nothing new. It has been going on for hundreds of years, I'm sure.
Many lawyers and judges blatantly misrepresent or violate actual law or precedent. This judge's decision is a case in point. I'm certain he knew he was violating Rule 12 and at least the Fifth Amendment and maybe the First Amendment.
Many lawyers and judges blatantly misrepresent the content of laws, rules or court decisions by representing their content without quoting what they're purportedly presenting. I'm sure that's intended to make it harder to find the text they pretended to present. I don't do that. You can easily find the exact location of the text I'm presenting because I quote it to almost the greatest extent possible.
My objection is not the quoting, it's the fragmentation, and I stated why. It just looks shifty and untrustworthy, and seldom worth untangling.
Why not the Eighth Amendment, while you're at it?
David, I've asked you many times, are you a lawyer or are you just someone making up stuff about which you know virtually (or actually) nothing?
Are you a lawyer? Have you ever even taken a law school class on civil procedure or the U.S. Constitution?
Zarniwoop, my bad. My response to you should have been the following.
The reason I am determined to quote content is that I don't trust lawyers or judges who don't quote content. Do you? This problem we're seeing with AI hallucinating quotations and citations is really nothing new. It has been going on for hundreds of years, I'm sure.
Many lawyers and judges blatantly misrepresent or violate actual law or precedent. This judge's decision is a case in point. I'm certain he knew he was violating Rule 12 and at least the Fifth Amendment and maybe the First Amendment.
Many lawyers and judges blatantly misrepresent the content of laws, rules or court decisions by representing their content without quoting what they're purportedly presenting. I'm sure that's intended to make it harder to find the text they pretended to present. I don't do that. You can easily find the exact location of the text I'm presenting because I quote it to almost the greatest extent possible.
You're waxing eloquent on a rule about how *parties* may move to strike things. And what the judge should do after that.
That rule doesn't talk about what the judge can do on the judge's own initiative. (And see EV's quote from a seemingly definitive explanation in federal court precedent here.)
Plus, read your own quote. It talks about pleadings that are allowed but vague enough to make it too hard to respond to. The judge here is saying the complaint wasn't allowed!
And if you are concerned about a basic question of fairness to Trump:
He has a whole month to try again! He's not being prevented from filing his complaint.
Tim, are you serious? You must not have read the language I quoted from rules. They clearly limit the power of the judge to strike an entire pleading or even part of a pleading. That's the precise point of those rules (and Amendment V).
Rule 12(f) expressly emphasized that a "court" could strike "on its own" only discrete parts of a pleading and only for particular reasons. Rule 12(e) was perfectly clear that the judge had no power to strike an entire pleading on his own before affording the process of law that was due.
I'm concerned that a federal judge would (as many federal judges do) violate our Constitution. Unlike you, I'm not concerned with the identify of their victims. I'm concerned with our Constitution and our rights. You should be, too. We all should be.
JJ here is about 5 minutes from saying that a judge can't force a lawyer to wear pants in court because nothing in the Fed. R. Civ. P. give a judge authority to give orders regarding sartorial choices.
You have this weird habit — which you also exhibited in discussing Charlie Kirk — of putting a bunch of isolated words or phrase in quotes and then just inserting a whole lot of your own words between them and claiming that the thing you're quoting is "clear" based on your insertions rather than the actual text you're quoting.
Rule 12(e) does not say anything at all about a judge "ha[ving] no power" to do anything. It's a grant of power, not a denial of power.
David, are you a lawyer or are you just some guy making up stuff about which you have no idea? That's a serious question. If you're a lawyer, you either do or should know that your assertion is blatantly false.
If you're a lawyer, you do or should know better than to try to make others believe that "Rule 12(e) does not say anything at all about a judge "ha[ving] no power" to do anything. It's a grant of power, not a denial of power."
Yours is actually an absurd position for a lawyer to take. The point of Rule 1 (which I quoted) saying that the rules (including Rule 12) "govern" is that they govern everyone, including judges and courts. That's the point of the power to "govern."
A very similar point was made explicitly and emphatically in Amendments V and Article VI:
“No person” may “be deprived” by any federal public servant “of life, liberty, or property" before affording them all “process of law” that is "due."
