Illinois Court Dismisses Defamation Suit Based on Allegations that Plaintiff Teacher Was "Anti-White" etc.

The court does, however, leave open the possibility that the plaintiff can file an amended complaint that can go forward.

From last Friday's Appellate Court of Illinois decision in Sebaggala v. Levinson, written by Justice Celia Gamrath and joined by Justices Sanjay Tailor and Michael Hyman:

According to the operative complaint, Sebaggala is a Black fourth-grade public-school teacher and a member of Abolition Coalition, a group of citizens who "support and advocate for diversity and anti-racism in Niles Township, Illinois schools." Levinson is the founder of NTAC, an organization whose primary goal is "to keep politics out of schools." Plaintiffs allege Levinson uses this platform to make "bigoted remarks" about members of minority groups.

In 2020 and 2021, Sebaggala and Levinson argued about politics and social issues on Facebook and other social media…. Levinson's statements about Sebaggala during this period [are alleged to have] constituted "a protracted and unlawful campaign of harassment," which we summarize as follows:

• On November 4, 2020, Sebaggala attended a Black Lives Matter protest organized by Abolition Coalition. Levinson stated on NTAC's social media that Sebaggala was protesting "in support of inappropriate conduct by a [District 219] board member."
• On June 8, 2021, Sebaggala attended a "Protest & Anti-Racism Celebration" hosted by Abolition Coalition to oppose police officers in schools. Levinson posted a video of the event on social media, referring to Sebaggala and other attendees as "agitators," and opining it was unacceptable for a teacher to advocate removing officers from schools.
• On August 8, 2021, Levinson referred to Sebaggala as "anti-white, anti-semetic [sic], anti-conservative, [and] anti-moderate" in a Facebook post.

On August 31, 2021, Levinson sent a 14-page letter to Sebaggala's employer, alleging "Sebaggala's activity perpetuates an anti-white sentiment that is ethically and morally wrong." In the letter, Levinson:

• States that Sebaggala and other members of Abolition Coalition engaged in "intimidation tactics," "verbal abuse," and "bullying" against parents and school board members, including "anti-white rhetoric" and "calling parents and board members racists, white supremacists, white nationalists, bigots, and misogynists."
• Claims that on July 27, 2021, after the school board did not vote for Sebaggala to fill a board vacancy, "a riot nearly broke out" and some school board members "required security to escort them to their cars."
• Provides screenshots of Sebaggala's Facebook posts, which she characterizes as "anti-white hate speech," "racist," and "offensive," and argues Sebaggala's posts serve no purpose except to "creat[e] tension and reactions on both sides."
• Asks, "[H]ow are white children in [Sebaggala's] classroom being treated? … [D]oes Ms. Sebaggala's in-person and online activity violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act …?"
• Concludes by stating, "Please take the time to address this complaint with Ms. Sebaggala. I would like this shared with the Board of Education members, administration, and teachers of District 65. … Lastly, I would like confirmation that this complaint was reported to Human Resources and added to her employee file."

According to plaintiffs, Levinson knew these allegations were "entirely false," and she "wanted to damage Sebaggala's career for the sole reason that Sebaggala is a Black teacher who supports Black Lives Matter." In response to the letter, Sebaggala's employer assigned a principal to observe Sebaggala's classroom. Sebaggala claims she "suffered a loss of reputation in her community and among her coworkers." …

Plaintiffs (Sebaggala and Abolition Coalition) sued for, among other things, defamation, "alleg[ing] Levinson falsely accused Sebaggala of falsifying racist events, threatening bodily injury to defendants and police officers, committing 'child abuse,' segregating students based on race, attempting to start a riot, and violating the Civil Rights Act." The appellate court held that they hadn't adequately alleged specific defamatory statements, but it left plaintiff another chance to amend the complaint:

"[A] defamation per se claim [i.e., a claim brought in the absence of a showing of specific damages -EV] must be pled with a heightened level of precision and particularity." … [The defamation claim] in its current form does not meet this standard and was properly dismissed, as follows.

Some of the statements alleged … are affirmatively rebutted by exhibits attached to the complaint. For instance, plaintiffs allege Levinson defamed them by saying Sebaggala "attempted to start a 'riot' in multiple school board meetings." However, Levinson's letter says only that "a riot nearly broke out" when the board did not vote to seat Sebaggala. It does not accuse Sebaggala of inciting it.

A few statements alleged to be defamation are not defamation at all because they are either true, as proven by the video of Sebaggala's public comments and posts of Sebaggala herself, or they can be given an innocent construction… [U]nder the innocent construction rule [imposed by Illinois law], if a statement may reasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff, it is not actionable per se ….

