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On the Status of Judicial Independence in the American Constitutional Order
My new paper on judicial independence as a constitutional construction.
I have posted a new paper on "Judicial Independence as a Constitutional Construction."
The paper builds on the notion of constitutional construction and the role constructions play in our constitutional politics and in structuring the workings of our constitutional system. It focuses on the specific context of judicial independence and contestation over how valuable that ideal actually is and how it should be realized in practice. Current proposals to reform the courts might unsettle long-established understandings of how the judiciary should operate, but such efforts to unsettle and reform established constitutional practices and understandings have happened before.
From the abstract:
An independent judiciary, in the American context, might best be understood as a constitutional construction. That is, it is a politically constructed set of practices, institutions, and norms that extend but do not contradict the legal requirements of the formal constitution. As such, judicial independence has come to occupy a fundamental status within our inherited constitutional order. But importantly, it is mutable. Our inherited practice of judicial independence has been built up, and fought over, across time, and within the contours of the written constitution can be significantly reconstructed.
The example of judicial independence can serve as a useful illustration of the significance of unwritten practices to our constitutional order. This also provides an opportunity to examine how judicial independence was constructed, and contested, across American history. As current activists and politicians raise questions anew about the future of judicial independence in America, these current debates can be situated within a long history of debates about the proper role, composition, and structure of American courts. This Article reviews those debates regarding federal courts in the Jeffersonian era, state courts in the Jacksonian era, and the Supreme Court in the New Deal era.
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Given the likelyhood that Humphrey's Executor v. United States will be revisited, it would be refreshing to see an article on executive independence.
What are the limits on how much Congress can order the Predident to do or not do?
What are the limits to judges second-guessing the President?
On one hand, POTUS can be considered the most powerful person in the world. On the other hand, he can be the least powerful person in government, subject to countless constraining acts of Congress, plus judicial review of almost everything he says or does. The only uncontestable action he can take is to use the nuclear football.
Such extreme vagueness makes American Democracy look silly.
Your comment reflects problems written about by others about the problems with presidentialism. Among the three main forms of governance (presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential) presidentialism is generally considered the worst by several measures.
An essay that explains the problems with presidentialism, and discusses some of the issues you raise really goes into it in depth: https://libertyseekingrebel.blogspot.com/2022/11/the-problems-with-presidentialism.html?m=1
"On the Status of Judicial Independence in the American Constitutional Order"
What difference, at this point, does it make?
The only thing the current judiciary is independent of is respect.
Is this one of those amusing paradoxes that in order for the judiciary to show their independence they have to go along with Trump?
Or they have to oppose him. Does it not depend on one’s political perspective?
"The formal pillars of judicial independence enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, such as judges holding offices during good behavior ... , offer critical protections for individual judges against political reprisal. Alexander Hamilton, ... , lauded these provisions as indispensable for securing firmness and independence, ..." (excerpt pg. 54)
I read the post above, and the Paper's footnotes and Conclusion. The above statement is without apparent basis in the article (based on where footnotes discuss "good behavior"), and recorded history.
I would appreciate knowing if Prof. Whittington or any reader is able to direct me to a listing (article) identifying any (all) Article. III. judges removed for "bad Behaviour" (not Article. II. "impeachment") during the last 236 years, or judges in the Colonies removed prior to 1789. ...
If not readily available, perhaps the readers could participate in compiling such a list here. (We can include "magistrates" removed prior to the end of their appointment, but please include the identified "bad Behaviour" and if the supervising Article. III. judge suffered any consequences ?)
"bad Behaviour" has been discussed in other articles I am aware of, and as such I suspect "self-enrichment" would yet be considered "bad Behaviour", as well an "other high Misdemeanor".
Self-anointing one's self with "life tenure" when one only "hold[s] their Office[] during good Behaviour" would appear to be "self-enrichment". ... Did not J. Sotomayor and J. Kavanaugh recently claim on separate occasions just such an "enrichment" ?
"The formal pillar[] of judicial independence enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, such as judges holding offices during good behavior ..." appears as real and substantive as California's "high speed rail train to nowhere".
I have no idea what you're saying here. Are you claiming that the "good behavior" clause is self-executing or something?
There's a thought; needs a bit of development.
Why did you not ask Prof. Whittington that question: "self-executing or [by another means]" ? … He states: “formal pillar[] of judicial independence … holding offices during good behavior ... , offer critical protection[] for individual judges against political reprisal …” He seems to suggest that a judge not exhibiting “good behavior” could suffer “reprisal”, e.g., “removal(?)”.
What’s that “formal pillar” made of, … “wasted words” ?
Perhaps "text, history, tradition" has provided an alternative to "impeachment" with its limits and inherent "political purposes".
Could be that the "one supreme Court" created through delegated Powers evidenced in Article. III. of the Constitution, as a whole one of the three branches of the federal government, was intended to have responsibility for administrative matters over the “inferior Courts” including ensuring "qualified personnel" (i.e., should "Advice and Consent" produce too many "politicized, otherwise corrupt or incompetent/incapacitated jurists") as well as the general "quality control" responsibility, i.e., judicial review, for the "inferior Courts as the Congress may ... ordain and establish."
Separately, if Congress can "ordain and establish" perhaps it could (given it has "power of the purse") "defrock and defund" any or all of the "inferior Courts"; even "remove", using "text, history, tradition", a sitting member of the "supreme Court" for "bad Behaviour". ... Not that there are enough members with the requisite intellect and integrity in Congress to actually act on their individual and collective Oaths of Office.
I think you already know this list. I tried asking AI your question and I do not think it provided any names you did not already know. The AI response:
Fifteen federal judges have been impeached by the U.S. House, and eight of those were convicted by the Senate and removed from office. Their “bad behavior” ranged from outright criminal conduct to abuse of office. Here are the ones who were actually removed:
1. John Pickering (1804) – U.S. District Court, District of New Hampshire – removed for drunkenness on the bench and unlawful rulings.
2. West H. Humphreys (1862) – U.S. District Court, Tennessee – removed for supporting the Confederacy.
3. Robert W. Archbald (1913) – U.S. Commerce Court – removed for corrupt dealings with litigants.
4. Halsted L. Ritter (1936) – U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida – removed for favoritism and tax evasion.
5. Harry E. Claiborne (1986) – U.S. District Court, Nevada – removed after conviction for tax evasion.
6. Alcee L. Hastings (1989) – U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida – removed for bribery and perjury.
7. Walter L. Nixon, Jr. (1989) – U.S. District Court, Southern District of Mississippi – removed for perjury before a grand jury.
8. G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. (2010) – U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana – removed for corruption, perjury, and accepting bribes.
So while the Constitution’s Article III “good Behaviour” clause is the standard, the actual removal mechanism has always been impeachment and Senate conviction.
Thank you for your response.
The obvious lack of any other response (including the "obvious (for the academics and 'much cited')" answered my questions.
The US Constitution is merely a piece of parchment until resurrected with "blood" of those who believe, versus "get paid by the word".
All other discussions are "academic": "publish or perish."
A more timely article would cover the status of judicial tyranny in the American constitutional order.