And "the supreme Law of the Land" is, first, our "Constitution, and" then the federal "Laws" that were "made in Pursuance" of our Constitution (including all federal rules of procedure and evidence) "and all Treaties" and all legislators and "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of [all] States" are "bound" to "support this Constitution."
That fragmentation has been noted by several real lawyers. Who are you trying to impress? Yourself, or your alter ego? All you're doing here is fragmenting dirt as you violate the first rule of holes.
Stupid Government Tricks, I already explained to you (in detail in this thread) why I quote legal authorities. If you don't like the quotation marks, just ignore them entirely. It's really that simple. You already indicated that you don't care about what actual legal authorities actually say, so the quotation marks should be simply irrelevant to you.
Yes, yes, you've explained the part I didn't question (the quoting) and skipped the part I do question (the fragmentation).
You are a fraud.
Stupid Government Tricks, it should be obvious even to someone not schooled in reading legal authorities that a Constitution written in the 1780's and even federal rules of procedure aren't written in a way that is particular easy for people like you to understand. So their words need to be re-arranged (restated) to make it easier for you to understand. But if you don't like what I write, don't read it. As I said, I'm not writing for you. Besides, what do you care what I write? You cannot (and you aren't even trying to) prove me wrong. Nor can anyone else.
David, at this point (because of all my writing to which you're responding) I'll say that if you are a lawyer, you actually do know that your assertion was false. I'll also say that if you don't know that your assertion was false, you're not competent to be advising anyone about federal rules.
David, I do not think the word "isolated" means what you think it means.
Eugene provides an example on how to write an article without Trump Derangement Syndrome.
I’m not sure this decision this creates a downside or acts as a deterrent. There’s still plenty of advertising value in filing a complaint like this. And with no sanctions or other real costs, the advertising form remains very low-cost for the benefit. As to the judge’s opinion, the fundraising prospects can simply be told what a jerk the judge is. In fact, riling up the judge and getting a few choice zinger quotes out of him to put in the fundraising literature may actually increase the net advertising take from the campaign.
Well, professionalism and norms would be the normal deterrent.
...and that's the problem. Fish rot from the head.
Exactly. We’re dealing with people for whom professionalism and norms are cons that people who were too stupid to study business and studied soft subjects like poetry, basketweaving, science, medicine, or law fall for. Successful people know that the only one who counts is #1 and not to fall for that shit.
I'd be impressed with this except for the fact that every left activist group writes similarly long complaints without being stricken.
How many left-wing activist groups have complaints detailing every single one of the plaintiff's cameo appearances?
*citations needed
Every judge should view every court filing with the clear understanding that it is an exercise of the freedoms of expression, communication and association expressly secured by the First Amendment. Courts “may not prohibit” any “modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments” by merely invoking the mere general “power to regulate the legal profession.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. U.S. 415, 428-429 (1963). Judges “may not, under the [mere] guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore” (knowingly violate) “constitutional rights” of lawyers or litigants. Id. at 439. Clearly, “it is no answer” to “constitutional claims” that the mere “purpose of” any “regulations” (court rules or rulings) “was merely to insure high professional standards.” Id. at 438-439.
A judge has no power whatsoever to seek to silence a litigant except to the extent that the judge complies with the law (including our Constitution) governing court proceedings.
Any “regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys” violates our Constitution. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). Court “restrictions on the time, place, or manner” of “speech” must be proved “reasonable.” Id. (collecting cases). That principle necessarily governs the execution of a rule (by a judge) as much as it governs the creation of a rule.
If sanctions can be “justified without reference to the content” of “speech,” they must be “justified” with proof they were “narrowly tailored to serve” a “significant governmental interest” and proof they “leave open ample alternative channels for communication” of relevant “information.” Id.
At least some judges in the Southern District of Florida routinely strike sua sponte entire complaints on the grounds that they are "shotgun pleadings".
Don't bother. Seriously.
Just get some butter, because he's on a roll.
But you can tell from the case citations and the fact that he didn't recognize the issue at the beginning that he lacks ... an understanding of how it all works together. And for the love of god, don't bring up the Rules Enabling Act. Or talk about stays- that might just destroy the whole thread (WHAT INHERENT POWER!!!!).
