Court Rejects Lawyer's and Client's Libel Claim Over Inside Higher Ed's Coverage of Title IX Suits

The court appears unmoved by the claim that an earlier ruling sent the "wrong message ... that people of color (all the plaintiffs are Latino) do not have a chance to get their day in this Honorable Court."

From last Friday's opinion by Philadelphia County (Pa.) Common Pleas Court Judge Lyris Younge in Jauregui Law Firm v. Inside Higher Ed (appeal pending):

Plaintiffs Jauregui Law Firm, Raul Jauregui Esquire, and Daniel Boye … [sued] Defendants Inside Higher Ed, Johanna Alonso, Dyller Solomon Law Firm and Barry Dyller Esquire … alleging defamation, false light and commercial disparagement. The suit arises from an article authored by Johanna Alonso and published by Inside Higher Ed on June 13, 2023 …[, which] is a brief synopsis of a series of Title IX suits stemming from an alleged rape that occurred at King's College in Wilkes-Barre Pennsylvania. [The article appears to be this one, though it bears a June 14, 2023 date. -EV]

In under five pages, the Article describes an initial Title IX suit filed by a female student against Plaintiff Daniel Boye, three Title IX counter-suits filed by Mr. Boye against the female student, her mother and her friend, and yet another suit filed by the three women against Mr. Boye and Mr. Jauregui alleging that Mr. Boye's counter-suits constituted an abuse of the legal process and were a deterrent designed to intimidate the women. The Article notes that Mr. Boye was expelled from King's College. In addition, the Article quotes attorneys involved in the suits (including Mr. Jauregui) and a Title IX expert, discusses the potential legal implications of Title IX "countersuits", and whether Title IX proceedings at colleges constitute quasi-legal proceedings….

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the Article is substantially true and accurate. The Plaintiffs claim that the Article is "vile," "drips with venomous derogatory false fact," and was written and published by "depraved liars … who claim to be journalists." However, despite the Article's brevity, the Plaintiffs are unable to point to any material falsity contained therein.

Plaintiffs' examples of alleged defamation are convoluted, semantic, but not defamatory. For example, Plaintiffs argue that the statement "the University ultimately found the female student was not responsible for any sexual misconduct, while the male student, Daniel Boye, was found responsible for rape and expelled" is defamatory because it implies that Mr. Boye was found guilty or liable for rape in a formal court. This argument betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of defamation because the Article's statement is literally true and does not portray Title IX proceedings at King's College as formal trials in a civil or criminal court. Plaintiffs even argue the Article's mere use of the term "rape" is defamatory because the term should only be applicable after being adjudicated in court. This argument is also without merit; Plaintiffs are not able to supplement colloquial understandings of common terms with their own hyper-specific definitions.

The Plaintiffs' complaint contains numerous other examples of opinion being misconstrued as fact, common words and phrases being assigned new, convoluted definitions, and instances where quotes by individuals interviewed in the Article are somehow attributed to the Defendants. It is unclear to this Court how allowing this case to proceed to discovery would transform the content of a substantially true and accurate article into something defamatory; Plaintiffs' aversion to the Article's content alone provides no basis for any of the causes of action asserted.

Additionally, the Defendants are protected by the Fair Report Privilege. The law has long recognized a privilege for the press to publish accounts of official proceedings or reports even when these contain defamatory comments; so long as the account presents a fair and accurate summary of the proceedings, the law abandons the assumption that the reporter adopts the defamatory remarks as his own…. The Article is consistent with the relevant documents and proceedings of the Title IX hearings and the Plaintiffs have failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that the privilege is inapplicable or has been abused in anyway….

The court, unsurprisingly, didn't find it necessary to discuss this argument that had been made by plaintiffs in an earlier motion for reconsideration (which the court earlier denied):

The other wrong message [of the court's earlier order granting judgment on the pleadings] is that people of color (all the plaintiffs are Latino) do not have a chance to get their day in this Honorable Court.

I saw nothing in the motion that offers any evidence at all that the decision stemmed from plaintiffs being "people of color."

For more on plaintiffs' arguments, you can see their Complaint and their Statement of Matters on Appeal. Benjamin Post and Mary Kathleen McGrath May of Post & Post LLC represent defendants.

Comments

[ReaderY]

The procedural posture of the opinion is interesting. The closing paragraph indicates it is a request by the trial court to the appelate court asking them to affirm the trial court’s judgment.

It seems an unusual legal system where trial judges get to submit what would appear to be de facto briefs to appelate courts explaining why the appelate court should affirm their judgment.

What’s behind this? Do trial judges in Pennsylvania’s system normally only issue judgments in these cases, and give written opinions supporting them only if their judgments are appealed, making their written opinions in effect justifications for affirming them? Is directly asking the appelate court to affirm ones judgment in the opinion itself normal for trial judges to do in these cases, or was it unusual for this judge to do this?

[Eugene Volokh]

Yes, that seems to be the Pennsylvania practice. It might stem partly from Pa. R. App. P. 1925, which is titled “Opinion in Support of Order,” and which requires judges to write opinions only once a notice of appeal is filed, PA. R. APP. P. 1925(a)(1)—at that point, it is especially tempting to view the opinion as addressing the appellate court.

On the other hand, the first opinion I could find that fits this pattern was from 1983, Appeal of Senft from the Decision of the Lower Merion Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 31 Pa. D. & C.3d 578 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1983), which happened eight years after Rule 1925 was adopted. Perhaps there is a different reason for the practice, or perhaps the Rule influenced the practice but only after some years of experience under it.

[not guilty]

That is peculiar and, I suspect, unique to Pennsylvania.

I wonder why counsel are listed as Plaintiff-Appellants and Defendant-Appellees, respectively.

[Longtobefree]

Just one more example why Title IX should be repealed.

[Krayt]

[not guilty]

What does Title IX have to do with whether a defamation plaintiff is required to plead and prove falsity, Longtobefree?

[Malika the Maiz]

So much for protect women’s sports (we knew that was never a thing with these people anyway)!

[ReaderY]

Also, even in a state with no SLAPP statute, one would think a lawsuit this patently frivolous over an issue of public concern would warrant sanctions under ordinary judicial rules. Otherwise rich plaintiffs could endlessly litigate journalists who cover them into bankruptcy. The fact that this case is being appealed suggests that Mr. Boye is doing everything he can to make this news story about him very, very expensive.

If his objective is to leverage his superior resources to employ courts and the legal process as a mechanism to bankrupt journalists attempting to cover him, he may well be able to achieve this despite losing on the merits at every step, just as Grant defeated Lee by draining resources despite technically losing nearly every battle.

[Krayt]

the Article is "vile," "drips with venomous derogatory false fact," and was written and published by "depraved liars … who claim to be journalists."

But enough about evening talking head shows!

[Rubbish!]

Playing the POC card used to mean you automatically got past summary judgment. But not in Trump's Philadelphia County. Sad.

[David Nieporent]

I would comment on what I perceive to be the quality of the plaintiff lawyer based upon the pleadings, but I'm afraid he'd sue me.