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Free Speech

Judge Barbara Lagoa (11th Cir.) Criticizes New York Times v. Sullivan

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From Judge Lagoa's concurrence in Friday's Dershowitz v. CNN, Inc. (and see also Judge Charles Wilson's concurrence taking the opposite view):

In New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, the Court usurped control over [the] field of speech-related torts and invented "a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Three years later, this same rule was extended to "public figures" in addition to public officials…. [In 1974,] the Court held for the first time that falsity and harm were not enough, and even private plaintiffs must show some sort of "fault," negligence at the least, to recover for defamation. And, even with that proof of culpable fault, damages were not presumed but had to be proven … [and] no plaintiff could recover punitive damages for defamation without showing Sullivan-style malice. With this series of cases … one generation of the Supreme Court succeeded in imposing federal constitutional limitations (seemingly untethered to the Constitution's original meaning) on all defamation claims brought by all manner of plaintiffs.

Justice White recognized the ill-fated trajectory of this line of cases after originally joining the majority in Sullivan…. Justice White elaborated on the central problem in Sullivan: A people who govern themselves, as the Founders intended us to do, are entitled to adequate information about their government and their representatives, and that essential flow of information warrants First Amendment protection; but protecting lies—by insulating those who spread them behind an iron barrier, to be breached only by a showing of actual malice—does nothing to support an informed populus and, instead, has the contrary effect of leaving lies uncorrected. … "Also, by leaving the lie uncorrected, the New York Times rule plainly leaves the public official without a remedy for the damage to his reputation. Yet the Court has observed that the individual's right to the protection of his own good name is a basic consideration of our constitutional system, reflecting our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."

As the Court concluded in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues." But that is precisely Sullivan's effect. Under the actual-malice standard, the public's "only chance of being accurately informed is measured by the public [figure's] ability himself to counter the lie, unaided by the courts. That is a decidedly weak reed to depend on for the vindication of First Amendment interests." … "While the argument that public figures need less protection because they can command media attention to counter criticism may be true for some very prominent people, even then it is the rare case where the denial overtakes the original charge. Denials, retractions, and corrections are not 'hot' news, and rarely receive the prominence of the original story."

Quite the journey we have taken from Sullivan's attempt to protect the public's interest in being fully informed on matters of public import. But that, in fact, precisely identifies the error at the heart of Sullivan: In "federaliz[ing] major aspects of libel law by declaring unconstitutional in important respects the prevailing defamation law in all or most of the 50 States," the Court "made little effort to ground [its] holdings in the original meaning of the Constitution." …

What, then, does the original meaning of the First Amendment tell us about the propriety of an actual-malice standard? To understand the original meaning of the First Amendment is to understand law as those who ratified it did. Our starting place is, therefore, the natural law and our accompanying natural rights as they were understood pre-ratification. Natural rights are those that we possess innately as human beings; their existence does not depend on government endowment. See generally Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 Yale L.J. 246, 268–80 (2017). As to expression, our Founders recognized a variety of natural rights, including (as relevant here) speaking, writing, and publishing. [Historical evidence omitted. -EV] The "liberty of the press," meaning the freedom to print information, fell within the scope of natural rights that pre-existed our Bill of Rights. Closely related to freedom of the press—distinct, according to some; overlapping according to others—was the freedom to publish, most closely encapsulating that which we now think of as "journalism." There is little doubt, then, that our Founding generation recognized the freedoms to think, speak, write, print, and share ideas as natural rights endowed in the people by their Creator, not their government.

With the natural right established, we turn to the limits the government was authorized to impose on speech. Those limits turn on two central inquiries: the scope of the natural right and the extent to which we, as a people, agreed to some restraint of the natural right in exchange for the benefits that nationhood offered. Enter here the concept of natural law, which, at the least, provides the understanding that, regardless of any government structure, one individual may not interfere with another's natural rights. See Campbell at 271; Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 Yale L.J. 907, 922–30 (1993) ("[B]eing equally free, individuals did not have a right to infringe the equal rights of others, and, correctly understood, even self-preservation typically required individuals to cooperate—to avoid doing unto others what they would not have others do unto them." (citing John Locke, Two Treatises of Government). As James Wilson explained it in his 1790 Lectures on Law, as to avoiding injury and injustice under the natural law, each person may act "for the accomplishment of those purposes, in such a manner, and upon such objects, as his inclination and judgment shall direct; provided he does no injury to others; and provided some publick interests do not demand his labours. This right is natural liberty." …

Jud Campbell has … explain[ed] that "whether inherently limited by natural law or qualified by an imagined social contract, retained natural rights were circumscribed by political authority to pursue the general welfare. Decisions about the public good, however, were left to the people and their representatives—not to judges—thus making natural rights more of a constitutional lodestar than a source of judicially enforceable law." Thus, the Founders simultaneously understood that freedom of speech was both a natural right not dependent on government creation, and also subject to certain limitations for the public good—so long as those limitations did not abridge the natural right as it existed in a system of natural law. And while the freedoms of speech and of the press were both viewed as natural rights, they were viewed as properly subject to different regulation, with recognition that written statements were "more extended" and "more strongly fixed," thus "posing a greater threat to public order."