DDT, I'll present again for your benefit what I presented to Loki, above:
Arbitrary “action becomes no less so by simple dint of repetition,” even by multiple tribunals. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 488 (2011). “And longstanding capriciousness receives no special exemption" from the law. Id.
“While communis error facit jus may be a sadly accurate description of reality, it is not the normative basis of" American "jurisprudence. Courts may not create their own limitations on legislation, no matter how alluring the policy arguments for doing so, and no matter how widely the blame may be spread” among any quantity or quality of courts. Brogan v. U.S., 522 U.S. 398, 400 (1998).
The whole point of the expression "communis error facit jus" is that MANY judges have violated the controlling legal authority. Many judges violating the law cannot make their violations legal. That is the precise point made explicitly and emphatically in Amendments V and Article VI:
“No person” may “be deprived” by any federal public servant “of life, liberty, or property" before affording them all “process of law” that is "due." It's process of "law" that is required, not a mere judge issuing a mere ruling or a judgment that violates the law.
And "the supreme Law of the Land" is, first, our "Constitution, and" then the federal "Laws" that were "made in Pursuance" of our Constitution (including all federal rules of procedure and evidence) "and all Treaties" and all legislators and "all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of [all] States" are "bound" to "support this Constitution."
To Professor Volokh's point, above, quoting 11th Circuit judges invoking mere purported "inherent authority" of court, it's not even potentially possible that any judge whatsoever has any "inherent authority" to knowingly violate the supreme law of the land (which expressly encompasses federal law, which necessarily encompasses federal rules of procedure and evidence).
Striking a pleading which violates the federal rules — there's no real dispute about whether it violates Rule 8, and you certainly haven't tried to make that case — is not "arbitrary." Or "capricious."
The judge's ruling did not deprive Trump of life (as appealing as that sounds), liberty, or property. And your very strong belief that courts do not have inherent authority to manage their dockets will become a valid citation as soon as you get yourself named to the Supreme Court, and convince 4 other justices.
David, I've asked you many times, are you a lawyer or are you just someone making up stuff about which you know virtually (or actually) nothing?
Are you a lawyer? Have you ever even taken a law school class on civil procedure or the U.S. Constitution?
David, clearly a judge violating the rules that expressly govern when he was given the power to strike a pleading clearly is arbitrary and capricious. It's the epitome of arbitrary and capricious.
David, did you ever actually practice law before any court? Do you have any idea what the word "liberty" means? Have you ever bothered to try to find out?
Asked and answered. Did you ever actually practice law before any court — I mean as a lawyer, not as a pro se criminal defendant?
What liberty do you think the court deprived Trump of?
Setting aside that this is wrong — you could have at least cited the right to petition in the 1A! — it's also totally irrelevant here. Nobody — least of all the judge — "silenced" anyone.
Nobody — least of all the judge — "silenced" anyone.
Oh, C'mon. Can't you see that what the judge did violates Trump's legal team's first amendment rights to freedom of expression? I mean, he's requiring them to say certain things and not allowing them to say certain other things, and not merely threatening consequences if they don't but actually unilaterally imposing them without due process.
And is that fringe on the edges of that flag in the corner?
David, again, your misrepresentation of law compels me to ask: are you a lawyer or just some guy making up stuff about which you know virtually (or actually) nothing? That's a serious question. Are you a lawyer?
I am a lawyer, and have been such for 25 years.
David, did you actually practice law? What courts were admitted to practice before, and did you actually practice before any?
I did and do actually practice law, before the federal and state courts of NY and NJ. (I am also admitted in the EDMI, but I only ever handled one case there.) Loki is also a practicing lawyer. Prof. Volokh obviously doesn't practice law full time, but has quite a lot of experience in the courts. All of us are telling you that you don't know what you're talking about. You, on the other hand, have conspicuously not revealed whether and where you practice law, and when expressly asked by me you dodged it by answering the question with a qustion.
David, I'm pretty sure that nothing I've seen you write led me to believe that you were a lawyer. I honestly don't even believe it now because the things you write are so totally devoid of any comprehension of even the most obvious legal issues and principles.
When you represent that you "practice law, before the federal and state courts of NY and NJ" are you representing that you actually have litigated in federal court?