Other statements alleged in the complaint may be deemed mere opinions, not facts capable of being proven true or false (e.g., racist, Marxists, Communists). When stated in general terms, as is the case here, they are nonactionable. See Coghlan, 2013 IL App (1st) 120891, ¶ 50 (and cases cited therein) (a harsh characterization that merely amounts to loose, figurative language that no reasonable person would believe presented facts, is not defamation, e.g., calling someone the "biggest crook on the planet," "trashy," a "traitor," "a rip-off, a fraud, a scandal, a snake-oil job," and using the term "blackmail" were all nonactionable); Ward v. Forest Preserve District of Winnebago County, 13 Ill. App. 2d 257 (1957) (saying "You are a Communist" is not slander per se and is non-actionable without special damages); Flickinger v. King, 385 So.3d 504, 514-15 (2023) (use of the term "racist" is not actionable as defamation); Law Offices of David Freydin v. Chamara, 24 F.4th 1122, 1131 (7th Cir. 2022) (under Illinois defamation law, comments such as "hypocrite," "chauvinist," and "racist" are not actionable when stated in general terms, without asserting specific factual support); Younge v. Berman, 2025 IL App (2d) 240354, ¶ 48 ("it is not defamation to inquire [with an employer] whether [an employee] has broken the law" and asking if this is "how [they] want [their] company represented").

This is not to say such words may never amount to defamation. But to be actionable they must be accompanied by specific factual support and pleaded with a heightened level of specificity. In Green, our supreme court held that plaintiff's "vague and generic" allegation that defendant accused plaintiff of "abus[ing] players, coaches, and umpires" was insufficient to state a cause of action for defamation per se. The court observed that "abuse" can mean to "reproach coarsely" or to "violate sexually." By not pleading either the actual words or the type of "abuse" to which defendant referred, plaintiff made it "virtually impossible" for defendant to formulate an intelligent defense.

The same is true here. Plaintiffs allege in general terms that Levinson called Sebaggala a "child abuser," said she "abuses white children in her class," "threaten[ed] bodily harm to defendants," and "threaten[ed] harm against police officers." Plaintiffs do not plead the type of abuse to which Levinson referred, and these statements do not appear in Levinson's letter or in the social media posts attached to the complaint. Plaintiffs give no details as to what Levinson actually said, when she said it, or to whom she said it. As such, plaintiffs have not met the heightened pleading standard applicable to defamation per se.

Nonetheless, if specific facts can be pled, some of Levinson's alleged statements may give rise to defamation per se. They strike at the heart of Sebaggala's profession and could suggest she lacks the ability or integrity to perform her job as a teacher. Such was the case in Kumaran where we held the plaintiff could state a cause for defamation per se based on defendants' remarks in an article (e.g., eight-ball, paranoid, and scam), which imputed a lack of integrity and impeached his reputation as a teacher. Although plaintiffs' complaint falls short of what was pled in Kumaran, they should be allowed one last opportunity to amend count I of their complaint to plead specific facts, if they can, to state a cause of action for defamation per se….

Based on the record and given the severity of accusations directed at Sebaggala's profession, we are not prepared to say quite yet that repleading a claim for defamation per se would be futile. Indeed, if plaintiffs can prove Levinson made false statements of fact (not opinion) that are not protected by innocent construction and fall within one of the five categories of defamation per se, damages are presumed, and recovery is certain. However, if, on remand, they fail to allege sufficient facts under the heightened pleading standard, they ought not be permitted to proceed with the defamation per se claim and this case should end….

Justice Hyman joined the majority, but added this:

In this era of social media, protecting individuals from false and harmful public accusations ensures justice in individual cases and maintains civility and truthfulness in public discourse. I write separately to pose a question regarding social media and claims of defamation.

People now communicate in ways that were unimaginable before the advent of social media; however, social media has also amplified the harm that false and defamatory statements can cause. Reputations painstakingly built over the years can now be destroyed in seconds by a single post that spreads with viral speed. While much of the legal conversation has centered on the responsibility of media outlets and the liability of online platforms, little attention has been paid to whether defamation law itself needs rethinking.

Any effort to curb the abuses of social media must be approached with caution, ever mindful of the fundamental protections guaranteed by the First Amendment. The challenge is not whether to act, but how. Thus, my question: How can we uphold free expression while protecting individuals from reputational harm in a digital age where the consequences are more severe and the reach broader than ever before?

This challenge will become increasingly urgent in the years to come, and the law must be prepared to respond with both fidelity to constitutional values and sensitivity to the character and livelihood of individuals.