We turn next to the contours of the natural right and the natural law, and the types of restriction that were viewed as consistent with those boundaries. The Founders widely believed that "opinions," as James Madison observed to his colleagues, "are not the objects of legislation." In other words, opinion, understood as non-volitional thought, was not subject to government regulation at the time of the Founding.

But the freedom of opinion raises another question: What forms an opinion? History confirms that the freedom to express opinions was, indeed, limited to honest statements and did not encompass dishonesty or deceit. For instance, even in the debates over the Sedition Act, a persistent and widespread consensus emerged that "well-intentioned statements of opinion, including criticisms of government, were constitutionally shielded."

Consistent with the notion that the natural right to free speech coexisted with a limitation forbidding injurious lies, "10 of the 14 States that had ratified the Constitution by 1792 had themselves provided constitutional guarantees for free expression, and 13 of the 14 nevertheless provided for the prosecution of libels." …

What do we take away from the original sources? As the Supreme Court observed in Roth, "[t]he protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people," but such assurance focused on the exchange of ideas in service of advancing truth and imposed no additional burdens to recovery based on the harmed party's station in society. In a 1774 letter to the inhabitants of Quebec, the Continental Congress expressed the following objective:

The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.

This statement from the Continental Congress … supports a conclusion that "[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests." Among those "excludable" expressions, we can only conclude, are those that patently do not serve "the advancement of truth."

Notably absent from the historical discussion is anything resembling a heightened requirement making it more difficult to prosecute libel or slander directed at an official (much less a "public figure") rather than a private citizen. On the contrary, the accepted consensus was that public officials could sue for libel "upon the same footing with a private individual" because "[t]he character of every man should be deemed equally sacred, and of consequence entitled to equal remedy." Tunis Wortman, A Treatise, Concerning Political Enquiry, and the Liberty of the Press (1800); accord St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States with Selected Writings (1803) ("[T]he judicial courts of the respective states are open to all persons alike, for the redress of injuries of this nature; there, no distinction is made between one individual and another; the farmer, and the man in authority, stand upon the same ground: both are equally entitled to redress for any false aspersion on their respective characters, nor is there any thing in our laws or constitution which abridges this right.").

From all this, I conclude, as Justice White did in Gertz, that "[s]cant, if any, evidence exists that the First Amendment was intended to abolish the common law of libel, at least to the extent of depriving ordinary citizens of meaningful redress against their defamers." What the historical documents suggest is that, in its original context, the First Amendment was intended to protect free dissemination of ideas—all manner of ideas, particularly those out of fashion or disfavored—but not the dissemination of lies. See, e.g., 10 Benjamin Franklin Writings 38 (1907) ("If by the Liberty of the Press were understood merely the Liberty of discussing the Propriety of Public Measures and political opinions, let us have as much of it as you please: But if it means the Liberty of affronting, calumniating, and defaming one another, I, for my part, own myself willing to part with my Share of it when our Legislators shall please so to alter the Law, and shall cheerfully consent to exchange my Liberty of Abusing others for the Privilege of not being abus'd myself."); Frank Luther Mott, Jefferson and the Press 14 (1943) (explaining that Thomas Jefferson endorsed the language of the First Amendment as ratified only after suggesting that "[t]he people shall not be deprived of their right to speak, to write, or otherwise to publish anything but false facts affecting injuriously the life, liberty or reputation of others").

And we held onto that principle for the first two centuries of our national existence. Just a decade before Sullivan, the Supreme Court reiterated as much, explaining that "[l]ibelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues behind the phrase 'clear and present danger.'" But, as we know, this interpretation of the First Amendment, true to its original meaning, fell apart shortly thereafter….

As expressed by Justice White, Sullivan and its progeny represent "an ill-considered exercise of the power entrusted to [the] Court." The lasting effect of Sullivan, as anyone who ever turns on the news or opens a social media app knows well, is that media organizations can "cast false aspersions on public figures with near impunity," causing untold harm to public figures and the general public alike. Jettisoning the original meaning of the First Amendment—and centuries of common law faithful to that meaning—has left us in an untenable place, where by virtue of having achieved some bit of notoriety in the public sphere, defamation victims are left with scant chance at recourse for clear harms.

But until the Supreme Court reconsiders Sullivan, we are bound by it, and I therefore must concur.