You can try to hide behind others, but I've never seen you prove anything. I'm certain you can't prove that anything I wrote about any legal authority was false or even inaccurate. Loki never even pretended to try to do so. Even Professor Volokh never even contended (much less tried to prove) that anything I wrote was in any way false or inaccurate.
Is it your position that lower court judges, SCOTUS and Congress went to the trouble of writing and approving FRCP Rule 12--which stated express limitations on when pleadings can be stricken--but all that effort imposed no limitation whatsoever on the power of a judge to strike a pleading? If so, what authority do you think supports such presumption?
When you refuse to answer whether you're a lawyer, are you implicitly admitting that you are not?
Okay, at this point I admit that it's just got to be a bit. Professor Volokh has expressly told you multiple times that you are wrong.
No. It is my position that Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (it's not "FRCP Rule 12," because the "R" in FRCP already stands for "Rule") does not "state express limitations" on when pleadings can be stricken.
Here is what an express limitation looks like: "Courts may not strike a pleading unless A, B, or C."
Here is what an express limitation also looks like: "Courts may not strike a pleading if A, B, or C."
Here is what an express limitation also looks like: "Courts may only strike a pleading if A, B, or C."
Here is what an express limitation does not look like: "Courts may strike a pleading if A, B, or C." You might want to infer that D is not grounds to strike a pleading, but inference is literally the opposite of express.
David, may I ask in what areas of law you've practiced? Don't worry, I'm not one of those creeps who tries to cause problems for people because of what they write. I'm just trying to understand the statements and questions you've written today.
Well, you say that court filings are the exercise of free expression rights. But I notice that you don't actually cite any cases that discuss court filings (as opposed to speech by lawyers more broadly).
As a general matter, courts do not treat court filings as means of communicating in general; they are only means for engaging in the business of the courts. There are all sorts of rules constraining who may file things in court, what those filings must contain, what those filings may not contain, and so on. "[A] lawyer's in-court advocacy is not protected speech under the First Amendment." Matter of Jordan (Kan. 2022). Even if there is any such right, “[I]n the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely circumscribed.” Gentile v. State Bar (1991). The same principles apply to written filings.
Professor Volokh, really? Really, do I need to "actually cite any cases that discuss court filings (as opposed to speech by lawyers more broadly)" as being within the freedom of expression and communication secured by the First Amendment? Do you actually doubt that "court filings (as opposed to speech by lawyers more broadly)" clearly are exercises of the freedom of expression and communication secured by the First Amendment? Isn't it obvious to you that words put into writing necessarily are exercises of the freedom of expression and communication secured by the First Amendment? What principles would cause you to even doubt that words put into writing necessarily are exercises of the freedom of expression and communication secured by the First Amendment?
Only if you don't want us to point at you and laugh.
Yes.
No.
David, your post here is exactly what I mean. I'm pretty sure that nothing I've seen you write led me to believe that you were a lawyer. I honestly don't even believe it now because the things you write are so totally devoid of any comprehension of even the most obvious legal issues and principles.
Professor Volokh, no offense intended because I know you are far smarter than I am, but any halfwit can quote Gentile v. State Bar (1991) for the proposition that “in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely circumscribed.”
Generations of judges have designed decisions to deceive Americans and deprive us of our privileges and immunities with that idiotic assertion. That far-less-than-half-truth straw man in irrelevant dictum is the darling of judicial despots.
First, you do or should know that assertion is not only obiter dictum, but it also is utterly irrelevant. That decision (and the underlying state action) clearly did not even address ANY speech of ANYONE inside any courtroom.
Second, the truth is far greater and simpler. Every “person” is entitled to “due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV. Nobody (including judges, lawyers, jurors, parties, witnesses or observers) has any contrary right or power. Even so, copious law protects copious speech by lawyers, litigants, witnesses and jurors in courtrooms and court papers.
I'm going to go with Sea Lion. AI Sea Lion.
Professor Volokh, I'll do better than give you a mere citation. Please see the 303 Creative majority opinion. which included the following. Please note the repeated use of "all," i.e., “all persons," "all, including” any speaker or writer “whose motives” someone considers “misinformed or offensive.” “All manner of speech” and "all views."
“The First Amendment” means “all persons are free to think and speak as they wish, not as the government demands.” It secures the “freedom to think as you will” and “speak as you think.” It “extends to all persons engaged in expressive conduct, including those who seek profit.” Its “protections belong to all, including” speakers or printers “whose motives” someone considers “misinformed or offensive.” It “protects” each person's “right to speak his mind regardless of whether the government considers his speech sensible” or “misguided,” even if it causes someone “anguish” or “incalculable grief.”
“All manner of speech” enjoys “First Amendment’s protections.” “A commitment to speech for only some messages and some persons is no commitment at all.”
“The freedom of thought and speech” is “indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.” “[A]llowing all views to flourish” is necessary to “test and improve our own thinking” as “individuals and as a Nation,” so it is a “fixed star in our constitutional constellation” that “government may not interfere” with the “marketplace of ideas.”
Bearing in mind all that I've presented to you today, is there any doubt in your brilliant mind that court filings are exercises of "the freedom of speech, or of the press" secured by the First Amendment, and which may be (as stated in Ward) subject to regulation that complies with (i.e., does not violate) the relevant rules? Is there any doubt in your brilliant mind that court filings are protected by the burdens of proof stated in SCOTUS precedent construing and applying the freedom of speech and press?
There is certainty in my mind that court filings are not exercises of "the freedom of speech, or of the press," as normally understood. I've pointed you to cases so holding, and of course actual practice in our courts is to sharply limit what can be said in court filings -- for the quite sensible reason that filings aren't supposed to be communications to the world, but parts of the adjudicative process.
You have a vision for how our legal system should operate. It is partly a substantive vision about what the rules should be. It is partly a vision of what constitutes law binding on district courts (you seem to conclude that a federal court in the Eleventh Circuit should set aside Eleventh Circuit precedents in favor of your reading of the Rules of Civil Procedure). And it is partly a vision of how precedents should be read: You think that general statements in precedents, which arise in a particular context (e.g., as to regulations that require a private person to create certain speech), are automatically generalizable to very different contexts (regulations on what can and can't be said in court filings).
But that's not how our legal system works. In the words of Nealy v. Warner Chappell Music, Inc. (11th Cir. 2023),
I think you know that as well as I know that. I'm just worried that some readers might not know that, and might understand your confident-sounding assertions as being about our legal system as it actually operates. Instead, they are about a different legal system that is the product of your vision of how it should operate.
Professor Volokh, you said "There is certainty in my mind that court filings are not exercises of "the freedom of speech, or of the press," as normally understood. I've pointed you to cases so holding."
I'm going to challenge you by saying that your statement is actually legally frivolous. You actually know that the expression of words in "court filings" is an exercise of "the freedom of speech, or of the press, as normally understood." You actually know that contending otherwise makes no sense legally or factually. Please prove me wrong. Please show me any court specifically holding that court filings are not an exercise of the freedom of speech or of the press as normally understood.
I know you're sufficiently intelligent and experienced to know what constitutes a court holding. I know that you know (or you should know by now) that the words you quoted from Gentile were mere dicta that was utterly irrelevant (and did not even accurately characterize the facts of that case. I know that you know (or you should know by now) that other opinions repeating that dicta never stated any such holding. But if you think you can find such a holding, please show me. I've looked for it, and I cannot find it.
I also know that you know that words written on paper clearly are within "the freedom of speech, or of the press as normally understood," and I'm confident that you know (because you appear to have tried to find it) that no legal authority even attempts to explain how filing something in court somehow magically converts such speech into something that is not an exercise of the freedom of speech.
Professor Volokh, I think every court filing I've ever made was subject to a limitation expressed in terms of the number of "words" or the number of "pages." Take a SCOTUS petition for cert. The rules expressly limit it to 9,000 words. It is required to be "printed" in a particular format. What possible basis in fact or in law could you have for contending that printed documents comprising 9,000 words are "not exercises of 'the freedom of speech, or of the press,' as normally understood"?
How do they magically convert from being "exercises of 'the freedom of speech, or of the press,' as normally understood" before filing with a court, but somehow cease being "exercises of 'the freedom of speech, or of the press,' as normally understood" upon filing with a court?
Professor Volokh, I do know and agree with the statement in Nealy. The court certainly was correct that "we must consider the context" including the material "facts of the case."
The context necessarily is expressly addressed in the First Amendment. We are talking specifically about court filings, which necessarily are documents. Briefs and petitions almost always are required to be printed and required to be below a specified word or page limitation. Complaints (as FRCP Rule 8 emphasizes) necessarily consist of a "statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction" a "statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" and "a demand for the relief sought."
How can you (or any judge) rationally believe any of the foregoing is not an exercise of the freedom of speech or press merely because it was filed with a court? The very precise freedom of speech and press at issue is expressed in writing in the actual rules permitting such court filings. Court rules of procedure are obviously restrictions on the time, place and manner.
Professor Volokh, we should start where SCOTUS recently said to start.
Again, I ask you to identify any principle that could cause you to believe that words written in a court filing somehow are not expression or communication that is within "the freedom of speech, or of the press."
An “Amendment’s plain text covers” the freedom of expression and communication, so “the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022). Each court must “justify” any “regulation” thereof, i.e., “must demonstrate” that any sanction for any court filing was “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition” of protecting speech/petitions. Id. Each court “must affirmatively prove that” such sanction was within this nation’s “historical tradition” of protecting speech/petitions within “the outer bounds” of each “right.” Id. at 19.
“An informed, independent judiciary” must have “an informed, independent bar.” Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001). Judges cannot “prohibit[ ] speech and expression upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise” of “judicial power.” Id.
Judges and “courts depend” on an “independent bar” for “the proper performance of [judges’ and courts’ constitutional] duties and responsibilities. Restricting” conscientious, capable “attorneys” from “presenting arguments and analyses to the courts distorts the legal system by altering the traditional” (constitutional) “role” of “attorneys.” Id. at 544.
Judges cannot “exclude from litigation those arguments and theories” they deem “unacceptable but which by their nature are within the province of the courts to consider.” Id. at 546.
Please also consider Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 137 (1961) (Black, Douglas, JJ., Warren, C.J., dissenting):
The “important role” of “lawyers” in “our society” makes it “imperative that [lawyers] not be discriminated against” regarding “freedoms that are designed to protect” Americans “against the tyrannical exertion of governmental power. [Indeed,] the great purposes underlying [such] freedoms [include affording] independence to those who must discharge important public responsibilities. [Lawyers], with responsibilities as great as those placed upon any group in our society, must have that independence.”
Professor Volokh, regarding the arbitrary distinction you made (between attorney speech in a courtroom and attorney speech in court filings) Gentile did not address (or even pretend to address) any court filing. It addressed actual verbal speech. It addressed speech completely outside a court and obviously outside any court proceedings. Even the language you quoted purported to address actual verbal speech, albeit inside a courtroom and during "judicial proceedings."
I'm going to follow your fragmentation process here, since you seem so enamored of it.
Weird renaming, but association? Where is that mentioned in the First Amendment? Do you have some super super secret first draft passed down the male line?
Nope. No freedom of association, unless you think the only association worth protect is assembling.
Stupid Government Tricks, your comments compel me to ask you the same question I asked David Nieporent: are you a lawyer or are you just someone making up stuff about which you know virtually (or actually) nothing? That's a serious question. Are you a lawyer?
If you're a lawyer, you do or should know that your assertions (in this forum regarding this issue) are shamefully ignorant of the law:
"association? Where is that mentioned in the First Amendment? Do you have some super super secret first draft passed down the male line?
Nope. No freedom of association, unless you think the only association worth protect is assembling."
In this very thread, I provided the following from SCOTUS back in 1963:
Courts “may not prohibit” any “modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments” by merely invoking the mere general “power to regulate the legal profession.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. U.S. 415, 428-429 (1963). Judges “may not, under the [mere] guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore” (knowingly violate) “constitutional rights” of lawyers or litigants. Id. at 439. Clearly, “it is no answer” to “constitutional claims” that the mere “purpose of” any “regulations” (court rules or rulings) “was merely to insure high professional standards.” Id. at 438-439.
Do you think they just made up the freedom of association? If you're a lawyer, look it up. If you admit you're not a lawyer, I'll show you more.
My objection to your fragmented quotes has nothing to do with lawyering.
Nobody thought that on its face, Trump’s complaint stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dismissal at the outset is thus appropriate.
Kafantaris, what actual law (rule of procedure) says that "Dismissal at the outset is thus appropriate" here.